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The “split-brain” cases raise numerous difficult and fascinating questions: 
questions about our own self-knowledge, about the limits of introspection and 
phenomenology, about personal identity, and about the nature of consciousness and 
of mind. While the phenomenon is therefore of relevance to many areas of 
psychological inquiry, my dissertation explores the split-brain studies from the 
perspective of theoretical psychology.  
The dissertation uses the split-brain cases to develop criteria for individuatng 
mental tokens, and then applies those criteria back to the split-brain subjects 
themselves, ultimately arguing that split-brain subjects have two minds and two 
streams of consciousness apiece. Because the dissertation defends a particulr 
account of the constitutive conditions for mental tokens against competing 
functionalist accounts, it also ends up being about the proper form for functionalist 
theories of the mental to take.  
  
I argue throughout that psychofunctionalists who are realists about mental 
phenomena should accept that the constitutive conditions for mental tokens are partly 
neural. In particular I argue that, within an organism, multiple neural events that 
sustain mental phenomena causally independently of each other in some relevant 
sense cannot be identified with a unique mental token, regardless of how unified that 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1 A History of the “Split” Brain 
The corpus callosum is the main commissure connecting the two cerebral 
hemispheres in placental mammals, and the largest fiber tract in the human brain. 
Epileptic seizures start in one hemisphere or the other; in a single individual, seizure  
will tend to start in the same hemisphere (right or left) again and again. A grand mal 
seizure is one in which abnormal electrical activity spreads from the hemisphere of 
origin into the other hemisphere, affecting the whole brain. Subjects in the midst of a 
grand mal seizure will usually lose consciousness. Over time repeated seizure  may 
cause damage to neural tissue. And people with severe epilepsy may experience 
multiple seizures per day.  
A callosotomy is surgical procedure in which the corpus callosum is severed 
or sectioned. In a partial callosotomy, the anterior two thirds of the callosum are 
sectioned; in a full callosotomy, the entire corpus callosum as well as the 
hippocampal commissure is sectioned; a commissurotomy entails full callosotomy 
plus sectioning of the anterior commissure.1 Doctors began performing callosotomies 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise specified, I do not use the terms “callosotomy” and “split-brain surgery” to refer to
cases of only partial callosotomy. I use it to refe to those who have undergone both full callosotomy 
and commissurotomy. Patients operated on by Bogen and Vogel in the 1960’s (the “West Coast 
series”) underwent commissurotomy, and those operated on by Wilson in the 1970’s (the “East Coast 
series”) underwent full callosotomy (although in stages), but not commissurotomy (Churchland, 1986). 
The term “split-brain” is generally used to refer to both callosotomy and commissurotomy subjects, 
and again I use it in the same way. When potentially re evant to a claim, argument, or idea, I will 
distinguish between subjects with intact anterior commissures and subjects in whom the anterior 





in the 1940’s on subjects with debilitating, sometimes life-threatening epilepsy. The 
operation apparently proved quite successful at preventing seizures from spreading 
from one hemisphere to the other in a majority of subjects; not infrequently it 
eliminated or drastically reduced seizure occurrence altogether, for reasons not fully 
understood. A majority of those subjects who were not helped by a callosotomy were 
helped by a commissurotomy. Meanwhile clinical post-operative studies of these 
subjects turned up only few side effects after the initial recovery period, mostly 
involving motor coordination, and little if any significant cognitive decline as aresult 
of the surgery. More commonly, in fact, “split-brain” subjects experienced cognitive 
improvement on many measures, presumably the result of at least one hemisphere 
being spared further seizures. These preliminary results, suggesting that sec ioning 
the callosum—again, the largest fiber tract in the human brain—has remarkably few 
negative effects, led one neurophysiologist to joke, in 1949, “I have laughingly said 
that, so far as I can see. . . . the only demonstrable function of the corpus callosum, 
[is] to spread seizures from one side to the other” (McCulloch, 1949: 21).  
At about this same time Ronald Myers and Roger Sperry were studying the 
results of callosotomy on cats (e.g., Myers 1955; Myers and Sperry, 1953; Sperry, 
Stamm, and Miner, 1956). Callosotomy had of course been tested on animals prior to 
performing it on human subjects. Myers’ and Sperry’s experiments were novel 
because in addition to sectioning the callosum of each cat they also sectioned its optic
chiasm, limiting each hemisphere’s visual information to that it could receive from a 
single (ipsilateral) eye. A simple eye-patch could then easily be used to effectiv ly 




were fascinating. Among other things, the animals could be trained to make 
competing visual discriminations with each eye, with no evident interference 
effects—as if the two surgically separated cerebral hemispheres embodied 
functionally independent perceptual, learning, memory, and action-guidance system .  
Sperry and others formed two, non-competing hypotheses for why human 
callosotomized or “split-brain” subjects seemed relatively normal after such major 
brain surgery, despite the important cognitive role they now had strong reasons to 
believe the callosum should play in human (not just feline) subjects. First, in humans 
(and similarly in other mammals), what is seen with a single eye is sent to both 
hemispheres2, what is heard with a single ear is sent to both hemispheres, what is felt 
with either hand is likely to be seen as well, and so forth. In other words, there is a 
great deal of perceptual redundancy in day-to-day life: the coil that feels hot glows 
red; the cashier who puts the five-dollar bill and two dimes in your hand says, “Five 
twenty is your change,” and the cold rain is felt and seen and heard and even smelled. 
This perceptual redundancy ensures that, in both daily life and under most 
experimental situations, the two halves of a brain have access to similar information 
about the environment (and the body), whether they receive this information from 
each other or not.  
                                                
2 Each hemisphere receives visual input from the contralateral eye via the optic chiasm and from the 
ipsilateral eye via the nerve. Although the hemispheres receive different visual information from the 
optic tract, visual information is lateralized not by eye but by visual field. The l ft visual field (LVF) 
projects to the right hemisphere (RH), and the right visual field (RVF) projects to the l ft hemisphere 
(LH). In other words, each hemisphere receives, via the optic tract, information concerning the 
contralateral visual field, the RH about the left side of space, the LH about the right side of space. In 
“normal” subjects—subjects who have not undergone partial or full callosotomy—each hemisphere 





Myers’ and Sperry’s second hypothesis for why split-brain subjects seemed so 
unimpaired following sectioning of the callosum was that human split-brain subjects 
in particular were, albeit not necessarily consciously or deliberately, finding ways to 
compensate for the lack of cortical (callosal) communication between their two 
hemispheres, partly via various attention-directing and self-cuing mechanisms and 
behaviors.3 Some of this “cross-cuing” they couldn’t help but engage in; for example, 
as Sperry pointed out, “the two retinal half-fields of the eyeball move as one, and eye 
movements are conjugate, so that when on hemisphere directs the gaze to a given 
target the other hemisphere is automatically locked in at all times on the same target” 
(1974: 7-8).  
A second wave of split-brain studies—on human subjects—began in the 
sixties. On the basis of Myers’ and Sperry’s results, the new studies were designe  
first of all, to direct sensory information to only a single hemisphere at a time and, 
second of all, to prevent or limit behavior that would serve as a means of 
“communication” between the hemispheres. The results of these studies—the split-
brain experiments, which are still ongoing—are famous, and famously fascinating. 
Just like those of split-brain cats, the two hemispheres of human split-brain subject  
evidenced high degrees of functional independence.  
There are several ways to limit the path of incoming sensory information to 
one hemisphere only. The simplest is in the case of tactile stimulation of the hand, 
                                                
3 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term subject to refer to a single human animal. I mean this term 
to be neutral on all questions concerning personal identity; thus a subject may or may not be 
equivalent to a person, and subjects may or may not stand in a 1:1 relationship with subjects of 
experience. In other words, a split-brain subject may or may not be (or possess) multiple subjects of 
experience, and the reader should not mistake talk of subjects for talk of subjects of experience.  
This choice of terminology may be slightly confusing, but I prefer referring to split-brain subjects 
rather than to split-brain patients because many split-brain subjects are merely voluntary participants in 




which is transmitted largely contralaterally4; a split-brain subject’s left hemisphere 
receives tactile information primarily from her right hand, and vice versa. Smells are 
only slightly more difficult; smell is transmitted only ipsilaterally, so if the person’s 
right nostril is sealed, only his left hemisphere knows what’s cooking. More 
complicated set-ups are required to keep the left hemisphere ignorant of what the 
right hemisphere sees or hears, but this is still possible, and many of the most 
compelling split-brain experiments involved visual perception in particular.5 
As mentioned previously the experiments also had to be designed and 
monitored with the goal of preventing the hemispheres from communicating via 
behavior: subjects had to be prevented from peeking at the object they’d been asked 
to explore manually, from talking out loud to themselves as they worked, and even 
from gesturing with their hands. Stimuli presented to either hemisphere that yielded 
an emotional response (often creating a change in facial expression) often permitted 
more than one form of communication between the hemispheres, as we shall see later. 
During these carefully designed and controlled experiments, split-brain 
subjects were found to suffer some cognitive or perceptual deficits: put an object into 
                                                
 
4 In general, the more proximal the body part, the greater degree of bilateral projection; the more distal 
the body part—particularly the hands—the more lateralized the projection. Even for the trunk, 
however, there may be a greater degree of contralateral than ipsilateral sensory projection.  
Most split-brain experiments that stimulate the body stimulate the hands. Information about pain, 
temperature, and “passive touch” is carried via the spinothalamic pathways, which have both 
contralateral and ipsilateral projections. “Active touch” and proprioceptive information travels along 
the dorsal-column-lemniscal pathways, which have no ipsilateral projections. But because it’s active 
touch that’s required for object-recognition in the tactile domain—i.e. for recognizing an object on the 
basis of having felt, and, generally, manually explored the object—and because most of the studies of 
split-brain perception in the tactile domain tested object recognition, tactile perception can generally be 
treated as contralateral only.  
Sensory information from any point on the face and neck is available to both hemispheres.  
5 In a dichotic listening experiment, each hemisphere of a split-brain subject will perceive acoustic 
signals from the contralateral ear, only. Visual information is lateralized by presenting visual stimuli 
not at fixation point but left or right of that point. (Or two distinct stimuli may be presented 




a split-brain subject’s left hand, and, if this hand remains hidden from the subject’s 
view, he will tell you he has no idea what he’s holding. But the phenomenon didn’t 
look like anomia exactly; after all, if the same object was placed in the subject’s right 
hand, he could tell you immediately what it was. It was only at right hemisphere 
perceptual tasks, indeed, that the subjects appeared to suffer from some sort of 
linguistic impairment.  
 
If this were the end of the data, we would most likely conclude that the subject 
simply didn’t know what he was holding in his left hand, just as he said. We would 
conclude that for some reason, the tactile information wasn’t registering at the 
cortical level or entering conscious awareness, or even that the subject had some more 
profound sensory deficit on the left side of his body; that the subject’s left hemisphere 
escaped the surgery cognitively intact, while his right hemisphere for some reason did 
not. This would already be interesting, even though, in a way, we might have 
expected something like this. We might expect that people who undergo such major 
surgery should suffer some major cognitive impairment. We might not even be 
surprised to find that the two hemispheres are differently affected by the same 
surgical procedure. By the 1960’s it had already been known for a hundred years that 
in humans the two hemispheres are not functionally identical. It was believed even at 
the time for example (and is still popularly believed) that the right hemisphere excels 
at certain kinds of spatial reasoning, and visual tasks requiring holistic processing, 
like face-recognition. Best known and best studied is the linguistic asymmetry 




area (responsible for language production) and does most of the receptive language-
processing as well.6  
But what was fascinating about the split-brain subjects was not that they 
showed severe right hemisphere impairment, but that they seemed, in fact, less 
impaired than they claimed they were. Put a pipe in a split-brain subject’s left hand, 
and he will say, as long as he doesn’t have visual access to that hand, that he doesn’t 
feel anything and can’t even guess what he might be holding; then place that same 
hand in a box containing a pencil, a pipe, a paperweight, and an apple, ask him to 
select the object he was just holding, and he will select the pipe every time, all th  
while complaining bitterly that the task is pointless since he has no idea what he ws 
just holding, as he has already told you. The subject’s right hemisphere, in other 
words, seemed able to feel the pipe, to identify it, to remember it, and to re-identify it. 
But the subject—speaking through his left hemisphere, the hemisphere with spoken 
language, but which hadn’t received the necessary perceptual information from the 
left hand—would claim ignorance.  
Via their left hemispheres, however, split-brain subjects actually professed 
ignorance less often than they should have. In particular, when a subject engages i  
                                                
6 For the sake of brevity and simplicity, I generally speak as if the left hemisphere were the 
“dominant,” linguistic hemisphere in all adults. This is in fact not the case: a small but significant 
percentage of the population is right hemisphere dominant. (It is estimated that 10% of the population 
is left-handed—i.e., right hemisphere-dominant for motor tasks—and that up to 20% of the left-handed 
population is right hemisphere-dominant for language s well. This means that perhaps 2% of the 
general population is right hemisphere-dominant for language.)  
There is a very small group of subjects who have undergone either callosotomy or hemispherectomy 
(in which callosotomy is performed and then an entir  hemisphere removed or functionally 
incapacitated). The subset of this group which is right hemisphere-dominant for language must of 
course be many times smaller. That said, it seems pos ible that the rates of right hemisphere-
dominance are somewhat higher among those who developed epilepsy in early childhood than among 
the general population, because early left-hemisphere damage (for many subjects, seizures have a 
pattern of beginning in the same hemisphere, whether right or left, each time, and thus over time may 
particularly damage the tissue in that hemisphere), might lead the right hemisphere to take over 




some right hemisphere-initiated or right hemisphere-controlled behavior, instead of 
admitting (via his left hemisphere) that he has no idea why he’s just done X, a subject 
often immediately confabulates (via the same hemisphere) an explanation instead. For 
example: one subject, N.G., giggled when her left visual field (LVF), i.e. her right 
hemisphere (RH), was presented with a picture of a naked woman (Gazzaniga, 
LeDoux, 1978: 154). When asked why she was laughing, she seized upon the 
experimental equipment. “That’s a funny machine,” she said.  
Callosotomy results in what is sometimes called the “callosal disconnectio 
syndrome,” in which the two hemispheres of the brain can be shown to function, at 
least in experimental situations, independently of each other, with respect to a good
deal of their perceptual, cognitive, and motor processing. I will simply call this the 
split-brain phenomenon. Split-brain studies on humans raised a host of philosophical 
problems and questions that the studies on cats alone would not have raised, at least 
not as vexingly or as pressingly: does sectioning a person’s callosum create two 
streams of consciousness? Two subjects of experience? Two persons? Two minds? 
 
2 Minds, Brains, and Unity 
The split-brain studies done by neuropsychologists like Sperry sparked a flurry o  
philosophical papers, written both by philosophers and by various scientists writing in 
a philosophic mode, on the import of these studies for our understanding of personal 
identity, consciousness, free will, and the mind-brain relationship. In fact the history 
of responses to the split-brain studies is interesting in and of itself. The split-brain 




they almost immediately attracted. And when the philosopher Puccetti argued in 1981 
that both split-brain and “normal” subjects have two minds and are two persons 
apiece, his article, published in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, was followed by 
peer commentaries written by professionals in philosophy, in hospitals and medical 
centers, in academic psychology, in cognitive psychobiology laboratories, and in 
medical colleges.  
Despite having attracted the attention of a broad range of thinkers early on, the 
results of the split-brain studies continues to be grappled with by psychologists and 
by philosophers. Despite the fact that callosotomies are performed less frequently as 
the years pass and with the advent and improvement of less invasive treatments for 
severe epilepsy, those old (and those few new) split-brain subjects who are still 
around are heavily sought after by neuropsychologists, and new split-brain studiesare 
published each year.  
Attempts to characterize these subjects’ mental lives occupy almost every 
possible position. Eccles (1965) has argued that the right hemisphere isn’t associated 
with any mind. Gazzaniga has argued that the corpus callosum is the mechanism for 
mental and conscious unity in “normal” subjects, and that split-brain subjects 
therefore have two minds, but views the left-hemisphere mind with the distinctively 
human (Gazzaniga, 1983a, 2000). Marks (1981) has argued that the split-brain cases 
show that a single mind need not have unified consciousness; Sperry has argued that 
split-brain subjects have two intelligent minds (1990); Bogen has argued that the 




(1981, 1989) has argued split-brain subjects have two minds and are two persons—
just like everyone else with two cerebral hemispheres. 
The split-brain cases have retained their ability to surprise and amaze for forty 
years partly because the philosophical and scientific questions they raised then are 
still open now. This work is about individuating mental tokens from a theoretical or 
scientific perspective, and about the insights that the split-brain studies yield into such 
individuation. It focuses on two questions about mental tokens in split-brain subjects 
in particular: how many minds they have, and how many streams of consciousness 
they have.  
 
2.1 Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness 
It may be instructive to examine a work in the existing literature on individuating 
mental entities in split-brain subjects—Nagel’s (1979) “Brain bisection and the unity 
of consciousness”—for two reasons. First, Nagel provides a good introduction to 
many of the philosophical puzzles about the split-brain phenomenon, and neatly 
describes some of the difficulties associated with ascribing either mental duality (two 
minds apiece) or mental singularity (one mind apiece) to split-brain subjects. Nagel’s 
article also ends up being as much about individuation questions as it does about their 
answers: his own remarks on individuation issues raise further questions about the 
methodology of individuating mental tokens, and about what it is that we’re doing 
when we ask how many minds split-brain subjects have.  
Split-brain subjects can easily be cast as walking, talking embodiments of the 
so-called mind-body problem, which is no doubt one source of their enduring 




isn’t only, or perhaps even primarily, a tension between mental and physical 
properties, or mental and physical descriptions of phenomena—the tension referred to 
by the explanatory gap problem. Rather, for Nagel, the studies reveal, first, a tension 
between two different modes of reasoning and acquiring evidence about the structure 
of split-brain subjects’ cognition. For the subjects don’t feelas if they have two 
minds, or two streams of consciousness. And in their daily lives they don’t behave as 
if they do, either. But during carefully controlled experimental situations, they do act 
as if they have two minds, and have two streams of consciousness, and so forth. 
Moreover, the scientific explanation for their more “disunified” behavior seems to 
require that if they have two minds and two streams of consciousness at their most 
“disunified” moments, they have them always. So the split-brain subjects present us 
with two conflicting sets of evidence: that acquired from ordinary experience and 
interaction with the subjects, and that revealed via careful experiment.  
But for Nagel this points to a much deeper tension revealed by the split-brain 
phenomenon. The phenomenon reveals a tension between two different ways of 
understanding the human subject and the human mind, all human minds: scientific 
modes of understanding, and non-scientific, intuitive or folk psychological, subjective 
and inter-personal, modes of understanding. Nagel’s fundamental concern is whether 
there is any scientific plausibility to our concepts of mental, personal, and conscious 
unity, and whether a scientific understanding of ourselves as physical system i  
compatible with our pre-theoretic ways—personal, practical, moral, legal—of 
understanding ourselves and those around us, as mental beings, as persons, as the 




suspects not only that the two modes of understanding are incompatible—that they 
will yield incompatible claims about split-brain subjects, and everyone else—but that 
we won’t be able to let go of either one of them. He despairs, that is, that our 
understanding of ourselves as persons, as experiencing beings, and so forth, outside 
the context of a scientific psychology, will prove incompatible with a growing 
scientific understanding of ourselves as physical systems.  
This work is in part an attempt to meet at least some of the challenge posed by 
Nagel, the challenge of showing that there is a determinate answer to the question of 
how many minds and streams of consciousness split-brain subjects have. But that 
portion of the work is necessarily tentative, and it could turn out that the concept of a 
single unified stream of consciousness, for instance, really doesn’t apply neatly to 
split-brain subjects. I am less interested (at least in this dissertation) in integrating the 
theoretical and the pre-theoretic modes of understanding, though I do argue at some
points that the approach to individuating mental tokens I defend, and any answers it 
yields, will not be so incompatible with our ordinary ways of understanding split-
brain subjects. That is, I not only argue for what I think is the proper scientific 
understanding of split-brain subjects’ mental lives; I also suggest that the models of 
mind and of consciousness that I apply to split-brain subjects would not do the 
violence to our ordinary (practical, personal, social, moral) ways of understanding 
them that Nagel feared. Still, the most fundamental aim of the work is simply to 
defend a theoretical approach to individuating mental tokens in split-brain subjects 





2.2 Five Hypotheses 
Nagel formed five competing hypotheses as to how many minds and streams of 
consciousness a split-brain subject might have. The first was that such a subject has a 
single mind and a single stream of consciousness, both associated with only her left 
hemisphere, and the second was that, while the right hemisphere might be associated 
with some conscious experiences, those experiences don’t belong to a mind (and 
perhaps aren’t part of a genuine stream of consciousness, either). He rejected th se 
first two hypotheses quickly. The right hemisphere-controlled behavior that subjects 
engage in during the split-brain experiments reflects the presence of a right 
hemisphere mental system that perceives and remembers, that learns, that reasons, 
that experiences human emotions: love, humor, embarrassment. Right hemisphere 
mental processes, in other words, reveal the functional organization of a mind.7  
Whether the right hemisphere of a split-brain subject is associated with 
conscious mental phenomena is somewhat more controversial. It is unlikely that it 
would have the very same kinds of conscious experience as the left hemisphere; it is 
unlikely that a split-brain subject’s right hemisphere, for instance, would generate a 
stream of inner speech, given its non-dominance for the production of propositional 
                                                
7 It should be noted that there are significant individual differences between split-brain subjects, with 
respect to all the “normal” mental properties (of personality, intelligence, etc.), but also with respct to 
the abilities of their right hemispheres in particular. At one extreme, some split-brain subjects don’t 
appear to engage in any interesting right hemisphere-controlled behavior; at the other extreme some 
subjects even learn to speak out of the right hemisphere. (Subject P.S. began to provide verbal 
descriptions of LVF/RH phenomena about two years following callosotomy, for instance (Gazzaniga 
et al. 1979). See Gazzaniga, 1983a for one perspective on RH linguistic capacity in split-brain 
subjects.) Split-brain experiments are of course run using the subjects from whose right hemispheres 
interesting behavior can be elicited. These are the subjects I talk about in this dissertation. Of course 
there are individual differences among those subjects as well, and so some of my specific claims about 
the split-brain phenomenon will apply more to some of these subjects than to others (or perhaps only t 
some subjects and not to others), and perhaps nothing I say about the phenomenon will apply to all 
split-brain subjects. It is possible to make the philosophically important points, though, while 




language. And right hemisphere consciousness may be depressed in many subjects (as 
Sperry (1990) speculates), due to left hemisphere dominance and draining of 
attentional resources. But right hemisphere-controlled behaviors are sometimes 
intelligent and deliberate-looking to a degree that strongly suggests consciousness. 
On some theories of consciousness, the right hemisphere’s conscious status will be 
less certain than on others’. But Nagel, at least, concludes, and I accept in this work, 
that the right hemisphere of a split-brain subject is associated with somestream of 
consciousness, and some mind, or other. The question is: which one? 
Nagel’s next three hypotheses all closely concern individuating minds and 
streams of consciousness. Hypothesis three is that each hemisphere of a split-br in 
subject is associated with a unique mind and a unique stream of consciousness. I will 
call these the claims of mental and conscious duality. Hypothesis four is that the two 
hemispheres jointly constitute a single mind, and perhaps even generate a singl inter-
hemispheric stream of consciousness; at some moments, however, the hemispheres 
may each be associated with a distinct stream of consciousness, and, more generally, 
the contents of the two hemispheres are occasionally “dissociated.” These 
hemispheres still always jointly constitute a single mind, however. (Becaus this 
hypothesis attributes to split-brain subjects a single mind at all times, and because it 
can attribute to them a single stream of consciousness at most times, I refer to it as 
making mental and conscious singularity claims.) And hypothesis five is that split-




that sometimes—especially under experimental conditions—they have two minds and 
two streams of consciousness.8  
According to the last hypothesis, callosotomy alone is insufficient to divide a 
single mind into two. Rather it is only the combination of callosotomy and a 
calculated directing of sensory information to one hemisphere or another and steps 
taken to prevent split-brain subjects from engaging in cross-cuing that divides one 
mind into two. The similarity between split-brain subjects’ behavior, outside of 
experimental situations, and our behavior, owes to the fact that they like us have 
single minds during these times. The dissimilarity between split-brain subjects’ 
behavior, inside of experimental situations, and our behavior, owes to the fact that 
they unlike us have two minds during these times.  
This hypothesis most explicitly raises the issue of what sorts of processes and 
capacities are sufficient to yoke potentially distinct mental systems into a single mind.  
The primary strength of this hypothesis is its midway position between attributing 
either one mind always or two minds always to split-brain subjects—either of which
makes a commitment to one popular intuition (one stream of consciousness per mind 
and one mind per body, respectively) at the cost of abandoning another (one mind per 
body and one stream of consciousness per mind, respectively). And the last 
hypothesis seems to fit particularly neatly with all the data on the subjects—at least 
                                                
8 Note that in all these hypotheses it is the mental status of the right hemisphere that is considered in 
need of determination. The association of the left h misphere with a mind, and the identification of the
subject with at least one mind, is not questioned. It is clear why: pre-surgery, the subjects had minds, 
and post-surgery, they talk, act, and claim to feel much the same. Through their left hemispheres, the 
subjects speak of their families, their recovery from the operation, their moods. There must be a mind 
in that brain somewhere, in other words, and the left hemisphere can avow its own conscious 
mentality. The split-brain puzzle arises because one can’t easily see how the right hemisphere could be 
associated with no mind at all (because right hemisphere-controlled behavior seems mindful) or with 
the left hemisphere’s mind (due to the disconnection syndrome) or with its own mind (because then the 




on the surface of things. For it can attribute any odd behavior to duality, and any 
“normal” seeming behavior to singularity.  
The problem with the last hypothesis, as Nagel notes, is that it is “entirely ad 
hoc” (Nagel 1979: 161); it achieves a “neat fit” with the behavioral data, or a kind of 
superficial explanatory plausibility, at a steep cost. For now how should we explain 
the significant change in mental structure a split-brain subject undergoes between 
entering and exiting an experimental situation? The split-brain experimental paradigm 
is certainly artificial. . . But still mainly just involves controlling the kinds of 
perceptual input that the subjects (or each of their hemispheres) have access to. How 
could merely sealing a nostril create a second mind? As Nagel says, “So unusual an 
event as a mind’s popping in and out of existence would have to be explained by 
something more than its explanatory convenience” (ibid).  
Of course, this objection to this hypothesis isn’t decisive, either. We should 
have to know more about what kinds of things minds are to know how easily they can 
“pop” in and out of existence. And from one perspective, functionalist commitments 
may make the hypothesis look not entirely unreasonable. Perhaps whether two mental 
systems (understood broadly to include everything from whole minds to visual 
systems and so forth) jointly constitute a mind or instead each constitute a disinct 
mind is a matter of the kinds of communication (or lack thereof) between them. And 
perhaps the split-brain experimental paradigm alters that communication in a ma ner 
sufficient to break down that bi-hemispherically constituted mind into two minds. 




between mental systems that suffice to make them one mind, will be considered in 
Chapters Two and Three. 
Nagel is soon left with hypothesis three (according to which split-brain 
subjects have two minds and two streams of consciousness apiece) and hypothesis 
four (according to which they have a single mind apiece, with sometimes dissociated 
contents conscious contents). A version of this latter hypothesis has been defended 
both by Marks (1980) and by Tye (2003): according to these philosophers, a split-
brain subject always has a single mind, and usually has a single stream of 
consciousness, but occasionally—especially during the split-brain experiment, wh  
the conscious contents of the two hemispheres (most) diverge—such a subject has 
two streams of consciousness.  
Nagel believes that there are very strong conceptual connections between 
unity of mind, unity of consciousness—and unity of the person. In fact at some points 
in his 1979 he refers seemingly interchangeably to being a single person, having a 
single stream of consciousness, and having a single mind. It is in part because the 
conceptual connections between these things are so tight, for Nagel, that he cannot 
accept hypothesis four:  
 
Lack of interaction at the level of a preconscious control 
system would be comprehensible. But lack of interaction in the 
domain of visual experience and conscious intention threatens 
assumptions about the unity of consciousness which are basic 
to our understanding of another individual as a person. These 
assumptions are associated with our conception of ourselves, 
which to a considerable extent constrains our understanding of 





So for Nagel it doesn’t appear possible to discuss how many minds or streams 
of consciousness split-brain subjects have without fairly definitive implications for 
personal identity. And we have deep commitments in the realm of personal identity, 
such that how we think about persons, including ourselves, and presumably in all 
sorts of non-scientific contexts, effectively constrains what we can accept about their 
minds and consciousness. For Nagel, it seems, attributing two streams of 
consciousness to a single person (simultaneously) is impossible primarily because we 
can’t “conceive what it is like to be one of these people” (ibid; original emphasis). 
Thus a person is a subject of experience, for Nagel, also, and a single person cannot 
be associated with two subjects of experience or two streams of consciousness.  
As we shall see in Chapter Three, Marks (1981) and Tye (2003), in contrast, 
again both accept versions of this hypothesis. And I think they are right to suspect 
more flexibility in our concepts of mental and conscious singularity than Nagel 
allows.9 Certainly scientific concepts and ideas appear amenable to a great deal of 
revision in light of new evidence and revised understanding, before they must be 
scrapped entirely. Even our folk psychological concept of a single mind may not 
absolutely require that a single mind has a single stream of consciousness (at a time). 
For the folk appear comfortable ascribing various sorts of mental and conscious 
                                                
9 Although most philosophers writing about individuating minds and streams of consciousness in split-
brain subjects have contrasted the mental and conscious duality or disunity positions with the mental 
and conscious unity positions, I contrast mental and conscious duality w h mental and conscious 
singularity. I prefer this terminology because talk of unity and disunity connotes harmony and discord, 
respectively, while talk of singularity and duality has fewer of these connotations. Split-brain subjects 
don’t seem subject to a great degree of inter-hemispheric conflict; I argue that they may nonetheless 
have two minds and two streams of consciousness—perha s just two cooperative minds, or two 
streams of consciousness with consistent contents. So I will generally contrast singularity with duality 
(or, sometimes, with multiplicity). There may be times however at which I refer to unity and disunity, 
either because I am saying something about mental or conscious harmony or discord, or because I am 
describing someone else’s views, and those views aren’t easily or accurately translated into talk of 




duality and disunity to single individuals: consider stories like that of Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde, fear of demonic possession. . . . (Or even a recent mediocre film in the 
comedy genre, in which a mortal who becomes God for a week is shown with the 
prayers of however many billions of the world’s inhabitants—or at least the world’s 
believers—running through his head simultaneously). So maybe Nagel’s conceptual 
framework is unusually fixed; maybe neither the scientists nor the folk would have as 
so much trouble admitting of a single mind with two streams of consciousness.  
The hypothesis faces other challenges, however. Most fundamentally, a 
proponent would have to offer an account of the sort of mental architecture that 
would sustain one stream of consciousness most of the time and then two streams of 
consciousness occasionally—and one would have to offer an account of 
consciousness and conscious unity that permitted this also. But this objection 
obviously requires explanation and argumentation, and I won’t attempt to provide 
those things in this introductory chapter. But moreover, if we weren’t sure whether 
the right hemisphere of a split-brain subject is associated with any conscious 
phenomena at all, this wouldn’t dissolve any worries that we had about how many 
minds the subject has. The subjects appear, at least at some moments, to have not just 
two sets of conscious experiences, but two sets of memories and beliefs, two sets of 
goals and desires and intentions—even two sets of dispositions, likes and dislikes. 
They really do appear to have two minds, and not just two streams of consciousness. 
Or, as Nagel says:  
 
The experimental situation reveals a variety of dissociation or 




anatomical basis, but because such a wide range of functions is 
split into two noncommunicating branches. It is not as though 
two conflicting volitional centers shared a common perceptual 
and reasoning apparatus. The split is much deeper than that.  
   (Nagel, 1979: 159; original emphasis) 
 
This objection isn’t definitive, of course. But it at least threatens to undercut 
the main motivation behind hypothesis four, whose main advantage seems to be (this 
is certainly why Nagel proposes it) that it purports to obviate the need to attribute two 
minds to a split-brain subject. Except that it wouldn’t.  
What, then, of hypothesis three—that split-brain subjects have two minds and 
two streams of consciousness at all times? The mental and conscious duality claims 
for split-brain subjects face several objections, some more and some less compelling; 
since I defend these claims, objections to them will be dealt with in some detail lat r 
on in the work. The most obvious (and most often cited) objection to these positions 
concerns the generally “normal” and “integrated” character of the subjects’ behavior, 
at least outside of experimental situations. In fact, as Nagel notes, they behave in a 
fairly integrated fashion even when they are at their most “disunified,” i.e. during the 
split-brain experiment The challenge from split-brain subjects’ generally integrated 
behavior is significant, and I will deal with it, again, at several points throughout tis 
work, though especially in Chapters Three and Four. But for now, simply note that 
the challenge may not be quite as great as some believe. Nagel, for instance, i 
ultimately unwilling to accept his third hypothesis in part because of the “highly 
integrated character of the subjects’ relations to the world in ordinary circumstances” 
(Nagel, 1979; 159). But surely this is explained in significant part, at least, by the fact 




same time at every time. By achieving a fit with the world, they would achieve som
degree of fit with each other—even without interacting with each other in any direct 
world. He also says that it seems “strange to suggest that we are not in a position t  
ascribe all those experiences to the same person, just because of some peculiarities 
about how the integration is achieved. The people who know these subjects find it 
natural to relate to them as single individuals” (ibid). But again, this first o all just 
assumes that a person cannot possess more than one mind. Second, how else ould 
“the people who know these subjects find it natural to relate to them,” than as single 
individuals? Of course is natural to relate to the walking, talking, familiar body of a 
loved one as if he were a single person with a single mind—particularly when he 
seems, to you, unchanged by the operation (assuming you aren’t performing 
experiments on him yourself), before which you also related to him as a single person 
with a single mind. Though Nagel is right that it would indeed feel strange, and 
probably uncomfortable, to ascribe to a single person two minds—or to claim that a 
single body were home to two persons (if we want to keep a one-to-one relationship 
between persons and minds)—this strangeness and even our discomfort do not mean 
that such an ascription wouldn’t in fact be the most correct. For whatever it matters, 
making this ascription could in time come to feel quite natural, if it did in fact fit well 
with the data, and if this fit is important to our concepts of mind and person.  
Nagel also makes a sort of regress objection to the duality position: if we 
allow that at least some human beings have two minds, why not allow that they have 
four or six or seven? Perhaps there is one mind associated with the visual cortex, one 




that a human being can have two minds, there will be no non-arbitrary way of 
limiting him to just two, either because each hemisphere may be itself be composed 
of many somewhat functionally distinct systems, or, perhaps, because he thinks 
distinct centers of consciousness might supervene on individual sensory processing 
areas. I don’t think most people who advocate a mental duality in split-brain subject 
are concerned about this though. For many of those who defend the mental duality 
model of split-brain subjects may take minds to be things that have, for example, 
memories and motor systems and perceptual systems; Bogen for instance writes that, 
“If the ‘mind’ includes (at least) the abilities to perceive, discriminate, compare with 
previously stored information, consider alternative actions, choose among them, and 
then to act, it is doubtful that any smaller subdivision of a mammalian brain than one 
hemisphere can support a mind” (1990: 216). A simple distinction between minds and 
modules can probably be drawn firmly just where Nagel fears that it can’t. 
Nagel’s final objection to the hypotheses of mental and conscious duality in 
split-brain subjects takes the form of a reductio. If the mental duality claim offers the 
right way to think about split-brain subjects, he asks, then might it not offer the right 
way to think about all of us? If the fact that split-brain subjects seem like one-minded 
people every day is best explained not by saying they do in fact have single minds but 
by referring to perceptual redundancy, shared embodiment, indirect or virtual 
communication between the hemispheres, then perhaps the fact that we all seem like 
one-minded people is best explained not by saying that we have single minds but by 




or virtual communication between the hemispheres. In our case, the communication is 
perfect; in split-brain subjects, the communication is simply less perfect.  
 
But it is clear that this line of argument will get us nowhere. 
For if the idea of a single mind applies to anyone it applies to 
ordinary individuals with intact brains, and if it does not apply 
to them it ought to be scrapped, in which case there is no point 
in asking whether those with split brains have one mind or two. 
     (Nagel 1979: 162) 
 
But, first of all, even if accepting a mental duality claim for split-brain 
subjects somehow required accepting such a claim regarding “normal” subject ’ 
mental lives, also, this need not, contra Nagel, constitute a reductio of the duality 
model. Why couldn’t “normal” subjects turn out to have two minds? If the empirical 
evidence and best theoretical models suggested that almost all of us do have two 
minds—hemispherectomized subjects constituting an exception—the concept of a 
single mind would hardly turn out to be useless or meaningless. The concept would 
still usefully pick out what “normal” subjects have two of—and what 
hemispherectomy subjects have one of. It is probably true that our concept of a single 
mind developed with average human beings in mind as exemplars. But this does not 
yet show that the meaning of the concept is exhausted by these exemplars. And the
concept could survive the loss of them as exemplars.  
Moreover, the adequacy of a mental duality model for split-brain subjects 
would not entail the adequacy of such a model for “normal” subjects. Again, it could
turn out that both “normal” and split-brain subjects have two minds apiece. It could 
also turn out that the former have one mind apiece and that only the latter have two 




that the corpus callosum does when it is present and functioning normally, and on 
what kinds of integration typify the inner workings of a single mind.  
Still, Nagel, at least, was unable or unwilling to accept a mental duality claim
for split-brain subjects, even if he doesn’t reject it in the disdainful language he 
reserves for some of the other hypotheses. He in fact ended his paper not by 
answering the “how many minds?” question but by finally considering the question 
itself. What kind of a question is it; from what standpoint would it be answerable? 
Nagel confesses that he sees no compelling reason to conclude that split-brain 
subjects have either one mind or two—or even that we ourselves have either one 
mind or two. He suggests that this is because our very idea of mind:  
may resist the sort of coordination with an understanding of humans 
as physical systems, that would be necessary to yield anything 
describable as an understanding of the physical basis of mind.  
      (Nagel 1979: 147) 
 
. . . and that our concept of mind will turn out to be “recalcitrant to integration with. . 
. . data [from neuroscience, etc.].” Thus, he says, either our “idea of a single person 
will come to seem quaint some day” or else—and this is perhaps worse—“we shall be 
unable to abandon the idea no matter what” scientists discover about the human 
behavior, psychology, and the brain. Nagel himself seems to believe that this second 
prediction is more likely to be born out by time (1979: 164).  
 
3 Conclusion 
As some of the quotes above illustrate, questions about how many streams of 
consciousness split-brain subjects have and about how many minds they have seem to 




dissertation isn’t about personal identity, however; I focus on the individuation of 
minds and streams of consciousness and mental states instead. But my concerns in 
this work do overlap with Nagel’s, to a significant degree, for this dissertation 
attempts to sort out a few matters essential to developing an understanding of human 
minds as physical systems. Unlike Nagel’s “Brain bisection and the unity of 
consciousness,” however, this dissertation focuses on the individuation of mental 
tokens from a theoretical perspective—from the standpoint, that is, of scientifi 
psychology. 
Chapter Two lays out some of the background necessary to individuating 
minds in split-brain subjects. It includes discussions on identity and individuation, a 
modest characterization of what minds are, and an attempt at sketching a distinction 
between what I call inter-mind and intra-mind interactions. In Chapter Three I defend 
the mental duality model for split-brain subjects, arguing that neuroanatomicl 
evidence supports such a model, and criticizing some competing views on the role of 
neural—and behavioral—facts in individuating mental entities. Chapter Four then 
lays out some of the background necessary to individuating streams of consciousness, 
and describes some of the resources that the conscious duality model has to explain 
the generally integrated-seeming nature of split-brain subjects’ behavior. Chapter 
Five defends the conscious duality model for split-brain subjects from some 
alternative models. Finally in Chapter Six I offer a defense of (moderate) mind-brain 
supervenience. This chapter offers the final word on why neural facts constitute a 
special kind of evidence for the individuation of mental entities; they occupy a place 




neural evidence (while in no way neglecting behavioral evidence) in individuating 
mental entities does not amount to some kind of neglect of or lack of appreciation for 
the mental (functional). In fact, quite the reverse is true. Realism about the mental 
requires making various forms of commitments to the neural entities and events that 








Chapter 2: On Individuating Minds and Other Mental Entities 
 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will begin to talk about individuating mental tokens, and in 
particular, individuating minds. Some of the many issues that arise in the course of 
this venture are: What are minds? Do minds (as opposed to mental states) really 
exist? Are neural facts relevant to individuating minds—or should we look at 
psychological facts only? Is there a principled distinction between the sorts of 
interactions that can occur between minds—and the sorts of interactions that can 
occur only within a mind? And what is the relationship between the identity questions 
raised here and other identity puzzles in philosophy?  
I do not yet, in this chapter, draw any conclusions about how many minds a 
split-brain subject has. This will wait for later chapters. This chapter provides the 
background necessary to doing that later work. Its main goals are to say something 
about what a mind is, what we’re doing when we try to individuate minds, and how 
we should go about doing that.  
In the next section I talk about the kinds of identity or individuation problems 
I will be concerned with in this work, and roughly locate them with respect to some 
other identity and individuation problems in the existing philosophical literature. I 
also talk a bit about the ntities whose individuation concerns me in this work, and 
about the kinds of things I think that they are.  
In that same section I also briefly discuss the nature of the “how many 




question according to which it is merely a verbal one. According to this position, it is 
not only indeterminate how many minds a split-brain subject has, but also there aren’t 
actually minds, in any interesting sense: there are mental states, and there are real and 
interesting questions about mental states, and so forth, but none about minds qua 
minds. I argue that at the very least the “how many minds?” question, which is a 
question about how to individuate minds (in general and in the split-brain subject), is 
not merely a verbal issue, but rather is interesting from the perspective of a scientific 
psychology, and no doubt from other perspectives as well.  
Section Three is about the criteria for a system’s constituting (one or more)
minds. I sketch a very modest set of criteria for mindhood, setting aside a range of 
controversial questions about the details of the mental architecture that characerizes a 
mind. In this section I also introduce a distinction between purely functional and 
partly neural accounts of mindhood and criteria for individuating minds. For knowing 
the criteria that some systems must meet in order to qualify as at least one mind, does 
not yet tell you how many minds a system is or some systems are. One also ed  to 
know the criteria of individuation for systems of that kind.  
In the split-brain case, one wants to know whether the two hemispheres are 
associated with one and the same or with two distinct mental systems or minds. The 
answer to that question depends upon facts about the ways in which and the extent to 
which the hemispheres interact with each other—for they do interact with each other, 
in all sorts of ways; the question is whether those interactions are of an “inter-mi d” 
or an “intra-mind” sort. A purely functional approach to individuating minds would 




approach would also look at facts about physical interaction. Either sort of approach, 
however, will need to make some kind of distinction between intra-mind and inter-
mind interactions, since causal interactions between mental states occur both within 
and between minds. In Section Four, I propose one way of beginning to draw this 
distinction. 
 
2 On Mental Entities 
Most work in psychology probably asks causal rather than constitutive questions 
about, and seeks to develop causal rather than constitutive accounts of, mental 
phenomena. But constitutive rather than causal analyses of psychological phenomena 
are common in philosophy of mind, and they are the primary focus of this work, 
though obviously I rely on causal claims and analyses as well. 
Within the philosophy of mind, meanwhile, most work providing constitutive 
analyses of psychological phenomena is probably work on characterizing mental 
types. But this dissertation is most directly concerned, instead, with ind viduating 
mental tokens: mental states, streams of consciousness, and minds. It does offer some 
characterizations of mental states, streams of consciousness, and minds, too, of 
course, since determining a thing’s token identity depends upon the type of thing that 
it is. So in this chapter, for instance, I offer a (very minimal) characteriza ion of what 
minds are; in Chapter Four, meanwhile, I will turn to the nature of a stream of 
consciousness.  
Because there is a lot of ground to cover, and because the major questions 




questions are somewhat different from those many philosophers have taken, I think it 
will be helpful to make some more introductory remarks and distinctions before really 
beginning. In the remainder of this section, then, I lay out some broad positions and 
assumptions that form the necessary background for the project of this dissertation.  
Section 2.1 explains the major theoretical orientation or perspective I take in 
this work. I then say just a little about what I take mental tokens in general and minds 
in particular to be. These will just be v ry rough, quick characterizations, and I won’t 
at that point provide any arguments for them or for the psychological accounts they 
presuppose. Much of this will instead be offered, gradually, over the course of the 
next several chapters (though of course like everyone else, I have to start with some 
fundamental assumptions, as well). In Section 2.2 I locate individuation questions 
about minds with respect to other sorts of identity and individuation problems. And in 
Section 2.3 I motivate the debate about how many minds split-brain subjects have, 
arguing that the “how many minds?” question for those subjects has both empirical 
and interesting conceptual aspects. These remaining introductory sections pave the 
way for the characterization of minds and the criteria for individuating minds that are 
developed in the rest of the chapter.  
 
2.1 Types, Tokens, States, and Systems 
To begin with, this dissertation is psychofunctionalist in its orientation. 
Psychofunctionalism is a branch of functionalism that says that our best 
understanding of the constitutive conditions for various mental phenomena will come 
from a developed scientific psychology. In other words, the story providing the best 




the best answer to questions like, “What is it to be a thought?” and “What is a mind?” 
will come from a developed psychological theory.10 Of course, scientific psychology 
is, at this point, a work in progress, and not a complete and well-accepted theory or 
collection of theories. This admittedly gives the claims defended in this work a 
definite tentativeness, but many of the claims I defend deal with basics and broad 
pictures and thus are hopefully not entirely premature.  
Although I believe that mental states are tokens of particular functionally 
defined types, these mental types needn’t be characterized entirely functionally, 
either. Some of the constitutive conditions for mental phenomena could turn out to be 
neural, or other physical conditions, as well. Functionalism involves abstracting away 
from some aspects of the physical, of course. But it is far too soon to say that a 
developed psychological theory will abstract away from the physical (particul ly the 
neural) altogether. So a functionalist theory of the constitutive conditions for mental 
phenomena needn’t be given in e tirely functional terms; it might refer to neural 
phenomena also, or to other physical (bodily or environmental) phenomena. (See on 
this issue Rey’s discussion of “anchored” functionalism, 1997, pp. 191-194.)  
I refer to mental states, mental events, and mental representations, 
interchangeably, to refer to things like Alena’s desire for a sandwich, or thefear 
Devon experiences when the phlebotomist gets out the needle. The term “mental 
token” will be used in a broader way, sometimes to refer to a particular belief or 
emotion, for instance, but sometimes to refer to a (particular) stream of 
consciousness, or a (particular) visual system, or a (particular) mind. The term 
                                                
10 Ramsification is a (logical) technique for defining theoretical terms, according to which the meaning 
of a theoretical term is entirely determined by the rol  that term plays within a theory. (The technique 




“mental token” will be used, that is, to refer to any thing that is mental or that 
possesses mental properties. (Context should make clear whether the mental toke 
being referred to is a particular mental event or representation, or some “larger” 
mental token, such as a whole mind.)  
There are different types of mental tokens, such as events of experiencing, of 
perceiving, of guessing, of remembering, of doubting, of believing, and so forth. Note 
that one or more of these psychological types just listed could turn out not to exist, 
however, since the best account of the constitutive conditions for mental entities will 
be given by a psychological theory or by theories that we don’t yet possess, and in 
which events like guessing could turn out to play no part. But this work is not really 
about mental types: it is really about what makes a particular mental token that 
particular mental token, as opposed to a different token of the sam  type, for instance. 
I do nonetheless require some basic assumptions about mental types generally, such 
as that mental states are intentional—they have content—and that to be in a mental 
state is to stand in a certain functional relationship to a representational content. 
(Something—a subject, or a system—may stand in different functional relationships 
to the same representational content, and something may also stand in the same 
functional relationship to different (i.e. to multiple) representational contents.) But 
while the dissertation assumes a functionalist/representationalist account of mental 
states generally, and therefore assumes that the identity of any mental state is always 
in part a matter of its functional role, nothing said here precludes the possibility that 
some mental states additionally possess qualia, or non-mental, non-representational 




Finally, I take it that physicalism is true, and that every mental token has 
physical properties. This in and of itself will not be argued for. For most of this 
dissertation, however, I additionally assume that the mental tokens are neural tokens, 
but in Chapter Six this claim will be argued for explicitly. This work is also (as is 
probably clear by now) written from the standpoint of realism, rather than 
instrumentalism, about mental phenomena and psychological explanation. I argue in 
Chapter Three that the joint commitment to realism and to physicalism has 
implications for individuating mental tokens in split-brain subjects and in general.  
Like a desire or an emotion, a mind is a kind of mental token—but it is a 
different kind of mental token. If mental states are states of a mental system, a mind is 
such a mental system. So while some might identify minds with streams of 
consciousness, for instance, and some with agents, I accept what I think is the most 
useful view of minds—and the one that does the most justice to current psychological 
theorizing on minds—which is that a mind is a ystem: a collection of parts organized 
so as to function as a whole, and as to yield operations that are not just the sum of any 
of the operations of its parts. (Of course, an agent can also be understood as a kind of 
system.) So the system must engage in operations or behaviors of characteristic sorts, 
and it must have an organization or architecture of a certain sort also: a mind it is 
composed of various subsystems interacting with each other in particular ways. 
Because these subsystems also generate and manipulate mental tokens, and have their 
own internal organization, they are also mental systems (or, as I will tend to call them 
to avoid confusion, mental subsystems). A mind, though, is a special kind of mental 




whatever those things turn out to be, and again it does this by virtue of possessing a 
certain architecture, whatever that architecture turns out to be. I say more about these 
matters in Section 3.  
Now that I have laid out, very broadly, the kind of perspective on the mental 
that is taken in this work, let me also make some basic remarks about identity and 
individuation, and roughly locate the identity and individuation questions that are the 
focus of this work with respect to other sorts of identity and individuation problems.  
 
2.2 Identity and Individuation 
As I have said, this dissertation’s primary focus is the individuation of mental entities. 
There is, of course, a great philosophical literature on identity and individuation. 
Much of this literature concerns the identity of persons, a subject not specifically 
addressed in this work. That said, certain concepts that figure in personal identity 
debates, including those of mind, stream of consciousness, subject of experience, a d 
conscious unity, figure very significantly in this dissertation as well.  
A great deal of the philosophical literature on identity also concerns identity 
over time. This literature’s fundamental question is: given an X at t1 and a Y at t2, 
what makes it the case that X (where X is the Self, or the Ship of Theseus, or the 
Vienna Circle) = Y? And indeed the split-brain phenomenon does obviously pose 
some interesting problems for accounts of diachronic identity, perhaps diachronic 
personal identity in particular. Those tempted to identify the split-brain subject with 
two persons, for instance, would have to say either that the subject was (constituted 
by or associated with) two persons even before the surgery, or else say that the




exist. . . . Or else say that the subject was a single person prior to the surgery, and that 
that person continues to exist as one of the persons currently associated with the 
subject.  
But it is synchronic, and not diachronic, identity that is the focus of this work. 
Granted, because a mind is a mind in virtue of its activities and functional 
organization, rather than because of some static property, I cannot separate the 
synchronic from the diachronic entirely; I cannot, and do not, confine myself to 
speaking of instantaneous mental properties in individuating minds. But it is 
nonetheless the case that much of the philosophical literature on identity concerns 
diachronic identity most directly, and that diachronic and synchronic identity 
questions involve a related and overlapping but still distinguishable set of concerns. 
Diachronic identity puzzles typically arise because of the problem of change: 
what sorts of changes can a thing undergo and still remain the same thing? It is 
intuitively easy to see the difficulty of answering such questions. But one might think 
that synchronic identity or individuation problems would be easy to resolve—indeed, 
perhaps that they might not even arise. It is easy to know whether some stuff is one 
individual thing or several things, isn’t it? And easy to tell whether, at any one 
moment, something is one thing not another (or part of another) thing of the same 
sort? (I don’t mean to put the problem entirely epistemologically, since ultimately we 
are interested in what makes something an individual.)  
I think that it is easy to think that individuation is easy because when we think 
of individual things, the first things we tend to think of are familiar physical objects: 




individuate such objects. At any given moment, even if one is not certain what has 
become of the Ship of Theseus, and whether the ship one is sailing on is that ship, it 
is at least clear that one is standing on oneship and not two. One might think that this 
clarity, this ease of synchronic individuation, generalizes. No matter what I think 
shall become of me tomorrow (or after my brain transplant, or after my 
teletransportation, or after my death), it is clear, at least, that I am a single person, 
with a single mind, now—isn’t it?  
But it isn’t. Familiar physical objects are one thing, and other sorts of things 
are something else. Indeed, what is puzzling and difficult about some diachronic 
identity problems may be explained at least in part by questions about the synchronic 
individuation of the entities at issue.11 A ship might be easy to at least individuate (at 
a time). The Vienna Circle is less so; if one knew the principle of individuation for 
such a group (if a group is what it was), then one might know—or at least stand a 
better chance of knowing—under which counterfactuals the Vienna Circle continued, 
or ceased, to exist.  
Minds are more complex than ships. Additional problems arise for the 
individuation of minds that don’t arise for the individuation of molecules, sporks, 
planets, and other physical objects. This is because, as I argue in this work, minds are 
systems. Because a system is a collection of parts with a certain, possibly quite 
                                                
11 Indeed, Nozick (1981) argues that what he calls “entification” (following Quine, 1964: 1) and what I 
call individuation “takes place in one fell swoop” (85); temporal considerations enter into even 
synchronic individuation, since causal connectedness is an element of synchronic unity or 
individuation. This is certainly true to some extent of individuating minds (and probably true of 
individuating mental systems generally) and the treatment of individuating minds and other mental 





complex, functional, active organization, the borders and boundaries of systems are 
less clear than the borders and boundaries of, for example, sporks.  
So there are no doubt individuation questions about lots of systems: is the 
U.S. fighting a single war against terror, on multiple fronts, or are we currently 
fighting multiple wars? What are the boundaries of an ecosystem, and how big or 
inclusive can one be? What makes something one storm rather than two? One root 
system or two? One legal system or two?  
It may be difficult or even impossible to give precise criteria of identity or 
individuation for all sorts of entities, and the best criteria may be contextual, and 
sensitive to a wide range of (not necessarily obvious) considerations and interests. 
Thus I do not attempt, in this work, to give criteria for the individuation of minds that 
will work in all context. (Much less do I try to given general criteria for the 
individuation of all complex systems!) Instead I merely try to work out how to 
individuate minds within one particular group of subjects. And even there, I abstract 
and idealize to some extent; there are significant individual differences among “split-
brain” subjects, in part because there is not a single kind of “split-brain surgery.” 
In light of the no doubt great difficulty of giving individuating criteria for all 
sorts of complex systems, we should consider Rey’s (1997) “Fairness Maxim” for 
philosophy of mind:  
DON’T BURDEN THE MIND WITH EVERYONE ELSE’S 
PROBLEMS. Always ask whether a problem is peculiar to the 
mind, or whether the issue could equally well be raised in other 
less problematic areas. If it can be, settle it for those areas fi st, 
and then assess the philosophy of mind. 





The problems of identity and individuation raised in this work are, on the one 
hand, hardly unique, insofar as there will probably be some easy cases and numerous 
hard cases for the individuation of any sort of complex system. Moreover, some of 
the features that make something a hard case for individuating minds may make 
something a hard case for individuating other complex systems as well. One featur
which makes for a hard case in the instance of individuating minds, for example, is 
shared states: i.e., some (mental) states of one putatively distinct system appear also 
to be states of another putatively distinct system. But two putatively distinct 
departments could share some members, or some administrative offices, and this 
could complicate those departments’ individuation as well. More importantly, how to 
individuate different sorts of systems will hinge upon the same sorts of questions at a 
very abstract level. In particular, as I argue in this work, questions about individuating 
minds, and no doubt about individuating many other sorts of complex systems, are 
largely questions about functional and causal independence and interaction.  
On the other hand, knowing how to individuate one sort of system, that is—
for instance a root system—won’t necessarily tell you how to individuate another sort 
of system—a legal system. To say that two sets of parts constitute distinct systems if 
those sets operate independently of each other in some requisite way and/or to some 
requisite degree, or that they are part of a single system if they interact in some 
requisite way and/or to some requisite degree, is to offer no more than a very abstract 
schema for individuation. For what counts as independence or interaction of the 




Consider, for illustration, some of the individuation problems that arise for 
living organisms. The philosopher of biology Wilson writes:  
The theories of individuation generated by considering only a 
narrow and conventional range of examples prove inadequate 
when applied to real living things whose normal modes of 
existence include complex metamorphoses, regeneration of lost 
parts, splitting apart and fusing together. A clonal population of 
the fungus Armillaria bulbosa occupies at least fifteen 
hectacres in a Michigan forest. Some mycologists have called it 
the largest individual living thing on earth. What are the 
grounds for this claim? Some species of rhizocephalans, a 
group of parasitic barnacles, have several distinct 
developmental phases. Is each phase a separate individual or do 
they collectively compose an individual? Strawberries can 
reproduce through sexual or clonal reproduction. Is each clone 
an individual or does the entire set of clones compose an 
individual? Or are both individuals? Questions like these 
cannot be answered satisfactorily by a theory that treats the 
characteristics of a higher animal as the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of individuality. In fact, cases like these 
raise the question of whether there a necessary and sufficient 
conditions for individuality simpliciter.  
   (Wilson, 1999: 2, emphasis added) 
 
Rather, a thing’s individuality may be a matter of the type of thing that it is, 
and in some cases may be best determinable from within a science of that sort of 
thing. Wilson explains for instance that although the “true jellyfish” (a scyphozoan 
jellyfish) and the colonial siphonophore resemble each other physically, and have 
“essentially the same functional structure” (1999: 7). But from a biological 
perspective other things may matter also: developmental history, evolutionary origin, 
mode of reproduction, and so forth. How organisms such as colonial jellyfish are 
individuated may depend upon—or for that matter influence—the outcome of debate 
between the “gene’s eye view” and the “organism’s eye view” of evolution (Sterelny 




important to determine exactly what qualifies as the life cycle of a single organism, 
and may determine this on the basis of factors which the “gene’s eye view” theoris  
finds irrelevant. Advocates of the “gene’s eye view” of evolution meanwhile take 
cases like these, in which it is difficult to determine what constitutes an individual 
organism, precisely as reasons for rejecting a view of evolution according to which 
phenotypic traits of whole organisms are the units of natural selection.  
In other words, although individuation problems are hardly unique to 
psychology, there needn’t be a general problem of individuation admitting of a 
general solution. Rather, how to individuate organisms and the life-cycles of 
organisms may be an issue best resolved by a science of living organisms. That i  
why the work of this dissertation really is unique to philosophy of mind. Limited 
analogies between minds and corporations, between the two “disconnected” 
hemispheres and the circulatory systems of conjoined twins, or whatever, may be of 
some use. But ultimately how many minds split-brain subjects have really is a 
problem for psychology, and for philosophers of psychology, in particular. This 
dissertation explores the individuation of mental entities—in split-brain subjects in 
particular—from a scientific, theoretical perspective: that of cognitive psychology. 
The analogy to individuation problems in biology above, however, should not 
be taken to imply that all individuation problems are scientific problems, problems 
best answered from a theoretical, scientific perspective. Some individuation issues 
may be proper to the legal domain, some to the philosophy of art. And arguably there 
are some individuation problems regarding split-brain subjects that are not best 




psychology. In particular I believe that questions about the individuation of persons 
(in split-brain subjects and in general) are not proper to the domain of scientifi  
psychology in the way that questions about the individuation of minds are. Of course 
many findings from scientific psychology may be relevant to the individuation of 
persons. But the concept of a person appears to be one with inextricably normative or 
as Locke (1690) once said “forensic” aspects, and of profound import to many non-
scientific domains of human activity and understanding.  
Of course, minds and persons are conceptually linked in various ways, and 
indeed questions about individuating minds in split-brain subjects have often been 
raised simultaneously with questions about personhood in split-brain subjects. In fact 
much of the philosophical and even neuropsychological literature on split-brain 
subjects has treated questions about individuating minds (and streams of 
consciousness) and questions about individuating persons interchangeably. That how 
many minds split-brain subjects have and how many persons they are have so often 
been treated as interchangeable questions is entirely understandable, as the concepts 
mind and person are again obviously deeply related. They are nonetheless distinct 
concepts; most obviously, a creature can have a mind without being a person.  
There is therefore the potential for becoming badly confused by many of the 
claims that are defended in this work, if the distinction between minds and persons is 
ignored or forgotten. For this work is about the individuation of entities that arguably 
do fall within the proper province of scientific psychology: it is about minds, mental 
states, streams of consciousness, and so forth—but not about persons. I do have my 




and in Chapter Three I argue that the mental duality or “two minds” model for split-
brain subjects may be compatible with multiple ways of understanding personhood in 
split-brain subjects. But the nature and identity of persons are excluded from this 
dissertation to the extent possible, because the concept of a person does not seem to 
be proper to scientific psychology. (Again, even if findings from scientific 
psychology contribute to our understanding of persons.) And I’ve tried to keep this 
work within theoretical psychology, not because non-scientific perspectives are less 
interesting, but simply to see what can be said within this one, and to provide a kind 
of unity to dissertation. 
Finally I want to say something about the relationship between the 
classification, or type-identifying, and the individuation, or token-identifying, of 
entities. Intuitively these activities can be distinguished: we can ask for instance 
whether something is an artifact or a natural object, while still knowing that w tever 
it is, it is an individual; or, talking about what are uncontroversially meteorological 
phenomena of a certain sort, we can ask whether we’re looking at one cold front or 
two. But as the foregoing discussion implied, asking either one of these questions 
requires some sense of both classification and individuality. For in both cases, we 
pick out some portion of the world from the rest of it to ask about, and in both cases, 
we pick that portion to ask about on the basis of features that contribute to making it 
the type of thing that it is. This is in part to say again that the criteria for individuating 
a thing depends upon the kind of thing that it is. 
Still, classification and individuation can be distinguished in part 




they take as unknown. These correspond to two ways of approaching the “how many 
minds?” question for split-brain subjects, for example. One approach takes as given 
the token-identity of a physical system qua physical system, and asks questions about 
its mental identity; a second approach takes as given the criteria of individuation for a 
mind, and then asks what physical stuff meets those criteria: 
 
Approach one: Given a split-brain subject’s right hemisphere (i.e. 
single cerebral hemisphere), and/or right hemisphere plus subcortical 
structures and so forth (but minus the subject’s left hemisphere), is that 
single thing a mind? (Or is it not a mind in and of itself—is it just part 
of a mind?) 
 
Approach two: Given the criteria for being an individual mind, what 
meets those criteria in a split-brain subject? The whole organism? The 
organism’s nervous system? The organism’s left hemisphere? Left 
hemisphere and right hemisphere, individually? Left hemisphere plus 
subcortical structures? Left hemisphere plus right arm?  
 
Either approach should get you to the same answer.12 The former approach 
just puts the issue in terms of classification or type-identity of physical tokens, and 
the latter puts it in terms of individuation, or the entokening of mental types. But each 
approach presupposes an answer to the other approach’s problems. They simply differ 
in what they take as given versus what they do not take as given. The former 
approach presupposes the individuality of a physical thing qua physical thing and 
tries to determine its mental individuality; the latter presupposes an account of mental 
                                                
12 These are not the only two ways of approaching individuating minds in split-brain subjects. Another 
approach—one that probably has a longer, more venerable tradition—would be to ask of a set of token 
mental states whether or not they all belong to the same mind—whether or not they are all co-mental, 
that is. To some extent I take this third approach in t is work, but I do so in a way that’s parasitic on 
the first kind of approach, because I ask whether right hemisphere and left hemisphere mental events 
belong to the same mind or not. Some way of picking out the mental stuff in question is needed, that is. 
If you can’t pick them out by reference to an already individuated subject of experience, for instance, 





individuality and tries to find physical stuff that, relative to or under such an account, 
constitutes an individual.  
If there seems to be a certain circularity here, there is. It is the same 
circularity, I think, that is necessarily involved in the construction of a functional, 
psychological theory of the brain (or a functional, psychological theory of whatever is 
the supervenience base of mind). And it is the same circularity that is necessarily 
involved in the construction of a realistic psychological theory—a psychological 
theory that is true. What makes an individual physical thing a mental thing is 
something—a functional role—it shares with many other physical, mental things. 
And what makes a kind of mental thing the very mental token that it is, is in part a 
matter of its physical properties. But this last is something I will have to argue for, as 
I do in Chapter Three. In the meantime, since the first approach—which asks about 
the mental identity of physically individuated hemispheres—is more familiar from the 
literature on the split-brain phenomenon, this is the one I start with as well. Ishall
move back and forth between the two approaches, however, as is inevitable, again, 
given the relationship between these approaches and the questions they ask. 
2.3 On Kinds of Questions 
I refer from time to time to the “how many minds?” question regarding split-brain 
subjects. That question asks whether a split-brain subject has one mind, or two. But 
someone might object, in the spirit of Parfit (1971, 1984, 1995, 2003a, 2003b), that 
though there are many facts about mental states in split-brain subjects, there needn’t 
be any further facts about minds in such subjects, and the subjects needn’t have any 




that compose them, then the split-brain case may simply be one in which the lower-
level facts just don’t yield a determinate number of entities at the higher-level.) And 
someone might add, in that same spirit, that the “how many minds?” question is 
therefore a trivial or a merely verbal one—one that could only be answered by 
arbitrary decision.13  
But while it is certainly possible that a split-brain subject ultimately does have 
an indeterminate number of minds, the debate about how many minds split-brain 
subjects have is still interesting and important, for several reasons. To begin with, it is 
in part empirical. There are many empirical facts about cognition in split-brain 
subjects relevant to resolving how many minds they have, such as the nature and 
extent of interhemispheric subcortical interaction in such subjects. For that matter, 
there are empirical questions about all subjects that are relevant to answering the 
question, too, questions about memory and the structure of emotional states and so 
forth. I hasten to add that of course many of the empirical facts relevant to 
determining how many minds split-brain subjects have are of course highly 
conceptual or theoretical at the same time. Still, it is no more true that the empirical 
facts are entirely in, than it is that the empirical facts can be determin d by 
observation, alone. 
The debate about how many minds split-brain subjects have is still admittedly 
largely a conceptual one. But conceptual questions can be quite interesting. Among 
other things, these are questions about our conceptual framework, and the role a given 
concept plays within that framework. Of course questions about terminology are 
                                                
13 Parfit is concerned with the identity of persons rather than the individuation of minds, but many of 
the conclusions he draws about personal identity—and the arguments he makes to support those 




rarely so interesting. But it is wrong to equate conceptual with verbal questions (as 
Parfit sometimes seems to); questions about how to think about something, or about 
how we do think about something, are not like questions about what ord to use to 
refer to something. Among other things, terminological questions can be resolved by 
decision to a greater extent than can questions about our concepts. We can and do 
change our concepts, of course, just as we can and do change our beliefs; but just as 
one can’t simply decide to change one’s beliefs and have done with it, one can’t 
always change one’s concepts simply by deciding to do so. (One can just decide to 
call brooks “creeks,” regardless of how one thinks about such moving bodies of 
water.) And even when conceptual questions can’t be resolved by anything but 
decision, the decision often needn’t be arbitrary in the way many terminological 
decisions are.14  
So, although there may be no absolute distinction between empirical and 
conceptual questions, even those conceptual debates that are most distant from the 
empirical, that seem least capable of being resolved by observation, may still be 
interesting conceptual questions. Furthermore they may matter, simply because they 
matter to us. For instance, although I can imagine the concept of a ersonnot figuring 
implicitly or explicitly into any empirical or scientific theory at ll, the concept is 
arguably still a central one to many domains of thought: central morally, legally, 
socially, and simply pragmatically. The concept of a mind could also be similarly 
important in some or all of these domains.  
                                                
14 I don’t mean to draw too firm of a line between verbal and conceptual questions or decisions, either, 
though; terminological disagreements often aren’t wholly arbitrary, and when they aren’t, it is 
generally because different terms have different conceptual connotatins that are not easily divorced 
from them. What might appear to be purely terminological disputes, in other words, in fact often turn 




But many conceptual questions are also scientific. Indeed one of the things I 
do in this work is explore the significance of the concept of a mind (among other 
concepts) to psychology (and to neuropsychology). There is at a minimum one sense 
in which the “how many minds?” question appears to be an important conceptual 
question, from the standpoint of scientific psychology. As a conceptual question, it 
concerns, in part, the relationship between neural and mental properties, entities, ad 
events, as will be made clear over the course of this work. One can already see in 
some of the literature on how many minds split-brain subjects have several attempts 
at answering that question whose general logic, if accepted, would have a negative 
impact on psychological theorizing.  
And although is too soon to say whether the term “mind” or some successor of 
it will have any role to play in future psychological theories, still, even if it didn’t, the 
concept of a mind might still play an implicit role in some such theories. Most 
simply, the concept of a mind might play the role of simplifying our thought about the 
smaller entities and activities out of which they’re composed. Because minds are 
systems, their behavior is “emergent” (in an unspooky sense) relative to the behavior 
of the things that compose them: their behavior, that is, is not just the sum of the 
behavior of its component parts, but also a function of the interactions between them. 
I suspect, moreover, that the concept of a mind plays an important, if always implicit, 
role in functional analyses of psychological phenomena: we need some sense of the 
boundaries of minds in order to correctly characterize the functional type of some 
token mental states. This point will be returned to and explained towards the end of 




3 The Criteria for Mindedness 
In this section, I discuss some basic criteria for mindedness: minimal criteria that 
something must meet to qualify as (at least) a (single) mind. I also compare purely 
psychological to partly neural criteria for mindedness. In this section, though, I focus 
on the type of things minds are; only in the next section will criteria for individuating 
token minds begin to be developed.  
 
3.1 Modest Criteria for Mindhood 
Minds are systems: structurally complex entities that are composed of parts organized 
in such a fashion as to yield the operations characteristic of a mind. But what sorts of 
operations or activities? What sorts of properties must a mind, a complex mental
system, possess?  
There is quite a lot of dispute about this question. Some make the criteria for 
possessing a mind very stringent, believing that to possess a mind one must possess 
natural language (see for instance Davidson, 1975, 1982; Dennett, 1996). According 
to such philosophers (they are mostly philosophers) having a mind requires having a 
mind a lot like ours. At the other extreme there are those who argue that even insects 
have minds (Carruthers 2004a), even if minds fairly differently (functionally) 
designed from ours. As with most things, most philosophers and neuropsychologists 
probably occupy an intermediate position on the question of what criteria a mind 
must meet. But there are numerous positions occupying even this middle ground, and 
numerous disagreements about the importance of consciousness and self-




characterized by a capacity for the “promiscuous” interaction of informational (or 
belief) and directional (or goal or desire) states.  
Fortunately, most of these disputes are orthogonal to current purposes. For 
again, the primary focus of this work is the individuation of mental tokens, including 
minds—and criteria for mindhood are not equivalent to criteria for individuating 
minds. Note that one could be certain, for instance, when faced with two mental 
systems, that either one of them, in the other’s absence, would constitute a unique 
mind—and yet arguably not know whether either of them did constitute a unique 
mind. For whether multiple mental systems are part of a single mind on the one hand 
or constitute distinct minds on the other depends upon the functional relationship 
between them. What is most relevant to current concerns is what kinds of functional 
relationships between mental systems suffice for those systems to jointly constitute a 
single mind.  
That said, the criteria for mindedness are of course not irrelevant to 
individuating minds. So not all of the disputes hinted at above, concerning the proper 
criteria for mindhood, are orthogonal to my purposes. The split-brain subjects 
constitute an interesting “hard” case for the individuation of minds primarily only if 
both hemispheres of a split-brain subject would meet the criteria for mindhood in the 
other’s absence. And this is the claim that I need to move forward: that in t e absence 
of the other hemisphere, ither hemisphere of a split-brain subject would constitute 
(possibly in conjunction with some non-cortical structures) a mind. The tenability of 




especially those requiring possession of full-blown (propositional) natural language 
capacities.  
Fortunately, that the right hemisphere of a split-brain subject is at least a 
candidate for being some kind of mind, is not as controversial as the positions that I 
will be arguing for. Most philosophers and neuropsychologists do believe, that is, that 
the right hemisphere of a split-brain subject does function in such a fashion that it 
would, in the absence of the left hemisphere, support a mind “comfortably 
characterizable as human” (Marks, 1981: 47, fn. 18). This right hemisphere mind 
would not be capable of all the things of which a human mind (or a human left 
hemisphere mind?) is capable, again particularly productive propositional language. 
But the right hemisphere can certainly see, hear, smell, and feel, and learn and 
remember. Right-hemisphere controlled behavior reflects the presence of right 
hemisphere beliefs and desires, likes and dislikes—even the presence of a sense of 
humor, and of recognizable and appropriate emotions, from fear to pride to slightly 
embarrassed self-consciousness. Under control of their right hemispheres, split-brain 
subjects respond to experimental instructions, can draw objects from memory, can 
indicate how positively or negatively they feel about their lives and themselves 
(Schiffer et al., 1998), and can engage in abstract (non-verbal) reasoning (Zaidel, 
Zaidel, and Sperry, 1981). That the left hemisphere would support a mind in the 
absence of the right is meanwhile of course never called into question, in large part 
due to that hemisphere’s capacity to speak for itself.  
In moving forward I will assume that in the absence of the left hemisphere, 




with non-cortical structures) constitute a mind. Partly in order to justify this 
assumption, I adopt a modest set of criteria for mindhood, that says that minds are 
information-integrating systems, mental architectures in which belief (or 
“informational”) and desire or goal (or “directional”) states interact to yield reasoning 
and decision-making, and that engage in various other paradigmatic mental processes, 
such as perceiving and learning. I do not enter any further into the disagreements 
between the various criteria for mindhood referred to above.15  
 
3.2 Purely Psychological versus Partly Neural Criteria for Mindhoo  
The criteria for mindhood referred to up until this point, including the very modest 
one I just advocated, have thus far all been given in purely psychological or 
functional terms. As minimally described, these functional accounts of what it is to be 
a mind make no commitment as to what implements a mind’s functional architecture. 
But some constitutive accounts of mind would identify minds explicitly with brains or 
with nervous systems—or, rather, with w atever physical part of a creature 
implements its various mental processes, processes like perceiving, remembering, 
decision-making, and so forth.  
Of course, a partly neural account of mindhood in and of itself might not seem 
to rule out much except dualism. (Compare this to an account of mindhood that views 
                                                
15 See Rey 1997 on “modest mentalism” for a sense of the modest criteria for mindhood that I accept. 
Of course the modest criteria given above might be too modest in certain respects; it would be natural 
to object that additional constraints are needed e.g. t mporal constraints: a mind must make decisions 
in real time, that is—quickly enough to survive in this world—and not just over the course of 
millennia. I’m sure the account does leave out some further constraints, but my intent is ’t to defend 
this one as adequate for all purposes as is. I think it is adequate for my purposes, however, for my 
intent is simply to say that on some modest, reasonble set of criteria for mindedness, the RH of a 
split-brain subject would meet it in the absence of any LH mind. Indeed this is an understatement: the 





natural language as central to genuine mentality; such an account rules out quite a lot 
of things as not viable candidates for mindhood.) And of course a partly neural 
account of mindhood is perfectly compatible with a very wide range of functional 
criteria for mindedness. Indeed a partly neural set of criteria for mindhood would still 
necessarily be partly functional or psychological. While one could a opt purely 
psychological set of criteria for mindhood, a purely neural set of criteria does n t 
seem to be similarly possible. The closest one could come to providing a purely
neural approach to individuating minds would be to say that a mind is a functioning 
nervous system (or a functioning brain). But, first of all, this might include too much; 
the Aplysia has a nervous system (probably the best understood nervous system of 
any living organism, currently), but I suspect many would balk at attributing a mind 
to it, because it is not clear that one needs a p ychological theory (as opposed to a 
neuroscientific theory) to explain its behavior. If, on the other hand, one tries to insist 
on some more stringent reading of functioning nervous system, this is presumably an 
attempt to sneak in some reference to psychological capacities and behaviors after all. 
Finally, there could be some argument about how to individuate nervous systems. (In 
fact questions about how to individuate nervous systems inform the debate about how 
to individuate colonial jellyfish as mentioned earlier.) And surely that question 
depends in part on the special functions of nervous systems. And once the system 
reaches a certain level of complexity, its functions are psychologica ones: nervous 
systems process, transform, and communicate information (representations); they 




Although a partly neural set of criteria for individuating minds would be 
compatible with a wide range of very different functional criteria for mindedness, the 
choice between a purely psychological and a partly neural set of criteria for mindhood 
is still significant, however, because the choice of criteria, here, influences or may 
even determine the choice of individuating criteria. One who adopted a purely 
functional account of mindhood, for instance, might similarly adopt a purely 
functional set of criteria for individuating minds. (Which functional criteria those 
should be will be discussed in the next section.) But one who adopted a partly neural 
account of mindhood would presumably adopt a partly neural method of 
individuating minds, as well. The difference between a purely functional and a partly 
neural set of criteria for mindhood is just that the former would acknowledge (at least 
the possibility of) non-physical minds, while the former wouldn’t—a difference with 
no pragmatic significance, perhaps, whatever metaphysical (and theoretical) import it 
may have. The difference between a purely functional and a partly neural set of 
criteria for individuating minds is (at least prima facie) among other things of more 
methodological import, however. From the perspective of a purely functional set of 
criteria for individuating minds, the absence of a corpus callosum in a split-brain 
subject is not necessarily even relevant to determining how many minds such a 
subject has. From the perspective of a partly neural set of criteria, however, that 
absence, that neuroanatomical fact, has prima facie significance.  
The partly neural account of mindhood is the one that neuropsychologists 
who’ve looked at the split-brain phenomenon tend towards, and the account probably 




general, understandably, given their professional orientation. This sort of account is 
again perfectly compatible with the modest functional criteria for mindhood that I’ve 
said I will be assuming. The two sorts of account can easily be combined simplyby 
saying that a mind is that physical part of a creature that bears its informati nal and 
directional states and sustains or implements their interacting, for example. Or, more 
generally, a mind is that physical part of a creature that implements its mental 
architecture. 
Such a partly neural account of mindhood might seem to entail that a split-
brain subject has two minds. For each hemisphere contains the mechanisms for 
memory and attention, each is subject to emotion, sensation, perceptual experiences 
of all kinds, and each sustains the interaction of informational states with each other 
and with directional ones, in order to guide behavior. Each hemisphere thinks.The 
activities each hemisphere engages in suggest that each hemisphere instantiate  the 
mental architecture necessary for mindedness. If a mind is just any physical part of a 
creature that embodies or implements its essential mental capacities, then each 
hemisphere is probably associated with a distinct mind. 
This partly neural account of mindhood, in other words, might be used to 
construct the following argument for mental duality in split-brain subjects. Call this 
the “argument from hemispherectomy”:  
  
P1: In the absence of the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere 
would constitute a unique mind; in the absence of the left 






C: Therefore the right and left hemisphere are each associated 
with a mind. 
  
The argument has a hidden premise, one that I think makes it, and the method 
of individuating minds that it assumes, unacceptable. Still there has been some 
temptation towards this first partly neural method of individuating minds; one can see 
it in Puccetti for instance (1981), and even Nagel flirts with it when he says:  
 
If we decided that. . . [split-brain subjects] definitely had two 
minds, then it would be problematical why we did not conclude 
on anatomical grounds that everyone has two minds, but that 
we do not notice it except in these odd cases because most 
pairs of minds in a single body run in perfect parallel due to the 
direct communication between the hemispheres which provide 
their anatomical bases. 
   (Nagel 1979: 162; emphasis added) 
 
In this vein, someone might suggest that, actually, if we’re going to identify 
every physical part of a creature that could meet the criteria for mindedness with a 
distinct mind, then split-brain subjects, and “normal” subjects as well, probably have 
three minds apiece: one mind associated with the left hemisphere, one with the right, 
and one with the whole brain.16  
                                                
16 Rey (1975) once made just this proposal (though for persons rather than minds), asking whether 
split-brain subjects, and “normal” subjects as well, might indeed each be associated with three persons: 
a left hemisphere person, a right hemisphere person, and a third person jointly constituted by the 
previous two. I think, however, that Rey was not using this first method of individuating minds being 
discussed here, but rather the one I will discuss in a moment, which identifies a mind with that physical 
part of a creature that in fact functions as a distinct mind. Rey suggested, that is, that both the right 
hemisphere, and the left hemisphere, and the brain as a whole, may all function as unique persons (or 
in this context minds).  
Despite its initial apparent counter-intuitiveness, this position has a lot to recommend it, and accords 
well with the principles for individuating mental tokens that I advocate in this work. While I argue that 
the two hemispheres largely lack the kind of integration that characterizes a single mind (and thus 
adopt a mental duality model for split-brain subjects), I do this primarily in the context of arguing 




The proper response to this suggestion, and to the argument from 
hemispherectomy, and to this first possible method of individuating minds as physical 
systems, is to insist on the distinction between what is counterfactually the case about 
a hemisphere, for instance, and what is actually the case about this hemisphere. That 
is, what might be a distinct mind given certain counterfactuals may nonetheless not 
actually constitute a unique mind, in and of itself, but may rather be only one of 
multiple mental systems that jointly constitute a single mind. It is no doubt true (and I 
am assuming) that in the absence of the other cerebral hemisphere (following 
hemispherectomy, say), either hemisphere of a split-brain subject would (perhaps in 
conjunction with some non-cortical structures) constitute a single mind. But this does 
not necessarily show that in the presence of the other hemisphere, a single 
hemisphere of a split-brain subject constitutes a unique mind.  
Most obviously, in the absence of a second hemisphere, either hemisphere 
might undergo significant re-organization, physically and functionally, in the course 
of which it might come to take on roles that it did not play when there was another 
hemisphere to play them. But this says nothing about what either hemisphere is 
actually doing without such reorganization. Surely a mind is something that does (for 
instance) reason and learn and perceive and so forth, rather than something that 
merely could come to do all those things, given significant reorganization.17  
                                                                                                                                          
in and are conceptualized, however, a three mind moel (mental trinity?) could be best. But I don’t sort 
out how such a model would work in this dissertation.  
17 Note that I say that a mind is something that can re son and remember and so forth without 
significant reorganization to make sure that minds asleep, or minds severely intoxicated, or whatever, 
are still minds. For something needn’t necessarily be currently reasoning or perceiving or remembering 
in order to constitute a mind. But it needs to be the case that the system in question would reason and 
perceive and remember and so forth given the rel vant counterfactuals. Of course, giving the precisely 
relevant counterfactuals is challenging at this point, in part due to the absence of a developed 




But even if either hemisphere could support a unique mind in the absence of 
the other without significant reorganization, arguably this still does not show that the 
two hemispheres in split-brain subjects (or in “normal” subjects) are associted with 
distinct minds. For in each other’s presence, and with or without a corpus callosum 
between them, the two hemispheres might still function as one mind. (Compare: two 
people who are perfectly capable of acting as unique agents may nonetheless right 
now be acting as a single agent.) And, indeed, few neuropsychologists who have 
believed that split-brain subjects have two minds have believed that “normal” (non-
split-brain) subjects do also. (Bogen (1990) is an exception, but Bogen’s reason for 
attributing two minds to a “normal” subject is not Nagel’s, above; Bogen is motivated 
by particular views about the kind of interhemispheric interaction the corpus callosum 
affords, and by particular views about the kind of interaction necessary to integrate 
what would otherwise be two minds into one.) 
So it is too simplistic to say that any physical part of a creature that 
implements all the psychological processes a mind must implement in fact constitutes 
a unique mind. How that physical system relates to other physical systems 
implementing those same processes is also relevant. This is a crucial point: 
hemispherectomy data, for instance, while relevant to determining how many minds 
split-brain subjects have, isn’t decisive to that determination. One who wants to claim 
that a split-brain subject has two minds must show not only that either hemisphere 
could meet the criteria for mindhood independently of the other, but also that the two 
“disconnected” hemispheres in fact function as distinct minds. 
                                                                                                                                          
be things like, “Given an additional six months of pre-natal development” or “given significant neural 




This suggests a second partly neural method of individuating minds. First, 
determine which physical parts or systems in a creature implement the psychologi al 
processes and organization characteristic of a mind. Next, determine which functions 
are necessary (or at least sufficient) to integrate what would otherwise be multiple 
distinct minds into a single mind—a single goal-and-information-integrating system, 
for instance. Then look for the structures supporting or implementing those functions. 
If those structures are absent between the mental systems in question, those systems 
are each distinct minds.  
Note that there is a circular relationship between individuating psychological 
entities and individuating neural entities within this partly neural approach. (This 
explains why there can be no purely neural or physical method of individuating 
minds.) True, the approach uses neural facts—facts about physical connections and 
their absence—to individuate mental entities. But the neural facts that matter, ma ter 
because of their psychological identity. So using facts about particular neural
structures to individuate minds isn’t justified by those structures’ purely physical 
features (!), such as the shape or size or location or even physical connectivity of he 
structures. The role those structures play in individuating minds must be justified in 
part by their functional significance. So first, the neural is psychologized, or given a 
psychological taxonomy. Only then can purely physical features of the structures—
such as, their being intact, versus their being severed—be used to individuate minds.  
A defense of partly physical criteria for individuating mental things can be 
found in the account of persons taken by Wiggins (1976), who suggests that the 




specification, along this sort of line: x is a person if x is an animal that perceiv s, 
feels, remembers, imagines, carries out projects, and so forth. So “On this account 
person is a non-biological qualification of animal” (161; original emphasis). Wiggins 
also insists that the individuating criteria for a person can’t be distinct from the 
individuating criteria for an animal (albeit an animal possessing certain psychological 
properties), although one might be able to argue with him on this point. (Perhaps a 
person is necessarily constituted by but not identical to an animal, for instance.) 
Along similar lines, Rey (1977), citing Wiggins (1976) turns from a purely 
psychological criterion for survival in part because the central psychologica  cr teria 
for survival require causal links of the right sort (between one’s mental states, and 
between one’s mental states and events in the world), and causal links in turn require 
(realizing) substance. But some substance matters more than others:  
 
What brings the bodily and psychological criteria together is 
the fact that there are certain parts of our bodies that are crucial 
to important part of minds. . . Not all our embodiment is, that 
is, strictly personal.    
   (Rey 1977: 58; original emphasis) 
 
In other words, mental and physical criteria for survival converge on the brain. 
So this too seems to be a philosopher’s analysis of a (partly) psychological kind, 
according to which the criteria for individuating tokens of that kind are partly 
physical (in this case neural). Yet the physical system in question must still meet 
certain psychological criteria.  
Since few contemporary philosophers of mind are dualists (much less 




subjects and wondered how many minds they have would have used a partly neural 
set of criteria for individuating minds in such subjects. This sort of account of mind, 
after all, still can’t help but be deeply psychological. Yet my impression is that 
philosophers of mind as a group have been somewhat less likely to adopt this account 
of mindhood than have neuropsychologists. Or, at least, they have been somewhat 
less likely to adopt a partly neural set of criteria for individuating minds. (Tye 2003), 
for instance, explicitly states that a mind is (constituted by) a brain (or perhaps a 
brain’s global organization, for one brain might have several such organizations). But 
his criteria for individuating minds, at least in split-brain subjects, are purely 
psychological.) Philosophers have had a greater tendency, in particular, to deny that 
split-brain subjects’ neuroanatomy can be used to provide any support for a mental 
duality claim for those subjects. Marks (1981) and Tye (2003), as we will see, deny 
that lack of a direct causal relationship between two sets of neural events poses any 
obstacle to identifying them with a unique mental token; these facts are (for Marks 
and Tye) at most facts about how minds are implemented, and not about mental 
architecture in particular. These philosophers have argued for what I will call a purely 
psychological method of individuating minds. They have rejected the use of facts 
about neural connection and disconnection, neurally mediated interaction or lack of 
interaction, to determine how many minds a subject has.  
Such arguments will be examined at various points throughout this work, but 
especially in Chapter Three. While the arguments in question make important 
contributions to the literature on the mind-brain relationship and on individuating 




unspoken and usually undefended assumption that neural facts offer constraints on 
mental individuation. Again, they only do so in a particular way: it is easy to use 
physical independence to argue for the presence of distinct minds for example only if 
you have the right sort of physical independence—but the right sort of physical 
independence is partly mental to begin with.  
Nonetheless, the claim that neural facts are just implementation facts, and not 
facts about mental architecture as well, is arguably poorly motivated in the end. Of 
course it is very difficult to see at what level of abstraction a developed psychological 
theory will be pitched, and therefore at what level of abstraction the constitutive 
conditions for minds (and other mental phenomena) will be given. (If all of 
psychology ultimately ends up even being pitched at a single level of abstraction.) 
Still, I believe that the claim that neural facts are just implementation facts ignores the 
important relationship between mental and physical architecture of which the split-
brain studies constitute obvious evidence. For co-mentality—the relation that multiple 
mental tokens bear to each other when they either jointly constitute or all belong to 
one mind—requires, in fact consists in, a rich causal integration of cognitive states
and processes. This causal integration has to be achieved via some physical 
medium—it has to consist in some kind of physical interaction—and that physical 
medium then poses additional constraints on identity. And as I ultimately argue in 
Chapter Six, neural stuff is, at least right now, the only physical medium capable of 





If neural facts are relevant to individuating minds, then neuroanatomical facts 
about split-brain subjects provide some prima facie support for the identification of 
each hemisphere of a split-brain subject with distinct minds. This is not just because 
the hemispheres are not physically connected at the cortical level. It is because of the 
plausible psychological function of the corpus callosum: to integrate mental 
processing across the two hemispheres (at least to some extent). The split-brain 
experiments seem to provide some evidence that the corpus callosum is a major 
mechanism subserving interhemispheric mental integration in “normal” (non-split-
brain) subjects. If that is correct, then, deprived of that mechanism, the hemispheres 
should each constitute a distinct mind.  
Still, one might object that even if the corpus callosum is a mechanism of 
(for) interhemispheric co-mentality, one that a split-brain subject of course lacks, 
there are many other means by which the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject 
interact. For the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are not causally independent 
or isolated from each other; there are all sorts of causal connections between right and 
left hemisphere mental states. Might these remaining mechanisms that susain
interhemispheric interaction in the split-brain subject constitute mechanisms for co-
mentality? To answer this, we need to know what sorts of interhemispheric causal 
interactions remain in split-brain subjects—and whether they’re the kind that count.  
Whether multiple mental systems, each of which would, on its own, meet the 
criteria for mindhood, do in fact constitute distinct minds, or whether they instead 
jointly constitute a single mind, is a matter of the kind and degree of causal 




interaction, those mental systems will plausibly constitute a single mind. And given 
the right sort of functional independence, those mental systems will each constitute a 
distinct mind. The questions to ask now, are: what kindof interaction? What kind of 
independence? For the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject function 
independently in some senses but not others, and they interact through a variety of 
means—but do they interact through the means relevant to individuating minds? 
These are the questions I turn to in the next section. 
 
4 Individuating Minds 
We have just concluded that whether multiple mental systems each constitute a 
distinct mind, or whether they instead jointly constitute a single mind, is a matter of 
whether and to what extent they functionally interact. It might seem that we re now 
in a position to determine how many minds a split-brain subject has. But we are not 
quite there yet. For we have not yet specified the kind and degree of independence 
and interaction that make the difference between co-mentality and multiple 
mindedness. For the human mind is far from an island: its states interact, causally, 
with the states of many other minds. In this section, therefore, I try to say more about 
the kinds of interactions between mental states that make (or at least tend to make) 
those states co-mental. 
 
4.1 Inter- versus Intra-mind Interactions 
In order to try to uncover some principled distinction between intra-mind and inter-




seems to be a prototypical case of inter-mind interaction. Consider the intuition that I 
and my sister, for instance, do not share a single mind, however many minds each of 
us has individually. The “how many minds?” question cannot just be a question about 
behavioral unity and disunity, partly because my sister and I can be very 
psychologically similar, and very close, and behaving very cooperatively—let’s say 
we’re in business together, and working jointly on a project—and our behavior can 
therefore be very unified. Yet even if our behavior was extremely unified (each 
anticipating each other’s desires and objections and striving to meet them without 
being asked, perhaps we’re even finishing each other’s sentences), few would say that 
we share a single mind (or, relatedly, that the best, much less the only, way to explain
our behavioral integration is to ascribe to us a single shared mind).  
The reverse is also true: individual humans can behave in a disunified fashion, 
and yet we seem to have other explanatory resources at our disposal in such instances 
than just attributing to them multiple minds. It is true that scientists and philosopher  
may have a tendency to individuate entities of all sorts at the level at which its 
component parts behave cooperatively and at which there is competition between that 
entity and other entities identified at the same level. And of course any line drawn
(non-arbitrarily) around a mind must be such that things (parts, states) within a mind 
are more closely related to each other, in some respect, han they are to things outside 
that mind (including things in other minds). But why think that the distance between 
minds must consist in competition or conflict? More precisely, why think that the 




behavior between the agents whose minds they are?18 Certainly in our incredibly 
social and psychologically complex species, individuals often act to advance each 
others’ interests and sabotage their own.  
Since only the incredibly deprived human mind is an island—since the mental 
states of one individual are generally intimately causally related to those of many 
others—the difference between having one mind and having two can’t be one of 
causal interaction versus independence in and of itself. The causal boundary between 
one mind and another, in other words, will not be absolute.  
Answering the “how many minds?” question requires distinguishing what we 
might call intra-mind from inter-mind interactions. One possibility is that there is no 
distinction between intra- and inter-mind mental interactions as such, or at least no 
distinction we can draw in purely psychological terms. Perhaps the only thing that 
makes an interaction between mental states intra- as opposed to inter-mind is that it i  
an interaction between mental states of one creature, for instance, where a creature is 
individuated in terms of spatiotemporal location. But if there were a way to draw the 
distinction in purely psychological terms, we might be able to use this distinction to 
count how many minds a single creature has.  
 
                                                
18 Note that there are probably several mundane sense i  which the two hemispheres of a split-brain 
subject, or even a “normal” subject, might be said to compete, routinely, with each other. Consider for 
example the “horse-race” explanation for the “redundancy gain”: responses to bilaterally presented 
stimuli may be faster (on average) than responses to unilaterally presented stimuli because there are 
two mental channels—hemisphere right and hemisphere left—through either one of which the solution 
can be calculated and the response initiated—whichever mental system “finishes” more quickly can 




4.2 Deliberate versus Non-deliberate Interactions 
Marks (1981) implies that the difference between inter- and intra-mind interaction (or 
“communication”) is the difference between deliberate versus unintentional or 
automatic communication, respectively. If permitted, split-brain subjects will engage 
in cross-cuing behaviors to integrate their behavior, even during experimental 
situations during which the hemispheres are denied their normal degree of perceptual 
overlap. Marks suggests that this cross-cuing represents a method of integratig what 
would otherwise be two minds into one, because there is no evidence that the cross-
cuing behavior is deliberate. This behavior rather seems automatic and unintentional. 
So, Marks’ suggestion is that intra-mind interaction is automatic and unintentional; 
inter-mind interaction is via deliberate communication. 
Cross-cuing behaviors in split-brain subjects are fascinating and extremly 
varied. The term “cross-cuing” itself has been used very broadly, to refer to anything 
from a split-brain subject using his left hand (under control of his RH) to spell out the 
answer to a question on the palm of his right hand, a question only his RH knows the 
answer to, to a subject frowning (generated by the RH) when her LH makes an 
incorrect guess. The left hemisphere shows an impressive (obviously not perfect) 
ability to “read” these cues and use them to help narrow in on the (roughly 
characterized) conscious contents of the RH. The cues are of very different sorts: 
spelling the answer on the back of one’s hand looks rather like a deliberate attempt a 
communication; frowning in response to knowing that one has just made a mistake 




This particular way of marking the distinction between intra-mind and inter-
mind interaction may be compatible with the individuation criteria and accounts of 
mind developed in the previous section. We can broadly define a mental system as a 
(functional and perhaps physical) thing organized in such a way as to allow the 
interaction of mental states. On this broad understanding, the human brain is a mental 
system, and so is a cerebral hemisphere, and so is an auditory cortex. My sister and 
myself (or at least our two brains) together constitute a mental system a  well. Now 
suppose we are interested not just in mental systems broadly speaking but in whole 
minds in particular. So we say that a mind is a mental system that (among other 
things) integrates informational and directional states, that reasons and makes 
decisions, that learns and perceives, and so forth. These criteria for mindedness might 
serve to exclude my auditory cortex as a candidate for mindhood, but they wouldn’t 
exclude my left hemisphere, my brain, or my brain plus my sister’s brain. At least, 
they wouldn’t necessarily exclude me and my sister together, for her mental states 
and mine can be integrated, and we can engage in joint decision-making, and so forth. 
Marks suggests, however, that the interaction of mental states within a mind must be 
automatic and unintentional, as opposed to taking the form of deliberate (and 
consciously engaged in?) communication. This, he must think, would prevent my 
brain and my sister’s brain together from qualifying as jointly constituting a single 
mind. And he also thinks that this way of filling out the intra- versus inter-mind 
distinction shows that the two “disconnected” hemispheres of a split-brain subject 




Imagine that a split-brain subject has just been asked a question, and that the 
subject’s right hemisphere sustains the belief that the correct answer is “blue.” The 
subject’s left hemisphere sustains no belief about the correct answer, and so the 
patient, under control of her left hemisphere, verbally guesses, “Red?” The subject’  
right hemisphere hears the subject give the wrong answer, and initiates (or is 
somehow the origin of) a frown—not as a deliberate attempt of communicating that 
an error has been committed, but simply because it is displeased, or whatever, by th  
subject’s error. Feeling the frown (and perhaps some negative affect), the subject, via 
her left hemisphere, immediately concludes that she (the subject) has made an error—
and she corrects herself, “I mean—blue.” Her left hemisphere now shares the 
previously solely right hemisphere belief that the correct answer is blue. So there has 
been an interaction between right and left hemisphere beliefs. Right and left 
hemisphere information has been integrated, we might say. And this interaction and 
this integration occurred via a wholly automatic and unintentional process. 
Accordingly, Marks says, the interaction was intra-mind: the subject’s two 
hemispheres jointly constitute a single mind.  
But the distinction between deliberate and unintentional communication is not 
sufficiently robust to support a distinction between inter- and intra-mind interaction. 
Most obviously, my mental states can causally affect my sister’s mental sta es 
without my wanting them to do so; in fact, my disappointment with the gift she has 
given me may cause her to believe that she bought the wrong gift, and to feel sad, and 




not to communicate my disappointment, or to engender in her any regretful beliefs or 
desires or feelings.  
Only slightly less obviously, my own mental states may frequently interact 
with each other via a conscious, deliberate process, as when I practice deep breathing 
to calm myself, or play upbeat music to get myself psyched, or (most famously) talk 
to myself in order to keep myself on task, and so forth. In fact it is possible that the 
contents of my stream of consciousness are often determined by an intentional 
(deliberate) process.  
So if there is a principled distinction between intra- and inter-mind 
interactions, it cannot be drawn in terms of intentional versus unintentional or 
automatic communication. (Note that it also, relatedly, can’t be drawn in termsof 
“person-level” versus unconscious communication, for again I may talk to myself, 
and mental states of which I am unconscious can causally interact with my sister’s.)  
 
4.3 Direct versus Indirect Interactions between Mental States 
Consider again the intuition that I and my sister do not share a single mind. It is 
interesting to note how strong this intuition seems even though the case would seem 
to present several significant challenges to that intuition. First of all, my sister and I 
are psychologically similar in many ways; we remember many of the sam events; we 
have highly similar senses of humor; we share many of the same interests, and many 
of the same character and personality traits. Thus our minds are “type-similar” if not 
type identical, to a large extent. If we were conjoined twins they would presumably 




experiences)—and yet the intuition that we would still have two minds seems just a  
strong.  
Secondly, it is not an accident that my sister and I are psychologically simiar 
in many ways, the way my psychological similarity to my twin on twin earth would 
be accidental. It is not an accident that my sister and I remember having eate  the 
same foods this Thanksgiving, for instance. We remember having eaten the same 
things because we ate at the same table: many of our type-same mental states have 
their causal origins in the same external events. A similar point may hold for our 
mental traits and not just contents; if my sister and I have many of the same 
intellectual strengths and weaknesses, for example, this similarity may be explained 
in part by the fact that we made our way through the same (primary) school system—
or by the fact that we carry similar genes. Thus not just our individual token mental 
states but our mental capacities may share a causal origin. 
Third, again, my sister’s mental states and my own frequently causally 
interact, and have done so for most of my life and all of hers. Thus my sister and I 
don’t just have many of the same beliefs about our parents, and we don’t just have 
many of the same beliefs about our parents because we in fact have the same parents; 
we also have many of the same beliefs about our parents because we’ve spent time 
sharing information about our parents. (“You will never believe what Mom said 
yesterday. Well, actually, ou will.”)  
Yet despite these three challenges that this really very mundane example 
poses to the intuition that my sister and I have at least two minds between us, the 




terms? (I.e., without simply referring to the fact that we are different organisms, or 
that we have different brains?) Or is it indefensible, at least in those terms?  
One possibility is that even though my mind and my sister’s mind are type-
similar, they aren’t type-identical. My sister tells me she has a crush on someone she 
calls “cookie boy”; I have never met “cookie boy,” and therefore we have many 
different types of beliefs and emotions and desires towards this “cookie boy.” My 
sister also dislikes horror movies and likes mushrooms, whereas I like horror movies 
and dislike mushrooms.  
This is surely not what makes it the case that my sister and I have different 
minds, however, as is immediately obvious when we consider the fact that I and my 
twin on twin earth, with whom I am psychologically type-identical (and if you wish 
physically type-identical as well) do not share a single mind. For minds, like mental 
states, are tokens.  
Note that, since I and my twin on twin earth are mentally type-identical, if you 
knew everything about my twin and had a complete psychological theory for her, you 
could use this knowledge to predict and explain all of my behaviors, because you 
would have a complete psychological theory for me also. But this would be sheer 
accident, for there would be no actual c usal connection between my twin’s staying 
up late last night and my feeling exhausted this morning. This is why we accept so 
easily that I and my twin have different minds: there are no causal connections 
between my mental states and hers. Or at least so we assume—but in fact even if 
some theory in physics said that there were such connections, there would be no 




relevant to either of us. This lack of (at least psychologically relevant) c usal 
connection can of course be expressed counterfactually: even if my twin hadn’t
woken up exhausted today, I still would have added an extra scoop of instant to my 
coffee this morning. 
But again, there are many causal connections between my and my sister’s 
mental states. For example, she likes mushrooms, and it is partly because she likes 
mushrooms that I believe that she likes them. Yet I and my sister still do not share a 
single mind, and while there are causal connections between my and my sister’s
mental states, they do not seem to be of the “intra-mind” sort. 
We can begin to express this in terms of counterfactuals by noticing that even 
if it is true that I would not believe that my sister liked mushrooms if she did not in 
fact like them, I don’t believe she likes them just because she likes them. My sister’s 
fondness for mushrooms causes her to behave in various ways with regards to them, 
and that behavior causes me to believe that she likes mushrooms. But she could like 
them without acting as if she did, in which case I wouldn’t believe that she liked 
them. Or she could dislike them and just act as if she liked them, and, my sister being 
a very good actress, I would believe that she liked them. Even if my sister’s fondness 
for mushrooms causes me to believe that she likes them, it does not do so “directly,” 
via a wholly mental process.  
Contrast this with the way in which I come to believe that I do not like 
mushrooms. If you asked me how I knew that my sister likes mushrooms, I would 
say, “We’ve discussed mushrooms, and she’s said she liked them. I’ve definitely seen 




I don’t like mushrooms, however, I would blink (instead of shrug), and say, “Well—
but I just don’t like them.”19 Moreover, I have a good sense (or would have, if I 
thought about it), of exactly how much I do not like mushrooms; I could tell you, for 
instance, that they’re better than okra, worse than cooked green beans, and about even 
with cauliflower.  
Or contrast the way in which my perceptual states interact with (some of) my 
beliefs with the way in which my perceptual states interact with yourbeliefs. My 
perceiving a glass of water in front of me may be sufficient in some instances to 
generate in me the belief that there is a glass of water in front of me, due to facts 
about my cognitive architecture. (That it allows the generation or derivation of belie s 
from a certain type of visual percept, for instance.) Thus there is what I will call a
“direct”  connection between my perceiving the glass of water in front of me and my 
believing that there is a glass of water in front of me. Whereas my perceiving a glass 
of water in front of me is not sufficient, in and of itself, to generate in you the belief 
that there is a glass of water in front of me. You will not come to believe this on the 
basis of my perception unless you follow my gaze in the direction of the glass, or 
                                                
19 Those who are aware of the debate between introspectionists and interpretationists on the subject of 
self-knowledge, or knowledge of one’s own non-perceptual states anyway, may protest that I am 
begging the question against the interpretationist by apparently assuming that I have some kind of 
direct, non-inferential access to my own propositional attitudes and so forth. This debate about self-
knowledge is certainly relevant to forming the intra-mind/inter-mind distinction, and I mention it again 
in a moment, but here I don’t think I am begging any questions. Assume that the interpretationist is 
correct, and my belief that I dislike mushrooms is the product of inferences generated by my 
mindreading system, just as my belief that my sister lik s mushrooms is the product of inferences 
generated by my mindreading system. And suppose that to yield those inferences my mindreading 
system has access only to my perceptual states in both instances. The process by which I come to form 
these two beliefs (about my sister liking and my disliking mushrooms) still may differ because in the 
one case the formation of those perceptual states cusally depends upon (my sister’s) overt behavior, 
while in the other case it does not. Still, the interpretationist’s claims do suggest caution in trying to 






unless I say that there is a glass of water in front of me, etc. Note that this isn’t 
because your mental architecture is any different from mine; it is not becaus  we have 
different types of minds. It is simply because we have different token minds. And 
while “direct” interactions between mental states occur within each of our minds, 
“direct” interactions don’t occur between them. 
The distinction I am now trying to get at can be sharpened by noticing the 
different sorts of counterfactuals linking (any of) my mental states to (any of) my 
sister’s, on the one hand, and at least some of my mental states to some of my own, 
on the other. We could begin to at least begin to list the sorts of counterfactuals 
linking my and my sister’s mental states: my sister’s taste for mushrooms will (ceteris 
paribus) make her desire some and if some are before her and she is hungry then she 
will (ceteris paribus) eat more than a little of it, and then I, observing her eating these 
mushrooms in the presence of delicious alternatives will come to believe (ceteris 
paribus) that she likes mushrooms, etc. (I am not suggesting that we could really list 
them all, and I’m sure there is much we don’t understand about inter-mind 
interaction—though note that a great deal of what we don’t understand about inter-
mind interaction probably stems from ignorance about intra-mind processes. But 
again, we could at least begin to list some of the counterfactuals linking her mental
states and my own.) But many of the counterfactuals linking my mental states to my 
own are comparatively subtle and complex; my mental states, that is, can causally 
interact with each other in particularly nuanced ways. (Just think of a Joycean str m 
of consciousness.) Folk psychology may tell us a lot of things about the 




still tells us very little. (It took scientific psychology, for instance, to come up with 
the theory of cognitive dissonance—a theory describing at least one way that likes 
can interact with beliefs.)  
While the distinction I am in the midst of drawing between “direct” and 
“indirect” interactions between mental states is (hopefully) somewhat intuitive, 
actually specifying the distinction in functional terms is not easy, or even possible at 
this point, given the uncertainty and the substantive (and great number of) 
disagreements about how mental states within a single mind do interact.20 Someone, 
for instance, might read the mushrooms example above and eagerly add that of course 
I have non-inferential access to my own beliefs and desires concerning mushrooms, 
whereas any beliefs I form about my sister’s mushroom-concerning beliefs and 
desires will be formed only by an inferential process, presumably of my mindreading 
system. But in fact some believe (see Carruthers 2009 for a defense) that mybeliefs 
about either my own dislike or my sister’s like of mushrooms will be equally formed 
by inferential processes of my mindreading system; and others, of course, quite 
strenuously disagree. And this is just one debate in contemporary psychology, 
concerning, in part, the kinds of interactions that do and don’t exist between various 
                                                
20 Of course, it isn’t difficult to specify in functional terms just this distinction, between intra-mind and 
inter-mind interaction! Specifying the functional distinctions between all sorts of psychological entities 
is immensely difficult. In fact the great difficulty of this task once drove Davidson (1973/1980) to 
despair that it couldn’t be done; he describes an anxious rock climber suddenly struck by the desire to 
cease to be imperiled by the weight of his partner, climbing up below him, and who knows that he 
could rid himself of this danger simply by relaxing his grip on his partner’s rope. And this desire, and
this belief, unnerves him so much that the rope actually does slip from his hold in a sudden spasm 
(leaving the other climber to plummet to the earth presumably). The action seems caused by a 
conscious belief that letting go would relieve him of danger and a desire to be relieved of this danger—
and yet in the example the first climber never wanted or chose for his partner to fall or for his own grip 
on his partner’s rope to relax. Davidson illustrates, in other words, the great difficulty of spelling out 
the criteria for intentional (deliberate) action—and by extension other psychological kinds. While 
conceding the difficulty of the task Rey (1997) prooses that it is one that a developed psychology will 
be up to (just as we expect that a developed biomedical science will be able to distinguish between 




sorts of mental states within a mind. Given this state of uncertainty about the kinds of 
intra-mind interactions that exist, it may be premature to attempt to formulate a 
principled distinction between intra- and inter-mind interactions.  
Perhaps the wisest strategy to take at this point is the Gricean (1965) one of 
distinction by exemplar, followed by deference to experts. Grice, recall, was trying to 
offer a causal theory of perception: a theory of perception according to which a causal
relationship between perceiver and thing perceived was in fact essential to the mental 
act in question constituting an act of actual perception. But when specifying the ri ht 
causal relationship, the right functional role of perception, proved beyond his grasp, 
he proposed simply referring to prototypical examples of perceiving—and then 
agreeing to let the “specialist” explain, now or much later, what distinguishes 
perception from, say, hallucination:  
I suggest that the best procedure for the Causal Theorist is to 
indicate the causal connection by examples: to say that, for an 
object to be perceived by X, it is sufficient that it should be 
causally involved in the generation of some sense-impression 
by X in the kind of way in which, for example, when I look at 
my hand in a good light, my hand is causally responsible for its 
looking to me as if there were a hand before me, or in which. . . 
. (and so on), whatever that kind of way may be; and to be 
enlightened on that question one must have recourse to a 
specialist.   (Grice 1965: 463, original emphasis) 
 
Similarly, perhaps the wisest move for me at this juncture would be to point to 
what we have some confidence are intra-mind interactions—such as a 
hemispherectomized subject’s decision to leave the house promptly on the basis of 
coming to believe that she can still make her train if she hurries—and then point to 




that “cookie boy” is a jerk on the (partial) basis of my sister’s recent decision that he 
is a jerk—and then wait for the specialist to illuminate the different psychological 
mechanisms at play in the former that do not appear in the latter. Then we can call 
those psychological mechanisms that do come into play in the former case “direct,” 
and the others “indirect.”  
I agree with these calls for conservativism to a large extent. Any distinct on I 
could draw at this point would necessarily be not just tentative but quite rough, given 
the currrent lack of certainty, again, about the kinds of ways that mental states in eract 
within a mind. The best distinction will be drawn out of a complete psychological 
theory that characterizes adequately and in detail the ways in which mental states 
interact within a mind. Note, for instance, that there will be a number of different 
kinds of “direct” interactions; beliefs might interact “directly” with other b liefs in a 
different way from the still “direct” way in which they interact with desir, or with 
perceptual states, and so forth. This will have consequences for the individuation of 
minds: whether two mental states that have interacted are co-mental or not will
depend not just upon the form their interaction took (or could have taken), but also 
upon the kinds of mental states that they are, and the particular manner in which a 
complete psychological theory determines that those particular kinds of mental states 
should be able to interact. This point is another plea for caution.  
Nonetheless I think that we can at least begin to say something, even if 
nothing very precise, about the difference between some “direct” and “indirect” 
interactions between mental states. (Perhaps what I will say here will b  entirely 




simply be not entirely right… and quite incomplete.) For, assuming that we can 
currently choose some exemplars of intra-mind and inter-mind interactions, then we 
might be able to find some differences between some of these exemplars. And even if 
the distinction we draw now is ultimately untenable or refuted or insufficient, still, 
drawing it might help to understand the appeal that the mental duality position has 
had so far.  
As a first, tentative attempt, I propose to define “direct” interactions 
negatively, in terms of “indirect” interactions between mental states. Two mental 
states interact with each other indirectly if the chain of events causally connecting 
them is composed partly of behavioral events, environmental events, and perhaps 
other nervous system events not categorizable as mental. (Events not carrying 
intentional content, perhaps.) Indirect interactions between mental events, then, are 
interactions that supervene on events on which no mental events supervene. And 
direct interactions between mental events are interactions that are not indirect.  
Even if this distinction between “direct” and “indirect” interactions captures 
some important difference between the way my mental states interact with each other 
and the way they interact with my sister’s mental states, we have to be cautious in 
trying to link this distinction to the intra-mind/inter-mind distinction. We have to be 
cautious, in other words, in trying to use this distinction between direct and indirect 
interactions to individuate minds. For instance, the direct/indirect distinction clearly 
does not map perfectly onto the intra-mind/inter-mind distinction: it is not the case 




This bi-conditional cannot be correct because many of the interactions 
between my own mental states are not direct, as defined above. To take the most 
mundane sort of example, one of the reasons I believe I am sitting down right now is 
because I am sitting down right now. . . And I’m sitting down right now because I 
decided to sit down several minutes ago. Thus there is an “indirect” causal 
relationship between that decision and my current belief that I’m sitting. This kind of 
“indirect causal relationship” between one’s own mental states is obviously incred bly 
common. (Of course, we’re not assuming that I have a single mind, but the problem 
with saying that intra-mind interactions are always direct is that the mental states of a 
single mind will no doubt have to interact with each other indirectly. It seems very 
unlikely, to say the least, that there might be a creature—at least one who lasts very 
long in this world—for whom all its mental states are directly causally connected! 
For one thing, any behavior such a creature engaged in could play no role in 
generating further mental states.) 
Nonetheless the distinction just drawn between “direct” and “indirect” 
interactions, while not equivalent to a distinction between intra- and inter-mind 
interactions, may still be useful in drawing that latter distinction. For even if my
mental states frequently interact with each other indirectly, just as they frequently 
interact with my sister’s mental states indirectly, it is still the case that some of my 
mental states interact with each other directly, whereas noneof them interact with my 
sister’s mental states directly. So perhaps we can instead say that if there are two sets 
of mental states, between which nodirect interactions are possible, then those two 




mental states between which any direct interactions are possible, then (if all the 
mental states within each set belong to a single mind) the two sets of mentalstates 
belong to one and the same mind. This seems to offer more secure grounds for 
making an intra-/inter-mind distinction. In particular, it draws the distinctio on 
causal and counterfactual grounds. 
But arguably this proposal should be modified further, in two ways. First, I 
said just above that if there are two sets of mental states, between which no d rect 
interactions are (nomologically) possible, then those two sets of mental states belong 
to (at least) two minds. It might be better, however, to say that the two sets of mental 
states do not belong to one mind—for perhaps one set of mental states belongs to no 
mind at all. (Some may believe that there can be mental states without whole minds.) 
Second, I said just above that if there are two sets of mental states between which any 
direct interactions are possible, then, so long as all the mental states within eac  set 
belong to a single mind, the two sets of mental states belong to one and the same 
mind. But this might be too strong; perhaps a pair of conjoined twins, joined partly at 
the brain, might share some mental tokens, but still have two minds. Instead of 
making a binary distinction between nodirect interaction and any direct interaction, 
the former signifying multiple minds and the latter signifying a single mind, to count 
minds, we might instead perhaps look at relative degrees of direct and indirect 
interaction. Between the mental states of a single mind there should be a rich web of 
direct interactions, while between multiple minds there should not be such a rich web 




Note again that the direct/indirect distinction I’ve drawn here is very general; 
it gives only the barest sketch of the difference between the ways in which one of my 
likes can interact with one of my beliefs, and the ways in which one of my sister’ 
likes can interact with one of my sister’s beliefs. For it says nothing about the ways in 
which my likes and beliefs can interact and the mechanisms that allow this other than 
that they can interact in a way that my sister’s likes can’t interact with my beliefs! For 
any degree of detail, then, we still need to defer to the experts.  
This distinction between direct and indirect mental state interactions, and the 
distinction between intra-mind and inter-mind interactions that we developed from it, 
can easily be integrated into either a purely psychological or a partly neural method of 
individuating minds. Those criteria both allow that whether multiple mental systems 
jointly constitute a single mind or separately constitute distinct minds depends upon 
the kind and degree of interaction possible between them. And the functional 
distinctions (direct vs. indirect, intra- versus inter-mind) developed in this section 
begin to fill out, just a little, the kind of interaction that matters.  
Is it possible that we could go somewhat further towards refining the 
distinction between intra-mind and inter-mind interactions? The examples of direct 
and indirect interactions that I’ve discussed so far refer to interactions between likes 
and beliefs, or percepts and beliefs. Given the account of minds as information-
integrating systems adopted earlier, however, we might want to place special
emphasis on the necessity of direct interactions between informational states and 
informational and directional states, specifically. And indeed the distinction between 




focus on interactions between informational and directional states specifically. For 
the prototypical cases of indirect mental state interaction (or perhaps just inter-mind 
indirect interaction?) seem to involve p rception. And it is meanwhile part of the 
functional role of informational and directional states, meanwhile, that they can 
interact with each other absent the mediation of any perceptual state. 
I am hesitant to try to tighten or refine the distinction too much, however—
hesitant to restrict the types of states to which it is best applied—because it is afer to 
commit myself less rather than more. So while I will note, where relevant, in the ext 
chapter, the kinds of mental states involved in potentially direct inter-hemispheric 
interactions in the split-brain subject, in general I will simply speak about direct and 
indirect interactions between mental states, and not confine myself to talk ofdirect 




This chapter was about the individuation criteria for minds. I have argued that a mind 
is a complex system with a particular mental architecture: one that allows 
informational and directional states to interact to yield reasoning and decision-
making, and one that engages in learning and perception. I have also begun to explain 
and defend the role I think neuroanatomical facts can play in the individuation of 
mental entities, suggesting the plausibility of a partly neural account of minds, a  of 




subjects do indeed have two minds, and I do this in part on the basis of the distinction 
between intra-mind and inter-mind interactions developed in Section Four here.  
But as I have cautioned several times already, that distinction was drawn only 
tentatively, and so far it is just a sketch. Ultimately the best distinction between intra-
mind and inter-mind interaction will come from a developed psychological theory, 
one that provides laws or principles or models concerning the ways in which mental 
states of various types can and can’t interact with each other within a mind.  
But it is at least conceivable that there won’t be any robust or principled 
distinction to be drawn. I can only hope to have made plausible that not just 
substances and organisms but causal processes can come in natural kinds, too, and 
that therefore psychological theories may ultimately vindicate the intuition that there 
is some deep psychological difference between all the ways my mental states can 
interact with my sister’s and some of the ways my mental states can interact with 
themselves. And in the next chapter, which focuses on individuating minds in split-
brain subjects in particular, I hope in describing the split-brain phenomenon to 
provide some indirect evidence that there is some important, deep psychological 
distinction between the intra-hemispheric and inter-hemispheric causal processes in 




Chapter 3: A Defense of the Mental Duality Model 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter is organized around a defense of the mental duality model for split-brain 
subjects. In the next section I explain why both a purely psychological and a partly 
neural set of criteria for individuating minds and mental tokens will tend to yield th  
same answer to the “how many minds?” question, for any creature, and why they do 
so in this instance. The explanation is simply that there is an isomorphism between 
neural structure (neuroanatomy) and at least one element of cognitive archit cture: 
mental connectedness, or integration. Section Two also describes Hurley’s obj ction 
to the “isomorphism thesis” and shows that her objection fails at least so long as we 
accept a general mind-brain supervenience claim. By the conclusion of that section, 
the presumption in favor of a “two minds” claim for split-brain subjects will be clear. 
Most of the rest of the chapter defends the mental duality model against what I 
take to be the three major objections to the “two minds” conclusion. The first 
objection, dealt with in Section Three, is the argument from unified behavior. That 
argument says that split-brain subjects surely do not have two minds, since their 
behavior is generally so integrated—as integrated as is yours or mine. I argue that the 
integrated nature of split-brain subjects’ behavior provides compelling, but 
defeasible, evidence for the existence of a single mind.  
A second objection to the “two minds” conclusion, presented in Section Four 




bearing similar psychological properties. I call this the “singularity-through-
redundancy” (STR) model. While I believe that this model founders for split-brain 
subjects on purely empirical grounds, I mainly submit it to theoretical scrutiny. The 
“singularity-through-redundancy” position says that when a partly neural and purely 
psychological criteria for mental individuation do yield different answers to the “how 
many minds?” question, the best answer is that yielded by the purely psychological 
criteria. The view, that is, rejects facts about causal interaction and independenc  as 
criteria for individuating minds in some instances. Yet one central claim of this 
chapter and this work is that physical properties play an essential role in the 
individuation of mental tokens. As I note in Section Two, this commitment to the role 
of physical properties in individuating minds, at least in the form it takes in this work,
bears strong resemblance to the “isomorphism” claim rejected by Hurley.  
After discussing the STR model and before discussing a last objection to the 
mental duality model, I pause, in Section Five, to consider what might be motivating 
some philosophers’ unwillingness to accept the mental duality model. One possibility 
is that these philosophers have fallen prey to verificationism about psychological 
explanation. But another possibility is that they cannot see how to integrate the 
mental duality model for split-brain subjects with our understanding of those subject  
in important, non-scientific contexts. I suggest, however, that the mental duality 
model is more compatible with our social, legal, moral, personal, and pragmatic ways 
of relating to and understanding split-brain subjects than one might suspect.  
The last objection to the mental duality model for split-brain subjects, 




compelling. Even though the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are divided at 
the cortical level, they remain connected via their mutual connectedness to various 
intact, non-cortical brain structures, and thus causally linked. In light of this, both the 
purely psychological approaches to individuating minds that I’ve advocated and the 
commitment to isomorphism between mental and neural architecture may threaten to 
make the “two minds” position untenable with respect to split-brain subjects. 
Furthermore, the commitment to isomorphism threatens to make the “how many 
minds?” debate merely verbal. For if the isomorphism view is correct, then just as a 
body of water might be intermediate between being one lake and two lakes, a mental 
system might be intermediate between being one mind and two minds. Once we 
acknowledge that, why should we think there is any non-arbitrary way of deciding 
whether split-brain subjects have one mind or two? 
While conceding that the split-brain cases show that two minds are not always 
wholly distinct in the sense of distinctness relevant to individuating minds, I 
nonetheless maintain that a split-brain subject does have two minds. The 
interhemispheric interaction afforded by non-cortical structures in split-brain subjects 
does not serve to integrate the mental processing of the two hemispheres but rather to 
coordinate their perceptual inputs and motor outputs. While non-cortical structures 
engage in mental operations, these operations are incorporated into cortical ones in 
such a fashion as to mean that a split-brain subject still has two minds, each 





2 Isomorphism and the Relationship between Neural and Psychological Facts 
The nervous system consists of cells engaged in rapidly and continually receiving, 
transforming or operating over, and communicating information to other cells. 
Understanding what the brain does is largely about understanding both the division of 
labor in the brain and how the fruits of this divided labor are integrated to yield 
sophisticated cognition, experience, and action. The nervous system, in other words, 
is about division and interaction. The “how many minds?” question, a question about 
mental architecture, is about this same thing, whether we approach the question 
armed with purely functional/psychological facts or with neural facts as well. 
The answer to the “how many minds?” question, at least for split-brain 
subjects, but presumably in most other cases also, may not depend upon whether 
neural facts are or are not used to individuate minds. All other things being equal, 
purely psychological and the partly neural criteria for individuating minds should 
tend to yield the same answer to the question. For both sets of criteria (properly 
formulated) are fundamentally about the same thing: they both cast the question as 
one about the causal relationships holding between various types of mental entities. 
While the purely psychological approach individuating minds that I sketched in 
Chapter Two, involving the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” interactions, 
may seem able to ignore facts about neural architecture, neural stuff sustains he 
interactions that the approach identifies as “intra-mind”; without that stuff between 
two mental systems, only inter-mind interactions are possible. (At least, for the 





While the partly neural approach to individuating minds may appear to look 
only for the existence of direct physical interaction between two neural systems, 
which interactions qualify as direct is in fact a psychological matter. That is, the 
partly neural criteria for individuating minds will tend to yield the same answer to the 
“how many minds?” question for an almost trivial reason: the brain structures whose 
presence or absence it uses in determining whether two mental systems are identifi d 
with one and the same or with distinct minds is given a psychological taxonomy: it is 
itself identified as playing this role because of beliefs about the psychological 
properties with which it is associated. Certainly the partly neural approach t 
individuating minds yields the same answer to the “how many minds?” question in 
this instance, where the neural story and the (correct) psychological story seem so 
neatly to cohere. The relationship between severing the corpus callosum on the one 
hand and mental dissociation on the other is easy to understand, at least in broad 
strokes.  
That the partly neural and purely psychological approaches to individuating 
minds converge on a response to the “how many minds?” question supports, and is 
supported by, what Hurley (1998) has called the “isomorphism” thesis. This is the 
claim that mental structure is isomorphic in some sense to neuroanatomical stru ture. 
Hurley discusses the appeal to isomorphism “with objective neuranatomical structure 
to resolve the indeterminacy” between competing views on the structure of split-brain 
subjects’ consciousness—a topic that will not be my focus until later chapters. But of 
course isomorphism to neuroanatomical structure could be appealed to in order to 




to neural structure, then neuroanatomical structure can be appealed to in order to at 
least help determine mental structure. And indeed I believe that “split-brain” 
neuroanatomy does tell us something about “split-brain” cognitive architecture: the 
fact that split-brain subjects have two cortically divided hemispheres provides some 
reason to think that such subjects have two distinct minds. Thus I will say something 
in defense of a version of the isomorphism thesis—a thesis Hurley rejects—here, 
since my arguments throughout the rest of the chapter all concern the isomorphism 
thesis, implicitly or explicitly. 
First I want to say the kind of isomorphism between neuroanatomical and 
cognitive structure that I think is plausible and that I will be defending, for it would 
clearly be easy to formulate an isomorphism claim that was too strong. The kind of
isomorphism that I think is plausible is just this: functional relations between 
individual mental states or between mental systems—i.e. between mental tokens—ar  
underlain by physical connections between those tokens. Of course the physical route 
connecting one to the other need not be direct (in an intuitive notion of direct). Then 
again, the functional relation need not be direct either. The activities of two mental 
subsystems could be coordinated with each other via a third subsystem. For that 
matter, two mental systems could also interact not with each other per se but rather 
with some further system that then coordinated their outputs. The first two systems 
could thus be functionally and causally connected, despite lack of a direct physical 
route connecting them—but even the functional and causal route between them would 
then be indirect insofar as it was mediated by some third system. That two tokens 




and of itself mean that those tokens didn’t belong to or weren’t a part of the same 
mind. We would need to know more about the form their interaction took.  
So all I mean when I speak of isomorphism between physical and 
psychological structure is this. First, functional relationships between various mental 
tokens (systems, subsystems, or individual mental states) supervene on physical 
relationships between those tokens. Second, facts about the physical routes between
mental tokens tell us something about the functional relationship between those 
tokens. But what those facts tell us depends upon the psychological taxonomy of the 
physical routes in question. So at some level functional structure and neural structure 
must be isomorphic because the psychological is neural, and (some of) the neural is 
psychological. There will therefore be some level of description of the neural events 
implementing an accessibility relation, for instance, that makes this isomorphism 
clear. (See Revonsuo, 2000, for a similar discussion.) Granted, the level of 
description may be very abstract, so the isomorphism itself may be very abstract. For 
the most part we’re just in the dark at this point about what the right level of 
description is or could be. But the kind of isomorphism that would support the mental 
duality model for split-brain subjects is intuitively easy to understand. Mental 
integration is achieved via causal interactions; causal interactions are physical 
interactions; the physical interactions in question are neural (or so I will eventually 
argue). So, mental connectedness is isomorphic to physical connectedness. 
Again, this is not to say that the fact that split-brain subjects lack a corpus 
callosum in and of itself provides evidence that those subjects have two minds apiece. 




is the fact that split-brain subjects lack a corpus callosum in combination with the 
claim or hypothesis that the corpus callosum serves as an important means of 
interhemispheric interaction (and in combination with model of the hemispheres 
themselves as cognitive systems of course) that provides evidence that spli-brain 
subjects have two minds apiece. This kind of isomorphism is in a way circular, then, 
though hopefully not viciously so, and so stated hopefully not absurdly strong, either. 
(In fact it arguably isn’t very dramatic.)  
But Hurley (1998) believes that dissociative identity disorder (DID) and 
agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC) show that there is no necessary isomorphism 
mental and neural structure, or between conscious and neural structure in particular. 
People with DID have multiple streams of consciousness, she says, yet a single 
physically unified brain. People with ACC meanwhile have two physically 
disconnected cerebral hemispheres and yet a single stream of consciousness. I won’t 
talk about DID here, partly for space constraints, and partly because DID remains a 
controversial diagnosis. But something should be said about agenesis of the corpus 
callosum, for individuals with this condition (ACC) are understandably seen as the 
“natural” version of split-brain subjects: individuals with ACC are born without a 
corpus callosum (or with only a partial corpus callosum). The condition is not rare; it 
has a prevalence of about .3% in the general population, and a prevalence of between 
2-3% among developmentally disabled individuals. It is associated with other central 
nervous system abnormalities in about 80% of cases (Geoffroy, 1994), but some 




Hurley is far from alone in thinking that individuals with ACC (“acallosal” 
subjects) each have a single stream of consciousness. Partly she believes this on 
behavioral grounds; acallosal subjects behave more like “normal” subjects than they 
do like split-brain subjects, she says. Thus while we have compelling behavioral 
evidence that split-brain subjects have a dual consciousness, there is no analogously 
compelling evidence that acallosal subjects do:  
When the corpus callosum is severed or absent within one 
body, we may have either a commissurotomy patient, who 
seems to support separate centers of consciousness, or a 
callosal agenesis patient (someone born without a corpus 
callosum). Callosal agenesis patients, or acallosals, typically 
pass almost all the experimental tests of unity that 
commissurotomy patients fail, including under conditions 
involving fixation. Their actions argue for a unified 
consciousness, even in experimental conditions and despite 
their similarity in gross neuroanatomical structure to 
commissurotomy patients.  (Hurley 1998: 189) 
 
While acallosal subjects do exhibit far fewer dissociation effects than do split-
brain subjects, however, they do not behave precisely like “normal” subjects. It is 
again hard to generalize here, since approximately eighty percent of such subjects 
have other brain and developmental abnormalities, but it appears that the lack of a 
corpus callosum alone does have some behavioral influences. At “cross-matching” 
tasks (a blindfolded subject has an object placed in her left hand, and now must select 
the same object using her right hand, for example), acallosal subjects are far superior 
to split-brain subjects, yet their performance time is significantly slower than that of 
IQ-matched controls (Vanasse, Forest, Lassonde, 1994), suggesting that they may use 
different neural and perhaps different cognitive means of performing such tasks. The 




ispi- and contralateral somesthic pathways. . . [performing] a bimanual matching ask 
using an intra-, rather than an inter-, hemispheric comparison process” (ibid., 199), 
and that their slower response times result from the fact that nerve transmission is 
slower in the ipsilateral lemniscal and spinothalamic pathways that would permit
intra-hemispheric performance of the cross-matching problem.  
Subjects with ACC exhibit somewhat unusual fine motor behavior. For 
example, by the time a “normal” subject’s fingers have reached a coffee cup, her 
fingers have already narrowed to the width appropriate for that object; in acallos l 
subjects, “the hand opens but remains in a gaping posture until it hits the object and 
only then do the fingers begin to close in an appropriate configuration on the object” 
(Silver, Jeeves, 1994: 216). These authors found that bimanual coordination “can be 
maintained by using visual and proprioceptive feedback, as long as performance is 
slow” (ibid 217). Performance breaks down at high speeds, however, and “Unlike 
normals, the acallosal subjects do not, with practice, become independent of visual 
information” (ibid). Like split-brain subjects, they exhibit alexithymia (O’Brien, 
1994). They appear to experience some kind of (not yet well-understood) 
impairments at visual and visual memory tasks (Temple, Ilsley, 1994). (It is possible 
that due to the absence of a corpus callosum that would allow the hemispheres to both 
benefit from their developing separate specializations, the right hemisphere as well as 
the left becomes specialized for verbal processing (see Sperry, Gazzaniga, and Bogen, 
1969), but I think that this hypothesis has waned in popularity (See Schmidt, 1994).) 





Nevertheless the claim that acallosal subjects have a single stream of 
consciousness is not implausible. Would the correctness of this claim require 
rejecting the isomorphism thesis—the thesis that the structure of mind (or, in this
case, the structure of consciousness) is isomorphic to neuroanatomical structure, in 
certain respects or to some degree? It might appear so, for acallosal subjects hav , 
relative to “normal” subjects, a divided brain; if both groups of subject nonetheless 
have a unified consciousness, then the structure of consciousness clearly can’t be 
isomorphic to neuroanatomical structure. And assuming this point generalizes—
assuming that mental structure in general isn’t isomorphic to neural structure—then 
neuroanatomical facts about split-brain subjects also cannot be used to help 
determine how many minds or streams of consciousness they have. (Though Hurley 
in fact questions the last move in this argument, as we will see below.)  
It is too quick, however, to say that acallosal subjects have a divided brain in 
the sense necessary to reject the isomorphism thesis. For on at least one 
understanding, the isomorphism thesis essentially just says that the the structure of 
consciousness is isomorphic to the neural structure that supports the structure of 
consciousness. (Other understandings of the isomorphism thesis are possible—but 
some of these theses are implausibly strong. The isomorphism thesis as I am 
defending it, is pretty modest: it just says that mental connectedness—co-mentality or 
co-consciousness—requires physical connectedness, because that’s what mental 
connectedness supervenes on. In fact, co-consciousness, for instance, consists in a 
certain type of physical connectedness. Which type of physical connectedness? 




While the isomorphism thesis, so understood, may not be tautological, it is not 
particularly dramatic, and there is certainly a kind of circularity involved in testing it. 
This kind of circularity is essentially just the bi-directional relationship betwe n the 
individuation and classification of psychological and neural entities. To see whether a 
creature, C’s, consciousness is isomorphic to his neuranatomy, you have to find the 
relevant portion of C’s neuroanatomy. (Suppose C has a single stream of 
consciousness—and two, disconnected pineal glands. This couldn’t weigh against the 
isomorphism thesis if the mechanism for co-consciousness in C had nothing to do 
with C’s pineal glands.) But which portion of his neuroanatomy is relevant to this 
investigation is a psychological matter. Thus the investigation into the structure of 
C’s consciousness and the structure of C’s brain, for the purpose of testing the 
isomorphism thesis (as it applies to consciousness), can only be undertaken together. 
(This of course is just a general fact about investigating cognitive and neural
architecture.)  
Since it is not clear what neural structures support consciousness and co-
consciousness—in any of us, to some extent, and in acallosal subjects, in particular—
the finding that acallosal subjects do have a single stream of consciousness would not, 
in and of itself, weigh against the isomorphism thesis. For while the two hemispheres 
of an acallosal subject are (largely) divided at the cortical level, they are not divided 
at a “lower” level.21 It is only in the context of a commitment to the cortex’s 
involvement in conscious experience and to the corpus callosum as a mechanism of 
unifying consciousness that an acallosal subject’s brain would be expected to support
                                                




two streams of consciousness in the first place. But how much do we know about the 
functional neuroanatomy of acallosal subjects?  
There is at least a debate about how acallosal subjects’ great degree of 
behavioral integration is achieved. Three positions in this debate are most prominent. 
The first is that some non-cortical structures of an acallosal subject may be more 
developed and/or may serve additional functions that they do not serve in a “normal” 
(or a split-brain) subject. The second is that ipsilateral sensory and motor pathways 
may be more developed in acallosal than in “normal” (or in split-brain) subjects, 
resulting in each hemisphere having increased sensory and motor powers, and 
therefore each capable of perceiving and doing more, and of acting independently of 
the other to a greater and more sophisticated degree, than is true in split-brain su jects 
and in “normal” subjects in particular. A third possibility is that an acallosal subject 
exploits certain kinds of behavioral strategies to compensate for the lack of a 
callosum. (Though these strategies would have to be very subtle, since acallosal 
subjects still exhibit fewer disconnection effects than split-brains even in 
experimental situations in which care is taken to prevent the use of such unifying 
behavioral strategies.) (For some time a fourth prominent hypothesis was that 
acallosal subjects’ hemispheres might enjoy a greater degree of bilateral 
representation of cognitive functions than in “normal” subjects do, but it instead 
appears that acallosal subjects’ hemispheres are normally lateralized on an individual 
basis. See Schmidt, 1994.) 
Based on our discussion up until this point, it should be clear that the first 




(particularly a newly operated one) has two streams of consciousness, that an 
acallosal subject has one stream of consciousness, and with the isomorphism thesis. 
Conscious unity would have a different neuroanatomical basis in an acallosal than in 
a “normal” subject—but for both subjects, consciousness would be isomorphic to 
brain. A similar point may hold for the second possibility, though only if ascending 
and descending motor and sensory pathways constitute a means of unifying 
consciousness. If they do not, however, this second hypothesis can support a 
conscious singularity claim for acallosal subjects only upon rejection of the 
isomorphism thesis—at least in one special case, to be discussed in the next section of 
this chapter: the case of singularity-through-redundancy.  
The possibility that behavioral integration in acallosal subjects is achieved via 
behavioral means probably seems intuitively less compatible with the claim th t they 
have single streams of consciousness. Hurley, however, disagrees; she in fact believes
that how acallosal subjects’ behavioral integration is achieved is irrelevant to 
determining the structure of their consciousness. Even if acallosal subjects depended 
largely on what she calls “external” or “extended” means of behavioral integration—
cross-cuing for example—those means could still serve to unify their consciousness. 
Given the functional importance of conscious unity, she continues, it is plausible to 
believe that we all develop in such a manner as to develop a unified consciousness, 
whatever our neuroanatomy (at least within reason—no doubt she would bar 
hydrocephaly, etc.). (Gazzaniga and LeDoux make a similar remark at one point, in 
the context of discussing some of the psychological, neural, and behavioral 




as if the brain demands integration, and in the absence of interhemispheric pathways, 
less efficient ways of achieving mental unity are employed” (1978: 39).) This makes 
a conscious disunity claim plausible for at least a recently callosotomized subject, 
since the means and mechanisms her consciousness had relied upon to become 
unified are now altered.  
Suppose a recently-operated commissurotomy patient uses a 
partly external mechanism of integration. For example, if 
access movements are prevented, a smile appears to signals 
that ‘yes’ is the right answer to a question. This would 
naturally be taken as evidence of disunity of consciousness and 
an attempt to communicate information between two separate 
centers of consciousness. The fact that the mechanism of 
integration is partly external here appears to have implications 
for the structure of consciousness.   (Hurley, 2003: 78)  
 
But if consciousness always tends to develop in such a manner so as to 
become unified, a disunity claim for acallosal subjects upon similar grounds has no 
support. In fact such a claim never has any support, again no matter what we discover 
about the means by which acallosal behavioral integration is achieved, even if it is 
achieved by, say, cross-cuing or other external or extended means: 
Suppose the acallosal has always depended in everyday life 
primarily on extended rather than purely internal mechanisms 
of integration. This involves subtle forms of cross-cuing and 
access movements that are not properly described at the 
personal level as rationally controlled, intentional actions. 
Rather, they function smoothly and automatically at a 
subpersonal level to integrate information. It was never the 
case that the acallosal harbored separate centers of 
consciousness and agency, somehow formed, structured, and 
unified independently of the partly external mechanisms. It was 
never the case that such prior separate units of consciousness 
hit on the use of external paths as a way of communicating 
between themselves. This person’s consciousness, including its 
structure, emerged and developed with partly external 





And if we accept Hurley’s arguments, here, we reject the isomorphism thesis; 
and if we reject the isomorphism thesis, then perhaps the structure of split-brain 
subjects’ neuroanatomy cannot be appealed to in order to resolve how many minds or 
streams of consciousness they have, either.  
Of course, the fact that this acallosal subject’s consciousness, including its 
structure, emerged and developed with partly external mechanisms “in play” does not 
entail that its structure emerged and developed as a single stream of consciousne s. 
This subject might well harbor separate (in the relevant sense) centers of 
consciousness, perhaps formed and shaped by partly external mechanisms. These 
mechanisms might even allow the two hemispheres to communicate quickly and with 
great skill, while not sufficing to create a single subject of experience that can 
simultaneously introspect the contents any two currently conscious experiences.22  
I don’t mean to say that development can be ignored when we try to do 
psychology, e.g. to determine the structure of a subject’s consciousness. But Hurley’s 
emphasis on the ways development shapes consciousness comes at the expense of de-
emphasizing the constraints the neural poses on conscious structure. Of course, this 
de-emphasis is deliberate on her part: Hurley rejects mind-brain supervenience: she 
believes there are mental phenomena (in human subjects, for instance) that are not 
neural. If the mind extends beyond the brain then of course “split-brain” 
neuroanatomy will not necessarily signify anything about split-brain subjects’ mental 
                                                
22 Whether the subject would develop two separate centers of agency is, I think, a harder question. 
Given the links between agency and acting on the one ha d and acting and embodiment on the other, it 
seems plausible that the hemispheres would develop in such a fashion as to in effect cooperate with 





architectures. If cross-cuing, for example, or even features of the environment, can be 
a means of mental unification, then the split-brain experiment may well change the 
mental architecture of split-brain subjects, though their n ural architecture remains 
identical in and outside of experimental conditions. In fact Hurley’s rejection of the 
isomorphism thesis ultimately just reduces to a rejection of mind-brain 
supervenience.  
This debate about the extent of the mind is highly relevant to current concerns. 
In fact a defense of mind-brain supervenience is thematically linked to many of the 
fundamental claims and positions in this work. I put off a defense of mind-brain 
supervenience until Chapter Six, however, and for the moment, I will simply assume 
the truth of some kind of mind-brain supervenience claim.  
With that claim in place, acallosal subjects present no reason to think that 
split-brain subjects have single minds. Indeed, contra Hurley, acallosal subject  could 
have single minds, and split-brain subjects could have two minds, and the 
isomorphism thesis could nonetheless still be correct: the different mental structures 
(one mind vs. two minds) such subjects possessed could be isomorphic to the in fact 
different neural structures each subject possessed. For the neural architecture of split-
brain subjects and “natural” split-brain subjects—subjects simply born without a 
corpus callosum—are unlikely to actually be the same. Having developed in the 
absence of a corpus callosum from the time of an acallosal subject’s birth, other 
neural structures—the anterior commissure, the intertectal commissure—may have 
developed properties, from the morphological to the functional, that these structures 




both supports and is supported by the fact that the partly neural and the purely 
psychological criteria for individuating minds will both tend to yield the same answer 
to the “how many minds?” question.  
The best model of split-brain subjects’ mental architecture is, I submit, the 
mental duality model. That is, a split-brain subject has two minds, one more or less 
associated with her left hemisphere and one with her right. While the two 
hemispheres to some extent share a functional foundation, due to their mutual 
connectedness to non-cortical structures, each hemisphere builds on top of and out of 
this minimal foundation a rich and unique cognitive and experiential structure—one 
that meets the criteria for mindhood independently of the rich and unique structure 
associated with the other hemisphere.  
This is a conclusion we could reach using either a purely psychological or a 
partly neural set of criteria for individuating minds and mental tokens. Given the role 
the corpus callosum plays in interhemispheric mental integration—a role evidenced 
by the results of the split-brain studies themselves—the absence of a corpus callosum 
in a split-brain subject has not just neuroscientific but psychological significance. 
And the causal, physical independence of left and right hemisphere mental activities 
has this same sort of significance. Within each hemisphere (and associated non-
cortical structures) of a split-brain subject there is a rich web of “direct” interactions, 
in the sense defined in Chapter Two, and yet between the two hemispheres interactio  
is predominantly “indirect.” In fact I will argue in Section Six of this chapter that the 
interhemispheric interaction afforded by non-cortical structures does not serve to 




processing to a degree, by producing in them some of the same perceptual types and 
contents, and by receiving and coordinating their motor outputs.  
That the two approaches to individuating minds should yield the same result 
in the split-brain case, however, may seem puzzling, partly because philosophers of 
mind and neuropsychologists have often tended to reach different answers to the 
“how many minds?” question for split-brain subjects, and because the former group 
has been more drawn to a purely psychological and the latter group to a partly neural 
set of criteria. I do believe that there is one view about the relationship between 
mental and neural tokens—one that neuropsychologists are less likely to adopt than 
philosophers—which may partly be responsible for this between-group difference. 
According to this view, which I call the “singularity-through-redundancy” position, 
there is at least one exceptional instance in which the isomorphism thesis isn’t 
correct. Since this view both draws upon some important functionalist principles, and 
yet nonetheless should be rejected, it is worth considering it in some detail, as I do in 
Section Four.  
First, however, I want to say something about the role of behavior in 
psychological theorizing and explanation. Those who have rejected the mental dualiy 
model for split-brain subjects have done so on the basis of the integrated nature of a 
split-brain subject’s day-to-day behavior. So what role do s that subject’s behavior—
inside and outside of experimental conditions—play in supporting a model of her 
mind—or minds? I argue that the role is somewhat more complex than critics of the 





3 Behavior and Psychological Explanation 
This section deals with the first major objection to a “two minds” conclusion for split-
brain subjects: the argument from unified behavior. Very simply the objection states
if split-brain subjects had two minds then they would behave in a disunified manner 
even outside of experimental conditions. Since they instead behave in a generally 
integrated fashion, they must have a single mind.  
One of the important features of the debate about how many minds split-brain 
subjects have concerns differing views on the relationship between behavior and 
psychological explanations of that behavior. In advancing a “one mind” conclusion 
for split-brain subjects, several philosophers have operated under an overly simplistic 
conception of this relationship. 
Those who advocate a “one mind” position for split-brain subjects rest their 
case primarily on the behavior of split-brain subjects outside of experimental 
situations. Outside of experimental situations, “one mind” advocates argue, split-brain 
subjects act basically like non-split-brain subjects. It is true that inside experimental 
situations, split-brains exhibit some unusual behaviors that non-split-brain subjects do 
not exhibit even in the same situations; perhaps this behavior should be explained by 
positing temporary conscious disunity. But since the vast majority of the time they act 
like us, it is surely extravagant o insist that nonetheless they always have two minds 
or two streams of consciousness or that they are always two persons.  
Quite obviously, the claim that split-brain subjects usually act like “normal” 
subjects only strongly supports a mental singularity claim if normals have one mind. 




of mental unity is based on us, then if it doesn’t apply to us, the whole concept ought 
to be scrapped. But although the concept may have its origins in application to 
“normal” subjects, why couldn’t it turn out that we all have two minds—and why 
would the concept suddenly lose value? Isn’t it valuable to know what “normal” 
human subjects have two of? What hemispherectomized people have one of?  
This is perhaps more easily seen if we think about a stream of consciousness. 
The very term, “stream of consciousness,” reflects its origins in phe omenology: 
consciousness feels like a stream in certain respects, and we assume we have just one, 
because it feels as if we only have one. Of course (as both Marks (1981) and Tye 
(2003) have noticed, by the way), it is arguably impossible for a subject to feel as if 
she has more than one stream of consciousness, regardless of how many streams of 
consciousness she in fact has. For by hypothesis any feeling can only occur “in” one 
stream of consciousness or another and not somehow “outside” of either stream and 
therefore capable of surveying both. Meanwhile, most philosophers speak 
interchangeably of having a single stream of consciousness and having a unified 
consciousness. Now, psychology does presumably owe us an account of the 
phenomenology of consciousness. So suppose a neuropsychologists ultimately 
discover what accounts for the phenomenology of consciousness, and the 
phenomenology associated with a stream of consciousness, and suppose they even 
discover the neural basis of the feeling of conscious unity—and then determine that 
there are two such bases in all of us. Do the concepts “conscious unity” or “stream of 
consciousness” lose all value, simply because they were first rooted in our sense of 




scientific theory of consciousness says that our consciousness is dual? Of course not. 
Such a theory would of course need to explain why we only feel as if we have a single 
stream of consciousness even though we have two such streams (and this seems 
comparatively easy, compared to the extraordinary difficulty of explaining why we 
have any kind of conscious phenomenology at all), but we might still very much want 
those concepts. For one thing, we would want them because we would want a 
psychological theory to tell us why it feels like we have only one stream of 
consciousness! 
Marks and Tye don’t seem to be making conceptual argument against mental 
and conscious duality in split-brain subjects, however. Marks and Tye seem to believe 
that non-split-brain, “normal” subjects have single minds and single streams of 
consciousness because th y act in such a unified fashion. They then conclude that 
because split-brain subjects act like these “normal” subjects, this provides very 
compelling evidence that they, too, have single minds and single streams of 
consciousness.  
One problem with this argument is that split-brain subjects don’t usually act 
exactly like “normal” subjects, even in their day-to-day behavior. Their fine motor 
behavior is different; they show some memory deficits; they rarely read for pleasure, 
and so forth. Now, it will probably be claimed that these sorts of behavioral 
differences between split-brain and non-split-brain subjects are irrelevant to the “how 
many minds?” and conscious unity debates, because, interesting though they may be,
they have nothing to do with ow many minds or streams of consciousness anyone 




isn’t just any old behavior but unified or disunified behavior. The argument from 
split-brain subjects’ normal behavior then quickly collapses into the argument from 
split-brain subject’s integrated behavior.  
The first problem with the argument from integrated behavior—when used to 
support a “one mind” (or “one stream”) conclusion in split-brain or in non-split-brain 
subjects—is that it begs the question, since it is unclear how to define “unifi d” 
behavior except in terms of what (we feel) a single person with a single mind and 
single stream of consciousness would do. But if unified behavior is by definition the 
kind of behavior exhibited by a single person with one mind and one stream of 
consciousness, then a subject’s “unified behavior” can’t simultaneously be used as 
evidence that she is a single person with a single mind and a single stream of 
consciousness.  
The inability to even define “unified behavior” apart from some notion of 
“having a single mind” is clearly a serious problem, and yet we can try to set it a ide, 
as much as possible. Let us say that behavior that isn’t unified is of the type that two 
people might engage in when they were in some degree of conflict with each other, 
and that behavior that isn’t like this is unified.23 Thus split-brain subjects normally 
exhibit unified behavior insofar as they do not usually slap one hand with the other, or 
slap their own faces to force themselves to get up after over-sleeping, or violently 
shake and come to the aid of a loved one simultaneously, or struggle to button and 
                                                
23 This does not, of course, offer a definition of “unified behavior” that is independent of the notion of 
mental unity, because two people aren’t in conflict with each other in the relevant sense unless their
intentions are in conflict with each other: two peole just pushed into each other by third parties in 
other words aren’t conflicting with each other in the relevant (i.e. psychological) sense. At this point 
though I am just trying to describe the type of behavior one mind advocates like Marks and Tye to 




unbutton their shirts or pull their pants up and down at the same time. Note that I said 
“usually”: these are in fact all things that split-brain subjects have been observed to 
do, outside of experimental situations.24  
Ultimately, all that “one mind” advocates such as Marks and Tye can really
mean when they use the unified behavior of split-brain subjects as evidence for their 
being single persons is that their daily behavior seems no less the product of a single
mind than does the behavior of a “normal” subject, and therefore that their daily 
behavior alone gives us no reason to think that they have more minds than do 
“normal” subjects.  
But given the constraints posed by the hemisphere’s shared embodiment, a 
high degree of behavioral integration is more or less to be expected, regardless of 
how many minds those hemispheres are associated with. Given the role they make for 
“unified” and “disunified” behavior in individuating minds, it is not surprising that 
Marks and Tye are able to find subjects with dissociative identity disorder (DID)
more compelling candidates for multiple mindhood than they do split-brain subjects. 
For the many “personalities” (or “alters”) of a subject with DID generally take turns 
exerting control over the subject’s behavior. Across time, it is easy to behave as if 
you are at war with yourself: I go on a two thousand dollar shopping spree; I cut up 
my credit cards that night, and return the clothes the next morning; that afternoon 
finds me yelling at a Visa representative over the phone that my card has been tolen 
and I need a new one immediately. It is not so easy to act at war with yourself literally 
within a moment, however. What must split-brain subjects do, exactly, in order for 
the “one mind” advocate to find compelling evidence of mental duality? Slit their 
                                                




wrists and call 911 simultaneously?25 The subjects can’t, physically, take a nap and a 
quick swim in the ocean simultaneously no matter how mentally “disunified” they 
are. Physical embodiment sets out a huge number of constraints on the degree of 
behavioral disunity that a single creature can exhibit, when “behavioral disunity” is 
defined as the sort of behavior which two creatures in conflict would exhibit.  
Nonetheless, let us grant that the daily behavior alone of split-brain subjects 
gives us no reason to think that they have more minds than do “normals.” Let us even 
accept that the unified behavior of split-brains outside of experimental situations 
provides compelling evidence that they have single minds. Is there any evidenc that 
could nonetheless weigh in favor of the opposite conclusion? 
The argument from the unified behavior of split-brains subjects still faces 
several difficulties. Most obviously there is the fact that split-brain subjects 
sometimes do not engage in it. “One mind” advocates like Tye of course 
acknowledge that split-brain subjects act disunified during experimental situations. 
But, Tye seems to say, split-brain subjects spend more time outside of experimental 
situations than they do inside, and therefore “act unified” more frequently than they 
“act disunified,” and therefore must really have a single mind. So, for example, 
regarding the claim of conscious disunity or duality in split-brain subjects—a claim 
we won’t examine further until later chapters but that “two mind” advocates and 
                                                
25 Actually I imagine that there are “normal” subjects (people who have a corpus callosum) who have
done these things nearly simultaneously—who have swallowed a bottle of pills and a minute later 
called an ambulance in a panic. This should call into question the extent to which “one mind” 
advocates rely not only on the “unified behavior” of split-brain subjects but also on the “unified 
behavior” of non-split-brain subjects in order to advance their positions. While swallowing a bottle of 
pills and then calling an ambulance—or swallowing a gallon of ice-cream and then a bottle of ipecac—
are behaviors of the mentally ill, they are also just extreme instances of the kind of disunified behavior 
that non-mentally ill people exhibit frequently. People break promises to themselves routinely; they 
begin plotting ways to get out of plans that were th ir idea in the first place; they wince, internally, 




neuropsychologists also generally accept, and that “one mind” advocates generally 
reject—Tye has written:  
The major difficulty faced by. . . . [this] hypothesis, which is. . 
. popular. . . . among neuropsychologists, is that, except under 
the specified experimental controls, there is nothing unusual 
about the behavior of split-brain subjects. Their behavior is 
generally just as integrated as yours or mine. What leads to the 
supposition that split-brain patients have a disunified 
consciousness [and two minds] is their failure to behave in an 
integrated, coherent way in certain, special experimental 
situations. But if behavior is the evidence on which the 
hypothesis of disunity rests, then the fact that split-brain 
patients behave in an integrated way at other times supports the 
hypothesis that their consciousness is generally unified 
 (Tye, 2003: 126; original emphasis) 
 
. . . . and that they have one mind. 
But this misrepresents the empirical and explanatory basis of the duality 
claim. Though it was split-brain subjects’ failure to act in an integrated fashion which 
first lead to the hypothesis of conscious and mental duality26, hat behavior is not the 
sole evidence supporting it, as it would be for subjects who behaved like split-brain 
subjects do inside experimental situations but who were in all other ways identical to 
“normal” subjects. We of course do have more evidence than that in favor of the 
duality claim for actual split-brains. We have neuroanatomical evidence, plus the 
general realist view that phenomena don’t change the moment we stop staring at them
intently. We know that during experiments split-brain subjects behave as if they hav  
two streams of consciousness, and we accept that this is because of their abnormal 
                                                
26 Though even this is in one sense inaccurate: it may not be giving Sperry and Myers all the credit 
they’re due for the careful design of the original split-brain experiments. Those experiments were 
designed to test an pre-existing supposition or hypothesis: i.e. that the corpus callosum was a 
mechanism subserving conscious unity, and that split-bra n subjects may always have two streams of 




neural anatomy. This claim—that the behavior observed during the split-brain 
experiment is a result of “split-brain” neuroanatomy—is used to understand and to 
explain the split-brain phenomenon, and is itself given some empirical support by the 
split-brain studies, studies that seemed to show that dividing the brain divides the 
mind.  
This anatomy, meanwhile, is not a product of experimental design: it is the 
permanent embodiment of their mental lives. Rey (1975) made this point long ago in 
the context of arguing that the split-brain cases are “disturbing” because they seemed 
to show that “it is just these hemispheres that. . . if they are detached from one 
another, seem to be each sufficiently complex and sufficiently autonomous to be 
regarded as separate persons. At least they seem so for the duration of the 
experiments. But these experiments in no way disturb the underlying structures: they 
simply lay them bare” (1975: 7, emphasis mine).  
Of course, the claims of mental and conscious duality are supported by 
neuroanatomical facts about split-brain subjects only given some kind of mind-bra 
supervenience claim. If we accept externalism about the ve icles of cognition and 
consicousness, then the split-brain experiment may very well alter subjects’ m ntal 
architectures. I won’t defend mind-brain supervenience until Chapter Six; if we 
assume mind-brain supervenience for now, however, it is again unclear how merely 
sealing a nostril could divide a consciousness, much less create a second mind. Thus 
while split-brain subjects’ behavior of course changes inside and outside 
experimental situations, surely this is not because their mental architecture changes. 




act upon different features of the world in the two types of circumstance. Thus “two 
minds” advocates point to many sources available to integrate split-brain subject ’ 
behavior, besides “co-mentality” (the relation two mental states bear when they 
belong to the same mind, or the relationship two mental systems bear when they 
jointly constitute or constitute in part a single mind). Their primary focus has been on 
the perceptual redundancy afforded by most environments and by much of the body: 
since both hemispheres are always in the same place at the same time, and since they 
have all the same sensory modalities, and have access to representations of many of 
the same parts of the body and world, they will see, hear, smell, feel, etc., many of the 
same things.  
The reason that mental duality advocates have placed most of their emphasis 
on the role of perceptual redundancy, when explaining split-brain subjects’ day-to-
day behavior, is probably that perceptual redundancy is precisely what the spli-brain 
experiment is designed to reduce. But cross-cuing is another feature often used to 
explain the integrated nature of split-brain subjects’ behavior outside of experimental 
situations, and for the same reason. Less usually referred to but (it seems to me) a  
least as important are the behavioral constraints no doubt posed by shared 
embodiment. Beyond the simple (but vitally important) fact that the two hemispheres 
cannot be two places at the same time, non-cortical structures would play a role in 
ensuring a degree of behavioral integration, even when the two hemispheres issue 
very different motor commands simultaneously. (Thus subjects might succeed in 
engaging in mutually conflicting actions with their two hands at once, but I have 




two actions would require physically incompatible postural sets, not just intentionally 
different actions.) Indeed, the constraints posed by shared embodiment go a long way 
towards explaining why a split-brain subject’s behavior is fairly unified even within 
experimental situations. Given these two sources of behavioral integration—
perceptual redundancy and, especially, shared embodiment—it will be hard for split-
brain subjects to constantly “act as if they are two people.” Meanwhile, shared 
embodiment is extra-mental, and perceptual redundancy, while mental, doesn’t 
require interaction between the hemispheres or integration of their mental 
processes.27  
My point about the role of behavioral evidence in theorizing about the 
structure of mental architecture isn’t, of course, that there is no such role. Behavioral 
evidence plays just as crucial a role for the advocate of mental duality as it does for 
the advocate of mental singularity. But it doesn’t play this role in nearly so 
straightforward a fashion as Tye implies in the passage quoted above, for several 
reasons.  
First, “one mind” or mental singularity advocates like Marks and Tye suggest 
that similar or identical behavior should be explained on the basis of (or should be 
taken as very compelling evidence of) similar or identical mental causes. This seems 
to assume that we can individuate behaviors on the basis of their physical features 
alone, and only then begin asking questions about their mental causes. In actual fact 
                                                
27 In other words, while there are admittedly mental causes of integrated behavior in the split-brain 
subject, not all of these support a “one mind” conclusion. As Gazzaniga (1985) has emphasized, for 
instance, certain features of human psychology—such as t e desire to see one’s behavior as coherent 
and rational and voluntarily generated—must also play a role in unifying behavior. Yet these features 





we individuate behaviors partly in terms of their mental causes all the time. Telling 
someone that you have no idea how their car got that huge dent in it is, for the 
purposes not just of moral but of psychological theorizing, a different behavior 
depending on whether or not you actually do know the origin of the dent. There is, in 
general, a bi-directional relationship between individuating and classifying behaviors 
and locating their mental causes. Part of what this means is that there is no entirely
theory-neutral way of individuating or classifying behaviors. One cannot, totally 
independently of a set of assumptions about the mental causes of behavior, 
individuate all behaviors of X-type (on the basis of a subset of their purely physical 
features for example), and then use that as evidence that they all have the same mental 
cause. It was the belief or intuition that they all have the same mental cause th t was 
used to identify those behaviors as all being of X-type to begin with. (Or, rather, I 
suppose that one could classify behaviors on the basis of their purely physical 
features—but such a classificatory schema, which wouldn’t distinguish between 
falling and lying down, would be of no use in psychological theorizing.)  
Second, note that the behavior the advocate of the mental singularity model 
takes as most relevant to the “how many minds?” (or the conscious unity) debate is 
grossly characterized, everyday behavior. More finely observed and characterized, the 
behavior of split-brain subjects is less normal.28 Which way should we characterize 
                                                
28 For instance, they have a moderate memory deficit; they show a slight tendency to confabulate; and, 
while perfectly friendly (indeed Zaidel, Zaidel, and Bogen (1999) refer to their “inappropriate or 
exaggerated politeness”), they have an impoverished ability to describe their own emotional 
experiences (ibid). (Might this be because of the voiceless right hemisphere’s role in generating 
emotional experience?) They avoid reading at any legth. (Trevarthen (1978), speculates that this may 
be because reading requires rapid and coordinated switches between right- and left-looking—and split-
brain subjects, in contrast to “normal” subjects—apparently look left and right with different 
latencies.) And they exhibit obvious impairments trying to learn new tasks involving bimanual 




their behavior, then, grossly or finely? This choice matters. If we classify behavior 
grossly, a split-brain subject behaves like a “normal” subject, strengthening the case 
that he has a “normal” subject’s mental life. If we classify behavior finely, or if we 
direct our gaze upon a much larger (i.e. temporally-extended) pattern of behavior, a 
split-brain subject behaves less like a “normal” subject, strengthening the case that he 
does not have a “normal” subject’s mental life.  
Note that these early (often implicit) choices about how to classify behaviors 
also influence our sense of which causes are mental and which merely neural. If we 
characterize behavior grossly, we may classify and individuate mental causes grossly 
also, and be content to let the details lie at the level of neural processing. (E.g., split-
brain and “normal” subjects have the same mental architecture; any behavioral 
differences between them result from differences in their neural architecture. We will 
see a version of this strategy below.) If we characterize behavior very fin ly, we may 
only be happy with a very detailed mental explanation, and then the detailed 
difference between a split-brain and a “normal” subject may suddenly look 
psychologically relevant after all. 
For instance, imagine our split-brain subject, S, in his home, sitting in an 
armchair, reading. Suddenly he gets up and walks into the kitchen, and proceeds to 
make a sandwich (using both hands). What is the (psychological) explanation for this 
behavior? We might intuitively identify “interrupting his reading to make a 
sandwich” as the behavior to be explained, and explain it by referring to S’s hunger or 
his belief that it’s lunchtime or that now would be a good time to take a break from 




Conveniently, this explanation can be offered without knowing anything about S 
other than what we’ve just observed, and as a first shot at a psychological 
explanation, this one seems fair. So far, no need to mention hemispheres, or even 
hands.  
But if we analyzed S’s behavior into smaller components, we might discover 
that his right handed behavior is controlled only by his left hemisphere and vice 
versa, or that a single hemisphere was controlling both hands. It might turn out that 
S’s right hemisphere was solely responsible for initiating S’s standing (out of 
impatience with reading and a desire to go turn on the television instead) but that his
left hemisphere was solely responsible for initiating walking to the kitchen, when it 
interpreted S’s standing as being caused not by a desire to watch television (S has 
recently vowed to cut back on television) but by a desire for lunch29. T e left 
hemisphere belief that getting out of the chair was motivated by a desire for lunch and 
its beliefs about sandwiches etc. would then be largely but not entirely responsible for 
the entire behavior, for distinct right hemisphere events—some of which look 
mental—initiated the whole sequence.  
I don’t claim that split-brain subjects’ behaviors are often caused in this way; I 
don’t think we know these sorts of details yet. My point is more general. Casual 
observation may not reveal whether a split-brain and a “normal” subject are 
exhibiting the same behavior in the relevant sense, where relevance is (as circular as 
this may sound) in part a matter of what, psychologically, caused the behavior. And 
                                                
29 Gazzaniga has in fact for a long time (at least since Gazzaniga and LeDoux, 1978) suggested that 
what he now calls the “left hemisphere interpreter” (see for instance Gazzaniga, 2000) is responsible, 
in all of us, for in effect continually asking the question, “Why am I doing this?” and then constructing 




casual or even careful observation alone certainly won’t answer the extremely 
difficult theoretical question of which causes of behavior are mental and which not.  
Probably there is no single best way to characterize anybody’s behavior, 
grossly or finely, at all times. Often grossly characterized behavior may be just what 
we’re after. And grossly characterized, split-brain subjects’ everyday behavior does in 
fact seem “unified”; it is certainly adaptive. But grossly characterized behavior often 
isn’t a great help in letting us locate the precise causes of that behavior. We may not 
always be interested in knowing the very detailed causes of behavior, but when we 
are, we may want to individuate characterize the behavioral explanandum more 
finely. 
Gross behavior often isn’t a great help in letting us locate precise mental 
causes especially when everything is working well. The behavior of a 
psychologically, intellectually, neurologically normal human adult, for example, can 
even make the notion of a “general purpose learner” or an “indivisible mental 
substance” look intuitively plausible. It is the blindsighted patients, the subjects with 
autism and agnosia, the child struggling to learn irregular verbs, or Damasio’s (1995)
ventromedial prefrontal cortices-damaged patients (who do so well on standardized 
tests of intelligence and moral reasoning and yet fare so poorly in the game of life) 
who make it a little easier to discern the architecture of all humans’ minds. Split-brain 
experiments are specifically designed to identify the precise causal, mental basis of 
split-brain subjects’ behaviors; the behaviors that emerge during those experiments, 




Tye seems to suggest, however, that split-brain’s disunified behavior at some 
moments (whether in or outside of experimental situations) isn’t even r l vant to 
determining how many streams of consciousness they have at other moments, when 
their behavior is unified. Behavior that occurs at t2, in other words, is irrelevant to 
determining the mental cause of a behavior occurring earlier at t1 or later at t3. This 
cannot be correct. We do want mental explanations that account for local, immediate 
behavior, but these explanations should be consistent with more global patterns of 
observed behavior. If the “how many minds?” question is a question about mental 
architecture, and minds, rather than being mere coll ctions of mental states, are 
defined architecturally, then we would expect basic rchitecture to remain largely 
stable over significant periods of time. What is much more fluid is the set of mental 
states (especially their contents) someone is subject to at any moment; we can easily 
imagine these changing (they’d better change!) in and outside of experimental 
situations. The “psychological frameworks” Tye (2003) apparently identifies with 
minds lack the stability we would probably want minds to have, since he defines 
these frameworks only in terms of coherent sets of mental states. Mental 
architectures, however, do have this stability.  
Finally, the behavior of split-brain subjects also isn’t the only relevant 
evidence for determining how many minds or streams of consciousness they have. 
There are at least some obvious, non-controversial limits to the significance of unified 
behavior in developing an adequate model of a subject’s mental architecture. Imagine 
two people yoked front-to-back to each other, with some kind of structure encasing 




move in unison, etc., producing unified behavior. Or imagine that the set-up is even 
more sophisticated than this; their brains are in fact wired up to the encasing 
structures, which moves their limbs in unison for them, and whenever conflicting 
motor plans reach the control unit for the structure, the strongest motor impulses win. 
(Or perhaps the control unit just gates one person’s motor plans for one hour, than the 
other person’s motor plans for the next hour, and so forth.) Or for that matter suppose 
when you looked inside the skull of a subject whose behavior was perfectly unified 
you saw to your shock that there were actually two tiny little guys in his bra n—with 
arms and legs and language and everything—controlling his behavior!  
Such examples are fantastical, but they show, again, that there are non-
controversial limits to the significance of even the most integrated behavior in 
theorizing about mental structure and in individuating minds. Psychological theories 
should of course be empirically adequate with respect to behavior. But, as essential a  
this criterion for theoretical adequacy is, it is still minimal. Psychological theories 
should also cohere with what we see at the level of neural implementation.  
No realist functionlist, of course, would disagree with this claim. But one 
might still argue that because we have neural architecture to refer to in the split-brain 
case to explain occasional instances of experimentally-induced dissociative or 
disunified behavior, this obviates the need to refer to any kind of unusual mental 
architecture to explain that same behavior. Thus one might interject, “Why can’t we 
just explain the lack of direct interaction between, say, one of S’s conscious (right 
hemisphere) experiences and another of S’s conscious (left hemisphere) experiences, 




explanation for occasional instances of clearly disunified behavior in S, is, after all, 
very easy to explain in broad strokes, simply by referring to S’s unusual ne ral 
architecture. After having offered this explanation, why take the extravagant second 
step of attributing to S two minds?” 
Tye appears to appeal to this sort of explanation at one point in the context of 
arguing that split-brain subjects aren’t two persons. Of a case in which the word 
“pen” has been projected to the right hemisphere of a split-brain subject, he writes:
“The fact that the split-brain patient doesn’t say ‘pen’, when asked what he saw, 
doesn’t show that he doesn’t believe that he saw ‘pen’. He does believe that. It’s just
[that], given the commissurotomy, he can’t verbally express that belief” (2003: 116). 
Thus there is a physical explanation for why the subject does not say that he just saw 
a pen. No further psychological explanation is necessary. And because there is such 
an obvious physical explanation for what might otherwise be puzzling behavior, we 
need not postulate the existence of multiple minds—merely an unusual neural 
architecture. 
It is of course true as a general rule that apparently inconsistent attributions of 
mental properties may be easily reconciled when we learn more about the neural 
architecture underlying them. For example, we can say that a stroke victim with 
visual agnosia consciously sees a fork, knows what a fork is, and yet cannot verbally 
identify it as a fork. We can say all this about the stroke victim knowing that the 
stroke has compromised some high-level visual areas of her brain, depriving her, 
perhaps, of the visual template for “fork,” and therefore making her incapable of 




however, that we can say all this about the stroke victim not just because she has an 
“unusual” neural architecture, but because of what we know about that architecture. 
Thus in the case of a stroke victim who can verbally identify a fork as a fork afte 
touching it, but not after looking at it, there is of course no need to postulate multiple 
subjects of experience, for instance—a feeling subject who knows what a fork is and 
a seeing one who doesn’t.  
But commissurotomy is a particular, not a general, case, with at least one 
strikingly different feature from (most) other unusual neural architectures. While 
many cases of unusual neural architecture may involve some compromised access
between mental systems, and while the split-brain case does of course involve this, in 
the split-brain case each of the mental systems in question—that associated with the 
left hemisphere and that associated with the right—is capable of supporting a mid
“comfortably characterizable as human” (Marks 1981: 47, fn. 18). Both hemispheres 
can sustain (I am assuming along with Tye) conscious experiences—experiences to 
which the other hemisphere is not subject. Either hemisphere can guide intelliget 
behavior, apparently without the help (indeed, sometimes despite the hindrance) of 
the other. There is even evidence that, in split-brain subjects, the hemispheres 
separately sustain autobiographical memories and different emotional respons  to 
these memories (Schiffer et al., 1998). Evidence not only from split-brain studies but 
from those rare cases of left or right hemispherectomy following (basically) normal 




candidate for constituting a unique mind. 30 (Tye himself apparently acknowledges 
this in a slightly different context; see p. 150).  
In the split-brain case, in other words, the very neural architecture, reference 
to which might be claimed to make unnecessary the positing of multiple minds, is in 
fact one of the strongest pieces of evidence in favor of there being multiple minds to 
begin with. For if the psychological entities we’re discussing don’t reduce in some
sense to these neural systems, then either I am wrong to assume that minds are 
(constituted by) brains, or else the discussion we’re having isn’t one of scientifi , as 
opposed to folk, psychology to begin with.  
I will continue to take the integrated nature of split-brain behavior as evidence 
against the mental duality model. As I have argued in this section, however, it is 
defeasible evidence.  
 
4 Perfect Parallelism: Does Redundancy Matter? 
I have argued that purely psychological and partly neural criteria for individuating 
minds will, all other things being equal, tend to yield the same answer to the “how 
many minds?” question. It might be said, however, that we can conceive of a 
particular kind of case that shows that the purely psychological and the partly neu al 
criteria will not yield the same answer to that question. In fact it might be said that the 
split-brain case is that case. And it might further be argued that in this special kind of 
case, the purely psychological approach to individuating minds yields the better 
answer, from the functionalist perspective.  
                                                




In this section I examine what I call the “singularity-through-redundancy” 
(STR) position: the claim that multiple neural events of the same psychological type 
and carrying the same content can be identified with a single mental token, even if 
these neural events operate causally independently of each other. I will approach this 
claim largely via the writings of Marks (1980) and Tye (2003), since they have 
developed and defended this claim most explicitly. But the claim enjoys broader 
appeal; Dennett, for example, gestures towards a similar position (1991), and even 
Sperry seemed to feel its pull at times (see his 1975 for example). One goal ofthis 
section is to help motivate a “two minds” conclusion for split-brain subjects. A larger 
goal, however, is to defend a partly neural set of criteria for individuating mental 
tokens. The underlying concern of this entire chapter is whether the causal 
relationships that multiple neural events bear, or fail to bear, to each other, constrain 
the mental events with which we can identify them. I submit that they do.  
The STR position has been defended most explicitly as a position on the 
structure of “split-brain” consciousness, rather than “split-brain” cognition or 
mentality generally. Because I wish to address particular arguments made in existing 
developments of this position, I will accordingly be talking about consciousness in 
this part of the chapter, even though a general discussion of the structure of “split-
brain” consciousness will need to be postponed until a later chapter. An examination 
of the theoretical reasons why singularity-through-redundancy fails as a 
characterization of split-brain subjects’ consciousness, however, is instructive in the 




conclusions drawn from this examination have some wider applicability to 
discussions of individuating mental tokens generally.  
 
4.1 STR: Meaning, Motivation, and Empirical Adequacy 
Marks and Tye say that “normal” subjects behave in a unified fashion, and that we 
believe that this is partly due to these subjects each having a single stream of 
consciousness or a unified consciousness. In their daily lives, meanwhile, the gross 
behavior of split-brain subjects usually resembles that of these “normal” subjects. 
Marks asks, “If we account for our integrated behavior, at least in part, by assuming 
unity of consciousness and can do the same for split-brain patients, why not do so?” 
(Marks 1981: 22) 
Marks and Tye accept that there are occasional times during the split-brain 
experiment at which split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness. 
Notwithstanding such moments they believe that a split-brain subject’s consciousness 
is normally singular or unified. They therefore face the challenge of showing how the 
split-brain experimental paradigm could alter the structure of a split-brain subject’s 
consciousness, especially since it does not alter that of the “normal” subject. 
(“Normal” subjects do not exhibit the conscious dissociation under conditions of 
perceptual lateralization that split-brain subjects appear to.) The solution both 
philosophers take is to say that conscious unity—which they equate to having a single 
stream of consciousness—can supervene on certain properties of conscious contents. 
When present, the corpus callosum ensures conscious unity even under conditions of 
lateralized perception, by allowing some kind of interhemispheric communication of 




subject will normally be subject to the same (or to highly similar) conscious ntents, 
Marks and Tye (and many others) believe, because they will be receiving the same 
(or highly similar) information from the environment and the body. The singularity-
through-redundancy claim asserts that what Marks calls the “independent duplication 
of information” suffices for a unified consciousness. Multiple neural events of the 
same mental type (e.g. conscious experience), and bearing the same content, a  
together constitute a single mental token, even if there is no causal interaction 
between them.  
One distinction that I will draw again in Chapter Four, on the structure of 
split-brain consciousness, but which is important to make here as well, is that 
between having a unified thing or things, and having a single thing, unified or 
disunified. In our daily language we generally treat “unified consciousness” and 
“single stream of consciousness” as near-synonyms—as mere different parts of 
speech. Yet some of those who have argued that split-brain subjects have two minds 
and two streams of consciousness prefer not to speak of mental or conscious disunity
so much as duality.31 They believe that, particularly since the hemispheres may be 
often or even always associated with similar psychological states, histories, and 
dispositions, it might be misleading to describe the hemispheres as mentally or 
consciously disunified, for the term “disunity” connotes conflict and discord.  
Ascribing a dual consciousness has fewer of these potentially misleading 
implications, and so, too, I submit, should ascriptions of multiple streams of 
consciousness. Since I am concerned with individuating mental tokens, and not with 
providing a qualitative analysis of their character, I prefer to speak of conscious 
                                                




singularity and duality, of having one stream of consciousness and having two 
streams of consciousness, rather than speaking of unity and disunity.  
Defenders of the singularity-through-redundancy characterization of split-
brain subjects’ consciousness are also interested in individuating streams of 
consciousness (though Tye especially is interested in providing some analysis of their 
phenomenal character as well). So they do not merely believe that the two 
“disconnected” hemispheres are largely unified in some sense or other. They claim 
something stronger. Defenders of the STR position, like Marks and Tye, equate 
having a single stream of consciousness with having a unified consciousness, and 
having two streams of consciousness with having a disunified consciousness.32 They 
therefore claim that to the extent that the two hemispheres are associated with the 
same conscious contents, they are associated with the same conscious tokens. It is thi  
claim that I reject.  
Now one objection to the singularity-through-redundancy characterization of 
split-brain consciousness is empirical: the two hemispheres are almost certainly not 
subject to identical, or even to highly similar, conscious contents outside of 
experimental situations. They are no doubt subject to more similar contents outside of 
experimental situations than they are inside of them, and this no doubt offers at least a 
                                                
32 Tye rejects attributing to split-brain subjects “two separate streams of consciousness that remain two 
from the time of the commissurotomy” in favor of saying that such subjects “are single persons whose 
phenomenal consciousness is briefly split into two under certain special experimental conditions, but 
whose consciousness at other times is unified” (2003: 126, citing Marks 1980 as well). Likewise, as a 
“rough necessary condition for two simultaneous cons ious experiences belonging to the same stream 
of consciousness”, Marks offers, “e1 and e2 belong t  the same unified consciousness only if they are 
known, by introspection, to be simultaneous” (1980: 13, emphasis added), thus tying possession of a 
single stream of consciousness to possession of a uni ied consciousness. Both philosophers meanwhile 
also accept what is of course widely accepted, i.e. that a stream of consciousness is composed of token 
experiences (or in Tye’s case, a single token experience—this is one of the main positions argued for 




partial explanation for the fact that split-brain subjects behave differently in the two 
types of circumstance.33 Nonetheless, since the hemispheres have different patterns of 
perceptual access to the world, and since they also have different processing styles 
and capacities, and appear to experience emotions somewhat differently, and to have 
access to a somewhat different store of long-term memories—not to mention the fact 
that one hemisphere can presumably generate a fairly normal stream of inner speech 
and one hemisphere probably can’t—it would be a stretch to imagine that the 
hemispheres are associated with highly similar, much less identical, conscious 
contents.  
This empirical objection, however, is irrelevant to determining a general 
method of individuating minds and other mental tokens, and I therefore set it aside in 
most of what follows. For most of this section I will assume that the two hemisphere  
of a split-brain patient are subject to highly similar conscious contents; eventually I 
will consider what we should say of a subject who possessed two hemispheres that 
independently generated neural events bearing truly indistinguishable psychologi al 
properties at every moment.  
 
                                                
33 The split-brain experiment, however, is also typically designed with the goal of eliciting a response 
from a hemisphere that might otherwise not respond; this probably plays a role in the increased degree 
of behavioral disunity patients exhibit in the labs. Schiffer, Zaidel, Bogen, and Chasan-Taber (1998) 
elicited different answers to questions about an unhappy childhood experience from the two 
hemispheres of a split-brain subject, for example, by putting two sets of pegs, five in each set, in fro t 
of the patient but obscured from his vision, where the leftmost peg in each set represented “none” and 
the rightmost represented “extreme,” and then requiing the subject to answer questions like, “How 
much did this experience upset you at the time?” using both hands at once. The subject P.S. (see 
Gazzaniga, LeDoux, 1978) similarly gave different responses when asked what he wanted to do 
professionally as an adult, depending on whether he was asked to respond verbally (using his left 
hemisphere) or in writing using his left hand (using his right hemisphere). Same stimuli, in other 




4.2 Constituting a Single Token 
The singularity-through-redundancy position holds that multiple neural events may 
jointly constitute a single mental event regardless of the nature of their causal relation 
to each other.34 This section examines two analogies Tye (2003) offers in support of 
this position and argues that both analogies are inappropriate to that purpose. The first 
seems simply non-analogous, and the second is subtly question-begging against those 
who would claim that the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are associated with 
distinct mental tokens.  
  4.2.1  The projector analogy 
Tye anticipates that some will object to STR by saying that, “a single exp ri nce 
cannot have as its physical basis neural events in the left and right hemispheres that 
are themselves causally unrelated.” But, he asks, “why not?”:  
Consider the following example. Two movie projectors each 
project an image onto a screen at time t. Only a single image is 
present on the screen at t, since identical slides are in the 
projectors and they are aimed at exactly the same part of the 
screen. There are two projections but only one image. One 
projection is redundant. Each projection on its own suffices for 
the screen image. 
       (Tye 2003: 127)  
 
There are three difficulties with this analogy. Note, first, that the redundancy 
in the “contents” of the projections is in fact irrelevant to their generation of a single 
image; one machine could project an image of a child at play, the second of a hulking 
                                                
34 At least, so long as they are both located in the same creature or brain; I am sure that neither Marks 
nor Tye would allow that one of my neural events and o e of my Twin-Earth-twin’s neural events 
could jointly constitute a single mental token. But it is not clear if this is just supposed to be a brute 
fact about creatures or brains. Part of what I am suggesting is that some of the same considerations that 
would weigh against identifying my neural event and my twin’s neural event with a single mental 
token also weigh against identifying a split-brain subject’s right and left hemisphere neural events wi h




monster, and the result would be a single image of a monster lurking over an 
unsuspecting child at play. The generation of a single image is a function of the 
direction in which the projectors are aimed, rather than of the contents they are 
projecting.  
More troublingly, the two projections appear not to realize but to produce the 
image. One could, for example, increase or decrease the number of images without 
manipulating the projections, simply by moving (or removing altogether) the scre n. 
But everyone will accept that a mental event can causally depend upon two 
independently acting neural events. The relationship between realizer and realized is 
more intimate than the relationship between cause and effect, and Tye needs to 
provide an analogy more clearly involving the former.  
Even if the projections did jointly realize the image, however, the doubly-
projected image offers an inadequate analogy to a case of m ntal singularity through 
neural redundancy in particular, because the individuation criteria for images and 
experiences are simply too different. Clearly an audience would see a single image, 
so long as all projections terminated on the same portion of the screen. And 
individuating images is arguably just a matter of determining how many images a 
normal viewer (a human being whose visual system is functioning normally) would 
see. But as Tye himself admits, the fact that split-brain subjects don’t “see double” or 
experience having multiple streams of consciousness is to be expected, regardless of 
how many streams of consciousness any of them actually have. When it comes to 




it comes to counting experiences and streams of consciousness, particularly those that 
do have redundant contents, phenomenology may not tell us much at all.  
If the disanalogy between individuating images and individuating experiences 
isn’t immediately obvious, it is because this first analogy plays off of our naïve or 
pre-theoretic notion of conscious experience as, to borrow Dennett’s (1991) oft-
borrowed phrase, a Cartesian theater. Once we rid ourselves of the illusion that 
conscious experience is a thing we atch, it is unclear what a conscious experience is 
supposed to be analogous to in this example. Maybe to the beam of light? But there 
are two of those. 
  4.2.2 The restaurant analogy 
In his second analogy, Tye, while seated at a restaurant, waves both of his arms at 
once to catch his server’s attention. There are two arm-wavings here, he says, and et 
one event of signaling the server. 
Note that this fails to show that either arm-waving is redundant in the sense of 
something unnecessary to giving the signaling event its character. There are, for 
example, social and psychological differences between trying to catch your serve ’  
attention by raising one hand, and trying to catch his attention by waving both hands 
wildly in the air, just as there are social and psychological differences between trying 
to catch his attention by waving both hands wildly in the air, and trying to catch his 
attention by shouting “Hey, boy!”35 
                                                
35 Tye himself introduces the example by asking us to imagine a “case in which I am in a restaurant, 
and, being anxious to leave, I signal the waiter by raising both hands in the air and waving them” 
(2003: 127; emphasis mine). Tye’s feeling it necessary to imply that of course he wouldn’t wave both 
hands in the air to catch his server’s attention unless he were particularly anxious constitutes an 
inadvertent admission that neither arm-waving is truly edundant, since both arm-wavings are 




Nonetheless, even if the event of signaling with one hand and the event of 
signaling with two hands have a different character, each appears to be but a single
event, and individuating events (tokens), rather than providing a qualitative analysis 
of their nature, is our current concern. Still, it is worth asking why Tye seems right 
that waving both arms in a restaurant is one way of realizing a single event.How do 
we know that waving two biological arms in the air isn’t just one way of realizing two 
waving-one-arm events—waving two prosthetic arms being a different way of 
realizing two waving-one-arm events?  
Actually, waving two biological arms in the air may be one way of realizing 
two waving-one-arm events. But Tye b lieves that there are two waving-one-arm 
events. His claim is that there is just one signaling event. How many events some 
spatiotemporal region constitutes or contains is relative to a particular level of 
description. There is a single signaling event in Tye’s restaurant case because 
signaling one’s server is a communicative act, and we individuate such acts partly in 
terms of intention. Thus if two parties seated near each other talked and decided (their 
situation being somewhat desperate) to both wave their hands at the same time in the 
hopes of finally catching their server’s attention, they arguably both participate in  
single signaling event. But if the same two parties both waved their hands at once by 
mere coincidence, then there were arguably two, simultaneous signaling events.  
Part of the reason we may find it hard to conceive of a reason we would want 
to say, of the original case that Tye provided, that there are two signaling events, is 
because we are just so used to thinking of a single human organism as having a single 




to behavior. In Tye’s original “restaurant” analogy, the two arm-waving events aren’t 
initiated causally independently of each other in the way we deem relevant to 
individuating communicative actions, because we attribute to Tye a single intention to 
signal by waving both arms.  
But of course precisely what is under consideration is to what extent this same 
sort of attribution is warranted for split-brain subjects. Identifying Tye’s two arm-
waving events with a single signaling event rests upon the assumption that there was 
a single mental event—a single intention to signal by waving both arms—causally 
responsible for both realizing (arm-waving) events. Proponents of the conscious and 
mental duality models claim that the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are 
associated with distinct mental events that drive the subject’s (unified-seeming) 
behavior, causally independently of each other, to a significant degree. Tye obviously 
disagrees, but his restaurant analogy offers only question-begging support for his 
position.  
Note again that it isn’t just the number of token intentions to signal that 
determine how many signaling events we locate. In the case in which two parties
waved at once, each possessed a unique token intention to wave; whether we see one 
or two signaling events depends upon whether there was an interactive process 
leading to the formation of the two token intentions. We ask the parties, “Did you talk 
to each other, and come to a mutual decision to jointly signal your server? Or did you 
each come to the decision to wave independently—was it mere coincidence that you 
both waved at once?” We try to determine whether there was a certain kind of causal 




wavings. So it is, too, when the events we’re counting aren’t communicative actions 
but cognitive acts.  
 
4.3 Three Claims on Irrelevance 
This subsection turns to three distinct claims supporting the singularity-through-
redundancy position, particularly as applied to the structure of split-brain subjects’ 
consciousness. These claims all concern what, if any, psychological significance 
attaches to the causal relationship that holds or that fails to hold between the neural 
events in whose mental identity we are interested.  
  4.3.1 Multiple realizatibility and the type-token distinction 
The first claim supporting the singularity-through-redundancy position asserts that 
facts about the realizers of mental phenomena are mere implementation facts, of no 
significance to their psychological identity.  
Fodor (1975) has argued that the kinds postulated by psychology will not 
reduce to the kinds postulated by any purely physical (non-functional) science, 
because the kinds of psychology—the types of entities to which it will refer in its 
laws—are multiply realizable. What makes a given mental event a pain event, or an 
event of believing something, as opposed to some other kind of mental event or no 
mental event at all, isn’t a matter of its intrinsic physical properties, but the role it 
plays within a functionalist story, a role connecting it to sensory inputs and to motor 
outputs and to other mental events. Thus creatures whose physical design was 
radically different from ours could nonetheless possess some or all of the same types 




somehow implement a functional design similar to that implemented by our own 
brains (whatever design that turns out to be).   
The principle of multiple realizability is foundational to the functionalist 
program, and has been appealed to in order to support the singularity-through-
redundancy claim. Marks answers the question, “Why should neural processes 
unrelated by direct causal routes not be the physical basis for a single mental state?” 
(Marks 1980: 23) in part by citing Fodor (1975). Tye says that when a split-brain 
subject’s right and left hemisphere, causally independently of each other, each 
generate a neural event of the type experience and carrying the same content, “There 
is. . . . a single experience. . . with a neurological realization or constitution that is
partly redundant and that differs from the neurological realization or constitution” 
that that single experience would have “in normal subjects” (Tye 2003: 127). Same 
mental events, different realizers, in other words. 
By casting the neuro-functional differences between split-brain and “normal” 
subjects as mere differences in how experience is realized, rather than as differences 
in how many experiences are realized, those sympathetic to the singularity-through-
redundancy position seek to ward off a simple objection. This objection states that 
while the hemispheres of a split-brain subject, S, may bear the same types of 
experiences (where contents are included in type), they surely bear distinct token 
experiences, for S’s hemispheres realize the experiences they realize causally 
independently of each other, and do not have a means of transmitting to each other 
the contents of at least the bulk of their experiences (absent behavior).36 This 
                                                
36 Due to the fact that the hemispheres remain connected to each other via mutual connectedness to 




objection rests on the intuition that facts about the causal properties of a neural event 
constrain the mental events with which we can identify it.  
Drawing on the language of multiple realizability, Marks and Tye respond that 
such facts are facts about how psychological phenomena are implemented, but are not 
psychological facts properly speaking. We can, and should, refer to those facts at
some times—such as when we need to explain why a split-brain subject’s 
consciousness, and not that of a “normal” subject, becomes dual or disunified37 
during the split-brain experiment. Marks writes that this disunity:  
is itself explained by the fact that the experimental controls 
defeat the mechanisms which are, as a result of 
commissurotomy, responsible for unity of consciousness in 
these patients. Similarly there is a natural explanation for the 
behavioral differences between split-brain patients and normal 
controls. The mechanisms which subserve unity of 
consciousness in the normal controls differ in ways that make 
them immune to failure in the experimental situation. 
     (Marks 1980: 22-3)   
 
But facts about functional neuroanatomy are facts about the mechanisms 
subserving various mental phenomena, not facts about which mental phenomena are 
actually being subserved. Marks believes that the moral of the split-brain cases is that:  
bilateral neural representation is a physical basis for unity of 
consciousness; but it is irrelevant how such representation is 
                                                                                                                                          
mental states that the hemispheres generate or expei nc  in an interactive way. Emotional states may 
represent an exception to the general rule that the two “disconnected” hemispheres generate 
experiences independently of each other; certain other feeling-like states, “affective mental auras” (as
Sperry, Zaidel, and Zaidel, (1979), once put it) or impressions seem the product of interhemispheric 
interaction as well. My fundamental concern in this section isn’t with the structure of split-brain 
subject’s consciousness, however, but with the singularity-through-redundancy claim. That claim 
doesn’t hinge upon the possibility of any kind of interhemispheric interaction in the generation of 
experience; it rather asserts that even without such interaction, two hemispheres can jointly generate a 
single stream of consciousness. I therefore ignore he as much as possible many complications and 
subtleties regarding interhemispheric interaction in split-brain subjects. Many of these will be returned 
to in Section Six, however. 




achieved, whether through the commissures or through 
mechanisms for independent duplication.  
   (Marks 1980: 22, emphasis added) 
 
Facts about how conscious representation is achieved in the “normal” and in 
the “split” brain should not constrain the individuation of psychological entities—
such as streams of consciousness—which are, after all, multiply realizable.  
If the principle of multiple realizability is correct, then creatures with a wide 
variety of physical constitutions could possess streams of consciousness. This does 
not mean that physical facts are irrelevant to individuating particular streams of 
consciousness, however. A mental token is a physical thing—a realizer of a particular 
mental type. The thesis of multiple realizability, and the fact that, as Marks says, the 
“general account of mind advocated by philosophers as diverse as Fodor and Grice. . . 
does not require corresponding types of neurological states for each type of
psychological state” (Marks 1980: 23, emphasis added), provides no support for the 
further claim that causally unrelated neural events can form “the basis for a single
mental state” (Marks, 1980: 23; emphasis added). The latter is a claim about mental 
tokens. But the principle of multiple realizability doesn’t say anything about how to 
individuate experiences or other tokens. It is silent on this matter. Since the principle 
of multiple realizability provides no guidance where counting mental tokens is 
concerned, we must turn elsewhere for this guidance.  
  4.3.2 Is causal independence psychologically relevant? 
The defender of STR must claim that multiple neural events (again, at least within a 
single creature or brain) can constitute a single mental token regardless of their causal 




claim. The claim could be interpreted simply as stating that mutually causally 
independent neural events can nonetheless together constitute a single mental token. 
Alternatively it could be interpreted as stating more narrowly that there is a particular 
class of cases in which neural events can constitute a single mental token causally 
independently of each other: that class of cases in which the neural events in question 
have “redundant” psychological properties. I will consider the broad interpretation 
first and the narrower interpretation next. 
Marks says that “the crucial causal principle” underlying the intuitive 
objection to the singularity-through-redundancy claim, i.e. the principle that the 
neural events which constitute a single token of a mental type must be themselves be 
causally related in some way, “is not strongly motivated. Why should neural 
processes unrelated by direct causal routes not be the physical basis for a single
mental state?” Psychofunctionalism certainly doesn’t “require any direct causal links 
between the neural events which are the physical basis for a single psychological 
state. It would be sufficient if causally unrelated neural events jointly, though 
separately, produced effects which were, from the standpoint of the psychology, the 
basis of a single mental state” (Marks 1980: 23). 
Anyone familiar with the binding problem (or problems) may second Marks 
here: no direct causal links (on an intuitive notion of “direct”) are required between 
neural events in order for them to realize a single mental state. The binding problems 
(roughly) concern how it is that we perceive objects possessing multiple perceptual 
properties, and entire scenes composed of such objects, given the fact that perceptual 




manner in the brain, such that color and shape, for example, are represented in 
different parts of the brain. If we state a priori, as it were, that two neural events can 
only constitute a single mental event when they are directly physically linked (in 
some intuitive sense of “directly”), then we may never find the neural correlates of 
the mental tokens that we surely possess. Marks would presumably say that a 
psychofunctionalist theory need not await a neurophysiological solution to the 
binding problem in order to speak confidently of the mental token that is my visual 
experience of my laptop (one representing it as having a certain shape and color and 
location).  
But even assuming that all this is correct, the kinds of causal independence the 
binding problem concerns appear irrelevant to the kind of causal independence we’re 
talking about in the split-brain case. To begin with, behavioral evidence alone allows
us to conclude that whatever neural mechanisms are responsible for phenomenal and 
functional binding in split-brain subjects, they operate intra-hemispherically (at least 
largely).38 Under conditions of perceptual lateralization, perceptual information is not 
bound, either phenomenally or functionally, across the hemispheres.  
Kingstone and Gazzaniga (1995) showed the right and left hemispheres of 
split-brain subjects different halves of compound words or word pairs, and yet the 
percept of each half was not joined phenomenally with the percept of the other half: 
subjects would report (left hemisphere) having seen the word “dog” rather than the 
(compound) word “hotdog”, for example. The two percepts also did not appear to be 
                                                
38 Again, I am ignoring the potentially major exception of binding via subcortical structures, largely 
because the singularity-through-redundancy position does not require any wholly brain-mediated 
interaction between the hemispheres. The shape thesstructures give to split-brain consciousness will 




bound together functionally somehow: when asked to draw the referent of the word 
they’d seen, subjects sometimes drew a dog, and sometimes a sun or a stove or a 
thermometer, but never a frankfurter.  
Supporters of the singularity-through-redundancy position might point out that 
on those trials for which they were allowed visual feedback while drawing, subjects 
did sometimes draw a dog sweltering under a hot sun. They did sometimes draw a 
picture integrating the referents of both halves of the compound word pairs, that is, if 
not a picture of the (single) referent of the compound word. Doesn’t this show that 
looking and drawing behaviors can be used to bind right and left hemisphere percepts 
functionally, if not phenomenally? But as the authors pointed out, the production of 
this sort of drawing, “does not reflect an internal. . . . transfer of. . . information.” 
“Indeed,” the authors continue, the only time that right and left hemisphere “word 
information. . . [is] integrated is on the sheet of paper in the drawing itself” 
(Kingstone & Gazzaniga, 1995: 324, emphasis added). Though the behavior might 
have been “unified” in some sense or other, interhemispheric percepts and processing 
were not bound in the sense relevant to the binding problem, nor in the sense relevant 
to individuating mental tokens. After all, if you were shown the word “hot” and I was 
shown the word “dog” and we both took a turn with a pencil, we might produce the 
same drawing.  
Again, then, whatever neural mechanisms are responsible for binding, they 
operate (largely) intra-hemispherically in split-brain subjects. But there is a more 
general principle lurking beneath this empirical point. The various proposed solutions 




O’Reilly, Busby, and Soto, 2003; Robertson, 2003; Treisman, 1996; Treisman and 
Gelade, 1980) all seem to require that multiple neural events constituting a single 
mental token at least have causal connections to further neural events, some of which 
also have a mental description. But interhemispheric interaction in split-brain subjects 
by and large does not supervene on wholly neural and mental events. It supervenes 
partly on behavioral and environmental events—as in the study cited above, in which 
a split-brain subject, S, can produce an “integrated” picture only if S’s right 
hemisphere can watch S’s left hemisphere drawing a dog, after which point, S’s right 
hemisphere can add its own pictorial contribution.39 Interhemispheric neural event 
pairs in split-brain subjects do not j intly produce mentation. They do jointly produce 
behavior: there are no doubt tons of behaviors in which split-brain subjects engage 
that involve the joint participation of both right and left hemisphere. But then there 
are many behaviors in which my sister and I engage which involve the joint 
participation of events located in her brain and events located in mine.  
I suspect Marks is right that two neural events need not interact with each 
other directly, physically, in order to constitute a single mental event.40 While the 
various and diverse proposed solutions to the binding problems all seem at least 
compatible with this assertion, they also all recognize a limit to how causally distant 
from each other these neural events can be, before we cease being able to recognize 
                                                
39 Of course, subjects will draw a frankfurter outside of the split-brain experimental paradigm, when 
they are allowed to read the compound “hot dog” naturally, scanning from left to right such that both 
parts of the compound are scanned in both visual fields, so that each hemisphere sees the compound. 
But, first, the production of such a drawing relies upon behavioral and environmental events, just as 
above, and second, it is quite likely that the drawing will be the product of a single hemisphere 
(probably the left, given other results that obtained in this study) rather than of both, thus still not
reflecting any interhemispheric binding.  
40 In fact they might not need to interact, technically, with each other at all, so long as they both 
interacted with a third neural event in an appropriately direct way; then, perhaps, the three neural 




them as constituting a single realizer, rather than as distinct realizes, of mental 
phenomena. Right and left hemisphere neural event pairs in split-brain subjects are 
for the most part located at a point past this distance, for their interaction does not 
occur prior to the behavior that they cause. When duality theorists say that in a split-
brain subject the right and left hemisphere generate experience causally 
independently of each other, this is the kind or degree of causal independence they 
have in mind.  
 4.3.3 Is neural redundancy psychologically relevant? 
There is a narrower claim that the STR position might be interpreted as making. Th s 
is the claim that even if, as a general rule, the mutual causal independence of two 
neural events requires identifying them with distinct mental tokens, there is an 
important exception to this rule: those instances in which the two neural events in 
question have indistinguishable mental properties. In such instances, either set of 
events seems redundant from a psychological standpoint. Why, then, identify each set 
with a unique set of mental tokens? 
After all, Marks calls it “a commonplace that the neural structure of human 
brain [sic] is highly redundant”; why should it, “be surprising if the redundancy is 
sometimes irrelevant for the purposes of psychology” (Marks 1980: 23-24)? Tye, too, 
says that:  
There seems no obvious reason why nature should not have made 
us so that, in certain circumstances, there is redundancy at the 
neural level in the generation of perceptual experience. After all, it 
is well known that the human brain has a neurological structure 
that is highly redundant anyway. Why not also here? 




The purported redundancy is from the psychological perspective but at the 
neural level: there are two realizations, but a single mental token, of a mental type. 
The realizing events are thus psychologically redundant, and the fact that there are 
two of them is psychologically irrelevant. 
This analogy to the “well known” redundancy of the human brain may be 
subtly question-begging, however. Two neural events need do more than bear the 
same content (and instantiate the same mental type) in order to be redundant. In most 
contexts, for instance, your neural event representing a rapidly approaching truck will 
hardly be redundant simply because I already have neural event with the same 
content. Psychological redundancy seems to occur within a mental system, where 
what constitutes a single mental system seems itself to be a matter of causal
organization.  
It makes sense to speak of the structure of the brain (and perhaps even of 
some of the contents of the brain) as to some extent redundant, assuming that the 
brain is a functional system characterized by a certain functional organizatio  and so 
forth. Thus if one area of the brain is damaged, another area can functionally 
compensate for its loss.41 
But those who advocate a conscious and mental duality model for split-brain 
subjects believe that the two “disconnected” hemispheres are distinct mental systems, 
and that right hemisphere neural events are therefore not psychologically redundant. 
                                                
41. Though even here there may not be exact redundancy in many instances; sometimes one area of the 
brain functionally compensates for the damaged area, t least to some extent, without performing the 
exact same operations. We should be careful not to individuate mental functions and capacities too 




Indeed, it seems fairly simple to show that right and left hemisphere neural events
aren’t really redundant in the split-brain subject. If, for example, something 
catastrophic suddenly happened to S’s left hemisphere visual system, his right 
hemisphere visual system would not be able to compensate for it, nor would his right 
hemisphere visual representations be able to serve as “back-up” copies of the 
representations he’s just lost, at least for many cognitive purposes. For instance, S 
wouldn’t be able to describe (via his left hemisphere) his right hemisphere 
experiences.  
This seems to suggest that attempting to formulate the STR position narrowly, 
as stating that the causal independence of two neural events is psychologically 
irrelevant so long as the events in question are redundant from a psychological 
perspective, doesn’t really change the main issue. For what qualifies as genuine 
redundancy itself seems to depend upon facts about causal interaction and 
independence.  
But the defender of STR might press that at most left and right hemisphere 
neural events aren’t redundant in the split-brain subject because the two hemispheres 
aren’t functionally identical, for instance, and thus right and left hemisphere neural 
events won’t have truly identical functional roles. But if a subject did possess two 
genuinely psychologically redundant neural events, couldn’t theyjointly realize a 
single mental token—no matter the manner of their causal connection to each other?  
 




It is worth emphasizing again that the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject sur ly 
do not have “redundant” psychological properties. The hemispheres have somewhat 
different patterns of perceptual access to the body and world; they have differing 
access to the visual field, for example, and to tactile information from the hands. But 
even if the hemispheres had identical perceptual access to the world, the right and left 
hemispheres are not functionally identical; they appear to process auditory (e.g. 
verbal) and visuospatial information differently, for example, and therefore surely 
generate mental states of different types (where content is included in type). 
Moreover, minds, certainly minds like ours, are so complex that, even if the 
hemispheres had identical patterns of perceptual access to the world, and even if they 
were functionally identical, it is highly unlikely that they would really be subject to 
all the same types of mental state (where content is included in type) at every moment 
(absent some kind of interhemispheric mental interaction to ensure this, that is).42  
Furthermore, while a description of an event’s mental type and content tells us 
a lot about its psychological properties, it doesn’t tell us everything. Even in a case in 
which the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject each generated neural event of th  
type “belief that X”, the belief might well be put to different uses in each hemisphere. 
Of course, the two uses would still have to have a lot in common in order for both 
states to remain beliefs (with the same content); they would have to share a single 
core or central causal role. Still, there are many things—probably indefinitely many 
                                                
42. As Gazzaniga once put it, “it is unlikely that the two independent mental systems (each with its 
own sensory input, processing and storage mechanisms, and motor output) would maintain equivalent 
attentional and motivational states over an extended period” (1978: 117). The same goes for other 





things—that can be done with a given mental state, even if we keep its functional type 
and content constant.  
The redundancy condition—the condition that two neural events must be truly 
redundant with respect to their psychological properties if they are to constitute a 
single mental token via causally independent processes—will be very difficult to 
meet. Certainly it is not met by the two hemispheres of split-brain subjects. Thu  
there will frequently be a way to distinguish between even two type- and content-
identical mental tokens, even within a single creature, by attending to their 
psychological properties alone, i.e. by looking at the other (instantiated) types of 
mental states they interact with. 
The STR position may still be founded on an important principle, however. 
This principle says that, whatever criteria we use to individuate neural events, when it 
comes time to individuate mental events or tokens, we should use purely 
psychological properties to do so. Thus if two neural events truly do have 
indistinguishable psychological properties, a psychological theory need not 
distinguish them, but may rather identify them with a single mental token. 
The next subsection of this chapter considers whether this is correct, or 
whether certain physical properties, in particular properties concerning the causal 
relationship a neural event bears to other neural events, is always an essential part of a
neural event’s psychological identity. It does this by conceiving of that creure for 
whom the case of singularity-through-redundancy could be made most strongly. I 
argue that even in such a case, we should reject that characterization of that creature, 




the causal properties of those tokens. It follows that in the rare case in which a purely 
psychological and a partly neural approach to individuating minds might yield 
different counts, the answer yielded by the partly neural approach is the better one.  
 
4.4 Mental Tokens 
I begin by describing the creature for whom the case of singularity-throug -
redundancy could be made most strongly. I nonetheless argue that the STR 
characterization would be inappropriate even in this case, for a method of 
individuation which is sensitive to the causal properties of realizers is required by 
those of us who are realists about functionalist explanation.  
4.4.1 Perfect parallelism: the best case for singularity-through-
redundancy 
We have seen that the principle of multiple realizability provides no support for the 
claim that causally unrelated neural events may constitute a single mentaltoken. We 
have noted that the neural redundancy, sensory decomposition and binding that exist 
in the “normal” brain are not analogous to the kinds of redundancy and causal 
independence the STR model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness concerns, and 
therefore not relevant to evaluating that model. Can anything else be said in favor of 
STR—or can anything be said more decisively against it?  
In fact I think that something more can be said in favor of the position, though 
I also think that ultimately, it still fails. To evaluate the position at its strongest and 
most plausible, consider a hypothetical case of what I will call “perfect parallelism.” 
Our “perfectly parallel” subject, PP, unlike our split-brain subject S, has two 
functionally identical hemispheres that operate wholly independently of each other 




Unlike those of our split-brain subject, PP’s two hemispheres operate in perfectly 
“redundant” or parallel fashion: every time PP’s left hemisphere generates a neural 
event realizing the belief that X, PP’s right hemisphere does also, and at the exact 
same time, but via a wholly independent causal processes. Every time PP’s right 
hemisphere generates neural event realizing the desire for Y, PP’s left hemisphere 
does too, at the exact same time, wholly independently. And every time one of PP’s 
hemispheres generates a motor plan, and initiates a motor impulse to, say, grab Z, 
PP’s other hemisphere does also, at the exact same time and again wholly 
independently, such that the set of neural events in either hemisphere alone would 
have sufficed for that exact same action having been performed. How many beliefs
that X does PP have? How many streams of consciousness? How many minds?  
Perfect parallelism is clearly a fiction, but one that may suggest that those 
sympathetic to the STR claim still have an important heoretical point against 
proponents of the duality model, who have tended to see neural facts and properties 
as in and of themselves highly relevant to the individuating of mental tokens. The 
defender of STR would presumably press, here, that while PP’s neuroanatomy may 
be striking and fascinating from some neuroscientific standpoint, the fact that PP’s 
beliefs, desires, experiences, intentions, memories, motor commands, and so forth, 
are realized “disjunctively” by two causally independent sets of neural events, is now 
without question psychologically irrelevant. For surely we lose nothing, from a 
psychological perspective, by attributing to our genuinely perfectly parallel subject, 
PP, only a single belief that X, a single desire that Y, and so forth, at every moment. 




two sets of mental tokens with indistinguishable psychological properties at every 
moment. Occam’s razor alone would suggest that we attribute the less extravagant 
number of mental tokens to PP. In which case the singularity-through-redundancy 
position, even if not tenable with respect to counting minds or streams of 
consciousness in split-brain subjects for purely empirical reasons, is premised upon a 
sound method of individuating mental tokens: in virtue of their purely psychological 
properties, and not their neural ones. In which case many members of the 
neuropsychological community have made a significant error. 
  4.4.2 Functionalism, physicalism, and the realist commitment 
Defenders of STR might at this point propose that we accept the following principle: 
that at any point in time, a given creature cannot have two or more mental tokens with 
indistinguishable psychological properties. Should functionalists accept this 
principle?  
In the abstract, functionalism doesn’t say much about the nature of mental 
tokens; functionalism proper is neutral with respect to what sorts of things can occupy 
the roles tagged by mental state terms, and is therefore in principle compatible even 
with ontological dualism. Of course the vast majority of functionalists are 
physicalists, who believe that all existing phenomena are actually physical (or h ve 
physical properties). Some functionalists—such as Rey (1994) and Tye and, so far as 
I can tell, Marks—are also realists. To commit to realism about functionalist 
explanation is to believe that there really are things occupying the roles defined in 
functionalist theories, that mental tokens of functionally defined types actually exist. 
The functionalist who is also a realist thus has an additional reason for being a 




require physical stuff (Wiggins, 1976; also Rey, 1977); identifying mental tokens, the 
realizers of mental types, with physical things, offers a way that functionalist 
explanations can be genuinely causal.  
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, this work is obviously written from the 
standpoint of a functionalism with realist commitments: it assumes that emotions and 
experiences and so forth are the types of things that are ctually realized by physical 
(I am assuming neural) events, and is concerned with the identity relations between 
mental types and neural tokens. For the functionalist who commits to realism, 
neuroscience has the potential to vindicate a psychofunctionalist theory, to show that 
the theory is not just empirically adequate or useful with respect to explaining d 
predicting behavior, but that the story the theory tells is moreover causal and correct. 
Of course the realist runs greater risks as well; neuroscientific discoveries can falsify 
the realist’s best functionalist theory, in a way that they can’t falsify the best theory of 
the non-realist. The functionalist who is a realist expects and in fact requires that at 
multiple points in the development of a psychological theory, neuroscientists will 
hunt for neural things playing one of the psychological roles the functionalist has 
described. If the functionalist is lucky, neuroscientists will find such things. If she is 
less lucky, such things won’t be found, and she will either have to repeatedly revise 
her theory or (perhaps, ultimately, following enough failures of the right sort) dr p 
the theory altogether. And sometimes neuroscientists may not only find something 





From the perspective of the functionalist who is also a realist, causal 
relationships to (instantiated) types of mental state are essential to a neural event’s 
mental type and arguably token identity. But are causal relationships to instantiated 
types of mental event all that matter to a neural event’s (mental) oken identity? Or 
are causal relationships to particular mental tokens also essential to a neural event’s 
(mental) token identity?  
It seems quite clear that relationships to particular tokens matter. Clearly, that 
one of your neural events and one of my neural events are identical with respect to th  
types of mental state to which they are causally related provides no reason for 
identifying these two neural events with a unique mental token. For the two neural 
events are causally related to distinct actual occupiers of these mental types. The 
point can be put in the following way. A mental token’s type identity is a matter of its 
bearing certain relationships to any mental tokens of particular types. But a mental 
token’s token identity is matter of it bearing certain relationships to particular mental 
tokens. The relationships that matter are of course causal and counterfactual ones:  
realist functionalism, again, is distinguished by a commitment to the reality, to the 
causal efficacy, of the entities and activities described by (some) functionalist 
psychological theory.  
Although functionalism is a theory about the types of things mental states are, 
not just mental types but mental tokens are of course familiar and important in 
functionalist psychology. Think about what it is to have an episodic memory of 
having done X, for example; there must be an actual causal connection of a certain 




twin earth doesn’t remember my mother, but not because she’s suffering from 
amnesia. She may have lots and lots of memories of someone exactly like m mother. 
But she has absolutely no memories of my mother, and therefore her memories are 
not mine.  
Now, how any of these mental tokens are individuated will be in part a 
physical matter. A mental token is an occupier of a given functionally-defined role; 
counting tokens is a matter of counting how many occupiers of that role there are. 
Occupiers are physical things; physical properties are relevant to determining how 
many such things exist. Admittedly, the physical, causal properties that an occupier of 
a psychological role possesses may not all be relevant to its individuation as mental 
token; indeed, a great number of them (e.g., the number of dendritic spines synapsed 
upon) are no doubt irrelevant. For that matter, not all of a neural event’s 
psychologically defined, actual causes and effects may matter to its identity qua 
mental token. A token percept that gives rise to a certain belief, for instance, might 
have been that same percept even if it hadn’t given rise to that belief. So not all of the 
causal relationships that a mental token does and does not bear to other mental tokens 
need matter to its token identity. But certain counterfactual relationships, for instance, 
the causal relationships a mental token can and can not bear to other role-occupiers, 
is clearly the sort of physical, functional property that matters to its kenidentity.43 
At least, it matters from the perspective of a functionalism committed to theview that 
mental tokens are real causal actors.  
                                                
43. See also Rey (1977) for an argument that the identity of a mental token hinges upon its causal 





I submit that the realist must concede that the perfectly parallel subject PP has 
two sets of mental tokens with indistinguishable psychological properties at every 
moment. Granted, by offering a complete characterization of the mental architecture 
of one of PP’s hemispheres—a characterization given in terms of interactions 
between the various types of mental states that hemisphere contains tokens of—you 
will have offered a complete characterization of the mental architecture of PP’s other 
hemisphere as well. Granted therefore that to offer a complete characterization of the 
structure of PP’s mental life as a whole, you need not refer to even a single further
(kind of) psychological property, once you have described all the psychological 
properties associated with one of PP’s hemispheres. Nevertheless, a characteriz tion 
of the structure of PP’s cognitive life would not be complete without the 
acknowledgment that there are in fact two of every psychological token and 
interaction heretofore mentioned in this characterization: two of every type of mntal 
state, two of every type of psychological process, two streams of consciousness, and 
two minds.  
Granted, it would by stipulation be impossible to see any evidence of these 
two sets of tokens with indistinguishable psychological properties in PP’s behavior. 
(Except counterfactually, through manipulations, e.g. by functionally incapacitating 
one of PP’s hemisphere and noting that PP’s behavior doesn’t change.) Granted a 
psychological theory for PP would therefore never have to mention the existence of 
two sets of mental states with indistinguishable mental properties in order to be 
empirically adequate with respect to even a single one of PP’s perfectly unified 




Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1990) point out, the realist commitment means that fit with 
behavioral data isn’t all that is relevant to evaluating a functionalist story. Whether 
that story correctly identifies the events that actually caused the behavior is also 
relevant.  
Defenders of the “singularity-through-redundancy” view might worry, 
however, that by attributing distinct mental tokens to PP’s two hemispheres, we 
actually lose explanatory adequacy with respect to behavior. For now having a single 
stream of consciousness can’t be an explanation for unified behavior, and having 
multiple streams of consciousness can’t be an explanation for disunified behavior. 
But this misses the point that perfect parallelism would be extraordinary. To the 
degree that an overlap in conscious contents ver plays a role in producing unified 
behavior, then we should expect two streams of consciousness with identical contents 
to produce unified behavior. It is just that it is highly unlikely that two such 
independently-generated streams will ever actually exist.  
Even if split-brain subjects had two hemispheres associated with highly 
similar or in fact identical conscious contents, this would not mean that such subjects 
had single streams of consciousness. Mental tokens are causal actors. Causally 
distinct mental actors—i.e. neural events that have psychological properties and that 
are causally independent in the strong sense described above in 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, or in 
any stronger sense—are distinct mental tokens. Well motivated functionalist 
principles give no reason to think otherwise. In fact, while functionalism says little 
about individuating tokens, a functionalism with realist commitments should use 




mental state types and contents play in functionalist explanations, and the status of 
mental tokens as causal actors.  
 
5 On Integrating Theory and Practice 
A major theme of this chapter so far has been the tension between neural and 
behavioral data regarding split-brain subjects—or, indeed, whether there is such a 
tension. In Section Two, Hurley (2003, 1998, 1994) argued that neuroanatomical 
facts about split-brain subjects don’t provide any objective evidence for mental 
duality, because (this is ultimately what her argument seemed to reduce to) we d n’t 
have any principled reason for privileging eural over other physical (bodily, 
environmental) phenomena as constitutive of the mental. In Section Three I showed 
that the unified or integrated character of split-brain subjects’ daily behavior cannot 
play as simple or decisive a role in supporting a mental singularity model as Mark
(1981) and Tye (2003) seem to suggest. And in Section Four I argued that 
neuroanatomical and neurofunctional facts about split-brain subjects play more of a 
role in supporting the mental duality model than Marks and Tye are willing to 
acknowledge.  
In this section I pause to examine why this theme, that of a tension between 
neural and behavioral evidence, has emerged several times in the discussion of this 
chapter. More specifically, I wish to explore whether there might be some underlyi g 
motivations for the “one mind” model of split-brain subjects that I reject, since I don’t 
think that the criteria for individuating minds that Marks and Tye, at least, offer t  




appealing. Might there be something else, some deeper motivation, driving them 
towards “one mind” conclusion? 
Recall that in my view, while the integrated nature of split-brain subjects’ 
behavior does provide some compelling evidence for the “one mind” model of “split-
brain” cognitive architecture, philosophers such as Marks (1981) and Tye (2003) have 
still drawn too strong an evidential link between split-brain subjects’ day-to-day 
behavior and the mental singularity model. I see two likely and distinct motivatins 
for their having done so. It is possible on the one hand to read Marks (1981) and Tye 
(2003)—less so Nagel (1979)—as having fallen prey to verificationism about the 
mental. Alternatively, these philosophers might believe that the “two minds” or 
mental duality model for split-brain subjects is incompatible with the way that we do 
or would understand and relate to these subjects in practical, social, legal, moral, and 
personal contexts. Nagel (1979), for one, expresses quite explicitly his concern about 
our ability to integrate theory and practice with respect to such subjects. In fact he 
seems to despair of our ultimately achieving any way to integrate our scientific and 
practical understandings of any human subjects. Perhaps Marks and Tye are 
motivated to defend the proposition that split-brain subjects have one mind apiece 
because they think doing so is the only way to avoid Nagel’s despair.44  
 
5.1 Entities and Evidence 
Verificationism is a theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a 
proposition, including or in particular a scientific proposition, is equivalent to the 
                                                
44 Hurley’s (2003, 1998, 1994) arguments, which I also discuss in this chapter and which similarly 
concern the evidential links between mental structure, brains, and behavior, are I think differently 




evidence for that proposition. This theory had close ties to logical positivism, of 
which behaviorism can be seen as an extension. Behaviorism was a theoretical 
approach in psychology that said, first of all, that the goal of psychology was to 
explain behavior, rather than to explain the mind, and that also said that psychological 
explanation should consist, in some sense, of statements about behavior (and 
behavioral dispositions and environmental stimuli). So for the behaviorist, behavior 
constitutes the proper explanandum, and the proper explanans, in psychology. 
The sense in which psychological explanation should consist of behavioral 
statements varies according to the form of behaviorism in question. Radical 
behaviorism proposed an entirely non-mentalistic explanation of behavior and was 
thus eliminativist with respect to mental states; psychological explanations should 
consist entirely in statements about behavior and environment. (Radical behaviorists 
such as Skinner believed that the cause of all behavior was directly or indirectly 
environmental—mental states and processes were not necessary to explain any 
behavior.) Analytic behaviorism was not eliminativist about mental states, but 
claimed that a mental state is just a behavioral disposition.  
Methodological behaviorism, meanwhile, was the view that scientific 
psychological procedures and explanations should be concerned with behavior, and 
not, for instance, with neurophysiological data. Rey (1997) has suggested that 
methodological behaviorism lives on in the form of what he calls superficialism, the 
view that “for every mental process there is some or other piece of outward behavior 
that would, in a particular context, be criterial (or decisive) of its presence” (1997: 




Dennett for instance admits: “I unhesitatingly endorse the claim that, necessarily, if 
two organisms are behaviorally exactly alike, they are psychologically exactly alike” 
(Dennett 1993: 922).  
Marks (1981) and Tye (2003) are not behaviorists or superficialists—at least, 
not explicitly or consistently. While some forms of functionalism incorporate 
elements of behaviorism, Marks and Tye both appear to be psychofunctionalists, who 
believe that the best (functional) analysis of mental states will come from a developed 
psychological theory (or theories). This developed psychological theory, it seems 
clear at this point, won’t be a behavioristic one.  
But nonetheless some of their arguments for mental singularity in the split-
brain subject do recall superficialism. Marks for instance claims that if a developed 
psychological theory explains the integrated behavior of “normal” subjects in part in 
terms of mental and conscious singularity, there will be great pressure on such a 
theory to explain split-brain subjects’ behavior in the same way, though note that he 
does not go so far as Dennett as to say that similar or identical behavior absolutely 
requires identical explanation: 
Since, apart from the experiments, the split-brain patients 
exhibit the same degree of behavioral integration we do, one 
would like to explain it in the same way. . . . This line, as 
opposed to treating each brain-half as a psychological subject, 
has the advantage of making the integrated action of both split-
brain patients and us depend upon the same thing. . . The 
appeal to disunity. . .will be limited to those spots where it does 
some genuine work, namely, to where it explains a lack of 
behavioral integration. So there will be considerable pressure 
on the psychology to give a one-mind account of split-brain 
patients.  (Marks 1981: 41-42; emphasis added) 
 




What leads to the supposition that split-brain patients have a 
disunified consciousness is their failure to behave in an 
integrated, coherent way in certain, special experimental 
situations. But if behavior is the evidence on which the 
hypothesis of disunity rests, then the fact that split-brain 
patients behave in an integrated way at other times supports the 
hypothesis that their consciousness is generally unified. 
    (Tye 2003: 126; emphasis added) 
 
One interpretation of these passages is that they reflect a confusion between 
the nature of a thing and the vidence we have of its nature, or between the 
metaphysical and the epistemic. There is no equivalence between disunified behavior 
and mental duality on the one hand, and unified behavior and mental singularity on 
the other, such that every time a subject behaves in a disunified fashion she must have 
two minds at that moment, and every time she behaves in a unified fashion she must 
have one mind at that moment. The behavior of a split-brain subject during the split-
brain experiment provides evidence concerning the deep structure of that subject’ 
mental life—a deep structure that is explained (in part) by the structure of the 
subject’s brain, something that doesn’t change even when her behavior changes. 
Behavior that looks “single-minded” may provide evidence, perhaps 
compelling evidence, perhaps very compelling evidence of actual single-mindedness. 
But it does not decisively support that conclusion. Neither would behavior that looked 
disunified provide decisive evidence of mental duality. The degree of “disunified” 
behavior split-brain subjects exhibit during the split-brain experiment only provides 
compelling evidence of conscious or mental duality in conjunction with hypotheses 
about how and why that behavior was elicited under those circumstances. If, for 




the split-brain phenomenon, but had no neuroanatomical abnormalities, and, 
moreover, if they exhibited this behavior not specifically during the split-brain 
experiments but rather when participating in any kind of psychological experiment 
whatsoever, the explanation for their behavior might not have been mental duality at 
all. Perhaps they would have been dubbed mentally ill, or simply uncooperative. The 
important point is, again, that mental duality (or “disunity”) doesn’t reduce to 
disunified behavior, nor vice versa, and mental singularity (or “unity”) doesn’t reduce 
to unified behavior, nor vice versa. 
For whatever reason—or probably for numerous reasons—the pull of 
verificationism often seems harder to resist in psychology than in other sciences. This 
is why Putnam’s (1975) refutations of verificationism using non-psychological 
examples, such as that of disease, remain useful. Medical professionals first become 
acquainted with a disease, X, through encountering the cluster of symptoms, W, that 
X normally produces. Indeed it may take quite some time before a particular cluster 
of symptoms, W, is hypothesized to be a cluster of symptoms, signifying the presence 
of a particular disease. And then it might still turn out that W isn’t really a cluster, or 
that it is a cluster signifying the presence of one of a number of diseases, or signifying 
either disease X or allergy Y, and so forth. Meanwhile, other people may acquire X 
without exhibiting W at all. 
The concept of a disease, in other words, is that of an underlying cause of the 
symptoms that first provided evidence that the disease existed. But the disease is not 
equivalent to the symptoms it (normally) causes. And similarly, Putnam continued, 




responses, but rather the presence of an event or condition that normally causes those 
responses” (1975: 330). Pain is what (normally) produces pain responses. Pain is not 
the cause of pain (pain is not t uching a hot stove, for instance, even though touching 
a hot stove does normally cause pain), and pain is not what pain causes. Pain is that 
which is normally (but not necessarily) caused by e.g. touching a hot stove, and that 
which normally (but not necessarily) causes e.g. wincing. And we tell similar stories 
for other mental entities. 
Including minds. The perfectly parallel subjects we considered in the previous 
section were in some respects not too far removed from Putnam’s “super-super-
Spartans. (Who, for ideological reasons, give no behavioral sign—not via report, not 
by wincing, or by screaming, or by clenching their fists, nothing—of experiencing the 
pain that they do nonetheless feel just as vividly as we feel ours.) Lacking the normal
behavioral evidence for mental and conscious duality, we nonetheless concluded that 
perfectly parallel subjects had two minds and two streams of consciousness because 
we had other evidence—neural evidence—that convinced us of their mental duality. 
Except that we are, if anything, in an even better position to conclude that perfectly 
parallel subjects have two minds and two streams of consciousness, than we would be 
to conclude that super-super-Spartans feel pain. For one thing, we had built into the 
thought experiment that we already had a good psychological theory for perfectly 
parallel subjects, one that gave us confidence that we knew the mental character of ll 
their neural goings-on. And second, we are in a better position, I think, to describe the 
sorts of behavior that pain normally causes than we are to describe the sorts of 




For (this is at least part of the explanation for this difference) we do (often) know 
when we’re in pain, and therefore can really observe the sorts of behavior that we and 
other people engage in when we’re in it. But, I would submit, we don’t know that 
we—by which I mean we human animals, and not necessarily we subjects of 
experience—have a single stream of consciousness. It’s possible that “normal” 
human subjects have two streams of consciousness as well, and therefore that much 
of the behavior we’ve thought resulted from having a single stream of consciousness 
really didn’t. And even if we do have single minds and single streams of 
consciousness, and even if we know that we do, I still don’t think that we know as 
much about the typical behavioral effects of having a single mind and a single stream 
of consciousness, as we know about the typical behavioral effects of being in great 
pain.  
Here I suppose Nagel (and perhaps Marks and Tye also) might object that my 
borrowed analogy linking mental duality to pain, or to polio, gets me in trouble. If 
polio is the thing responsible for the cluster of symptoms associated with polio, why 
can’t mental singularity be whatever normally causes unified behavior? We could just 
stipulate, that is, that whatever the mental causes of integrated behavior, it shall 
constitute a single mind. But this is what we don’t do with diseases. While the 
medical community might hypothesize that there is a single disease responsible for 
symptom-cluster W, this is a hypothesis, one that they are willing to revise in light of 
further discoveries about the cause, or causes, of W. It could have turned out that 
there were two, distinct diseases (or one disease and one allergic reaction) both 




medical community would not claim are now both a single disease by prior 
stipulation. And similarly it could turn out that there are two minds responsible for 
my integrated behavior.  
This is all of course familiar, but the verificationist turn that Putnam (1975) 
sought to bury may still haunt some corners in psychology (and philosophy of 
psychology). So perhaps verificationism is the best explanation for Marks’ (1981) and 
Tye’s (2003) (less so Nagel’s (1979)) repeated appeal to split-brain subject’ 
integrated behavior to support a mental and conscious singularity model. The appeal 
makes sense up to a point, for integrated behavior no doubt does provide some 
compelling evidence for some kind of mental integration or at least coordination. 
(The right kind or degree of which would produce mental singularity, in my account.) 
But the appeal can only be taken so far. Unified or integrated behavior is, again, 
defeasible evidence for mental and conscious singularity, just as a perfectly calm 
demeanor is compelling but defeasible evidence for the absence of great pain. 
This dissertation tries to defend the positions that split-brain subjects have two 
minds and two streams of consciousness. But the defenses of those particular 
positions are of course tentative. We don’t yet have an adequate, developed 
psychological theory or set of theories, and so we can’t yet say with certainty whether 
the kinds of causal interactions between right and left hemispheres in split-brain 
subjects isn’t of the intra-mind sort, in part because we don’t know the full extent of 
interhemispheric interaction in split-brain subjects, but in large part also because we 
don’t yet know with certainty what the “right” kind of causal interaction—interaction 




lot of what I can do at this point is just provide some evidence for supposing that 
there is a distinction between interhemispheric and intra-hemispheric interaction in 
split-brain subjects, and that this distinction is psychologically relevant, relevant to 
identifying those hemispheres with minds.  
The “how many minds?” question, applied to split-brain subjects (or for that 
matter to “normal” subjects), is like the question about whether a particular subject or 
group of subjects who perhaps aren’t showing any symptoms nonetheless all suffer 
from a common disease. What we cannot yet answer with certainty, but what we want 
to know, is whether there is some kind of unifying causal process, or some kind of 
unifying or integrating system of causal interactions, that’s absent between th  
hemispheres, though present wi hin them, in split-brain subjects. And, if the answer to 
that question is yes, what we want to know is whether this causal process is somehow 
explanatorily deep, and thus so important that its presence trumps the absence of 
superficial behavioral “symptoms” of duality. The answer to one or both of these 
questions might be no, and the “one mind” model might be correct. But 
verificationism cannot lead us to the right answer. 
 
5.2 Minds and Persons 
But there may be something else going on in Marks (1981) and in Tye (2003) and in 
Nagel (1979) that is responsible for the (in my view) exaggerated emphasis they plac  
upon split-brain subjects’ grossly characterized, day-to-day behavior, in theorizing 
about their mental structure. A second interpretation of these philosophers is that they 
are simply concerned about how on earth to reconcile a scientific model of split-brain 




practical ways of understanding and relating to those subjects. For we would naturally 
respond to such subjects, we would naturally relate to them, as if they were single 
persons, with single minds, and with a single unified consciousness, and so forth. We 
might call this the problem of integrating theory and practice.  
Tye, for instance, emphasizes that “Split-brain patients typically act as if they 
are single persons with a unified conception of the world and what is going on around 
them” (2003: 115; original emphasis)—in contrast, he says, to subjects with 
dissociative identity disorder (DID), or what used to be called “multiple personality 
disorder.” A split-brain subject—with a discernible and seemingly normal 
personality, temperament, and range of behavior types—unlike a DID subject—is not 
the sweetest, most unassuming, if a bit shy, person you’ve ever met on one day, and a 
loud-mouthed, arrogant, obnoxiously aggressive person the next. And Marks, too, 
believes that a subject with DID is a better candidate for possessing multiple minds 
than a split-brain subject is:  
The successive sets of propositional attitudes we use to explain 
her [a DID subject’s] State 1 behavior have a familiar kind of 
internal coherence, and they follow each other, with various 
changes and overlaps, in the way we expect; and those for State 
2 do so as well. Each, separately, looks like part of a typical 
psychological history of a single person. But if we attempt to 
combine them, that is, take the successive sets of propositional 
attitudes in their true temporal order, we can maintain the 
internal coherence of the individual sets on each side of a 
transition between State 1 and State 2 only by making it 
unintelligible how they could be parts of the psychological 
history of a single person.  (Marks 1981: 27) 
 
Marks makes this worry about integrating theory and practice particularly 




life forms performed outwardly undetectable, immediate-recovery laser-callosotomies 
on all “normal” human subjects last year, and that we simply haven’t discovered it 
yet, because the vast majority of us have never been subjects in a split-brain 
experiment. “For my part,” he says, “I find it scarcely conceivable that my 
individuality depends upon the falsity of this surgical fantasy, or upon any facts about 
how I might behave in . . . [a split-brain] experiment” (Marks 1981: 11). Note the last 
clause in particular: Marks is barely able to concede that his own behavior under 
conditions of perceptual lateralization could provide compelling scientific evidence 
that he has two minds (or at least, that he isn’t an individual); how can he then in 
good faith be any less reluctant to ascribe mental duality (or at least, dual identity) to 
split-brain subjects?  
The worry about integrating theory and practice is most explicit in Nagel: 
 
It seems strange to suggest that we are not in a position to 
ascribe all those experiences to the same person, just because 
of some peculiarities about how the integration is achieved. 
The people who know these patients find it natural to relate to 
them as single individuals.  
   (Nagel 1979: 159; original emphasis) 
 
Even more troublingly, for Nagel as for Marks, what we say about split-brain 
subjects has implications for what we say about “normal” subjects as well. Split-brain 
subjects are just like us in this important respect, Nagel says: they have two 
hemispheres, each of which ould support a mind in the other’s absence; as it is, 
though, those hemispheres don’t function entirely independently of each other. They 




all the ways and to the extent that ours do, this just makes our degree of “mental 
unity” greater than theirs. . . But not absolute. “Even if we analyze the idea of unity in 
terms of functional integration, therefore”—as I have suggested we do—“the unity of 
our own consciousness may be less clear than we had supposed” (Nagel 1979: 164). 
And while:  
The concept of a person might possibly survive an application 
to cases which require us to speak of two or more persons in 
one body. . . it seems strongly committed to some form of 
whole number countability. Since even this seems open to 
doubt, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single 
person will come to seem quaint some day, when the 
complexities of the human control system become clearer and 
we become less certain that there is anything very important 
that we are one of. But it is also possible that we shall be 
unable to abandon the idea no matter what we discover. 
     (Nagel 1979: 164) 
 
Nagel, in other words, ultimately suggests that no integration of theory and 
practice is possible. Either one way of understanding split-brain subjects (and 
“normal” subjects as well) will have to bow to another—or neither will yield, nor 
admit of integration with the other. The scientific worldview, in other words, and the 
non-scientific worldview, will both survive. But they will describe different worlds.  
Of course the general problem of integrating scientific with other modes of 
understanding is a deep one, and one that many people, not just philosophers and not 
just scientists, may be increasingly familiar with. And that the problem exists in this 
particular instance will probably be clear to anyone familiar with the split-bra n 
phenomenon. One of the things that makes the phenomenon so puzzling and so 
fascinating is, of course, the disconnect between their ordinary, every day, and their 




this disconnect as one between, again, scientific and other (legal, social, moral, etc.) 
modes of understanding human beings. Fortunately, I think that the theory-practice 
problem in this instance is less serious than in other, more familiar cases embodying 
this problem, such as the free will vs. determinism case.45 
This is because the mental duality model, or at least some plausible versions 
of it (including the one to which I would ascribe), understands mental duality in such 
a way that we can attribute two minds to a split-brain subject and still rationally a d 
in some sense correctly—not just pragmatically, in other words—view that subject as 
an individual, probably in most of the ways in which our pre-theoretic understanding 
of human beings suggests that we should. Thus there is, I believe, less of a conflict 
between the scientific or theoretic and the non-scientific or pre-theoretic image of 
human beings in this case, than there is in the free will case, for instance.  
The conflict between theory and practice is not so great in this instance for 
three reasons. First, the mental duality model of split-brain subjects needn’t attribute 
mutually incoherent psychological states to the two hemispheres—so we are free to 
view those subjects’ mental lives as coherent and thus unified in somesense, just as 
Marks and Tye and Nagel do. Second, there are plausible accounts of personal 
identity according to which a single person can have two minds, at least as some 
plausible versions of the mental duality model understand mental duality. And third, 
                                                
45 The problem of integrating scientific and non-scientific understanding of human beings with respect 
to free will is that science (or much of science, anyway) presents us with a deterministic universe. Yt 
some sort of vision of other people and of ourselves as freely acting agents is important not just in 
social contexts in general, and not just in spontaneous, personal interactions with other people, but also
for making (and justifying) moral judgments. It’s important in legal contexts—to some extent the 
concept is even codified in law!  
Perhaps another example of this is that between the scientific, value-free universe, and the pre-
theoretic, moral universe: morality, religion, society, law, teach that some deaths are unjust, killings 
wrong; but scientists discover only the deaths, only the killings, only the causes of death and of killing, 




while the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject don’t stand in the sort of functional 
relations to each other that they would need to in order to constitute a single mind, on 
my view, the relations that they stand in to the subject’s body and to the subject’s 
world make it so that even if the subject were somehow constituted by two persons, 
these would be persons who should justly and rationally be treated as one (at least in 
most instances). These three claims are related, but let me discuss each of them 
separately.  
Marks and Tye believe that we have more reason for ascribing multiple minds 
to a DID than to a split-brain subject, because only the former subject is one to whom 
it is tempting or potentially necessary to ascribe incompatible personalities, 
incompatible character traits and values and goals, and so forth. But in most instances 
we aren’t tempted to ascribe incompatible personalities or characters and so forth t a 
split-brain subject at all. So whence the motivation for attributing multiple minds to a 
split-brain subject?  
But the mental duality model is obviously not offered in terms of incoherence 
or incompatibility between mental states or mental systems. The two minds of a split-
brain subject may be very similar. If my arguments concerning the perfctly parallel 
subject are correct, two minds can be not just perfectly coherent but qualitatively 
identical and still be two minds. So the fact that split-brain subjects seem, most of the 
time, like “normal” individuals with “coherent” mental lives is not in any conflict 




elsewhere. What makes it rational to relate to a split-brain subject as a “single 
individual” may, perhaps, depend upon the overall coherence of her mental states. 46  
Second, the passages quoted above in this subsection also exaggerate the 
seriousness of the problem of integrating theory and practice with respect to split-
brain subjects by conflating seeing or treating a subject as (constituted by) multiple 
persons, and attributing multiple minds to that subject. But individuating minds and 
personal identity are, I think, distinct issues. This is one of the reasons why I have
tried to steer clear of personal identity questions (and why I have felt that I could do 
so), but let me just briefly explain why, when we understand the meaning of the 
(scientific) attribution of mental duality to these subjects, we see that it is not 
necessarily incompatible with regarding such subjects as single persons.  
While both personal and mental singularity may be a matter of integration, as 
Nagel says, being a single person may require a different kind of integration, nd/or 
integration of different things, than being a single mind requires. For instance, in the 
                                                
46 To be clear, I am not actually convinced that coherence and unity play as significant a role in 
governing our understanding of and interactions with other people that Marks and Tye and Nagel seem 
to believe. There’s no doubt that certain kinds of unity play a significant role in such interactions; I 
expect that if I tell someone something important, he’ll remember it the next day, for instance. 
(Although I trust I’m not the only one who’s been disappointed in the past.) But it seems to me that we 
beholders tolerate, if barely, a fair degree of what our eyes take to be inconsistency, incoherence, et ., 
in other people. And even in extreme cases in which we don’t tolerate it, cases in which a subject’s 
apparent incoherence, irrationality, inconsistency, or disunity, baffles or disturbs us greatly, I have 
further doubts about whether, in these cases, we actually resort, in a meaningful way, to treating such a 
subject as multiple individuals. (Do jurors accept the insanity plea of a plaintiff diagnosed with DID 
because they really think his body is occupied by multiple persons, only some of whom can be justly 
sent to prison? Or do they just think the guy’s nuts?) Of course we would treat very differently (and 
understand differently) the angry, aggressive, potentially violent “alter” of a subject whose other 
“alter” is fearful, retiring, gentle. But responding to an angry person very differently from how one 
would respond to a fearful person, whether they’re the same person (at different times) or not, is just 
basic social competence. Still, since Marks and Tye and Nagel, and perhaps many other philosophers, 
are all convinced of the importance of seeing other people as unified and coherent agents, I don’t push 
this point. Here I just claim that coherence and unity may enjoy a significance in non-scientific ways of 
understanding people that they don’t enjoy in scientific ways of understanding minds; there thus seems 
to be no conflict between the two modes of understanding, however; in contrast to the free will case 
where there is at least a prima facie conflict between free action and determinism (even if 




next section, I am going to argue that the generally integrated character of split-brain 
subjects’ behavior results less from interhemispheric integration of mental states and 
processes and more from interhemispheric coordination of output (and input). To take 
one example, imagine that, if right and left hemisphere simultaneously issue 
competing and conflicting motor plans, the stronger issuance wins, and that action 
and not the other is initiated. (Though within some very short time period, 
presumably, the other hemisphere could generate an even stronger “vetoing” 
response, checking or reversing the other hemisphere’s motor plan.) This could be 
modeled as (friendly) competition between two still distinct mental systems (or even 
as a form of cooperation between the two distinct mental systems). And, admittedly, 
it could perhaps be modeled as a form of competition (or perhaps cooperation) 
between persons as well. But this could also be easily modeled as intra-personal 
competition between or coordination of desires, as well. If “part of” Carter, say, 
wants to leave the server’s tip right where it is, but “part of” him wants to just go 
ahead and grab it, and if his desire to take cash is tronger than his desire to leave it 
where it is, and if his tronger desire is the one that actually “prevails” over his 
behavior, yielding an efficacious motor plan that results in him stealing someone 
else’s tip. . . . Many people, probably most people, would probably say that we c n 
hold Carter responsible for stealing someone’s wage, and that we can view him as a 
single person. And, interestingly, it seems as if there are least some instances in 
which we could hold Carter to be a single person, morally culpable for this theft, even 
if Carter is a split-brain subject and the competing desires were located in distinct 




ambivalent thief, and there may be better and worse angels of his nature. . . . But this 
is mundane, really. Perhaps the right thing in the end would be to say that Carter, the 
whole organism, wanted to be good (RH) and he wanted to be bad (LH) and in the 
end he especially wanted to be bad (LH).  
This isn’t to say that we should definitely see Carter as a single person, 
responsible for stealing his server’s tip, in the example I just sketched; for one thing, 
the sketch is too bare, and anyway, much deeper thought about personal identity, not 
to mention moral responsibility, would be called for. All I hope to have suggested is 
that accepting the mental duality model, properly understood, for split-brain subject, 
leaves room for negotiation and maneuver where constructing an account of personal 
identity, even a psychological account of personal identity, is concerned. The mental 
duality model could very well be compatible with a wide range of positions on 
matters that are of great personal and social and moral and legal and practical 
importance to us.  
I said above that even though being a single person probably is in part a 
matter of integration, just as being a single mind is also a matter of integration, the 
kind of integration that matters may differ between the two sorts of cases. But it is 
also arguable that personal unity or individuality depends less upon mental 
integration than does mental singularity or one mindedness. Personal individuality 
might depend more upon other factors—perhaps factors like unity and coherence, for 
instance, as Marks and Tye believe. The psychological similarity between a split-
brain subject’s right and left hemisphere could have more relevance to that subject’  




more to personhood than to mindhood as well; the fact that the two hemispheres of a 
split-brain subject have a similar history, that is, may be of greater importance to the 
subjects’ personal identity than it is to individuating their minds. For the two 
hemispheres do share a history, including a social history, and a history of acting 
together. (Not necessarily acting as one, mentally speaking, but they’ve jointly 
contributed to many of the same actions. And personhood is I think more closely tied 
to notions of agency than is mindhood, which would make sense, given the different 
domains to which the concepts of persons and minds are belong.) And they share not 
just a past, of course, but also a future, because they remain inside the same body. 
Indeed regardless of how little integration there is between right and left hemisphere 
mental processes, there is still just one life to be led, one set of things to experience, if 
not one shared set of experiences, and one past to be remembered, if not one shared 
set of memories.  
The shared history of the two hemispheres provides another reason why it is 
not just understandable but rational for the loved ones of a split-brain subject to 
continue to relate to the subject as a single person after his callosotomy. It isn’t as if, 
after their only son’s callosotomy, S’s parents are suddenly confronted with two 
strangers, Rightie (RH) and Leftie (LH). They have known Rightie and Leftie for all 
of S’s life: S has always been constituted in part by both Rightie and Leftie. Now 
granted Rightie and Leftie may now bear a different relationship to each other, and 
may now be associated with distinct minds. (For that matter, maybe S’s right and left 
hemispheres were always associated with distinct minds.) But all the same elements 




one son. (After all, while his brain and his two hemispheres are an important part of 
him, to say the least, his parents might well balk if you stated that they were the 
entirety of him.) 
Finally, even if S were associated with two distinct persons, Rightie and 
Leftie, it is not clear how one could treat S as two persons, in any way that would 
significantly diverge from treating S as one person. S isn’t like a pair of conjoined 
siblings, joined at the hip, each of whom can at least do ome different things, can 
have some different relationship with a unique marital partner. S isn’t like a DID 
subject, whose body is occupied by different persons (if that is what you think about 
DID) at different times. There is no need to say things twice, to S, and no way to have 
a relationship with Rightie that you don’t have with Leftie; there is little way, on a 
day-to-day, practical basis, to d  something to Rightie that you don’t do to Leftie.  
If S’s two hemispheres had very different characters, and each initiated 
behaviors that differed, morally, from that of the other, and if neither hemisphere 
could act quickly to stop the other hemisphere’s immoral behavior, then there might 
be some difficulties about, say, imprisoning S for a crime he’d committed. But I don’t 
think this is a genuine worry, first, and second even if we did somehow have good 
evidence that Rightie really wanted to stop Leftie from stealing the car but was just 
too functionally depressed or something, we wouldn’t, I don’t think, resort to treating 
S like two persons. We would again at most have to treat him as someone who wasn’t 
fully culpable for his actions, because he (S, that is, not Rightie or Leftie) wasn’t 




full range of beliefs to be used in the same reasoning process, or couldn’t use some of
his desires to guide his action.  
I don’t mean to say that these few quick and rough things that I’ve said here 
on the subject of personal identity are uncontroversial, or that they can definitely be 
used to develop the best account of persons. I do hope to have made plausible my 
belief that accepting a model of a split-brain subject’s cognitive architecture 
according to which she has two minds still leaves room for ascribing those minds to a 
single person. In some cases multiple minds may bear relationships to each other t at 
allow them to jointly constitute (or constitute in part) a single person—without 
bearing the relationships to each other that would make them into a single mind, from 
the perspective of a scientific psychology. For while scientific findings will probably 
contribute to our understanding of persons and personhood in general, in all of us, the 
important interests we have in persons are not equivalent to or exhausted by the 
scientific interests we have in minds. 
 
6 Duality versus Partial Co-mentality 
In this section I turn to a final objection to the “two minds” conclusion for split-bran 
subjects: the objection posed by the existence of subcortical structures connecting the 
two cortically separated cerebral hemispheres in split-brain subjects. That the two 
hemispheres of a split-brain subject remain connected via structures which figure in 
cognition and experience might in fact seem to call into question the very meaning 




combination with the isomorphism thesis, may show that a split-brain subject has an 
indeterminate number of minds. 
 
6.1 Partial Co-Mentality (Or, an Indeterminate Number of Minds?) 
In the previous chapter I concluded that a question can escape being “merely verba ,” 
if can be shown to be an empirical question, or an interesting conceptual question. 
(Some such conceptual questions have a role to play in scientific theories, though as I 
suggested in Chapter Two, there is no reason to think that all in eresting conceptual 
questions do.) A merely verbal question, however, can only be answered by arbitrary 
decision.  
I think that the concept of a mind does have a role to play in a psychological 
theory, or at least in a functionalist psychological theory—a role which is both 
important and very subtle. This role relates to the relationship between type-
identifying mental states and individuating token minds. Within the functionalist 
framework, the types of interactions a mental state can and can’t engage in—th  
nature of its causal relationships to other tokens of particular mental types—is in fact 
a large part of what makes that mental state the type of mental state tha i  is. In 
saying that a belief is unconscious, you say something about the systematic relations 
it bears to other mental states of various types, something about its causal role in a 
larger psychological economy. The relationship between mental state type and mental 
interactions within the computational-representational theory of mind means that one 





One of the things a psychological theory for a particular species tells us is 
which types of mental state that members of the species have and the different ways 
those different types of mental state can interact with each other. A psychological 
theory might tell us that beliefs and desires can interact with each other wiout the 
mediation of perceptual states, for instance, or that the activation of stored episodic 
memories, in contrast to the activation of stored semantic memories, consists in par  
of the generation of mental images. But these general rules—rules that in part define 
what it is to be a belief, an episodic memory—are only meant to apply within a mind; 
the inability of a belief and a desire to interact absent a perceptual process d esn’t 
even constitute an exception to the general rule that beliefs and desires can, ceteris 
paribus, interact absent a perceptual process, if the belief and the desire are each 
located in a distinct mind; the rules are defined over a mind, but not across them. This 
is, I think, part of the work that minds do within a psychological theory, though they 
do this work subtly and implicitly.  
The boundaries of a mind are functional but have theoretical and explanatory 
significance. To mark something as a mind is to mark it as a system with the kind of 
structure that requires psychological explanation. But also, the functional 
relationships between mental tokens within a mind require a different sort of 
psychological explanation than do functional relationships between mental tokens 
across minds. The “how many minds?” question is then a question in part about 
where and when we apply our psychological theories, a question about carving up the 
domain of psychological explanation, and perhaps a question about the range of 




A purely psychological and a partly neural approach to individuating minds 
should tend to yield the same answer to the “how many minds?” question for any 
particular creature, given, among other things, the necessity of providing the eural 
with a psychological taxonomy before using neural facts to individuate minds in the 
first place. I have argued, however, that for the rare creature for whom the purely 
psychological and the partly neural criteria for individuating minds may yield a 
different answer, the correct answer is that yielded by the partly neural method of 
individuating minds. These claims both support and are supported by the 
isomorphism thesis, according to which cognitive architecture and the neural 
architecture underlying it are isomorphic.  
But while the isomorphism thesis provides some reason to reject the “one 
mind” claim for split-brain subjects, it does not necessarily support a “two minds” 
conclusion for such subjects. In fact it might be claimed that the isomorphism thesis 
supports the claim that split-brain subjects represent a case intermediate betwe n 
having one mind and having two. Let the term “co-mentality” refer to the relationship 
mental tokens bear to each other when they belong to the same mind. Following 
Lockwood (1989), we might reason as follows. (Lockwood argued that the neural 
architecture of split-brain subjects affords them a partially unified consciousness. His 
model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness will be examined in Chapter Five.) irst, 
physical connectedness comes in degrees. (Imagine an island composed of two small 
mountains and a valley in between, and now imagine the ocean levels rising 
continually, such that this island gradually becomes two islands.) Second, if mental 




also. What would it mean for co-mentality to come in degrees? It is difficult to make 
this idea precise without an account of what functional relationships specific types of 
mental states should bear to each other when they do belong to a single mind, but let 
us continue to try to use co-mentality as a placeholder for whatever kind or kinds of 
relationships two mental states bear to each other when they belong to the same mind, 
and say that, for a given set of mental states, their degree of co-mentality is bsolute 
when every mental state in that set is co-mental with every other state in that set. 
Their degree of co-mentality is zero when no mental state in that set is co-mental with 
any other state in that set, and intermediate degrees of co-mentality fall in between 
these two extremes.  
Perhaps split-brain subjects have neither a single mind within which all 
mental states are co-mental with each other, nor two wholly discrete minds between 
which no two mental states are co-mental with each other. For while the two 
hemispheres of a split-brain subject are divided at the cortical level, they remain 
connected to each other via their mutual connectedness to subcortical and other non-
cortical structures. These non-cortical structures meanwhile make complex and 
essential contributions to mental operations. So perhaps, in a split-brain subject, ther 
are right and left hemisphere mental states that are not co-mental with each other, but 
subcortically-borne mental states which are co-mental with both right and left 
hemisphere states. Therefore a split-brain subject has neither one perfectly “unified” 
mind nor two wholly “discrete” minds. 
But accepting that co-mentality can come in degrees might call into question 




intermediate between having one mind and having two minds, then the “how many 
minds?” question may not be answerable—not in whole number terms—absent 
making some kind of arbitrary decision, at least for split-brain subjects. So why 
agonize over the “how many minds?” question?  
This worry, that the possibility of partial co-mentality challenges th entire 
import of the “how many minds?” debate for split-brain subjects, is itself easily dealt 
with. Prima facie, at least, cases of partial co-mentality seem possible. There seems 
no reason to insist that minds must be wholly discrete from each other, in the relevant 
(intra-mind) sense. Conjoined twins who partially shared a cerebral lobe might not 
have wholly discrete minds, for instance. Isomorphism between mind and brain may 
give reason to think that multiple minds need not be wholly discrete. But this doesn’t 
make it a waste of time to wonder, in any particular instance, whether co-mentality 
holds or does not hold at all between multiple mental systems. And as, in general, two 
things need not be wholly discrete or distinct from each other in order to be two 
things, there could still be reason to wonder whether a split-brain subject is more 
helpfully and accurately conceived as having two minds or one mind.  
So do the two “disconnected” hemispheres of a split-brain subject constitute a 
single mind, between which only partial co-mentality holds? It is certainly true that, 
due in very large part to their mutual connectedness to non-cortical (neural) 
structures, the two hemispheres of a split-brain subjects are psychologically unified in 
some special ways. In the rest of this section however I explain why I nonetheless 
believe that the “two minds” or mental duality model is still the best model of split-




involved in cognitive operations, but in a way that is more consistent with mental 
lateralization or bilateralization than with mental unification; non-cortially-mediated 
interactions between the two hemispheres serve more as a means of coordinating the 
activities of the two hemispheres than they do as a means of integrating their mental 
processing.  
At least so I believe at the present time. Ultimately, whether sub- and non-
cortical structures do compromise a mental duality model or better support a partial 
co-mentality model in part depends, of course, on what those structures are doing, and 
on their place in the overall mental architecture associated with a split-brain subject’s 
brain. But we don’t know these things yet. So everything I say in this section will of 
necessity be very tentative. I speak in broad strokes in part for that reason, and in part 
because I am interested in the philosophical question of whether, assuming that non-
cortical structures are essentially involved in cognitive processes, and assuming they 
mediate some form of causal interaction between the two hemispheres, the two 
hemispheres cannot be associated with distinct minds. I argue that they still can.  
 
6.2 Subcortical Structures: Plausible Sources of (Interhemispheric) Mental 
Integration? 
This subsection describes introduces some important terms and players 
(neuroanatomical structures) in the debate about “subcortically mediated” 
interhemispheric interaction in split-brain subjects, to give some sense of what this 
debate is about. In this subsection I deal with some empirical and terminological 
issues and challenges to the debate; subsequent subsections turn to the more 




There are a few different ways of classifying cortical and non-cortical 
neuroanatomy, but I will use “cerebral hemispheres” to refer to the cerebral cortex, 
the basal ganglia, and the cortical white matter (including the corpus callo um). I will 
use “cerebral cortex” to refer to the frontal, parietal, occipital, and temporal lobes, 
and also to the olfactory cortex and hippocampus. I will also classify as cortical the 
corpus callosum, the anterior commissure, and also the hippocampal commissure. By 
“subcortical structures” I mean to refer to the thalamus and hypothalamus, and to the 
striatum, and to the amygdala. (There are, again, other ways of classifying ome of 
these structures, but I think this way makes best sense of the split-brain literture on 
cortical and subcortical structures.) See Figure 3.1.  
 
 




































When neuropsychologists (and philosophers) refer to subcortical structures as 
a possible means of interhemispheric mental unity in split-brain subjects, to which 
structures can they be referring? To begin to answer this question we need to know 
which structures communicate across the midline of the brain, either via commissures 
or by virtue of being midline structures (rather than bilateral, paired structures) to 
begin with.  
In addition to the corpus callosum (and the optic chiasm, at which information 
from the nasal visual field from both eyes crosses to be carried to the hemisphere 
contralateral to the eye from which it originates), the brain contains a number of other 
crossing pathways: the anterior commissure and the posterior commissure, mentioned 
just above, and the massa intermedia, the hippocampal commissure and fornix, and 
the intertectal commissure.  
Note in addition that at every level of the spinal cord there are both gray and 
white matter commissures carrying sensory and motor information. On the motor 
side—the white matter commissures of the spinal cord are contributed to by the 
corticospinal tract—these play a role in applying motor commands potentially 
initiated by only a single hemisphere to muscles on both sides of the body. Despite 
these commissures, the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject often don’t have 
strictly speaking identical motor control over the two sides of the body. 
In the brainstem, most pathways ascending from the spinal cord run 
contralateral to the side from which they originate, and most pathways descending to 




with cranial nerves and their pathways is much more complex and difficult to sum up. 
Pathways from cortex to cranial nerves and vice versa tend to be bilateral (Mosenthal, 
1995), but with a mixture of crossed and uncrossed (contralateral and ipsilateral) 
pathways, and not every nerve shows this pattern. Significantly ascending cranial
nerve V, however, which carries sensory information concerning the face, projects 
bilaterally (Gazzaniga, 1970) which is why a split-brain subject can cross-localize for 
points on the face and neck.  
Finally the brain contains some midline structures, most notably, for our 
purposes, the cerebellum. The lateral hemispheres of the cerebellum (the 
cerebrocerebellum) send and receive “crossed” information: the right side of th  
cerebellum generally receives information concered with the right side of th  body, 
that is, and sends its output to the left hemisphere (which is also primarily concerned 
with the right side of the body). Thus right cerebellar lesions can produce right side 
hemineglect (perhaps at least in part due to the right lateral cerebellum’s connectivity 
with the left hemisphere).47 Also note, though, that the vermis or central portion of the 
cerebellum, between the two cerebellar hemispheres, is concerned with movements of 
the trunk. Thus right and left side body maps may be coordinated via their mutual 
connectedness to central cerebellar body maps.  
Many bilateral, paired, non-cortical structures are not directly connected to 
each other; there is no commissure of the amygdala, for instance, and no striatal 
commissure. Of course, even absent any commissural connections between, say, right 
and left amydala, these structures could still interact. In fact so long as both are 
                                                
47 Silveri, M., Misciagna, S., Terrezza, G. 2001. Right side neglect in right cerebellar lesion. Journal of 




functioning they are bound to interact at some point or other; everything in the brain 
will interact with everything else in the brain via some, possibly very long, very 
convoluted, causal chain. But then, again, I’m sure every structure in my brain has 
interacted at some point with every structure in my sister’s brain; we’re concerned 
here with questions of causal intimacy.48 We have prima facie reason to suspect 
(though of course not to be certain) that two brain structures connected directly by 
some neural pathway are in some sort of important functional relationship with each 
other—a more intimate functional relationship than two structures that are only very 
indirectly connected, in part because direct pathways of course allow for faster 
communication, and speed matters in the brain. So let us consider the most promising 
pathways—the most direct routes between one hemisphere and the other—in split-
brain subjects. 
Of these, several don’t look at this point to play any significant role in the 
interhemispheric integration of mental states and processes. The massa intermedia 
connects right and left thalamus, a structure that is arguably so inextricably l nked 
with cortical areas in its functioning that it could be considered a cortical structure, 
functionally. But so far as I know there is very little communication between right 
and left thalamus, and whether the massa intermedia really has any functional 
significance is unclear, especially since it is apparently absent in a very significant 
portion (about 20%) of the human population. (It is noteworthy that the massa 
intermedia isn’t necessarily a commissure per se but rather just a fused group of 
                                                
48 One strong way of expressing this point would be to say that we’re concerned with which causal 
chains constitute natural (functional) kinds in psychology. And in particular with which causal chains 
constitute the natural kind of an i tra-mind interaction. But this assumes that there is such a kind, 




midline thalamic nuclei, and thus we might not expect it to serve a “unifying” role.) 
The functional significance of posterior commissural fibers is also not clear, though 
they may be involved somehow with pupillary light reflexes. (The functional 
significance of the habenular commissure, which I did not mention earlier, is also not 
clear, and I have never heard the habenular nucleus specifically implicated in th  
debate about subcortical communication in split-brain subjects.) There is also a 
habenular commissure connecting right and left habenulae—limbic structures. It is 
possible that this commissure serves some sort of role integrating or coordinating the 
states of the two hemispheres with respect to the sorts of activities the habenular 
nuclei are involved in, including regulation of sleep-wake cycles, pain processing, 
and reproductive and nutritive behavior. (The habenular nuclei output to midbrain 
tegmental areas and to the pineal gland.) I have not read anything in the split-brain 
literature implicating it in any function (much less interhemispheric functio ), 
however.  
This leaves, as commissures likely to serve as significant routes of 
interhemispheric interaction, in addition to the corpus callosum, the anterior 
commissure, the hippocampal commissure, and the intertectal commissure. 
Sectioning the posterior callosum, however, as is done in a full callosotomy, 
necessitates sectioning the hippocampal commissure as well (Gazzaniga 2000). In a 
complete commissurotomy, meanwhile, the anterior commissure also sectioned. Thus, 
depending on the extent of the surgery, there are fewer or greater opportunities for 




The anterior commissure “derives its fibers from the temporal lobe and from 
subcortical ‘limbic’ structures, in particular, the amygdala, and projects to the same 
regions in the other hemisphere” (Gazzaniga and LeDoux, 1978: 153). Gazzaniga and 
LeDoux accordingly speculate that the anterior commissure may play some role in the 
interhemispheric transfer of affect in callosotomized (though not 
commissurotomized) subjects. Others raise doubts, however; Doty writes that “the 
amygdala, as the principal organizer of emotional reactions, is decidedly unilateral in 
its anatomical relations and electrophysiological manifestations” (1989: 70)). He 
drew this conclusion in part after performing unilateral lesion studies on non-human 
primates; at least one study using rats found that anxiety could be increased by 
stimulating the right amygdala, but not by stimulating the left (Adamec and Morgan, 
1994), suggesting an absence of at least left-to-right amygdala transfer. Studies like 
these are more difficult to run using human subjects for obvious reasons, but 
Damasio, Adolphs, and Damasio (2003) theorize that one should expect even greater 
degrees of lateralization of emotion in human subjects. (Actually there is a good deal 
of evidence for the lateralization of emotions in human and in some other mammalian 
subjects, but since cortical areas are significantly involved in emotional circuits as 
well, it is difficult to determine how lateralized subcortical emotional circuits are 
from the mere fact that emotion is lateralized in the hemispheres.) Since I don’t know 
how to rule out that the anterior commissure plays some role in the interhemispheric 
transfer of affect in some split-brain subjects I will assume that it might. If the 
anterior commissure does serve as a means of interhemispheric communication, then 




complete commissurotomy (and certainly those have undergone only partial 
callosotomy) may constitute importantly different cases, however, where comparing 
the mental duality and the partial co-mentality models is concerned. Still I will 
continue to speak generally of “split-brain subjects” and only distinguish between 
(full) callosotomy and commissurotomy cases if it seems particularly relevant.  
The split-brain literature on interhemispheric subcortical interaction is 
unfortunately slightly more difficult to sort through than it probably has to be. One 
difficulty is terminological. The term “subcortical” is used sometimes to refer only to 
non-cortical components of the cerebral hemispheres: the thalamus and 
hypothalamus, the striatum (or basal ganglia), and the amygdala. In some of the 
literature on subcortically-mediated interaction in the split-brain subject, however, the 
term “subcortical” is used to refer more broadly to anynon-cortical brain structure. 
(E.g., Handy, Gazzaniga, and Ivry (2003) write: “Evidence that a putative internal 
clock may be linked to subcortical mechanisms has come from a variety of sources. 
This work has focused on the c rebellum and basal ganglia, two structures that have 
extensive reciprocal connections with the cerebral cortex” (1461; emphasis added). 
Or, Corballis and Forster (2003) write of “a subcortical visual route, presumably vi  
the superior colliculus” (337).) I prefer to use the term “subcortical” more strictly, to 
refer to non-cortical components of the cerebral hemispheres, and to use the broader 
term “non-cortical” to refer to non-cortical neural structures: to midbrain structures, 
to the cerebellum, and in some instances even to the cord. But this terminological 




(and philosophers) intend to implicate when they speak of possible “subcortical” 
interactions in split-brain subjects.  
For much of the literature on split-brain subjects uses the term “subcortical” 
imprecisely in a further way also. Works referring to “subcortical” interhemispheric 
interaction in split-brain subjects often don’t specify, or even speculate as to, which 
sub- or non-cortical structures are mediating the interaction in question. Granted, the 
reason for this is understandable: many times, authors no doubt simply don’t know 
which non-cortical structures are sustaining the interaction in question. But this is still 
a significant problem, for two reasons.  
First and more obviously, “subcortical” and “non-cortical” are 
neuroanatomical and not functional terms, and subcortical structures, no less than 
cortical and non-cortical structures, are not helpfully spoken of as a unitary ensemble. 
(In fact even one particular subcortical structure, the thalamus, contains at least four 
functionally distinct nuclei group, one concerned with arousal and awakeness and 
attention, and one limbic, one motor, and one sensory.) It is informative to be told 
that subcortical structures serve a function no more frequently than it is informative to 
be told that the cerebral cortex serves a function. Meanwhile many subcortical 
structures are not, prima facie at least, even plausible candidates for mediating 
interhemispheric interaction (except indirectly), since again many of these paired 
structures are not linked across the midline functionally or even physically, and others 
are often sectioned in the course of a “split-brain” surgery. 
The intertectal commissure, between right and left superior colliculus, is an 




is that a stronger case can be made for interhemispheric mental (in particular motor-
perceptual and attentional) integration via the superior colliculus than for 
interhemispheric mental integration via any other non-cortical structure. See Savazzi 
et al. (2007) for discussion. (Note that the superior colliculus is a midbrain structure, 
and not properly speaking a subcortical structure. Note also that the superior 
colliculus contributes some fibers to the posterior commissure.)  
I am sure that the authors who refer to subcortically-mediated 
interhemispheric interactions in split-brain subjects, without implicating particular 
sub- (or non-) cortical structures, would agree that, ideally, we would all know more 
about which particular sub- or non-cortical structures mediate such interactions. Still, 
they would say, referring instead simply to “subcortical structures” as a group is at 
worst non-ideally vague. But, these authors would presumably continue, in their own 
defense, some form of integration is achieved by split-brain subjects in a number of 
behavioral tasks, suggesting that some form of interhemispheric m ntal integration 
has been achieved. And since cortically-mediated routes to such integration have 
(essentially) been blocked in the split-brain subject, the integration exhibited must be 
proceeding via sub- or non-cortical routes. This justifies referring broadly to 
subcortical (or non-cortical) sources of mental integration, even though ideally, again, 
one would be able to narrow down which structures in particular are responsible for 
the integration.  
But there is a second, more significant, problem with sweeping references to 
“subcortical” sources of (interhemispheric) mental integration (especially when 




colliculus or the cerebellum). Some such references may be at worst not just vag e, 
and therefore not as helpful or informative as they would ideally be, but actually 
misleading: they may refer to sources of interhemispheric mental integration that 
don’t actually exist. 
For not all integrated-seeming or unified behavior, even behavior that is the 
product of both hemispheres’ participation, need be the product of the hemispheres 
interacting with each other. And not all communication between the hemispheres 
amounts to interhemispheric integration of mental states and processes. So if you 
observe integrated behavior in a split-brain subject, or even if you conclude that some 
form of interhemispheric communication has occurred, you can’t infer that some 
form of non-cortically mediated, interhemispheric mental integration has occurred. 
Instead, unified behavior may be the result of some sub- or non-cortically mediated 
coordination of the hemispheres’ inputs and outputs. (For instance, Savazzi et al. 
speculate that “it might well be that after callosotomy, input to the extrastriate area in 
one hemisphere could provide descending input to the pontine nuclei bilaterally 
through brainstem commissures and then to the contralateral cerebellar cortex which 
finally, in connection with the motor cortex on the same side, will carry out the 
response” (2007: 2424). Depending on the form that this “connection” between the 
ipsilateral cerebellar and motor cortex takes, no interaction between the two 
hemispheres per se need be involved.) Meanwhile, this coordination of 
interhemispheric inputs and outputs may or may not itself be a form of non-cortical 
mental integration, depending upon the form it takes. And, again, communication 




of intra-mind interaction. (Note that interhemispheric communication between the 
two hemispheres of a split-brain subject will indeed always or almost always be sub- 
or non-cortically-mediated. But this would be true even if the two hemispheres never 
interacted except via a route that involved behavior. This is because of the brain’s
“vertical” functional organization: both perception and action involve non-cortical 
structures and pathways.)  
Knowing which non-cortical structures were mediating interhemispheric 
interaction (assuming we also knew some things about the functional properties of th  
non-cortical structures in question) would help determine the psychological nature of 
that interaction. It would help determine whether the function those structures were 
performing in fact serves as a form of mental integration: as a form of intra-mind 
interaction. There may be some cases in which one can read off the behavioral data 
and know that some form of interhemispheric interaction has occurred; if a split-brain 
subject, S, can describe (LH) the form of a visual stimulus presented only in her LVF 
(RH), for instance, this suggests interhemispheric interaction. (Though even in this 
case, we would need some way of knowing that RH processing was involved, for it 
seems possible that instead visual information was sent to the right superior colliculus 
and then directly transferred via the intertectal commissure to the left superior 
colliculus and then ultimately to the left hemisphere, without any right hemisphere 
involvement. Holtzman (1983) raises this issue.) But in many instances, behavior that 
appears to involve both hemispheres’ participation really might not. Or it might 
involve both hemispheres’ participation, but not their interacting (directly or 




joint effects on some downstream, non-cortical processing. Or it might involve b th 
hemispheres’ interacting, but still without entailing any intra-mind integration. (To 
take an obvious example, suppose that that you present a photograph of a church to 
S’s LVF (RH) and she says (LH) “It’s a church.” Clearly interhemispheric interaction 
has occurred. But suppose that it occurred via this route: S drew a picture of a church 
with her left hand (RH), and brought her sketch of the church into her RVF (LH).) 
This is all just prefacatory, to urge caution and clarity (as much as is possible) 
in discussions about subcortically- (or non-cortically-) mediated interhemispheric 
interactions in split-brain subjects. In the rest of this section, I suggest that on the 
whole sub- and non-cortical structures do not serve as a means of integrating what 
would otherwise be two minds into one, and that the “two minds” or mental duality 
model for split-brain subjects is the most useful and accurate. 
 
6.3 What Kind of Interhemispheric Relations Do Non-cortical Structures Afford? 
Non-cortical, including subcortical, structures obviously play a complex and 
important though admittedly not yet well understood role in coordinating the 
activities of the two hemispheres: in perception and emotion, in attention and action. 
That they play such a role, however, does not mean that they integrate what would 
otherwise perhaps be two minds into one. While it is not possible to draw any 
decisive conclusions at this point about whether and to what extent non-cortical 
structures serve as mechanisms for inter-hemispheric co-mentality, this sect on 
presents some reason to think that non-cortical operations are consistent with a men al 
duality model for split-brain subjects.  




Non-cortical structures utilize representations: representations of temporal duration, 
for instance, and of visually perceived stimuli, and of motor effectors. Also, and 
perhaps most famously, the split-brain cases illustrated that non-cortical stu tures 
either play some crucial role in generating, or permit the interhemispheric transfer of, 
emotional or affective information (or both). (Non-cortical structures may also 
generate and/or transfer what Sperry, Zaidel, and Zaidel (1978) referred to as general 
mental aura, though the anterior commissure may also be implicated here.)  
Yet even in these cases, it is difficult to say whether the two “disconnected” 
hemispheres hare the same set of mental tokens, in virtue their mutual 
connectedness to intact non-cortical structures in which these tokens are located, or 
whether they instead both have a non-cortically-mediated ability to access or to 
generate distinct tokens of some of the same of mental state. For while, on the one 
hand, some kind of affective information appears able to travel, via some route, into 
one hemisphere from the other, the hemispheres do distinct things with these states.  
In one famous example, a frightening film (about fire safety) was played only 
in V.P.’s left visual field (right hemisphere). After viewing, V.P. said (LH) that she 
didn’t know what she saw—“I think just a white flash”, she said, and, when prompted 
further, “Maybe just some trees, red trees like in the fall.” When asked by her 
examiner (Michael Gazzaniga) whether she felt anything watching the film, she 
replied (LH), “I don’t really know why but I’m kind of scared. I feel jumpy. I think 
maybe I don’t like this room, or maybe it’s you. You’re getting me nervous.” Turning 
to an assistant, she said, “I know I like Dr. Gazzaniga, but right now I’m scared of 




In another case, Schiffer et al. (1998) elicited different answers to questions 
about an unhappy childhood experience from the two hemispheres of two split-brain 
subjects. The experimenters put two sets of pegs, five in each set, in front of each 
patient but obscured from his vision, where the leftmost peg in each set represented 
“none” and the rightmost represented “extreme,” and then required the subjects to 
answer questions like, “How much did this experience upset you at the time?” using 
both hands at once. (Via his right hemisphere one subject expressed a higher degree 
of disturbance by these memories than he did via his left. The second subject’s right 
hemisphere expressed both a more positive self-image, and more negative emotions, 
e.g. greater loneliness.) While the results of this second study could be interpreted as 
showing that the hemispheres don’t experience even the same affective states, despite 
subcortical intactness, it is equally possible that the hemispheres did xperience the 
same affective states, and yet, again, the hemispheres responded differently to these 
states. (E.g, the first subject’s left hemisphere might have “played it cool” ab ut being 
bullied in childhood; the second subject’s left hemisphere might have deemed it 
socially inappropriate to express an overly strong self-image or admitto overly 
negative emotions.)  
Meanwhile, the route by which the affective information travels between the 
hemispheres is also of course highly relevant, and at this point I think still unclear, at 
least in many cases. Consider three ways that affective information could 
hypothetically have carried from V.P.’s right to her left hemisphere, in the example 
cited above. (These are obviously not the only three possible routes, and indeed I do 




evidence concerning the generation of affect and emotion; the examples I giv  are 
just to illustrate that the particular neural route taken may have consequences for how 
we describe the psychological interaction between right and left hemisphere.) One 
possibility is that her right hemisphere visual system in conjunction with her right 
amygdala and generated an affective representation, a representation of a negative 
affective state. (There is disagreement about the content of affective and emotional 
states and even whether and to what extent such states are representational; the nature 
of such states is of course relevant to current concerns, but is also beyond our scope, 
so I am deliberately vague, here.) Then V.P.’s left hemisphere gained acc ss to this 
token representation via her anterior commissure. (I believe that the anterior 
commissure was not sectioned in V.P., but in any event for this example assume that 
it wasn’t.) So V.P. said that she felt a little jumpy.  
 A second possibility is that V.P.’s right hemisphere visual system in 
conjunction with her right amygdala generated an affective representation,  
representation of a negative affective state. Then, via V.P.’s anterior commissure, the 
content of this representation was communicated to V.P.’s left amygdala, which 
formed a representation with this same content. Her left hemisphere received this l ft 
amygdala affective representation (perhaps via her left thalamus) and so V.P. said that 
she felt a little jumpy.  
A third possibility is that V.P.’s right hemisphere visual system in conjunction 
with her right amygdala and hypothalamus resulted in a particular physiological state 
of arousal: slightly elevated heart and breathing rate, sudden muscle tension, and so 




hemisphere via ascending spinal cord tracts, and perhaps via left-side subcortical 
limbic structures, and so V.P. said that she felt a little jumpy.  
Obviously, the former possibility looks more like a genuine case of 
subcortically-mediated interhemispheric mental unity than the latter. And this is so 
even though subcortical structures (the amygdala, the hypothalamus), and loops of 
activity from RH to subcortical structures to LH, characterize all three possible routes 
of affective transfer. What differs between the three possible routes is where the 
transfer from right to left occurs, whether the hemispheres share any mental tokens, 
and (perhaps most crucially) whether the transfer involves some n n-representational 
step.  
Picking apart whether and when the hemispheres share mental tokens, and 
what sorts of mental tokens they share, is admittedly very difficult. Careful study may 
be required in order to determine the exact form that non-cortically-mediated, 
interhemispheric coordination takes. For example, it may appear that the hemisp res 
are communicating via shared representations even when they are not. Consider an 
interesting study by Naikar (1996) concerning the observation that split-brain subjects 
can often perceive apparent motion across the midline. When two dots are presented 
very near to each other and in quick succession, subjects, split-brain and “normal,” 
tend to perceive a single dot moving from the location of the first dot to the location 
of the second. Interestingly, split-brain subjects still experience this phenomenon 
even when the first dot is presented to one hemisphere and the second dot to the other 
hemisphere. In order to correctly indicate whether the motion was from left to righ  o  




have access to both representations—to the representation of the first dot and to the 
representation of the second dot. Moreover, there was a plausible candidate mediating 
this apparently interhemispheric motion perception ability—the superior colliculus. 
For it was already known that striate cortex lesions, at least in macaques, does not 
eliminate motion sensitivity in higher visual regions (MT—often called the equivalent 
of human V5), while lesioning the superior colliculus on top of striate cortex does 
eliminate motion sensitive responses in MT. Thus, the superior colliculus is 
apparently capable of sustaining direction sensitivity in MT in the absence of input to 
that same area from the striate cortex.  
At the same time, however, neurons in the superior colliculus are not 
themselves direction-sensitive (and any degree of direction sensitivity in the pulvinar 
is eliminated by lesioning of the striate cortex). Thus, Naikar could conclude that, 
“visual input reaching MT by the tectopulvinar route must be nonselective, and MT 
must have the capacity to produce directionally selective responses from nonselective 
input” (Naikar 1996: 1042, emphasis mine). This is an example in which subcortical 
structures allow for the cortical generation of a representation they themselv s do not 
seem to bear.  
Naikar ultimately explained the observed phenomenon not in terms of shared 
access to the same set of representations, but rather to attentional shift, hypothesizing 
that what allows split-brain subjects to distinguish the direction of (apparent) motion 
across the midline were non-cortically-mediated shifts of attention from the location 
of the first dot to the location of the second dot. The shift of attention from, say, left 




sense) perceive or experience, and from this could infer that the motion was from left 
to right. This hypothesis was supported, in the following way: the two dots in this 
experiment were each of a different color—color being a property that the superior 
colliculus does not appear to represent at all—and subjects were asked to indicatethe 
color of “the” dot. On those trials for which motion was reported, subjects gave the 
color of the second dot—which is what one would expect if the hemisphere receiving 
the second dot (the hemisphere to which attention had been shifted) were indicating 
the color. On those trials for which motion was not reported—as if attention had 
never shifted from the first dot, and from the hemisphere that had received that dot—
the color of the first dot was given. Naikar concludes that “there are two. . . processes 
that can mediate motion perception; a subcortical, involuntary process that is 
insensitive to object features, and a cortical, voluntary process that tracks visible 
stimulus features” (1996: 1048).  
Now, admittedly, some kind of representation must be used by the superior 
colliculus in shifting attention from one hemisphere’s visual field to the other. Indeed 
it has been known since at least the 1970’s that the superior colliculus allows split-
brain subjects to verbally describe (LH) left visual field (RH—and right superior 
colliculus) visual stimuli. (See Trevarthen and Sperry, 1973.)49 This midbrain-
                                                
49 This is actually a fascinating paper in part because Trevarthen and Sperry detail some of the verbal 
and other behavioral responses of their subjects to the suite of perceptual tasks (presentation of LVF 
(RH) stimuli, or bilateral presentation of visual stimuli, where the stimuli either differed or did not 
differ in form or in motion between the two fields. One gets a sense not just of the important individual 
differences between subjects but of the fragility of bilateral cooperation at least when verbal respone 
is required. N.G., who , “became aphasic and distres ed in attempting to respond to double questions 
such as ‘what kind of movement? and which way did it move?’ She made contradictions or irrelevant 
replies and refused to continue, saying she could not tell or even see the stimulus. Then again, with 
simple choices between ‘quick’ and ‘slow,’ she responded calmly and correctly.” (Trevarthen and 
Sperry, 1973: 560). “In general, L.B. was not able to describe more than one or two distinctive features 




mediated exchange of visual information is usually referred to as “crude” or 
“primitive”—split-brain subjects can’t describe (LH) LVF (RH, right superior 
colliculus) visual stimuli in great detail, or sometimes at all—but still, they are 
capable of making some discrimination of shape and movement. Indeed, as I said 
before, the intertectal commissure, connecting right and left superior colliculus, 
seems to me probably the best candidate for mediating a genuinely intra-mind form of
interaction between right and left hemisphere in the split-brain subject.  
But even here I am uncertain, for the following reason. The superior 
colliculus, like many other non-cortical structures, is clearly involved in some clearly 
mental (especially motor-perceptual and attentional) processes. But it is, I think, 
through its interactions with cortical areas, that it is involved in these processes. It i  
less certain that colliculo-collicular interactions are themselves clearly mental. So 
while the intertectal commissure may allow a way for the two hemispheres to interact 
with each other, and to interact with each other via their connectedness to a midbrain 
structure that does figure importantly in some mental processes, it is still not clear 
that this interaction serves to really integrate the mental processing of the two 
hemispheres. Intertectal transfer may not take the right form for this to occur.  
                                                                                                                                          
confused and he mumbled, or his speech was temporarily arrested. On many occasions he made 
elaborate and totally inaccurate confabulations describing details of visual appearance which were not 
even remotely related to the stimuli. Confabulation c uld be obtained by forcing him to give elaborate 
responses, or it could be greatly reduced by cautioning him to give simpler responses, more carefully 
and slowly. Occasionally, however, he could give a clear spontaneous description of one or two 
elements of form” (ibid, 560-561). For instance, when two parallel black bars were presented to his 
LVF (RH) he said, “straight, like square blocks. No, n t square; long and thin, like caskets, two of 
them.” The paper is also fascinating from the perspctive of trying to distinguish conscious from non-
conscious perception, and raises the question (see Dennett, 1997) of just how informationally rich a 
representation has to be before we take it as conscious—and just how informationally impoverished a 




So, again, while subcortical operations make no doubt crucial contributions to 
genuinely cognitive processes, it is not clear that they themselves constitute such 
processes. It is via their interactions with cortical structures that non-cortical 
structures most clearly participate in mental processes. And these cortico-subcortical 
(or cortico-pontine, or cortico-tectal, or cortico-cerebellar, etc.) connections tend to be 
lateralized. The right superior colliculus is in communication with the right visual 
cortex. The left thalamus with the left cerebral hemisphere. The right cerebellar 
cortex with the right motor cortex. There are bilateral sensory and motor projections 
between some of these higher and lower structures; in these cases, we might think it 
relevant to the “how many minds?” question to know whether these bilateral 
pathways engage in some kind of processing or merely transmit (without 
transforming) representational contents, though perhaps this makes no difference. 
This is the sort of subtle and difficult issue I’m not sure we’re in a position to answer 
yet. 
In the next subsection I consider more directly the nature of cortical-non-
cortical interactions, rather than the nature of non-cortical representations. Insofar as 
non-cortical structures and functions serve to coordinate the functioning of the two 
hemispheres, they do so, I believe, largely in a manner similar to the way in which 
shared body and environment coordinate their activities: these structures opeate to 
ensure that similar contents are produced by the two hemispheres, and give both 
hemispheres a similar ability to control many parts of the body. This sort of 




minds, albeit two minds that causally interact with each other richly and at every 
moment. But this interaction, in other words, may still be of an inter-mind sort. 
  6.3.2 Coordination versus integration 
The criteria for individuating minds that I sketched in Chapter Two were founded on 
the claim that a single mind is characterized by some kind or kinds of cognitive 
integration, even if we must wait for a developed psychological theory to give a 
characterization of that integration. Accordingly, when two mental systems 
significantly integrate their activities, they become a single mental system.  
Whatever the degree of sophistication of non-cortical operations, and 
whatever the psychological status of non-cortical representations, there remains the 
separable question of to what extent non-cortical structures serve to int grate rather 
than to simply coordinate the activities of the two hemispheres. Many 
neuropsychologists believe that it is this sort of integration, this intra-mind 
interaction, that the corpus callosum affords. But the inputs and outputs of two 
systems may be highly coordinated—and yet there can remain two systems.  
A similar sort of distinction, though using slightly different terminology, can
be found in Seymour et al. (1994), in which is urged “the need to distinguish between 
the transfer of information between the hemispheres via some extra-callosal route 
versus the integration of utputs from the two hemispheres by non-cortical structures. 
. . with the latter form of integration neither hemisphere has access to the processing 
operations of the other, but rather some other process coordinates the outputs of both” 
(113; emphasis added). The authors say this after remarking that in many cases, 
behavior that looks to be the result of interhemispheric cooperation in the split-brain 




there is some mechanism in place that allows the hemisphere more likely to be right 
in a particular instance to dominate performance.  
Some non-cortically mediated interaction between the hemispheres in split-
brain subjects actually bears, upon careful examination, a striking resemblance to 
more obvious forms of cross-cuing. In an experiment allowing for extended viewing 
of lateralized stimuli, Myers and Sperry (1985) found for instance that patient L.B. 
was pretty good at naming letters, digits, and pictures presented to his LVF or RH.
But he could only do this if he had previously been shown the pool of choices each 
individual presentation would be taken from. Corballis notes that “L.B. seemed to use 
an active strategy of rehearsing the likely alternatives, presumably with his left 
hemisphere, until a matching one ‘sticks out’” (1994: 164)—until, presumably, his 
right hemisphere, the only hemisphere that knows the answer, can respond somehow 
(perhaps by producing an affective state). Then, “reading” the response, the left
hemisphere can take over again.  
In another study (Gazzaniga, 1987, designed in part to replicate results from 
Sergent, 1983), pairs of letters were presented bilaterally, one in each visual field, to 
split-brain subjects, who were then asked to press one button if either letter was a 
vowel and a different button if neither letter was a vowel. Split-brain subjects were 
above chance at this task, but their “no” responses took significantly longer than their 
“yes” responses. From the observed time differences between affirmative and 
negative responses Gazzaniga (1987) inferred that although the hemispheres 
cooperated in performing this task, they were forced to do so without actually 




“each hemisphere can observe whether or not a response is forthcoming from the 
other hemisphere, and if no response occurs within a certain time period it can infer 
that no vowel was presented” (Corballis, 1994: 168; emphasis mine). He calls this a 
kind of “poker” strategy, and it is one that appears to play a prominent role in the 
degree of integration or at least cooperation the hemispheres exhibit.50 That is, both 
hemispheres perceive and process independently of the other, and then each 
hemisphere (or perhaps just a single hemisphere) waits to see what the other 
hemisphere’s “move” will be: in some instances the move is not an actual physical 
movement, but rather some other kind of output (such as an intention to respond).  
In other cases the interaction between the hemispheres appears to take the 
form of one hemisphere actively interrogating the other hemisphere for a response to 
some kind of binary question. The hemispheres appear capable of transferring 
information about many things, as long as the transfer can take the form of a question 
with only two possible answers: yes/no, even/odd, etc. For instance, imagine that a 
split-brain subject is bilaterally presented with pairs of objects—a coat and a hat, a 
coat and a coke, a cherry and a coke—and that the subject’s task is to say whether the 
two objects belong to the same or to a different category. Receiving the image of a 
hat, the LH can in effect “ask” the RH: “Is it clothing?” The exchange of binary 
information can be used in some sophisticated ways: if a split-brain subject is 
presented with bilateral number pairs and asked to say whether the numbers add up to 
greater or less than 10, and her LH receives the number 4, the LH can in effect “ask” 
                                                
50 At least during split-brain experiments; whether the wo hemispheres would cooperate to this same 
degree outside of the split-brain experiment is difficult to say. Outside of the split-brain experiment 
there may be less pressure on either hemisphere to cooperate with the other, since a single hemisphere 
can simply grab the information it knows it wants from the environment directly, and since there is no 




the RH: is your number big or small? Receiving this information alone will allow the 
subject (or his LH) to give the answer on most trials. (It is possible that the transfer of 
binary information plays a very significant role in the set of studies in which split-
brain subjects exhibit interhemispheric interaction; Myers and Sperry (1985) 
themselves noted that interhemispheric transfer of information in split-brain subjects 
does not appear passive or automatic but rather a matter of “active search”.) 
It is instructive to compare the kinds of interhemispheric interactions that exist 
in split-brain subjects to those afforded by the corpus callosum in “normal” subjects 
(and perhaps by other structures in acallosal subjects). Weissman and Banich (2000) 
for instance found that, with the corpus callosum intact, the hemispheres couple or 
uncouple their activities depending on the complexity of the task subjects are engaged 
in, practicing a divide-and-conquer strategy only for more complex tasks. Hochman 
and Eviatar (2004) found evidence that the division of labor between the hemispheres 
for complex tasks often takes the form of one hemisphere (perhaps the one dominant 
for that task) engaging in the initial processing and responding, while the other 
hemisphere concurrently monitors the first hemisphere’s performance, engaging in 
error correction, post-response, when necessary. These studies used “normal” 
subjects, and their results may explain both why split-brain subjects often suffer 
greater impairments in performance as task complexity increases (e.g. Kreuter, 
Kinsbourne, and Trevarthen, 1972), and why they fail to engage in spontaneous self-
correction (Kaplan and Zaidel, 2002), the latter of which is something that “normal” 
subjects apparently almost always do (according to Kopp and Rist, 1999). Of course, 




hemispheres interestingly seems to resemble close communication and coordination 
between two minds. It is nonetheless clear that in comparison to such instances, the 
interaction between the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject is of a less intra-mind 
sort.  
Clearly the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject do not function entirely 
independently of each other: in fact, they will causally interact with each other 
essentially at every moment. The question relevant to individuating minds in split-
brain subjects is whether there is some psychologically important distinction between 
intra- and interhemispheric interactions. It is of course too soon to be certain tha 
there is such a psychologically important distinction—but it seems, at this point, that 
there is. As Reuter-Lorenz and Miller summed up the literature on subcortically-
mediated (and non-cortically mediated) interhemispheric interaction: 
In fact, the separated hemispheres are virtually isolated from 
one another, so that one hemisphere is rarely conscious of 
stimulation presented to the other. Visual and tactile 
information presented to one hemisphere cannot be compared 
with information presented to the other hemisphere. The 
separated hemispheres are also unable to share abstract codes 
or semantic information, despite previous claims to the 
contrary. Coarsely coded information about spatial location 
may be shared, but this capacity may be limited to central 
portions of the visual field. Moreover, the separated 
hemispheres can implement different visuomotor programs 
concurrently and with minimal interference. . . Thus, the 
autonomy of the hemispheres produced by callosal section 
extends beyond perceptual processing into the stages of 
decision making and response preparation.   
   (Reuter-Lorenz and Miller, 1998: 16) 
 
This last point is particularly significant. Sometimes it is argued that wile the 




conscious perceptual, processing, the mental architecture of a split-brain subject
remains “unified” at some deeper level.51 In response to such arguments it is 
important to recall that the functional split between the hemispheres itself goes very 
deep. Processing becomes “unified” at some point: for instance Reuter-Lorenz and 
Miller speculate that the reason split-brain subjects so rarely exhibit interhemispheric 
conflict in their behavior is that “it has been shown that each hemisphere is able to 
inhibit, or gate, the responses of the other” 1998: 16; emphasis added). So some form 
of coordination is achieved eventually. Arguably, however, this coordination occurs 
at so deep a level, at so functionally late a stage, that it constitutes coordination 
between minds.  
Let me end by quickly clearing up one likely misunderstanding of my view of 
non-cortical mental processing. I do believe that non-cortical structures are sential 
to the operation of the mind (or minds). And I even accept that at least some non-
cortical processes are not just causally necessary to mental operation but are 
themselves components of, partly constitutive of, mental operations. So my view is 
not that only cortical operations are mental. My view is that, first, non-cortical 
operations are mental in large part in virtue of being incorporated into cortical 
operations. Interactions between right and left superior colliculus in and of 
themselves, for instance, may not be mental. But interactions between striate and 
extra striate cortex and the superior colliculus are mental.  
                                                
51 Sperry said this at one point about even the consci u  structure of split-brain subjects: because 
“mental-emotional ambience or semantic surround generated in one hemisphere promptly spreads also 
to the second hemisphere”, he suggests that the “structure of the conscious system in the divided brain. 




This may not be the case in all animals. Berridge for instance notes that 
“Humans can be devastated, rendered into vegetative states, by large neocortical 
lesions, whereas a rat can lose its entire neocortex and continue on remarkably 
normal” (2003: 41). Berridge is articulating something like the view I’m defending 
here; indeed this view is not novel; Berridge himself cites Gallistel (1980) and 
Hughlings Jackson (1958), a 19th century British neurologist. Berridge calls the 
evolutionary (and probably developmental) process by which subcortical processes 
become incorporated into cortical ones, “encephalization” (the term 
“encephalization” has other uses and meanings as well.) “Encephalization has 
modified the autonomy of subcortical structures, so that neocortical inputs have 
become incorporated into subcortical function to a greater degree than in nonhuman 
animals, so much so that human subcortical function cannot be maintained normally 
when cortical inputs are suddenly removed” (Berridge, 2003: 43). Merker, even in the 
context of arguing that consciousness i  not a cortical function, admits that “In adults 
massive bilateral cortical damage will typically issue in a so-called persistent 
vegetative state” (2007: 65). Admittedly, “This by itself does not, however, allow us 
to make an equation between cortical function and consciousness, because such 
damage inevitably disrupts numerous brainstem mechanisms normally in receipt of 
cortical input” (ibid). But I do not need, nor intend, to claim that the hemispheres 
function to sustain consciousness or anything else ind pendently of non-cortical 
operations. And again, I do not even need to claim that non-cortical structures 
contribute only non-mental inputs to (and coordinate the outputs of) mental, cortical 




noncoritical interactions may not. There are two mental systems in the split-brain 
subject, a right hemisphere-noncortical system and a left hemisphere-noncortical 
system. Taken by themselves, right and left hemisphere superior colliculus, for 
instance, or right and left hemisphere thalamus, are not mental systems. Non-cortical 
structures owe their mental status to the cortical elaboration of their activ ties.  
Finally, the degree to which non-cortical processes are incorporated into 
cortical ones has another consequence as well: that of making the overall menta
architecture of the human brain largely “vertical” as opposed to “horizontal.” This 
idea is difficult to cash out precisely; to convey it at this point is more to convey a 
general impression resulting from sifting through a bunch of data, than it is to convey 
even a sketch of a model that would systematize this data in some way. But let me 
convey what I can. What I mean by saying that perception, cognition, and motor 
intentions are functionally instantiated in the human brain in “vertical” loops of 
activity, is that these loops pass through spinal cord and cerebral hemisphere and 
thalamus and cerebellum and midbrain superior colliculus, and back up to cerebral 
cortex and back down to spinal cord and via the midbrain reticular formation, etc. . . . 
And there are comparably few loops passing (“horizontally”) from one side of the
brain to the other. There is some “direct” communication between the hemispheres, 
via the intertectal commissure, for instance, but by and large, right and left sup rior 
colliculus seem to interact more with right and left hemisphere, respectively, han 
with each other. Moreover, when there is communication between right and left si e 
structures, when there is a circuit running from one side of the brain to the other and 




available for processing by both sides of the brain, rather than consisting in a kind of 
(physically) central processing itself. The actual processing, the computation, he 
transformation of representational contents, seems still to occur either w in a right 
or left side structure, or between structures, but vertically. The processing isn’t only 
cortical; it’s in part sub- and noncortical. But it is still largely later lized.  
Until the corpus callosum, that is. The corpus callosum suddenly adds a 
substantial “horizontal,” left-right element to the otherwise mostly vertical, up-down, 
functional organization of the brain. With that pathway in place, there is a case for th
two hemispheres constituting a single m ntal circuit. They interact not simply 
because they’re “hooked up to” the same body and environment—via a loop that 
passes outside the boundaries of any mind—but because they are engaging directly 
with each other. When the corpus callosum is sectioned, however, the functional 
organization of the brain is again on the whole vertical.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This chapter argued that split-brain subjects have two minds, whether we individuate 
mind on the basis of purely psychological criteria or partly neural criteria. The two 
methods of individuating minds yield the same result in part because there is, at a 
very abstract level, an isomorphism between mental and neural structure.  
I rejected verificationism in the “how many minds?” debate; while behavioral 
evidence is of great importance in determining how many minds a creature has, 
integrated behavior does not provide decisive evidence of mental singularity, since 




intra-mind interactions, and other sources of behavioral integration that are not mental 
at all.  
The “how many minds?” question is properly a question about mental 
architecture and mental tokens, and thus type-identity (identical contents) cannot 
make a single mind.  
While noncortically-mediated interhemispheric interactions could of course in 
theory integrate the mental processing of the two hemispheres so as to yield a single 
mind, and may in fact turn out to do so, I gave some reasons to think that the two 
hemispheres of a split-brain subject are in fact associated with distinct minds.  
Finally, while acknowledging that accepting the mental duality model poses 
something of a challenge to our various practical ways of interacting with and rel ting 
to split-brain subjects, I also suggested that integrating our theoretical and our 
practical understanding of such subjects is not quite so difficult as some philosophers 









Chapter 4: On Co-consciousness and Conscious Unity 
 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter I turn to the structure of split-brain subjects’ consciousness. I  the first 
part of the chapter I lay the groundwork for comparing competing models of the 
structure of split-brain subjects’ consciousness. In the second half of the chaptr I 
defend the model I advocate, the conscious duality model, from the most obvious 
challenge it faces: that of explaining the integrated nature of split-brain subjects’ 
behavior.  
The unity of consciousness, as a scientific subject, is a jungle: rich, 
complicated, and vast—a terrain in which are woven together the strands of various 
other areas of study, from perception and attention to action and agency to the 
binding problem. One loses one’s bearings here very easily. There is so much more 
that could be said about this topic than what I can discuss here, that I accordingly 
spend a good deal of this chapter simply stating which issues I will and will not be 
dealing with. I also draw a few important distinctions and explain how I will be using 
certain contested terms in this terrain. Then I offer a simple account of co-
consciousness—the relation composing conscious representations into streams of 
consciousness—based in the Global Workspace theory of consciousness. This 
account of co-consciousness is then used to defend the conscious duality model for 




By way of introduction both to the debate about the structure of consciousness 
in split-brain subjects, and to a more general debate concerning what phenomenology 
and conscious contents can tell us about conscious structure, I will in the next section
introduce one particular voice in this debate: that of Puccetti (1989, 1981), who 
argued that not just a split-brain but also a “normal” subject has two minds, two 
streams of consciousness—and is (associated with) two persons. While I don’t draw 




Probably the most infamous philosopher’s stance on split-brain consciousness, 
cognition, and personal identity, is Puccetti’s (1989, 1981). Puccetti believed, first, 
that split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness, a conclusion that many 
neuropsychologists also accepted, but one that philosophers were (and continue to be) 
more reluctant to accept. 
Next Puccetti argued that we all have two streams of consciousness. This 
second claim was considered more extreme; Bogen, it is true, has also advanced a 
(qualified) conscious and mental duality claim for “normal” subjects (Bogen, 1981, 
1990), but even most neuropsychologists believed that “normal” subjects have single 
minds and single streams of consciousness. (Sperry and Gazzaniga certainly believe 
this; see for instance Sperry 1977, 1968, and LeDoux and Gazzaniga, 1981.)  
Finally Puccetti argued that each “normal” human subject is also two persons, 




though only one person (the left hemisphere person), speaks. (So, I am writing this 
paper, but I am only one of the people associated with my brain and my body. The 
other person associated with my body, the right hemisphere person, doesn’t fight to 
make its—his or her?—presence known, having learned submission to the dominant 
hemisphere’s person from an early age.) Even Bogen (1981, 1990) hadn’t gone this 
far, insisting that there remained enough integration and commonality between a 
“normal” subject’s two streams and two minds to generate only a single person.  
Puccetti’s argument for this startling conclusion takes the following form52:  
P (1): There are neural processes in the left hemisphere of right-
hemispherectomy (or split-brain) subjects that suffice for (or 
constitute) conscious experience; there are neural processes in 
the right hemisphere of left-hemispherectomy (or split-brain) 
subjects that suffice for (or constitute) conscious experience. 
P (2)/Conclusion 1: Therefore there are neural processes in the left 
and right hemisphere of a “normal” subject that also suffice for 
or constitute conscious experience.  
P (3): The corpus callosum does not serve as a “fusing” mechanism 
that somehow fuses these two sets of experience into a single 
stream of consciousness. (Or, at least, the burden of proof lies 
on those who believe that the callosum does serve as such a 
mechanism, to show that and explain how it performs this 
function.) 
P (4)/Conclusion 2: Therefore each “normal” subject (like each split-
brain subject) possesses two streams of consciousness, one 
associated with each hemisphere. In a “normal” subject, the 
corpus callosum acts to ensure that the two streams have 
duplicate contents. Thus right now for example, both of my 
hemispheres are generating a conscious visual experience of 
my laptop.  
P (5): But we do not (usually) experience “double vision.” I only see 
one laptop, that is.  
P (6)/Conclusion 3: Therefore each stream of consciousness, each 
hemisphere’s set of experiences, is associated with a unique 
subject of experience.  
P (7): There is a unique person for each subject of experience.  
P (8)/Conclusion 4: A “normal” human subject is associated with 
two persons: a speaking LH person and a silent RH person. So, 
                                                




the “I” who sees only a single laptop is really just the person 
associated with one of my hemispheres, my left hemisphere. 
(Since “I” am typing this. There is another, mute person, 
associated with my right hemisphere, which is the subject of 
the second experience of this laptop.) 
 
Several of Puccetti’s commentators within the philosophical community took 
issue with his first premise: with the claim that the isolated right hemisphere can 
generate conscious experience. This claim was much controversial in the 
neuropsychological community, although there were some here who questioned this 
claim as well (e.g. Davidson, 1981).53  
For many other commentators, especially those in the neuropsychological 
community, premise (4) was particularly problematic. It is true that of course the 
burden of proof in general lies on those who would insist that some particular thing 
does exist or that some existing thing does have some property where there is no 
(widely acknowledged) evidence for this positive claim. But similarly the burden of 
proof lies on those who would insist that some particular thing doesn’t exist or 
doesn’t have some property when there is (widely acknowledged) evidence against 
this negative claim. In this case, there is one widely acknowledged piece of evidence 
for the positive claim, i.e. for the claim that the corpus callosum does act as a fusing 
mechanism: the split-brain phenomenon itself!  
                                                
53 Another non-philosopher responded:  
As a clinical neurologist I have been trained not to deal with the concept of 
consciousness. I can deal with responsiveness, for that I can test with a stimulus, grading 
the response or noting the nonresponse. What is going on in that patient’s brain between 
the stimulus and the response is his own province. Pr sumably, what is going on is 
consciousness or awareness of the stimulus and response—but it is still the private 
domain of that individual. Therefore, I will deal with responsiveness and hope that 
‘consciousness’ fades into a well-deserved obscurity.      




The inference from premise (5) to premise (6) was not subject to particular 
criticism, and yet I believe it is the most interesting move in his argument—though 
not necessarily the most convincing. This is where Puccetti reasons that if my brain is 
currently generating two experiences of my (one) laptop, and if I nonetheless do not 
see two laptops, then each experience must belong to a different stream of 
consciousness, and a different subject of experience. Note that this is in essence an 
argument for conscious duality grounded in phenomenology. These are different 
grounds from those in which I ground my arguments for the conscious duality model 
of split-brain subjects; I don’t believe that phenomenology tells us very much about 
the structure of consciousness. This is mainly because there is nothing it is like to 
have (or no phenomenal experience of having) two streams of consciousness. We 
cannot feel that we have two streams of consciousness, because conscious feelings are 
located within one stream of consciousness or another; there is no phenomenal 
perspective external to a particular stream of consciousness from which to experience 
multiple streams.  
We should furthermore pause to consider whether having two co-conscious 
experiences, E1 and E2, both with content C, would feel any different from having 
just E1 or just E2 (with content C.) Imagine, for the moment, that Puccetti is right that 
each hemisphere of my brain is generating a set of experiences, and that each 
hemisphere is generating its set of experiences with some degree of causal 
independence from the other. (We have already seen the difficulty of distinguishing 
direct from indirect causal interactions in the generation of mental phenomena, but let 




hemisphere interact with each other in certain subtle and complex ways, ways in 
which they don’t interact with the conscious representations of the other hemisphere.) 
Now imagine that each set of experiences contains one or more experiences of my 
laptop right there before me: call these E1 and E2. According to Puccetti, I should see 
two laptops—unless these two experiences of the laptop belong to distinct streams of 
consciousness and distinct subjects of experience. . . and I am really only one of these 
two subjects of experience.  
But it is not immediately obvious why I should be expected to see two laptops 
in front of me, no matter how many streams of consciousness or subjects of 
experience are associated with my brain. What I see is a function of what my 
experiences represent, and what they are representing is a single laptop at a single 
location. Why, then, would I see two laptops unless I had either one (or more) 
experiences representing the presence of tw  laptops before me, or two experiences, 
each representing a laptop at a different location? (Note that this is what “double 
vision” involves: seeing two objects that do not occupy the exact same space, though 
they might overlap in space.) Hurley (1998) seems to make a similar point when she 
writes that “There is nothing it is like for there to be one experience with content r 
rather than two duplicate experiences at the same time with content r; here is no 
subjective contrast here. Therefore, we cannot imagine what it is like for there to be 
one experience rather than duplicates” (Hurley 1998: 165). 
While the content of conscious experience tells us some things about the 
structure of consciousness, there is much that it does not tell. The structure of 




be determined by considering the functional properties of and the functional relations 
between the various representations carrying conscious contents.  
 
3 Some Claims and Distinctions 
In this section of the paper I lay out a number of distinctions and positions concerning 
consciousness and conscious unity in general, and the structure of consciousness in 
split-brain subjects in particular.  
 
3.1 Right Hemisphere Consciousness 
I will be assuming that the right hemisphere of a split-brain subject is associ ted with 
conscious phenomena. There are two sorts of data that I believe provide especially 
compelling evidence of conscious processing in the “disconnected” right hemisphere. 
First, there is data concerning the right hemisphere’s emotional responsiveness: 
V.P.’s distress after her right hemisphere was shown a film in which people are 
thrown into flames (Gazzaniga, 1985); the “wide, sheepish, and (to all appearances). . 
. self-conscious grin” that accompanied the “thumbs-down” L.B. gave in response to 
a (LVF/RH) photograph of himself (Sperry, Zaidel, and Zaidel, 1979); the right 
hemisphere’s positive feelings about justice, abortion rights, and sex, and dislike of 
taxes (Schiffer et al. 1998).  
Split-brain subjects also engage in some right hemisphere-controlled 
behaviors that strongly suggest conscious experience and processing. They can draw 
objects whose names only their right hemispheres have been presented with 




subject “broke out laughing” upon first encountering (with his left hand/RH( a 
stimulus consisting of a square wooden block with a tack nailed into its center. 
“Every time he felt it, he would pick it up and twirl the block about the axis and 
would chuckle heartily when doing so. When asked what was funny he would say, ‘I 
don’t know, something in my left hand I guess’” (Gazzaniga, 1970). The right 
hemisphere also performs comparably to the left on the Raven Progressive Matric s 
Test (Zaidel, Zaidel, and Sperry, 1981), a fairly involved test of non-verbal reasoning. 
Shallice explains:  
To perform correctly on this test, the relation between two items has to be 
abstracted and then extrapolated so as to infer the third item in a progression; finally, 
the results must be matched to one of a set of possible answers. The processes 
involved are far more demanding than, say, those used in picture-word matching in 
the number of components, the level of abstraction, and the involvement of more than 
the operation of a routine schema. If this level of performance could be obtained 
unconsciously, then it would be really difficult to argue that consciousness is not an 
epiphenomenon.  
(Shallice 1997: 264) 
This isn’t to say that the conscious experience and cognition of the two 
hemispheres are the same. They surely aren’t. The hemispheres have non-identical 
patterns of perceptual access to the body and to the world, and moreover there are 
hemispheric asymmetries with respect to perceptual rocessing, that seem likely to 
result in differences in conscious contents. And the left hemisphere’s dominance for 




associated with a (normal) stream of inner speech. This in and of itself would amount 
to a difference in conscious contents, of course, but the difference between the two
hemispheres with respect to their linguistic capacities may have further effects on 
conscious cognition as well.  
For instance, Zaidel, Zaidel, and Sperry (1981), in the study cited above, 
actually gave split-brain (and hemispherectomized) subjects two versions of both the 
Raven Standard Progressive Matrices and the Raven Color Progressive Matric s tests, 
a book version and a board version, the latter of which is designed to encourage a 
trial-and-error method of solving the problems. (In the book version of the test, 
subjects select the correct answer from a series of choices by pointing. I the board 
form, each problem appears on a board with the “solution piece” missing; the answer 
choices are a number of moveable pieces each of which fits neatly into the missing 
space, and subjects are encouraged to try out different solutions until they’re satisfi d 
with their answer.) While the right hemisphere tends to slightly outperform the left on 
the book form of at least the somewhat simpler Raven Color Progressive Matrices 
test, the left outperforms the right on the board form, suggesting that the left 
hemisphere benefits more from the ability to take a trial-and-error approch t  the 
task. The authors note that the finding that the book form of the Raven Progressive 
Color Matrices test favors the right hemisphere, and the board form the left, “is in 
accord with a study of thirty-two 7-8 year-old children in which it was found that 
verbalization of strategy during and after solution of the problem improved scores in 
the board form of the test but actually decreased scores in the standard book form” 




So, again, I don’t assume that the hemispheres are subject to the same 
conscious contents, nor even that their phenomenal experience is qualitatively the 
same—visuospatial processing differences between the hemispheres could result in
different sorts of phenomenal experiences—nor that they are equally capable of ll 
the same kinds of conscious cognition. The left hemisphere may be capable of more 
sophisticated processing in some cases due to its superior linguistic abilities, and its 
capacity to sustain a (normal) stream of (inner) speech, for instance. And it may be 
difficult (for some) to imagine engaging in conscious cognition that doesn’t rely on 
inner speech, or to imagine possessing a stream of consciousness from which a stream
of inner speech has been stripped. Despite this, the evidence does make it reasonably 
safe to conclude that the “disconnected” right hemisphere has some sort of conscious 
mental life. 
 
3.2 Access versus Phenomenal Consciousness 
Much of the current philosophical literature on consciousness draws a distinction 
between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995). If there 
is something it is like to possess a mental state, that mental state is said to be 
phenomenally conscious. A mental state that is available for some kind of central 
cognition is said to be access conscious.  
The major model of access consciousness is the global workspace theory of 
consciousness (Baars, 1988, 1997; also Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). While there is 
no general or complete or accepted theory of consciousness, the global workspace 
theory has a number of defenders both among philosophers of psychology and among 




According to this account, non-conscious perceptual representations may play an 
important role in cognition and behavior, but they do so in virtue of their accessibility 
to only one or a few local processing systems. For instance, Milner and Goodale 
(1996; also Goodale and Milner, 1992) showed that some motor control systems use 
non-conscious visual representations that are not available consciously and therefore 
cannot be reported by the subject or used in the subject’s practical reasoning. (For 
instance, in the Müller-Lyer illusion, subjects typically report that the line ending in 
outward pointing arrows is shorter than the line ending in inward pointing arrows. But 
when you ask them to pretend that they are reaching for the arrows to pick them up, 
their fingers are the same distance apart for the two lines.) Conscious representations 
may be used in practical reasoning to select actions to perform, but the actual 
performance of visually-guided actions uses representations for online control and 
guidance that are not conscious, that are made locally available only to motor 
systems.  
Some perceptual representations, however, achieve a state of global cognitive 
importance; these representations—access conscious representations—are broadcast 
to a large number of consumer systems at one time. (I will call these global consumer 
systems “global consumers.”) Their joint accessibility to multiple global consumers at 
one time allows them to be used in a kind of “central” or “domain-general” cognition. 
Representations that re broadcast to global consumers are said to be located within a 
“global workspace.” (This workspace is functionally defined, though there may be 
workspace areas of the brain as well.) Some plausible global consumer systems are: 




system; a conceptual system; a verbal report system; and a practical reasoning 
system.  
The nature of the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness—
conceptual or metaphysical—is open to dispute. Some believe that a theory of access 
consciousness also offers a theory of c nsciousness, period (e.g. Dennett, 2001; 
Dehaene et al. 2006). Others deny that a theory of access consciousness offers a 
theory of phenomenal consciousness, while accepting that all phenomenally 
conscious representations are nonetheless also access conscious (Carruthers, 2005a). 
Others deny even this, and assert that there can be phenomenally conscious states that 
are not access conscious (e.g. Block, 2007; Lamme 2004, 2003). (Note also that some 
who assert that all phenomenally conscious states are also access conscious do not 
assert the converse; that is, they believe that there may be access conscious 
representations that are not phenomenally conscious (e.g. Prinz, 2007a).) Finally, 
some question even the conceptual distinction between access and phenomenal 
consciousness. (E.g. Church 1997; Dennett 1997.)  
Phenomenal consciousness is often taken to be a “harder problem” for 
psychology than access consciousness. The latter phenomenon easily lends itself to 
functional characterization. But some of those who deny that a theory of access 
consciousness can explain phenomenal consciousness seem to do so because they 
believe that what is most mysterious about phenomenal conscious are qualia or 
qualitative properties: the redness (as opposed to the greenness) of the experience of 
red; the pleasantness (as opposed to the painfulness) of pleasant experiences. And 




properties. In fact some doubt whether any functional property can explain these 
qualia, and would refer instead to intrinsic neural properties.  
In addition to accepting the global workspace theory of access consciousness, 
in this work, I also accept that all phenomenally conscious representations are al o 
access conscious, or (according to the global workspace theory) gl bally broadcast. 
But I do not, in this work, take a stand on whether or not global workspace theory 
also offers an account of phenomenal consciousness. The claim that all phenomenally 
conscious representations are also access conscious is less controversial than the
claim that there is just one kind of consciousness, or that the global workspace theory 
offers a theory of phenomenal consciousness. In fact I may not even need the claim 
that all phenomenally conscious representations are also access conscious. But I will 
claim that phenomenal co-consciousness requires access consciousness. 
 
3.3 Co-consciousness 
Right now as I type this I am conscious of the feel of the laptop keys under my 
fingers. So I have a tactile experience (or perhaps multiple tactile experi nces) of 
myself typing this. But I can also (consciously) hear myself typing this (the keys 
click as I type). So I have an auditory experience (or perhaps multiple auditory 
experiences) of myself typing this. Moreover, my tactile and my auditory experi nc s 
bear a certain relation to each other. When this relation holds between two conscious 
or consciousness-composing representations, it is because it holds that there is 
something it is like to have both of those representations, together, rather than there 
simply being one thing it is like for me to possess one representation and a distinct




to have them both at once. I will call this relationship “co-consciousness” (as is fairly 
standard, although Bayne and Chalmers (2003) prefer to speak of subsumption, and 
thought Tye (2003) rejects the concept altogether).54  
I have characterized co-consciousness thus far in terms of what-it’s-like-ness; 
this might easily be interpreted as meaning that I am only interested in phenomenal 
co-consciousness in split-brain subjects. (For two states to be access co-conscious is 
presumably just for them to be jointly available for some kind of “central” or 
“domain-general” cognition.) I am actually interested in both phenomenal and access 
co-consciousness, though the structure of split-brain subjects’ phenomenal 
consciousness may be more controversial than the structure of their access 
consciousness (assuming the structures of the two kinds of consciousness can diverge 
in some way). Bayne and Chalmers (2003) for instance suggest that the split-brain 
phenomenon more clearly involves disunity of access than of phenomenal 
consciousness. But while I may continue to speak more explicitly of phenomenal than 
of access co-consciousness, implicitly I will really be talking about both, for I believe 
that access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness in split-brain subjects do 
not diverge in structure, for several reasons. First, I share some of Dennett’s (2001, 
1997) suspicions about suggestions that there are conscious experiences that cannot 
be reported (verbally or otherwise) in any way. I also echo Tye’s sentiments that 
                                                
54 Tye rejects the use of the term because he rightly believes that its standard use implies that two co-
conscious representations are each themselves conscious experiences. My use will not assume this, 
though; two co-conscious representations must belong t  or compose a stream of consciousness, but 
my use of the term will not assume that these co-cons i us representations are themselves conscious 
phenomena. The term “co-consciousness” is simply ver convenient given the distinction I will draw 
between conscious disunity and conscious duality, for I can speak of the presence or lack of co-
consciousness between representations without referring to their being unified or disunified. I will 
continue to speak of “conscious representations,” and not just “representations composing a stream of 




surely the simplest explanation for why a split-brain subject who has just seen the 
word “pen” in his LVF (RH) and “knife” in his RVF (LH):  
 
has no access consciousness of ‘pen’ next to ‘knife’ is that he 
has no visual experience of the one design to the left of the 
other in his visual field. He has an experience of ‘pen’ and, on 
this basis, he undergoes a cognitive state representing ‘pen’. He 
also has an experience of ‘knife’ and, on this basis, he 
undergoes a cognitive state representing ‘knife’. But he does 
not experience the two words together. That’s why access 
consciousness of both [together] is missing.   
     (Tye 2003: 125) 
 
Finally, the account of phenomenal co-consciousness that I offer will simply 
be incompatible with the suggestion that split-brain subjects have two streams of 
access conscious representations but one stream of phenomenally conscious 
experience. So while there may be a conceptual distinction between phenomenal co-
consciousness and access co-consciousness, just as there may be a conceptual 
distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, I submit 
that we needn’t draw this distinction in determining the co-consciousness relations 
between conscious representations.  
A distinction that is more than just conceptual, however, is that between 
synchronic co-consciousness—co-consciousness at a time—and diachronic co-
consciousness—co-consciousness across time. The concept of a streamof 
consciousness actually probably connotes diachronic as much as synchronic co-
consciousness: one experience flows into another, a moment later, and it is difficultto 
say when one ends and the next begins. Intuitively most of us feel, that is, that our 




a fluidity or continuity to our experience. (Though Strawson (2003) thinks that “the 
basic form of our consciousness is that of a gappy series of eruptions of 
consciousness from a substrate of apparent non-consciousness” (359), so intuitions 
differ.)  
Diachronic co-consciousness is perhaps even more difficult describe than 
synchronic co-consciousness in phenomenal terms. Roughly, though, the idea is that, 
if I have experience E1 of a cat crouching and then a moment later an experience E2 
of the same cat beginning to pounce, there is something it is like to experience E2 
immediately following E1, rather than there just being one thing it is like to 
experience E1 and then another thing it is like to experience E2 and nothing it is like 
to experience the two in quick succession. (Compare the case I just described to a 
case in which the last thing I see before I drift off to sleep is a cat crouching, and the 
first thing I see when I wake up is a cat pouncing.)  
Note that intuitively synchronic co-consciousness seems tran itive in a way 
that diarchronic co-consciousness doesn’t. Intuitively if E1 is co-conscious with E2, 
E2 with E3, E3 with E4, and so forth up to E100, all at a moment, then there is 
something it is like to experience E1 and E100 together as well. (This intuition will be 
challenged, however, once below, and once in Chapter Five.) In contrast, if E1 is 
diachronically co-conscious with E2, E2 diachronically co-conscious with E3, and so 
forth, up to E100, there does not seem to be something it is like to experience E1 and 
E100 together. (Well, after all, they aren’t experienced together.) So the two kinds of 




The two forms of co-consciousness are of course related nonetheless, and 
ultimately an account of both is needed. Moreover, it is possible that both synchronic 
and diachronic co-consciousness require the same kind of account. Nonetheless in 
this work I deal only with synchronic co-consciousness, offering an account of what it 
is for multiple simultaneously conscious experiences or representations to be co-
conscious with each other. This focus on synchronic co-consciousness is appropriate 
since at least the major puzzle of split-brain consciousness concerns the relationship 
between left and right hemisphere conscious experiences at any given moment. And I 
am able to maintain this narrow focus on synchronic co-consciousness in part because 
there is no special problem of diachronic co-consciousness facing the particular 
model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness that I adopt. Since I believe that split-
brain subjects have two streams of consciousness at all times, that is, and not just 
inside of experimental conditions, I don’t face the problem of explaining how a single
stream of consciousness could divide in two and then merge back into one again (and 
on the basis of simply putting on and removing a blindfold, respectively).  
 
3.4 A Unified Consciousness versus a Stream of Consciousness 
I define streams of consciousness in terms of the co-consciousness relation. If tw  
(simultaneously) conscious representations belong to the same stream of 
consciousness, then they are co-conscious, and if two (simultaneously) conscious 
representations are not co-conscious, then they do not belong to the same stream of 
consciousness. At any moment, a stream of consciousness is composed of the entire 
set of experiences that are all co-conscious with each other. (At least, as  first pass. 




not be transitive; if that is correct, then the concept of a stream of consciousness 
needs either revision or rejection.)  
Thus, for two conscious representations to be co-conscious is for there to be 
something it is like to experience them (or their contents) together; for a subject to 
have a single stream of consciousness, composed of a multitude of representations, all 
of which are co-conscious with each other, is for there to be something it is like for 
that subject to possess all those representations at once. (In contrast, for a creature, C, 
to have two streams of consciousness is for there to be one thing it is like for C to 
possess some subset of C’s representations together, and another thing it is like for C 
to possess the remainder of C’s representations together, and nothing it is like for C to 
possess all of C’s representations together.) 
Throughout this dissertation I have at numerous points contrasted singularity 
with duality, rather than unity with disunity. The distinction between singularity nd 
duality on the one hand and unity and disunity on the other is perhaps of particular 
importance when we examine the structure of consciousness. So in this and 
subsequent chapters I will distinguish between having a single stream of 
consciousness and having a unified consciousness. For I submit that these are in fact 
two different things: one could conceivably have a single stream of consciousness 
that could not properly be called unified; I even believe that there is at least one sense 
in which one could have a fairly unified consciousness while still possessing multiple 
streams of consciousness. Talk of conscious singularity versus conscious duality, or 
of having one versus two streams of consciousness, encourages a focus on 




phenomenal character of consciousness. And individuating mental tokens is the 
subject of this dissertation. 
I have said that to have a single stream of consciousness is just to have all of 
one’s currently conscious representations be co-conscious with each other; it is to 
have there be something it is like to bear all of those representations at once. To have 
a unified consciousness, however, is to have both something more and something less 
than this. The concept of a unified consciousness is richer than that of co-
consciousness, because when we speak of human consciousness as unified, we don’t, 
or don’t always, just mean to claim that there is something it is like to possess our 
conscious representations together. We often are attempting to describe what this 
something is like. In particular, we often mean to say that this thing, our phenomenal 
experience, is not disorienting—that the entire phenomenal state-of-being has a kind 
of stable, centered, coherent feel to it. Sight and sound, touch and smell, are 
coordinated, and seem to occur from a particular physically localizable perspective. 
The body and world presented to us via our conscious experience of them seem to 
make sense: objects don’t flicker in and out of existence; many motions follow 
predictable arcs; things stand in spatial relations to each other, and these relations are 
transitive—and all of this is perpetually confirmed via action, such that the 
information delivered separately from a particular sense generally coincides with the 
information delivered separately from the other senses, and such that perception can 
guide constructive action while action has predictable effects on perception. What we 
experience now usually makes sense given what we were experiencing a moment 




It is at least conceivable, however, that there should be something it is like for 
a subject to possess all her current experiences together. . . . and that this phenomenal 
state-of-being should be in fact incredibly disorientating. Sight and sound, smell and 
taste, touch and balance, have all become radically unhinged from each other; it looks
as if you’re sinking down and feels as if you’re floating up; you can’t tell if you’re 
hearing a loud noise from a distance or a quiet noise up close. Objects do appear to 
flicker in and out of existence. Walking in the direction of an exit only makes it look 
as if it’s receding further from you. Thoughts and intentions are formed but 
experienced as coming from outside your head, while outside things—the wind in the 
trees, the stories in the news, other people’s thoughts and voices and actions—are 
experienced as being under one’s control, perhaps even private phenomena. Indeed, 
phenomenal states-of-being with some of these features may actually exist—perhaps 
in subjects with severe schizophrenia, for instance (or subjects who have not yet 
adapted to wearing lenses that invert directionality). Yet although co-consciousness 
would seem to be a precondition for even experiencing this sort of radical 
disorientation, it would be perverse to call such a phenomenal state-of-being unif ed.  
In another sense, though, calling experience unified may mean less than 
calling experiences co-conscious. For, prima facie at least, it would seem that a 
creature could have two streams of consciousness, and yet enjoy a significant degree 
of conscious unity. First of all, each stream might itself enjoy a high degree of 
conscious unity (coherence of contents, for instance). Second and more interestingly, 
there might be a great deal of coherence between or across the two streams. The 




some sense incompatible with each other. Conscious unity may be grounded in many 
other things besides similarity (or compatibility) of contents, also. For instance, a set 
of experiences may be more or less unified depending on the role they play in 
behavior, or depending upon the kinds of spatial relations that the objects they 
represent are experienced as standing in, relative to each other, or depending upon 
whether or not they all bear the same kind of accessibility relations to the same set of 
long-term memories. Experiences might be more unified to the extent that they re 
caused by the same things in the world.  
Someone might press, however, that having a single stream of consciousness 
and having a unified consciousness are at most conceptually distinct, and that some 
kind of coherence in contents, for instance, is the basis not just of conscious unity, but 
also of co-consciousness. When Baars, for instance, writes that “It has been known 
for at least a century that two simultaneous, incompatible events do not become 
conscious at the same time” (1988: 126), he seems to mean that two conscious 
representations do not become co-conscious if their contents are incoherent. He 
provides as an example of two simultaneous, incompatible events, a speech sound in 
the left ear and a falling glass in the right visual field, and claims that only one of 
these events can be globally broadcast at any moment; those who doubt that these two 
events are truly incompatible can think instead of something like the phenomenon of 
binocular rivalry.  
I agree that there appear to be significant and fascinating causal relationships 
between co-consciousness and coherence of contents, although I think it is difficult to 




consciousness, or that co-consciousness compels that contents be made to cohere.55 
But in either case, this is fine; co-consciousness is clearly an aspect of conscious 
unity, perhaps even the most important aspect of it, and perhaps there are limits to 
how disunified a single stream of consciousness can become as well. Again, there 
probably are deep and important relations between co-consciousness and conscious 
unity. But there nonetheless are cases in which one’s conscious experiences are 
disorienting and confusing in part because they’re co-conscious, and it’s confusing to 
experience them together: cases in which something sounds as if it’s coming from 
behind you but looks as if it’s coming from right in front of you; cases in which 
vision and sensation yield simultaneously incompatible information; cases of damage 
to early striate cortex in which, in the early recovery period:  
the patient will see pure motion (usually rotary) without any 
form or colour. Then brightness perception returns as a pure 
Ganzfeld—a uniform brightness covering the whole visual 
field. When colours develop they do so in the form of ‘space’ 
or film colours not attached to objects. The latter develop as 
fragments which join together and eventually the colours enter 
their objects to complete the construction of the phenomenal 
object.     (Smythies, 1994: 313)  
 
Such cases need not necessarily be cases of possession of multiple streams of 
consciousness. In fact, again, the opposite would appear to be true: one can hardly 
                                                
55 I say this because it looks as if co-consciousness may sometimes be a causal precondition for 
conscious coherence, rather than the other way around: co-consciousness seems to force some degree, 
or at least some kinds, of coherence of conscious cntents. Consider the so-called McGurk effect, for 
instance (McGurk, MacDonald, 1976). People who atch someone mouthing the sound “Ga ga” while 
simultaneously listening to someone utter the sound “Ba ba” actually hear someone say “Da da.” But 
presumably if the visual representation of the mouth and the auditory representation of the vocalization 
were not co-conscious, this effect would not be produced. I don’t actually know if anyone’s run this 
experiment using split-brain subjects, but I would expect that if only the RH watched someone 
mouthing the sound “Ga ga,” and only the LH heard someone utter the sound “Ba ba” (this would 
have to be set up as a dichotic listening task in order to work), the subject would say (LH) that she’d 




find disorienting the clash of sight and sound, for instance, unless the sight and sound 
are experienced together. Otherwise it is just sight and just sound, and no conflict.  
So despite the no doubt deep and important conceptual and causal and perhaps 
even constitutive relationships between co-consciousness and (at least some elements 
of) what I have identified as conscious unity, co-consciousness and conscious unity 
also remain importantly distinct in certain respects. And meanwhile my sense i  that a 
great deal of the literature on the puzzle of “split-brain” consciousness would benefit 
from drawing this distinction; thinkers (both philosophers and neuropsychologists) 
seem to talk past each other (or sometimes even past themselves) switching between 
stating that the two hemispheres obviously are associated with distinct streams of 
consciousness and puzzling over the fact that a split-brain subject’s consciousness 
sure doesn’t seem so disunified. I believe that a split-brain subject’s consciousness is 
dual and fairly unified, especially outside of experimental situations. (A “normal” 
subject’s consciousness is nonetheless no doubt more unified, given the kinds of 
integration of conscious contents that the corpus callosum allows.)  
That said, one of the key things that makes our consciousness feel uni ied is 
co-consciousness: the fact that there is something it is like to experience lots of 
experienced things together. In fact the phenomenon of co-consciousness may be 
what is most puzzling about conscious unity. This is difficult to say without first 
being clear on all the elements of conscious unity, but co-consciousness is probably 
more puzzling and mysterious than at least some plausible aspects of conscious unity, 
such as the way consciousness relates to action and agency, or the coherence of 




where consciousness is concerned, involves co-consciousness in particular: both right 
and left hemisphere of a split-brain subject appear subject to conscious experiences, 
as evidenced through their right hemisphere-controlled and left hemisphere-controlled 
behavior; and yet right hemisphere experiences do not seem co-conscious with left 
hemisphere experiences.  
 
 
3.5 Consciousness and Subjects of Experience 
One standard description of (phenomenal) consciousness is this: a state is 
phenomenally conscious when there is something it is like for a subject to possess 
that state. This formulation links the concept of consciousness to that of a subject of 
experience. The concept of a stream of (phenomenal) consciousness or of co-
consciousness may presuppose a subject of experience to an even greater extent.  
The close conceptual link between co-consciousness and subjects of 
experience is made clear when, for example, in the course of defending the apparently 
dramatic thesis that disunity (multiplicity) of phenomenal consciousness is 
impossible, Bayne and Chalmers (2003) qualify that they can still accept, if they 
choose, Puccetti’s view that split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness 
apiece. For Puccetti also attributes two subjects of experience (and in fact two 
persons) to split-brain subjects, and as it turns out, Bayne and Chalmers only commit
themselves to the claim that a single subject of experience can have no more than one 
stream of consciousness at a time. But if this is the case, then their “phenomenal unity 
thesis” is much less dramatic. For any time one has evidence (assuming there could 




could simply—in fact, one would have to, on Bayne and Chalmers’ view—accept that 
the creature was also associated with multiple subjects of experience.  
As Dainton (2000) points out, Bayne’s and Chalmers’ is the standard way of 
individuating experiences: the token identity of an experience is standardly thought t  
depend upon the time at which it occurs, its phenomenal character, and its subject. 
But Dainton also says that while the first two criteria are both sound and helpful, the 
third criterion is “not very informative” (Dainton 2000: 25). This seems right, and 
perhaps the reason that the “consubjectivity thesis” (the thesis that co-conscious 
experiences belong to a single subject of experience) is not very informative is that 
our concept of a subject of experience is so tightly linked with our concept of a 
stream of consciousness. It is part of our concept of a subject of experience that that 
subject has no more and no less than a single stream or center of consciousness (at a 
time).  
I suggest that our concept of a subject of experience is so tightly linked with 
our concept of (especially phenomenally) conscious of experience that we can’t really 
get any purchase on the idea of a subject of experience who has an experience that is 
conscious—but that the subject of experience herself or himself or itself can’t 
experience. We have to say, in that case, either than the experience belongs to some
other subject of experience, and not that one, or else that the experience is in fact just
a non-conscious representation. Therefore, if there is nothing it is like to possess two 
experiences or streams of consciousness at once, then those two experiences or those 
two streams of consciousness cannot belong to a single subject of experience. Which 




experiences. Thus the consubjectivity thesis may be true, but true on the basis of our 
conceptual schema. While this is interesting, if correct, it will not help us individuate 
experiences: if you knew how many subjects of experience a given creature possessed 
or was constituted by, you would already know how many streams of consciousness 
that creature had. We have no hold on the concept of a subject of experience, that is, 
apart from our hold on consciousness and co-consciousness.  
It is less clear if a single stream of consciousness can be associated with more 
than one subject of experience. I am imagining a case of telepathy in which t o 
creatures temporarily appeared to share, to have equal access to, the same s ries of 
token conscious experiences. This might constitute a case in which t o subjects of 
experience possess the same center or stream of consciousness. This is not clear, 
however. There appear to be two subjects of experience if subjects of experience a e 
relatively enduring things; if instead there is a new subject of experience at each 
moment (as Strawson (1997) has argued), then perhaps during the telepathic time 
period there is but a single subject of experience. (It might also be argued that 
subjects of experience should be individuated in terms of their purely physical, 
nonfunctional properties, but this restriction might be unprincipled for telepathically 
communicating creatures.) Alternatively, perhaps such creatures would not really 
share a token stream or center of consciousness to begin with. In any event, while 
interesting, these questions don’t appear to be essential to resolving matters 
concerning the structure of consciousness in the sorts of creatures we know of. I will 




such a subject does not possess more, or less, than one stream or center of 
consciousness at a time.  
This, of course, still does not say what a subject of experience s. While I can’t 
say anything that’s illuminating on this question, I will assume that it is an important 
part of our concept of a subject of experience that if such a subject is presented with 
more than one experience, those experiences all belong to one stream of 
consciousness. We could, of course, revise the concept—but it’s unclear what kind of 
work the concept would do if we did revise it in this way. What work is done by the 
concept of a subject of conscious experience who has conscious experiences she or he 
or it can’t experience the relations between? Still, perhaps this is mistaken; in any 
event, subjects of experience enter little into what follows, and I don’t try to 
individuate experiences or streams of consciousness by referring to the subjects of 
experience that possess them.  
Finally, I distinguish a subject of experience from a person, at least 
conceptually—even for a creature who is associated with both a person and a subject 
of experience. The concept of a person is first of all richer than that of a subject of 
experience. Many non-human animals, for instance, may be subjects of experience, 
without being persons. One possibility is that a person is a subject of experience 
that/who also possesses additional properties. (E.g., self-consciousness, moral 
agency…) Or a person may be an animal that/who is a subject of experience and 
that/who also possesses additional properties.  
A distinct possibility, however, and one that may be counter-intuitive but that 




phenomenon, is that a person could, in theory, be identified with morethan a single 
subject of experience, especially for limited periods of time, but perhaps even 
perpetually. It isn’t clear that there is such a close conceptual link between persons 
and subjects of experience that a person couldn’t have or be associated with more 
than one of the latter, particularly if the subjects of experience were subject to very 
much the same sorts of experiences, and assuming that the person’s mental and 
behavioral life overall was characterized by a high or moderately high degree of 
integration. Of course, whether this were possible in fact would depend in large part 
upon the place of conscious experiences and streams of consciousness in cognitive 
architecture.  
I am still trying to avoid personal identity questions to the extent possible in 
this work; this explains why I have, throughout, spoken of split-brain subjects, 
without meaning to presuppose any claims about how many persons or subjects of 
experience they are; in some of what follows I may speak of a (single) split-brain 
subject as being associated with or possessing two subjects of experience. Perhaps the 
best account of personhood is one according to which a person is a subject of 
experience, or perhaps not; again I wish to remain neutral on these sorts of questi ns 
to the extent possible.  
 
 
3.6 What is Co-consciousness? 
One of the several reasons that I accept the rough adequacy of the global workspace 
theory of consciousness is that I believe that it suggests a plausible account of co-




(access) conscious in virtue of both being available to global consumers. They may or 
may not be available to the same token global consumers: if the representations in 
question are mine and yours, then they obviously won’t be available to the same 
token global consumers.  
Presumably, for two representations to be access co-conscious is just for them 
to be jointly accessible or jointly globally broadcast. For instance, if an access 
conscious representation is one that can play a role in your practical reasoning, or one 
whose content you can report, then two access co-conscious representations can be 
jointly used in your practical reasoning, or you can report b th of their contents.  
I suggest that for two representations to be ph nomenally co-conscious—for 
there to be something it is like to have both of those representations at once—is also 
just for them to be jointly accessible or jointly globally broadcast. This joint 
availability is what makes it the case that there is something it is like for their subject 
to experience both of them together—that there is a phenomenology of the two states 
together that differs from the phenomenology either of them has (or would have) 
alone.  
This account needn’t require that accessibility explains or confers phenomenal 
properties. Something else, besides global accessibility, may be necessary to account 
for the phenomenology that experiences like E1 and E2 have. . . . But their joint 
accessibility may nonetheless account for their joint phenomenology. So, again, for 
two representations to be co-conscious with each other—either access co-consci us 
or phenomenally co-conscious—is simply for them to be broadcast or available to the 




I should note that what makes a set of (token) global consumers constitute a 
set in the relevant sense here is not arbitrary; the set comprised of all of your global 
consumers and of all of my global consumers is not a set, in the relevant 
(psychological) sense, because there are no representations that are jointly available 
to your global consumers and to mine. Thus when I say that a split-brain subject, S, 
has two sets of global consumers—a right hemisphere set and a left hemisphere set—
the division of all of S’s global consumers into two distinct sets of global consumers, 
a right hemisphere set and a left hemisphere set, is not arbitrary, and is not on the 
basis of purely physical features of those consumers somehow. The division is 
functional: RH conscious representations are broadcast to RH global consumers, LH 
conscious representations are broadcast to LH global consumers. So, we can use the 
term “f-set” (functional set) to refer to the set of global consumers that share access to 
the same representations. Note also that there is a sort of circular relationship between 
individuating token representations and individuating token global consumers (or sets 
of token global consumers). That is, one reason to identify right and left hemisphere, 
content-bearing neural events with distinct conscious experiences, is that right and 
left hemisphere neural events make their contents available to distinct global 
consumer systems. And one reason to identify right and left hemisphere consumer 
systems as distinct sets of consumer systems is that they have access to different 
conscious representations. 
If this account of co-consciousness is correct, then phenomenal (and access) 
co-consciousness is a product of very much the same forces and mechanisms as those 




that can support consciousness as the global workspace theory describes need be 
capable of supporting co-consciousness, for we can conceive of a global workspace 
whose contents are always limited to a single representation at a time. But any 
architecture in which the workspace does take more than one representation at a time 
is ready to support not just access consciousness, but phenomenal co-consciousness 
as well. 
This account of co-consciousness makes a prima facie case for conscious 
duality in split-brain subjects. The results of the split-brain experiments suggest that 
global broadcast is not inter-hemispheric in split-brain subjects; right hemisphere 
experiences appear broadcast to right hemisphere global consumers, left hemisphere 
experiences to left hemisphere global consumers. There is, of course, no reason to 
think that broadcast somehow becomes inter-hemispheric outside of experimental 
conditions. The conscious duality model for split-brain subjects will be defended 
against competing models of their consciousness in the next chapter.  
I have assumed thus far that co-consciousness is an all-or-nothing affair—that 
multiple representations either are or are not co-conscious. If the account of co-
consciousness that I have accepted is correct, however, then someone might argue 
that phenomenal co-consciousness can be partial in the following sense. There may 
be greater or lesser degrees of co-consciousness to the extent that there are greate  
and lesser degrees of global broadcast. And there may be greater or lesser degrees of 
global broadcast if broadcast can be to more or to fewer global consumers within a set 
of global consumers—not as a function of architecture, but as a function of more 




hemisphere representations are not broadcast to right hemisphere global consumers, 
and could not be so broadcast, not because of any attentional deficit, but simply 
because of a split-brain subject’s mental architecture. But in some instances a 
representation might not be broadcast to a full set of global consumers not because of 
architectural limitations but only because of more contingent factors.  
Of course, consciousness and co-consciousness would necessarily be an all-
or-nothing affair in a creature that just possessed a single token “global” cnsumer. 
Imagine that C just has one system (let’s say some “inner sense” faculty), availability 
to which makes a mental state conscious. (Though this would be a creature for whom 
or for which the global workspace theory would not apply, since conscious 
representations aren’t broadcast globally but only to a single consumer system. Some 
other theory of consciousness would be necessary for this creature—like a higher-
order representation theory. Of course this could have implications for the proper
theory of co-consciousness in this creature at well, but let us ignore these points for 
the moment, since we are not such creatures in the first place.) Then if E1 and E2 are 
available to the inner sense faculty and E3 isn’t, it is not just the case that E1 and E2 
aren’t co-conscious with E3; E3 simply isn’t conscious. In such a creature, any 
conscious experience will necessarily be co-conscious with every other conscious 
experience.  
We are not such creatures, however; the global workspace theory of 
consciousness posits multiple global consumer systems. So perhaps for us 
consciousness itself can come in degrees, greater degrees of consciousness 




like this idea can be found in Dennett (1991); Dennett’s 1991 account of 
consciousness as a “Joycean stream” is not a version of the global workspace theory, 
but some of its elements are similar.) So imagine a creature with a whole suite of 
global consumers: a higher-order thought faculty, a practical reasoning system, a 
language system, an emotional system or systems, a memory system or systems, and 
so forth. In this creature, two representations that were available to all the same token 
global consumers would be perfectly co-conscious; two representations that were 
available to an overlapping but still distinct set of token global consumers would be 
partially co-conscious. So, if access consciousness comes in degrees, and if the 
account of phenomenal co-consciousness that I have accepted is correct, then 
phenomenal co-consciousness can come in degrees also. 
Note that if access consciousness and thus co-consciousness comes in degrees 
in the way I have just suggested, co-consciousness could theoretically fail to be a 
transitive relation. As I said before, intuitively co-consciousness is transitive: if E1 
and E2 are co-conscious, and E2 and E3 are co-conscious, then E1 and E3 are as well. 
But now imagine that E1 and E2 are co-conscious by virtue of both being available to 
two overlapping but distinct sets of (token) global consumers, and that E2 and E3 are 
similarly co-conscious by virtue of both being available to two overlapping but 
distinct sets of global consumers—but that the sets of global consumers to which E1 
and E3 are both available do not overlap at all.  
If access consciousness and thus co-consciousness regularly does come in 
degrees, then our consciousness is less structured, it would seem, than we might 




consciousness holds, and between which co-consciousness does not hold, human 
consciousness may be more like a messy web of experiences, with some (co-
consciousness) links strong and some weak and some simply absent.  
But that consciousness does come in degrees in the way Dennett (2001, 1991) 
believes is uncertain; I take it that there is some evidence that broadcasting really is 
pretty much an all-or-nothing affair; a representation can be available to oneor a f w 
consumer systems. . . . Or it can be available to all of them. (See Dehaene et al., 
2006.) Of course it is possible that a representation that is broadcast to all global 
consumers at once will only be processed by a couple of these systems, but this need 
not make it less conscious (though such limited processing may have the consequence 
of making it conscious for less time). If global broadcast does not come in degrees, 
then on my account, co-consciousness will not come in degrees either. Or at least not 
for this reason—for there is a different (though related) sense in which co-
consciousness might be said to be partial, one that is particularly relevant to the split-
brain cases. I won’t assess the likelihood of this second form of partial co-
consciousness until the next chapter, however, keeping the discussion deliberately 
simple for now.  
Finally, as I said earlier, I deal only with synchronic co-consciousness i this 
work. But perhaps roughly the same sort of account could be given for both 
synchronic and diachronic co-consciousness. Consciousness takes time; an 
experience is broadcast to and processed by global consumers not just for an instant, 
but for a longer period. (Of course it is not clear how long, and of course it no doubt 




experience is broadcast. Meanwhile, the represented times of these experiences may 
of course overlap or be adjacent as well. Perhaps two experiences represented as 
occurring in quick succession are diachronically co-conscious when they are jointly 
broadcast to the same global consumers.  
Of course, even a rough sketch of that sort of account faces numerous 
difficulties. I nonetheless suspect that something like the account of synchronic co-
consciousness that I adopt could be made to work to explain diachronic co-
consciousness also. (Among other things, the account of co-consciousness offered 
explains both why synchronic co-consciousness is (or tends to be) transitive, while 
diachronic co-consciousness is not.) But again, in this work I confine myself to a 
treatment of the structure of consciousness at a time.  
 
 
3.7 Preliminary Conclusions and Assumptions 
The next section of this chapter concerns the resources available to the defender of 
the conscious duality model to meet the challenge posed by split-brain subjects’ 
normally unified behavior. Since a great many of claims, assumptions, and 
distinctions have just been laid out, however, let me recap them before moving on.  
A preliminary distinction: 
• A stream of consciousness is a set of mutually co-conscious 
experiences. A unified consciousness is a consciousness that 
meets a set of normative criteria especially concerning 
consistency, coherence, and perhaps agency.  
 
Assumptions—I will not argue for these, at least for the most part: 
• Both hemispheres of a split-brain subject are subject to some 





• Phenomenally conscious experiences are also access conscious.  
 
• Global workspace theory offers an adequate account of access 
consciousness. (It may or may not offer an adequate account of 
consciousness, period.) For a representation to be access 
conscious is for it to be available or globally broadcast to ome 
set of (token) global consumers.  
 
• There is one stream of consciousness per subject of experience 
and vice versa.  
 
• Knowing how many streams of consciousness a creature has 
does not yet tell us how unified the creature’s consciousness is 
(and, albeit to a lesser extent, vice versa). A subject could have 
two streams of consciousness that nonetheless (together) 
exhibit a high degree of unity, or a single stream of 
consciousness that was nonetheless fairly disunified.  
 
Implicit argument—while I don’t explicitly argue for this claim, I hope that in using it 
fruitfully, I will provide some support for its truth:  
• Global workspace theory offers an account of (access and 
phenomenal) co-consciousness. For two representations to be 
co-conscious is for them to be available to the same set of 
(token) global consumers.  
 
Explicit argument—this claim will be defended in this and the following chapter.  
• Split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness, though 
these streams of consciousness are no doubt more unified (with 
each other) outside than inside of experimental conditions.  
 
4 The Conscious Duality Model and the Challenge from Unified Behavior 
 
There are two major models of the structure of split-brain subjects’ consciousness. 
The first is a “singularity model” of consciousness, according to which split-brain 
subjects have a single stream of consciousness, at least most of the time. Several 




brain subjects always have one stream of consciousness, associated with only their 
left hemispheres (Eccles 1965; MacKay 1966). In another version of this model 
(Marks 1980, Tye 2003) split-brain subjects normally have a single stream of 
consciousness, associated with both hemispheres, but ometimes have two streams of 
consciousness, one associated with each hemisphere, for brief moments during the 
split-brain experiment; in this model, the possession of the same conscious contents 
suffices for the hemispheres to share a single stream of experience.  
The second major model of the structure of split-brain subjects’ consciousness 
is what I have called the “duality model.” In this model, a split-brain subject has two 
streams of consciousness, whose contents will be less or more similar as a function of 
whether the subject is inside or outside of the split-brain experimental situation, 
respectively. This model appears more favored by those in the neuropsychological 
community. (See for example Sperry 1990, 1968, 1966; Sperry, Zaidel, and Zaidel, 
1979; Gazzaniga and LeDoux 1978; Bogen 1990, 1985, 1969; Uddin, Rayman, and 
Zaidel 2005.) 
The major evidence in favor of the singularity model of split-brain 
consciousness is simply that split-brain subjects behave in such an integrated fashion 
under most circumstances. The major evidence against such a view is the dissociated 
behavior they sometimes display (usually during the split-brain experiment although 
sometimes at other times), in combination with the best explanation for that 
behavioral dissociation. The best explanation for the dissociated behavior split-brain 
subjects exhibit during the split-brain experiment is that they do indeed have two 




streams of consciousness during these experiments refers to the permanent 
embodiment of their mental and conscious lives, their neuroanatomies, it is difficult 
to believe that the split-brain experimental paradigm itself alters the structure of split-
brain subjects’ consciousness. There is better reason to believe that, their high degree 
of behavioral integration notwithstanding, split-brain subjects always have two 
streams of consciousness. 
The duality model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness is simply one 
according to which the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are associated w th 
two distinct streams of consciousness—two sets of token experiences, within each of 
which there are at least a great deal of co-consciousness relations and between ach of 
which there are at most few co-consciousness relations. The duality model holds that 
a split-brain subject’s two streams of consciousness are explained in part by her 
neuroanatomy: a split-brain subject lacks the neural pathways necessary to sustain 
interhemispheric co-consciousness.56  
That the duality model refers to neuroanatomical facts in this way, or at least 
that its application to split-brain subjects is partially explained by neuroanat mical 
facts, probably accounts for the popularity of the duality model within the 
neuropsychological community (in contrast to the philosophical community). 
Neuropsychologists are more likely to accept—or to simply assume—some kind of 
isomorphism between the structure of consciousness and the structure of the brain. As 
I have emphasized previously, this isomorphism is really between co-consciousness 
                                                
56 This formulation remains uncommitted as to the prope  model of consciousness for acallosal 
subjects; perhaps in an acallosal subject some other structure, besides the (absent) corpus callosum, 
sustains interhemispheric co-consciousness. This formulation may imply that a “normal” subject has a 
single stream of consciousness, since it refers to “ plit brain” neuroanatomy in particular, but I actually 




(and co-mentality) and functional neuroanatomy; it is largely because of observations 
made during the split-brain experiments themselves that the corpus callosum came to 
be viewed as a mechanism for co-consciousness (and co-mentality). Granted, if 
sectioning the corpus callosum had not led to any observable conscious dissociation, 
then neuropsychologists might still have insisted upon an isomorphism between 
conscious and neural structure—they might simply have hypothesized the anterior 
commissure as the crucial mechanism of interhemispheric co-consciousness, for 
instance. But, since the findings of the split-brain experiment were what they wer , 
the corpus callosum instead was identified as that crucial mechanism. And once it 
was so identified, a conscious duality claim had to be maintained for split-brain 
subjects in extra-experimental situations.  
Of course it is not universally accepted that, absent a corpus callosum, a split-
brain subject lacks a means of achieving interhemispheric co-consciousness 
(conscious singularity). In the previous chapter we looked at an argument (the 
singularity-through-redundancy position) to the effect that mere duplication of 
conscious contents across the two hemispheres suffices for interhemispheric co-
consciousness. And in the next chapter we will look at one model of split-brain 
subjects’ consciousness according to which it is at least partially unified, or (to use 
the language of conscious singularity rather than unity), according to whicha split-
brain subjects’ two hemispheres are at least partially co-conscious. We will also in 
that chapter look at a model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness according to which 




consciousness at a time—one sometimes located in the right hemisphere, and 
sometimes in the left.  
But before we consider these alternative models of split-brain subjects’ 
consciousness, and the challenges th y pose to the conscious duality model, let us 
first examine the most obvious objection to the conscious duality model: the 
challenge posed by the generally integrated-seeming nature of split-brain subjects’ 
behavior. For while the conscious duality model seems prima facie compatible wih 
neuroanatomical evidence, it might also seem prima facie incompatible with 
behavioral evidence, for two reasons.  
To begin with, the duality model holds that split-brain subjects’ consciousness 
is dual both in and outside of experimental conditions, and yet split-brain subjects (in 
contrast to “normal” subjects) behave differently in the two types of circumstance. 
Since the subjects’ neuroanatomies obviously remain constant, the duality model 
must also offer some account for subjects’ behavioral changes between the two types 
of circumstance.  
The duality model can easily meet this first challenge. The split-brain 
experimental paradigm is highly artificial, presenting numerous constraints not 
present in daily life. The absence of these constraints may allow subjects to 
compensate (not necessarily effortfully), to a large degree, and by a variety of means, 
for the lack of integration of conscious processes between the two hemispheres.  
But the duality model must also explain why it is that, particularly outside but 
even inside experimental conditions, split-brain subjects really don’t behave in so




show in the next section, a defender of the duality model has adequate resources to 
meet this second challenge as well For there are many mechanisms that ay serve to 
integrate the behavior produced by the two hemispheres even if these mechanisms do 
not suffice to make the hemispheres co-conscious. The duality model can 
accommodate the behavioral data, in other words, even if accepting it means 
accepting that conscious singularity in and of itself does not play as large role in 
producing unified behavior as one might have thought. This role may instead be 
played in large part by conscious nity as I have defined it, as well as by a variety of 
other non-conscious (and even non-mental) mechanisms and factors. I provide this 
argument in the rest of this section. 
 
4.1 Duplication of Contents 
Perceptual redundancy and resulting duplication of conscious contents across the two 
hemispheres have been favorite mechanisms for behavioral unification for duality
theorists, partly because they would seem to explain why a split-brain subject’s 
behavior changes between experimental and non-experimental conditions. The 
defining methodological feature of what I am calling the “split-brain experiment” is 
the attempt to lateralize perceptual information. Outside of these highly artificial 
experimental set-ups, the hemispheres have access to the same perceptual informatio  
(either at the same time or in very quick succession, due to saccades, etc.) to a 
significant degree. This is of course largely because they’re in the same body, and 
always at the same place at the same time, and because they possess the same sensory 
modalities. It is also partly due to overlap in attentional mechanisms. For example, 




hemispheres to automatically center on, focus on, and hence probably attend to, the 
same items in the visual field all the time” (Sperry, Gazzaniga, Bogen, 1969: 28 ). 
And they have equal (or similar) access to physiological states: those associated with 
hunger, with intense anger, with exhaustion, and so forth.  
Note that perceptual redundancy is greatest outside experimental conditions, 
but impossible to eliminate entirely even within experimental conditions. Perceptual 
redundancy, then, offers a partial explanation both for the fairly unified behavior of 
split-brain subjects within experimental conditions, and the even more unified 
behavior of split-brain subjects outside of experimental conditions.  
The hemispheres don’t have identical perceptual access. Take vision, for 
instance. The right hemisphere is the only hemisphere to (consciously) represent most 
of the left visual field, and the left hemisphere is the only hemisphere to (consciously) 
represent most of the right visual field. It does appear that both hemispheres of a split-
brain subject do learn to consciously represent an overlapping area at the visual 
midline, but this area is no more than two degrees wide (Fendrich, Gazzaniga, 1989; 
Fendrich, Wessinger, Gazzaniga, 1994). Within that narrow strip of the visual field 
that is represented by both hemispheres, meanwhile, “the signals conveyed to each 
hemisphere from the contralateral hemiretina appear to be weak or degraded” 
(Gazzaniga, 2000). So at any given moment, the two hemispheres will differ with 
regards to those qualities represented visually in conscious experience.  
Granted, split-brain subjects do (when permitted) frequently move their eyes 
about the visual scene, resulting in the hemispheres acquiring “identical” visual 




information at any one moment; instead, there is a staggering effect: the left 
hemisphere gets information about the forest while the right hemisphere gets 
information about the girl playing; then the left hemisphere gets information bout the 
girl playing while the right hemisphere gets it about the shore; then the left 
hemisphere gets it about the shore while the right hemisphere gets it about the boa  at 
the center of the lake, etc. 57 But it is also true that our conscious representing of 
visual scenes in general may be built up over many moments, by a series of saccade , 
and so maybe over the course of several seconds the hemispheres will receive the 
same visual input from the world.  
Even if the conscious visual contents of both hemispheres were identical, the 
hemispheres would still differ in terms of things like their conscious tactile 
contents58. When S’s blindfold is removed, both hemispheres can visually represent 
that S is holding both a flashlight and a book of matches, but only the RH also feel  
the flashlight, in a detailed way, and only the LH also feels the matches, in a detailed 
way. And S will not have any rich tactile representation of the flashlight and the 
matches at once. Temperature (Gazzaniga 2000) doesn’t appear to be experienced in 
precisely the same way by the hemispheres; Dimond (1980) even says that some 
split-brain subjects report having burned their left hands for several moments before 
“they” (their left hemispheres) realized it. 
Finally, the two hemispheres also of course differ in linguistic capacity. While 
there is still significant debate about the linguistic capacity of the disconnected right 
                                                
57 In making this point I am not conflating time of rep senting and time as represented: the claim isn’t 
merely that hemispheres represent, at different times, the same qualities, but that they will also 
represent the same qualities as existing (or being experienced) at different times.  
58 Since stereognostic or “active touch” information fr the hands is sharply lateralized in split-brains 




hemisphere, and about the connected right hemisphere’s contributions to language, it 
is less controversial to state that split-brain subjects’ left hemispheres are generally 
responsible for the production of propositional speech. Since the right hemisphere is 
nonetheless often capable of producing non-propositional vocalizations (Code, 1997), 
the most reasonable hypothesis concerning the inn r speech of split-brain subjects is 
that the left hemisphere engages in it and the right hemisphere does not. Inner speech 
of course has a phenomenology.  
Inner speech isn’t something out in the world to be perceived, of course; it’s a 
product of the hemispheres’ perceptual (and conceptual) systems. This suggests that, 
while the hemispheres no doubt do enjoy a good deal of perceptual redundancy, 
especially outside but also inside experimental conditions, it is important to 
distinguish between identical (or highly similar) perceptual access and identical (or 
highly similar) perceptual contents. For two hemispheres (or for that matter, two 
creatures) to have identical perceptual access is for them to be able to accss, via 
perception, information about the same portions of the world. (And also they should 
be able to access this information via the same sensory modalities; it isn’t the case 
that I and a bat in my attic have identical perceptual access to the moths I see and the 
bat hears (or echolocates).) Thus you and I have the same perceptual access if we’re 
both free to look about the same room. The split-brain experiment denies the two 
hemispheres equal perceptual access to the world: it displays to the right hemisphere 
what it conceals from the left. Outside of the split-brain experiment, however, a 




Indeed in some cases the hemispheres may acquire the same perceptual 
contents even when they lack the same perceptual access. Sperry (1990) notes that 
“By the laws of percpetual completion and closure each hemisphere automatically 
tends to fill in its half stimulus across the midline to form a whole bisymmetric 
percept on each side” (Sperry 1990: 375, citing Trevarthen 1976). By presenting a 
split-brain subject a (bilateral) chimera, the subject can “be made to perceive two 
quite different things occupying the same position in space at the same time, 
something rejected, of course, by the normal brain” (ibid)—but such chimeras (or 
their equivalents) are rare in nature, and thus this perceptual completion provides one 
means by which contents are duplicated in the two hemispheres, even without 
identical perceptual (or sensory) access. 
Still, this point, that perceptual contents aren’t only a matter of sensory input, 
cuts both ways. The hemispheres appear to process sensory information of various 
sorts somewhat differently (and also appear capable of maintaining somewhat 
different focuses of attention).  
For instance, there seem to be some differences between the two hemispheres 
with regards to emotional perception and experience59. At the very least, to the extent 
that the cognitive component of emotion (Schacter, Singer 1962) involves language 
and hypothesis-formation (as to the cause of the physiological element of emotion for 
example), the hemispheres will almost certainly differ with regards to the cognitive 
                                                
59 The preponderance of studies in this area suggest that here is some difference in the way the 
hemispheres perceive, process, and express positive versus negative emotions, but there is not yet a 
clear conceptual model of this difference. Very roughly, though, the data suggest the right hemisphere 
has some advantages for some aspects of the conscious perception of negative emotions, and vice 




content of emotional experience60. But the hemispheres may differ even with respect 
to the non-cognitive aspect of emotion; there is some evidence that (at least in many 
people) the right hemisphere experiences more negative affect. (See Schiff r 1998 for 
a very dramatic version of this thesis.) 
It seems very likely that the visual processing differences between the two 
hemispheres result in phenomenal differences as well. That the right hemisphere 
excels at representing (at least some sorts of) spatial relationships between visually 
perceived objects, for example, suggests that the right hemisphere’s phenomenal 
experience of the visually-perceived world may differ from the left hemisphere’s. The 
left hemisphere also appears more sensitive to local visual configurations and the 
right to global physical patterns. (See Hellige, 1993, for discussion of hemispheric 
asymmetries in the visual and visuospatial realm. Also see Zaidel 1990 suggesting 
that hemispheric differences in the storage and retrieval of long-term semantic 
memory may underlie some of the perceptual asymmetries between the hemispheres.)  
These sorts of differences in perceptual processing presumably have 
consequences for phenomenal contents. So even identical perceptual access would 
not necessarily mean identical perceptual contents. This point has probably not been 
sufficiently acknowledged by supporters of the conscious (and mental) duality 
models.  
Finally, all that said, it is again important to emphasize that (contra the 
singularity-through-redundancy position discussed in Chapter Three) even if the 
                                                
60 Schiffer et al. (1998) even elicited different answers to emotionally salient questions from the right 
and left hemispheres of two split-brain patients, although it is of course possible that the hemispheres 




hemispheres were subject to identical conscious contents, this still would not mean 
identical perceptual states. As Sperry said:  
Many unifying factors can be enumerated that tend to make at 
least components of the inner experience of the two 
disconnected hemispheres similar or identical in orientation 
and content especially during ordinary unrestricted behavior. 
The bilateral sensory projection systems of the brain, like those 
for cutaneous sensibility of the face, ensure a bilateral 
reduplication of symmetric sensations in both hemispheres. 
Thus, with conscious attention focused on facial, auditory, or 
other stimuli that get bilateral representation, both hemispheres 
presumably develop a full bilateral percept with no vertical 
split between right and left aspects. Scanning movements of the 
eyes yield a similar duplication with respect to vision. The 
overall effect in some respects is thus more like a twinning or 
doubling of the conscious domain of the self rather than 
midline division. 
   (Sperry 1990: 380, emphasis added)  
 
This last point reflects why I have, throughout, spoken of the conscious 
duality model rather than of the conscious di unity model of split-brain subjects’ 
consciousness—and it also reflects why Sperry begins the passage quoted above by 
speaking of unifying factors. There is no question but that, where content is 
concerned, the two streams of consciousness are to a large degree similar, and to an 
even larger degree coherent. Note that these are two different things: not every 
difference or inconsistency in contents need signify incoherence. When the conscious 
contents of the two hemispheres differ, they may do so, in many cases, simply 
because the two hemispheres are conscious of different portions of the world, or 
different aspects of the same portion of the world. There are cases in which their 
contents will be incoherent; think again about the chimera case. But again, such 




of midline stimuli, the hemispheres will generate representations of midline visual 
stimuli with similar contents.  
 
4.2 Attention 
The literature on attention in split-brain subjects is complex and at time seemingly 
contradictory. This may in part be because of the difficulty in distinguishing between 
various types of attention. I will try to quickly give the major findings here before 
discussing in slightly more detail a couple findings that illustrate the need to 
distinguish between integrated or adaptive-seeming behavior and behavior that stems 
from mental and conscious singularity.  
The hemispheres compete for processing resources: though they can perform 
different tasks at the same time (this is true to some extent in “normal” as well as in 
split-brain subjects), increasing the difficulty of one hemisphere’s task will impair the 
performance of the other. (Holtzman and Gazzaniga, 1982; Reuter-Lorenz et al., 
1996.) While this sharing of (competition for) processing resources won’t serve to 
integrate the activities of the two hemispheres per se, it may still encourage nified 
behavior, insofar as it makes it difficult for one hemisphere to “run away with” a task 
while the other is also deeply involved with a task.  
At the same time, the division of resources between the hemispheres can 
actually aid their performance for some tasks. Holtzman and Gazzaniga (1985) gave 
split-brain and “normal” subjects a complex spatial memory task, in which 
information critical to the task was presented in both visual fields. For “normal” 
subjects, the visual information was combined, and as a result the hemispheres 




fields was of course not combined, with the result that each hemisphere had to solve a 
problem only half the size. The split-brain subjects outperformed the “normal” 
subjects.  
The two hemispheres may engage in visual search independently; a split-brain 
subject is twice as fast as scanning, say, eight stimuli when the stimuli are divided 
across the two visual fields as she is when all eight stimuli are in the same visual field 
(Luck et al., 1989, 1994). At the same time, Holtzman et al. (1983) found evidence 
suggesting that a split-brain subject cannot divide her spatial attention across the two 
hemispheres—directing attention to two different points, one in each visual field, at 
once, for instance. Using a very similar paradigm, however, Mangun et al. (1994) 
obtained the opposite result: split-brain subjects did appear able to direct spatial 
attention to both visual fields at once. Arguin et al. (2000) argued that this 
discrepancy could be explained by the fact that in the Holtzman et al. (1983) study the 
onset between cue and target was 1500 msec—a fairly long interval, especially since 
that is a length of time sufficient to allow information for the control of visuo-spatial 
attention to transfer between hemispheres. (Either hemisphere can direct attention o a 
point in either visual field.) This may have prevented the hemispheres from operating 
as autonomously as they otherwise could. And indeed with shorter interval times 
Arguin et al. (2000) again found that at least most of the split-brain subjects they used 
in their study could divide their attention between two visual fields, while their 
“normal” subjects could not.  
There has also been some suggestion that voluntary attentional orienting 




al., 1995), with attention lateralized to the left hemisphere, while automatic 
attentional orienting can proceed somewhat independently in the two hemispheres 
(Luck et al. 1989, 1994). (Note, though, that Arguin et al. (2000) believe the results of 
their study shows that even voluntary attentional orienting can proceed independently 
in the two hemispheres. In the Kingstone et al. (1995) study suggesting the opposite 
conclusion, the task required not only voluntary directing of attention but strategic 
directing of attention; perhaps this accounts for the difference?) And there is some 
evidence (not just from split-brain subjects) that the right hemisphere is dominant for 
visual spatial attention insofar as it attends to the whole visual field, while the l f  
hemisphere attends just to the right visual field.  
It is likely that none of the findings just cited are, individually, secure at this 
point. Nonetheless we may be able to draw, with some confidence, the conservative 
conclusion that the hemispheres compete for attentional resources to some extent, 
while possessing (or at least operating) some attentional mechanisms idependently. 
(Of course, it is possible that tention is being used too broadly in the literature on 
attentional mechanisms at this point, and that some of what looks, now, like 
competition for attentional resources will eventually be conceptualized as competition 
for something else, and, similarly, that some of what looks to be the independent 
exercise of attention now will come to be conceptualized as the independent exercise 
of something else.) Obviously to the extent that the two “disconnected” hemispheres 
do share and compete for attentional mechanisms, this could play some role in 




More interestingly, behavior that seems integrated—smooth, coordinated, 
adaptive—could in part be the product of a lack of integration of attention. Let me 
illustrate this idea using two further studies as an example.  
Ellenberg and Sperry (1980) designed a study in which split-brain and 
“normal” subjects were asked to engage in a variety of sorting tasks, sometimes 
unimanually and sometimes bimanually, to see how well they could perform different 
tasks with the two hands (and thus presumably the two hemispheres) at once. All four 
conditions involved taking small objects from a central container, and then putting 
each object onto either a top of a bottom shelf, right of the central container for the 
right hand, left of the central container for the left hand. The objects used in the study 
were cylindrical beads (C), spherical beads (S), wing nuts (W) and hex nuts (H).  
For instance, in the unimanual task subjects sorted the objects in the following 










In the bimanual-same condition, subjects were asked to sort using both hands 











In the bimanual-reverse task, they might be asked to sort as follows, using 










And, finally, in the bimanual-different task (in which the objects were drawn 
from two central containers, one for the right and one for the left hand), they might be 











Ellenberg and Sperry made several interesting observations. To begin with, in 
“normal” subjects (and also subjects who had undergone only partial callosotomy), 
the two hands always moved at the same rate in all the bimanual conditions. At least
several of the full callosotomy (split-brain) subjects, however, began sorting at 




“Normal” (and partial split-brain) subjects were (interestingly) particularly 
impaired at the bimanual-reverse task, even compared to the bimanual-different task, 
at least at first; with practice their performance on the two sorts of tasks equalized. 
But they were always significantly slower at both of these tasks than they wer  at the 
unimanual or the bimanual-same task, and their hands always moved in synchrony, 
and, moreover, whenever they made a mistake with one hand, they tended to 
simultaneously slip up with the other. (Ellenberg and Sperry speculate that, since 
“normal” subjects get faster at the bimanual-different and especially the bimanual-
reverse sorting tasks, but since bimanual synchrony was never broken, “normal” 
subjects might improve not because they get better at lateralizing attention, but rather 
because the task becomes more and more automated with practice, requiring less 
attention.) 
It did not matter to the (full) split-brain subjects which sorting task they were 
asked to perform,: they performed at about the same rate, and with the same number 
of errors, regardless of condition, and, again, their hands sometimes sorted at different 
rates, with no ill consequences. As Ellenberg and Sperry note:  
 
The present findings support the idea that attention is normally 
limited to a unitary focus and that the cerebral commissures act 
to keep the left and right hemispheres working together in a 
single unified attentional system. This bilateral integration of 
attention appears to be a dominant organizing principle in 
cerebral function such that the intact hemispheres have great 
difficulty executing two simultaneous tasks independently 
despite lateralization of stimuli and responses.  





So, split-brain subjects perform tasks that “normal” subjects really can’t, and 
that are therefore said to involve conflicting motor plans (suggesting that motor plans 
and spatial representations of movements are isolated to each hemisphere) (Franz, 
Ivry, Gazzaniga, 1996). For instance, a “normal” subject can draw two pictures at 
once, one with each hand, only if the figures to be drawn are either identical or mirror 
reversed. (So, a normal subject would not have much difficulty drawing an “O” and 
an “O” at once, or a “b” and a “d,” but would have trouble drawing a “t” and a “y” at 
once.) But a split-brain subject can draw two different figures at once.  
Now, I accept that the explanation for this difference has to do with some kind 
of internal, inter-hemispheric unity or integration in the “normal” subject that is 
missing in the split-brain subject. The first study, for instance:  
 
support[s] the idea that attention is normally limited to a 
unitary focus and that the cerebral commissures act to keep the 
left and right hemispheres working together in a single unified 
attentional system. The bilateral integration of attention 
appears to be a dominant organizing principle in cerebral 
function such that the intact hemispheres have great difficulty 
executing two simultaneous tasks independently despite 
lateralization of stimuli and responses. 
   (Ellenberg and Sperry, 1980: 416) 
 
And there is furthermore one sense in which the behavior of a “normal” 
subject during the sorting tasks would look “more unified” than the behavior of a 
split-brain subject: in the “normal” subject, the movements of the hands would 
remain coupled (synchronized), even if their sorting tasks were different.  
In some other ways, though, I suspect that the split-brain subject’s behavior 




subject, by the way, sat still and participated cooperatively—and an error by one hand 
wouldn’t disrupt the whole process. Of course, if you ran the experiment on a 
“normal” subject first and then observed the split-brain subject’s uncoupled (de-
synchronized) hand movements, you might find the latter eerily “disunified.” But I 
think you would only find it so because, observing the behavior of the “normal” 
subject, you constructed a theory of the internal process and architecture that would 
result in both hemispheres halting when one slipped. On its surface, though, the 
behavior of the split-brain subject would look perfectly adaptive—even, in a sense, 
coordinated: coordinated with the requirements of the tasks and the aims of the 
subject (as a whole).  
Or consider the second study. Imagine telling two subjects to draw a house 
with one hand a tree with the other, at the same time. One subject sits down and does 
it, without too much difficulty. The other subject stops and starts a few times, then 
fails to follow instructions by letting his hands “take turns,” until, when gently chided 
for this, he says in frustration, “But this is impossible.” Note, again, that the 
performance of the first subject might strike you, on its face, as being more smooth, 
coordinated, adaptive, integrated. It’s the second subject who seems to be coming 
undone.  
Of course, it isn’t the surface that should interest serious psychology: it’s the 
first subject and not the second who has two minds and two streams of consciousness. 
The point is just that the day-to-day behavior of a split-brain subject, behavior that 
looks, again, adaptive, coordinated, smooth, and so forth, may result from inter-






One series of experiments by Sperry, Zaidel and Zaidel (1979, “Self recognition and 
social awareness in the deconnected minor hemisphere”) illustrated the fairly 
extraordinary capacity of the disconnected left hemisphere, at least, to observe and 
correctly interpret right-hemisphere controlled behavior, thus bringing the two 
hemispheres into some kind of “agreement” about what subjects had experienced 
even if only their right hemispheres had experienced something to begin with. 
(Though, admittedly, the “mind-reading” exhibited in this study relied not only on the 
right hemisphere’s cross-cuing behavior but also on affective states generated in 
response to emotionally significant right hemisphere experiences.) 
Bogen (1990) gives several fascinating examples of cross-cuing in the patient 
L.B. for instance:  
 
1) A pipe was placed in his left hand (RH); LB turned it around 
in that hand until it was in a normal pipe-holding position; he 
then lifted it up to (but not into) his mouth, and then said (LH), 
“Oh, that’s a cigarette.” Feeling it with his right hand (LH) he 
then correctly identified it as a pipe.  
 
2) When a pair of glasses was put into his left hand (RH), L.B. 
opened the arms of the glasses and then had to be prevented 
from sliding them onto his head. He was told to try to identify 
the object without manipulating it further, and couldn’t. Then 
he snapped the arms closed and quickly said, “Are those your 
glasses?”, presumably from the auditory cue.  
 
3) A handkerchief was placed in his left hand (RH). He 
squeezed it, turned it over, and then “smoothly reached 
backwards and slipped it into his left hip pocket. At this point 
he said, ‘Oh, sure, that’s a comb.’ When told he should feel it 
with his right hand, he did and then shook his head with a 





4) Bogen (1990) also cites a case in which Butler and Norrsell 
(1968) tested L.B.’s ability to name objects felt with his left 
hand (RH), using a wooden sphere, a wooden cube without 
sharp edges, and wooden pyramid. While L.B.’s hands were 
hidden from his sight behind a screen the experimenters would 
place one of these items in his left hand and ask him which he 
was holding. (Presumably L.B. knew beforehand that these 
were the choices.) To their surprise, he identified them 
correctly most of the time. At first Butler and Norrsell 
suspected L.B.’s hemispheres were exploiting some kind of 
subcortical communication, but then they noticed that their 
subject was looking around the room in a systematic way 
during the experiment. Whenever they put the sphere in his left 
hand he would look at the clock before saying, “It’s the round 
one”, and whenever they put the cube in his left hand he would 
look at the door before saying, “It’s the square one.” When 
they put the pyramid in his left hand he would look up at the 
ceiling for a few moments before saying, “It must be that 
triangular shape.” (Bogen 1990: 218). Once blindfolded, his 
performance fell to chance.  
 
Of course, not all cross-cuing is so deliberate-seeming. When a split-brain 
subject is asked a question to which only her right hemisphere knows the answer, and 
the subject (LH) makes an incorrect guess, she will often frown, immediately aft r 
which she will attempt to correct herself. In such cases the frown is presumably 
initiated by the RH, but surely not as a deliberate attempt at communicating its 
displeasure to the LH.  
On a loose understanding of “cross-cuing,” split-brain subjects could be 
engaging in it all the time. Given the hemisphere’s equal (or nearly equal) access to 
proprioceptive information, given either hemisphere’s ability to see what every part 
of the body is doing in most circumstances, any behavior that is initiated by one 




could qualify as a form of cross-cuing. But this could mean that the hemispheres were 
“cross-cuing” each other most of the time.  
 
4.4 Affect… and Aura? 
Affect constitutes another potential source of behavioral unification in split-brain 
subjects; the hemispheres have some kind of shared access to affective information. 
As noted in Chapter Three, it is not clear whether the hemispheres, by virtue of intact 
subcortical structures, actually share token affective (etc.) states, or whether instead, 
by virtue of their mutual connectedness to intact subcortical and non-cortical 
structures, the hemispheres are merely caused to enter into similar (types of) affective 
states. As Sperry says:  
 
Whether the neural cross integration involved in the foregoing 
as, for example, that mediating emotional tone, constitutes and 
extension of a single conscious process or is better interpreted 
as just a transmission of neural activity that triggers a second 
and separate bisymmetric conscious effect in the opposite 
hemisphere remains open at this stage. (1990: 380) 
 
It is easy to think of an affective state as something somehow discrete, sharp, 
or specific: a wave of anger, a pang of regret, a burning desire, a thrill of excitement, 
and so forth. But much more diffuse (and difficult to characterize) states, with some 
kind of emotional or affective valence to them, seem to transfer between the 
hemispheres as well. Sperry notes that “cross-integration systems of the intact 
brainstem. . . that mediate a prompt bilateralization of emotion generated unilaterally” 
presumably also involves “mood, alertness, and perhaps subtle shades of these as in 




At the same time, the inter-hemispheric transfer of these phenomenally diffuse 
states seems to sometimes co-occur with or perhaps include the transfer of certain 
contextual, categorical or conceptual information. This is information that one would
expect to have some kind of emotional valence, perhaps—but one wouldn’t 
necessarily expect this information to be conveyable in the form of an affective state. 
Thus See Sperry, Zaidel, and Zaidel (1979) refer not just to the inter-hemispheric 
transmission of affect but also of aura; other times people speak of “general mental 
set” (see for instance Sperry 1990, p. 380) or gist. The exact or even fairly rough 
nature of this “aura” isn’t at all clear; among other things it is quite possible that there 
isn’t one mental mechanism or property that’s being picked out by terms such as 
“aura” and “mental set” and “gist.”  
In cases where the transfer really is of a state with some emotional valence, 
the anterior commissure may be involved; Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978) explain that 
“the human anterior commissure derives its fibers from the temporal lobe and from 
subcortical ‘limbic’ structures, in particular, the amygdala, and projects to the same 
regions in the other hemisphere” (153, emphasis added). These are structures 
involved in emotion, of course, but they are also involved in emotional or affective 
components of memory, and in memory generally, since the temporal lobe contains 
the hippocampus, and since it is implicated in semantic/conceptual knowledge.  
The transfer of affect and aura probably plays some role not just in unifying 
the behavior of split-brain subjects, but in providing their two streams of 
consciousness a unified character, at least to some extent. As mentioned in Chapter 




propensities” (Doty 1989: 70). But even if they are often not in the same emotional 
state, this does not mean that they can be in wildly different emotional states. In part, 
emotional states are physiological (or at least many emotional states are) states, with 
physiological markers: racing hearts, shallow breaths, tense muscles, and o forth. 
And of course the hemispheres are located in and have similar perceptual access to 
the same body. So they would be likely to enter into similar affective states even if 
only via a process that supervened in part on viscera, muscles, etc.  
On the heels of discussing sub- and non-cortically mediated mechanisms that 
generate similar affective states and arousal levels and so forth in the two 
hemispheres, Sperry cautions that these “bilateralizing and unifying mechanisms are 
largely of the nonfocal general background category, whereas conscious awareness 
tends on the other hand to be correlated predominantly with attentional and focal 
aspects of cerebral function” (1990: 380). In part given the inherent difficulty of 
investigating such diffuse, non-specific states, however, it would not be surprising if 
we currently fail to appreciate how deeply and how constantly these diffuse 
background states color those states at the forefront of our consciousness and 
attention.  
 
4.5 Same Body 
There is of course a limit—a hard one—as to the degree to which a single-bodied 
creature can behave in a disunified manner. There are numerous types of constraints 
posed by shared embodiment. Though the hemispheres may initiate distinct actions 




bend down at the same time, for instance. The two eyes and of course the two retinal 
hemifields move together. And so forth.  
Ultimately, of course, however many minds a creature has, those minds must 
realistically converge and be converged upon by pathways to and from the same 
body. Conflicting motor/behavioral plans will thus need to be resolved at some point 
prior to the actual initiation of action (at least in cases where the actions are 
physically, not just intentionally, incompatible), and one mind will receive a much 
richer degree of sensory information about the actions initiated by the other/s than i
possible between multiple creatures. Bogen (1990) for instance points out that, “if one 
hemisphere initates motion, the other hemisphere receives considerable 
proprioceptive feedback” (217; emphasis added).  
And both hemispheres can also control the whole body; both hemispheres can 
initiate walking or stopping, bending or stretching, facial expressions and eye 
movements. The two hemispheres may not function entirely identically with respect 
to control of the body, but each has sufficient control over most of the body such that 
actions initiated by one hemisphere can look perfectly “normal” i.e. not disunified. 
Even for the parts of the body where the hemispheres are least functionally identical 
with respect to motor control, i.e. the hands, there is a pretty good amount of 
ipsilateral motor control is still possible (Kingstone and Gazzaniga, 1995; Miller and 
Kingstone, 2005.) (This may be more true in split-brain than in “normal” subjects, of 
course.)  
Most simply, but probably also most profoundly, bodies are spatiotemporally 




minds that have always been together. As Sperry, Gazzaniga, and Bogen once put it, 
“these two separate mental spheres have only one body so they always frequent the 
same places, meet the same people, see and do the same things all the time and thus 
are bound to have a great overall of common, almost identical, experience” (1969: 
286). While each hemisphere may have its own mental life, to which the other 
hemisphere does not have (for example) introspective access, the split-brain su ject 
still has but one life to lead.  
This is no doubt of profound importance to explaining the degree to which the 
hemispheres of a split-brain subject are at peace with each other. For it is probably 
true of all of us that the integrated nature of our behavior, when it is so integrated, 
owes in large part to constancies and consistencies in our lives, and our surroundings. 
There is all sorts of evidence from social psychology, for instance, that suggests that a 
person’s behavior, on a moment-to-moment basis, is shaped by situational factors to a 
much greater extent than one might believe; in fact a person’s behavior on a moment-
to-moment basis might be shaped more by situational factors (and of course general 
psychological abilities, ones common to people generally) than by any idiosyncra ies 
of her mind/s or her person.  
 While shared embodiment clearly plays an important role in accounting for 
the degree of behavioral unification split-brain subjects exhibit, shared embodiment 
exists both inside and outside experimental situations, of course, and therefore can’t 
account for the change in subjects’ behavior between the two types of circumstance. 
It is instructive in this regard to note (as Nagel 1979 long ago did) that split-brain 




situations. All the mechanisms referred to in this section are available at least o some 
degree during the split-brain experiment itself. So, however disunified split-brain 
subjects’ behavior appears during the split-brain experiment, that behavior is still 
even at those moments subject to numerous unifying forces—forces that nonetheless, 
I have argued, don’t suffice to create a single stream of consciousness.  
 
4.6 Same Brain 
In his early work on the split-brain phenomenon, Sperry (1964) found that: 
 
although deep surgical bisections are possible experimentally 
that include the roof of the midbrain, the supramammillary 
commissure, and even the cerebellum, it was sufficient merely 
to cut the forebrain commissures that mediate cross 
communication between the hemispheres proper to prevent 
interhemispheric transfer of perceptual learning and memory. 
     (Sperry, 1990: 371)  
 
But even very “deep” levels of the nervous system—all the way down to pattern 
generators in the spinal cord—will play a significant role in integrating behavior. The 
two hemispheres of a split-brian subject remain connected to the same peripheral 
nervous system and spinal cord, the same cerebellum, the same cranial nerves, the 
same brainstem and midbrain and diencephalic structures. This is not to say that those 
structures serve as a means of inter-hemispheric mental integration; many of them 
don’t. But even when they don’t there are numerous ways in which the hemispheres’ 
mutual connection to those structures may unify split-brain subjects’ behavior. 
Bogen, for instance, notes that the two hemispheres share the same blood 




hemisphere causes a particular hormone to be secreted, the other hemisphere will also 
feel its effects. Hormone transmission or communication may be relatively slow, but 
nonetheless “important for mental states” (1990: 217). And presumably because of 
the brainstem ascending reticular activating system, the two hemisphere will be on 
the same sleep-wake cycle. (I only know of one report by a split-brain subject of one 
hemisphere being awake while the other slept (Dimond 1980). And, even in this case, 
the restless right hemisphere apparently soon slapped the patient’s left hemisphere 
awake.)  
 
4.7 Single Hemisphere Control 
Gazzaniga and LeDoux point to evidence that “potential homolateral pathways may 
lie dormant or undeveloped in the normal brain” (1978: 36) but develop and become 
more functionally active following callosotomy. These pathways might make 
cooperation between the hemispheres less necessary, by allowing both hemispheres 
greater individual control over (and perceptual access to) the whole body. They write, 
of these “shifting circuits” and of cross-cuing, that, “It is as if the brain demands 
integration, and in the absence of the interhemispheric pathways, less efficient ways 
of achieving mental unity are employed” (Gazzaniga and LeDoux 1978: 39). But 
what is most clearly achieved, when the hemispheres achieve greater degrees of 
motor control over ipsilateral pathways, is behavioral unity. Perhaps some mental
unity, in the sense of coherence or cooperation, is achieved as well—but not mental 
or conscious ingularity.  
It is also possible that non-cortical structures become better, over time, at 




or ignoring one set of outputs). And meanwhile Wolford, Miller, and Gazzaniga 
(2004) write that that over time working with split-brain subjects one gets the sens 
that one hemisphere often simply “defers” to the other hemisphere. In fact they 
suspect that it is difficult to get one hemisphere to even try very hard on a task for 
which the other hemisphere is (or is at least “believed” to be) superior or dominant.  
 Sperry (1990) believes that activity in one hemisphere may at times even 
depress activity in the other. (Perhaps because the hemispheres compete for some 
attentional resources?) At the same time, he notes that this is most likely und r 
experimental conditions involving “prolonged use of a single hemisphere with 
deprivation of focal input to the other” (380).  
 
In ordinary unrestricted behavior, on the other hand, it is rare 
that conditions would thus selectively restrict sensory input or 
central processing to one hemisphere for an extended period. 
Thus, typically, the two disconnected hemispheres appear to be 
actively, but separately, conscious in parallel, each working 
and contributing in its own way to the performance on which 
attention is focused.    (Sperry 1990: 
380-381) 
  
Gazzaniga (1985) is a fiercer advocate of general left hemisphere dominance, 
claiming that when the right hemisphere has no language, it also displays:  
 
a striking inactivity that borders on behavioral tedium. This is 
not to say these right hemispheres do not have specialized 
systems. They may have, but it is next to impossible to 
demonstrate their existence in a brain system that is so unable 
to behave overtly. 





Others (Levy, 1983), just as adamantly contest the claim of general right 
hemisphere “passivity.” But even if neither hemisphere is passive much of the time, 
one hemisphere could still dominate, to some extent, much of the time. It could be 
that the left hemisphere usually dominates. Or, again, it could be that the hemispheres 
take turns dominating, depending on what sorts of tasks the subjects are engaged in.  
Note that if it were the case that, usually, in a split-brain subject, only one 
hemisphere (or only one hemisphere at a time) dominates behavior, and this was 
partly responsible for the subject’s generally integrated behavior, mental (a d 
conscious) singularity would in a sense be the explanation for that behavior: the 
behavior in question would be integrated (in part) because it was the product of a 
single mind and a single stream of consciousness. But this would not mean that the 
subject only possessed one mind or one stream of consciousness. It would just mean 
that at any given time the existence of one mind and one stream of consciousness wa 
hidden from us.  
 
4.8 Owing Actions 
One interesting area of research and debate in the broad area of consciousnes studi s 
in recent years concerns conscious will (see Wegner 2002 for instance), and, 
relatedly, the manner in which people come to posit (correctly or incorrectly) the 
mental causes of their behavior. One element of this discussion concerns human 
beings’ “mindreading” capacities, and to what extent our self-knowledge is simply 
result of our turning those capacities inwards, in a form of self-interpretation. 
Carruthers (forthcoming), for instance, argues that we have no introspective or 




so forth—but only to our perceptual states. In defending this position he draws upon 
some of the split-brain data. This is data suggesting that, instead of acknowledging 
ignorance about the cause of some (RH-controlled) behavior, the subject (LH) will 
often instead simply invent a reason, apparently swiftly and smoothly and with no 
sense of engaging in fabrication.  
Gazzaniga (1985) has argued for years that the left hemisphere houses an 
“interpreter” that strives to tell a unified story of the self, a story about a unified, and 
rational, conscious and mental agent—even when there is no such thing: 
 
The same split-brain research that exposed startling differences 
between the two hemispheres revealed that the human left 
hemisphere harbours our interpreter. Its job is to interpret our 
responses—cognitive or emotional—to what we encounter in 
our environment. The interpreter sustains a running narrative of 
our actions, emotions, thoughts, and dreams. The interpreter is 
the glue that keeps our story unified and creates our sense of 
being a coherent, rational agent. (Gazzaniga 2000: 1320) 
 
The effect of telling this story—often a fiction—may be to make the story 
come partially true: self-interpretation, that is, may serve to make a subject’s 
behavior, across time, more integrated (or at least integrated-looking). Recall an 
example from Chapter Three: our split-brain subject, S, who has been reading, 
suddenly stands, because his RH is bored with reading. His LH could (or could at 
least try to) force him to sit back down with the book again. This would look like 
ever-so-slightly non-integrated behavior. But instead of trying to initiate sitting back 
down again, S’s left hemisphere may instead “go along with” this RH-initiated 




hemisphere will say to itself (i.e. perhaps S will say to himself, in inner speech), 
“Time for lunch.” And once he does say that, he may very well go make lunch. 
Most callosotomy patients experience intermanual conflict within the early 
recovery period. This behavior subsides with time, although may reappear 
occasionally in brief episodes for years. More commonly, “Even many yearsafte  
operation, patients will occasionally be surprised when some well-coordinated or 
obviously well-informed act has just been carried out by the left hand” (Bogen, 1985: 
314). “Patients sometimes complain that their left hand behaves in a ‘foreign’ or 
‘alien’ manner, and they routinely express surprise at apparently purposeful left-hand 
actions” (Zaidel, Iacoboni, 2003). “They may quickly rationalize such acts, 
sometimes in a transparently obvious way” (Bogen, 1985: 314). 
I have spoken so far as if only the left hemisphere has a mindreading system 
or interpreter, and I have furthermore equated possessing a mind-reading system with 
engaging in self-interpretation (of the sort that leads to confabulation). In fact I 
suspect that the right hemisphere also supports or engages in mindreading; it has a 
sense of humor, anyway, and apparently shifts attention automatically to where 
someone else is looking, while the LH doesn’t (Kingstone, Friesen, and Gazzaniga, 
2000). Some RH-initiated cross-cuing in split-brain subjects looks like it might 
require some beliefs about minds and communication.  
The left hemisphere could still be the only hemisphere associated with an 
“interpreter” in Gazzaniga’s sense, however. Perhaps, even if the RH does have 
sophisticated mind-reading capabilities, it doesn’t turn them on itself. Even if the 




hemisphere does could serve to integrate a split-brain subject’s behavior, partcularly 
over time.  
 
4.9 Single Streams versus Unified Behavior 
I have just come from suggesting that one hemisphere’s tendency to self-attribute 
beliefs and desires and percepts (even falsely), and to rationalize the subject’  
behavior, can be a source of behavioral integration.  
This leads to a sort of broader point about, and perhaps a limited criticism of, 
the challenge from unified behavior. To some extent, the challenge assumes that two 
minds will necessarily be in some degree of obvious, visible competition or conflict 
with each other. Call this the “agent assumption,” for it is the consequence of two 
other assumptions: that minds are agents, and that agents are individuated on the basis
of competition and coordination of action. The latter assumption might rest upon 
some questionable conceptions of agents. But more relevantly, to this work, a mind 
and an agent are arguably different things. Clearly an agent has (or is partly 
constituted by) at least one mind, but a mind can lack agency. (One can become 
totally paralyzed for instance without loss of consciousness or cognition.) Agency 
requires mind, body, and appropriate interactions between the two. (This is not a 
dualist claim—I’m using “body” to exclude the brain. A functioning brain isn’t 
enough for agency either, in other words.)  
Some degree of shared agency is literally forced on however many minds 
share a body; e.g., one body can only go one place at one time More interestingly, a 
still further degree of shared agency is not strictly forced upon those minds, but made 




hemisphere selects, the food it brings to the mouth, its smoking habit, its preferred 
leisure activities. . . . But what is that first hemisphere to do? Change the subject’  
outfit—again? Then he’ll be late. Yank the cigarette from his own mouth and throw it 
on the ground, knowing that soon enough he (the other hemisphere) will just be 
lighting another one anyway?61 You could burn through a whole pack that way pretty 
quickly. This is the sort of competition it might not be worth trying to win.  
That the challenge from integrated behavior does make this “conflict 
assumption,” or that the assumption is questionable, might not be obvious. Someone 
might say, “Look, of course two people can get along splendidly, without ever 
fighting with each other. But they will still wake and retire to bed at different times, 
still watch different programs on television, still exhibit talent for and interest in some 
different things. One will still prefer vanilla and the other chocolate, one cservative 
and the other liberal principles, even if they have the good sense not to come to blows 
about such things. Because their minds are different, their behavior, as peaceful as it 
is, will be visibly different. And if their two minds were in one body, it would look 
like it.”  
But, first off, again, having a single body makes it simply impossible to 
exhibit much behavior that will obviously look disunified. Conjoined twins must at 
least rise from and retire to bed at the same time, though they surely have two minds; 
the bodily sharing is even more complete in the case of a split-brain subject, who has 
just one, discrete (rather than two partly merged or shared) bodies. This again forces a 
high degree of behavioral unity upon such subjects. You can’t eat and not eat vanilla 
                                                
61 Though, admittedly, one split-brain patient apparently did complain that his left hand (RH) wouldn’t 
let him smoke; it kept taking cigarettes from his right hand (LH) and from his mouth and putting them 




ice cream at literally the same moment (this would be physically impossible), and as a 
matter of law, you only get one vote. Some sort of compromise is not just essential; 
it’s inevitable. And then it often doesn’t look like compromise.  
If you took two minds, each from a different body, and placed them in the 
same body, you would thereby give them incentive to cooperate. Or rather—since 
that isn’t quite the way of putting it; neither mind would necessarily even know the 
other was there—you would thereby create a situation in which they would naturally 
cooperate with each other not deliberately, but by intending to behave rationally. (Or, 
by intending for their subject to behave rationally.) Merely by each “acting” in 
accordance with many of their own interests, especially important background 
interests, the minds would manage a kind of cooperation-in-effect. And they would 
do this, they would at least attempt to do this, no matter how limited their capacity for 
intra-mind interaction with each other.  
Finally, and relatedly, we should note that it is entirely open to empirical 
question to what extent co-consciousness (and for that matter conscious unity more 
broadly understood) plays a role in integrating behavior in the first place. Again, 
split-brain subjects behave in a fairly unified fashion even at their most disunified, 
during the split-brain experiment. These are the same times at which even defenders 
of the conscious singularity model like Marks (1980) and Tye (2003) believe that 
split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness. I have just offered a list of
factors and mechanisms that I believe integrate split-brain subjects’ behavior without 
providing a means of inter-hemispheric co-consciousness. If I am right, then having a 




explaining integrated behavior. The relationship of that stream of consciousness to a 
creature’s body, the environment the body is located in, the particular contents of the 
stream, its functional location within a larger mental architecture, the cognitive 
capacities of the creature—these, instead, may play the larger part.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The account of co-consciousness that I have adopted makes a prima facie strong cae 
for the conscious duality model in split-brain subjects. I am assuming that the right 
hemisphere of a split-brain subject has some conscious experiences. This means that 
either the right hemisphere has its own set of global consumers, or that its experiences 
are globally broadcast to the global consumers of the left hemisphere. The results of 
the split-brain experiment suggest that the latter is not the case. Therefore each 
hemisphere of a split-brain subject has its own set of global consumers to which its 
own set of experiences are made available. Co-consciousness no doubt holds wit in 







Chapter 5: Models of Consciousness in the Split-Brain Subject 
1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three I argued against a version of the singularity model of split-brain 
subjects’ consciousness, in favor of the conscious duality model, which I defended in 
Chapter Four. In this chapter, I contrast the model of split-brain subjects’ 
consciousness that I defend with two other, less standard models. The “partial co-
consciousness model” says that the two hemispheres share some conscious 
experiences, and rejects the view that co-consciousness is transitive. The “dynamic 
singularity model” says that a split-brain subject possesses a single intra-hemispheric 
stream of consciousness, one whose “location” shifts from one hemisphere to the 
other with a shift in motor intentions. I reject these alternative models, and also show 
that the conscious duality model has the resources to meet the biggest challenge it 
faces, which is that of accounting for the generally integrated nature of split-brain 
subjects’ behavior.  
 
2 The Partial Co-consciousness Model 
Among those models of split-brain subjects’ consciousness that ascribe conscious 
phenomena to the “disconnected” right hemisphere, the two major competitors are the 
conscious duality model, and a conscious singularity model that says that the two 
hemispheres jointly realize a single stream of consciousness.  
 But it might be said that there is a third, alternative model of split-brain 
subjects’ consciousness that is superior to both the singularity and the duality model. 




co-consciousness model”), split-brain subjects do not have either a single stream of 
consciousness within which all experiences are mutually co-conscious, nor two 
discrete streams of consciousness, between which no two experiences are co-
conscious. Lockwood instead suggests that we drop the transitivity thesis, according 
to which co-consciousness is a transitive relation. The partial co-consciousness model 
that results from dropping this transitivity thesis, Lockwood argues, is not only more 
compatible with the behavioral evidence than is the duality model of split-brain 
subjects’ consciousness, and more compatible with the neural evidence than is the 
singularity model; it is also more compatible with the behavioral evidence than is the 
singularity model, and more compatible with the neural evidence than is the duality 
model. And there are no reasons to reject it, besides a stubborn and unscientific 
adherence to the pre-theoretic assumption that co-consciousness is necessarily 
transitive.  
Others, however, have argued that there is no good evidence for a partial co-
consciousness model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness (Hurley 1994, 1998, 
2003), or have even suggested that there is something impossible or even incoherent 
about the consciousness described by the model (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003). In this 
section I describe and offer a limited defense of the partial co-consciousness model; a 
stream of consciousness characterized by non-transitive co-consciousness relations is 
in fact prima facie plausible. I suggest that the model nonetheless does not offer the 
best characterization of split-brain subjects’ consciousness. Indeed my arguments 




Lockwood’s model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness to it, there is in fact greater 
reason to identify C with two streams of consciousness.  
 
2.1 A Case of Partial Co-Consciousness?62 
As Lockwood (1989) notes, we intuitively think of co-consciousness as a transitive 
relation. We believe, that is, if A and B are co-conscious, and B and C are co-
conscious, then A and C are co-conscious, as well. If co-consciousness is transitive in 
this way, then each experience that occurs within a stream of consciousness is co-
conscious with every other experience in that stream, and is not co-conscious with 
any experience outside that stream.  
Now what happens if you acquire evidence that, in apparent contradiction of 
this transitivity principle, experience A and C are not co-conscious with each other? 
The principle can be saved by concluding that you earlier erred in believing that there 
was just a single mental token with B’s content, and by accepting that there are 
instead two mental tokens, two experiences, Band B΄, with the same content, and that 
B is co-conscious with A and B΄ is co-conscious with C. Thus one resolves prima 
facie violations of the transitivity principle by revising one’s initial indiviuation of 
experiences. Lockwood, however, suggests the opposite move: keep the individuation 
of entities as is—just drop the principle.  
For some split-brain experiments doappear, prima facie, to provide examples 
of failures of transitivity. Consider for instance an experiment by Sperry, Zaidel and 
                                                
62 When I speak of transitivity and failures of transitivity in this chapter, I mean to refer to transitive 
co-consciousness and failures of co-consciousness to be ransitive. Also, I refer to the “partial co-
consciousness model” and to “partial co-consciousnes ,” though strictly speaking I should refer to the 




Zaidel (1979) in which a four-photograph array was projected in the LVF (i.e. to the
right hemisphere) of split-brain subject N.G., who was then asked to point to each 
photograph in turn, using her left hand (under dominant control of her right 
hemisphere). In one instance the array consisted of three photographs of unknown 
men, and one photograph of her adult son. N.G. began pointing to each photograph, 
and then paused when she got to the photograph of her son. The following 
conversation between N.G. and the experimenter ensued:  
N.G.:  Hey, wait a minute. That’s L____ [her daughter]. No 
that’s me. No, wait a minute.  
Ex:  Do you recognize one of these? 
N.G.:  Yes, that one right there. [She points to the photograph 
of her son.] 
Ex:  OK, how do you feel about this person? 
N.G.:  Good, good, good. Me, when I was younger. . . or L 
____ [her daughter] or, or B_____ [her husband]. . . or I 
don’t know. [She laughs loudly.] That’s it. That’s gotta 
be. [She laughs again.] 
Ex:  Whatever it is, it is OK, eh? 
N.G.:  Yea, it’s fine, it’s beautiful. 
Ex:  You don’t see any others there that you recognize? 
N.G.:  No. Just that one. [She points again to the picture of her 
son.] The best looking one there. 
   (Sperry, Zaidel, Zaidel, 1979: 158) 
 
Let me describe what makes this scenario puzzling—first, from an intuitive 
perspective, and then in a way that will motivate, and illustrate, the partial co-
consciousness model.  
It would appear that N.G. visually recognizes her son in the photograph: the 
photograph of her son evokes a positive emotional response, and reminds her of her 
family. Moreover these appear to be conscious responses: N.G. reports her positive 
emotional reaction, and begins aming family members. But there is evidence that at 




person photographed. And this not-seeing appears conscious also, in the sense that 
N.G. does not describe being blind, or having a blind spot. So she appears to have a 
“unified consciousness” in one respect: the positive emotional response evoked by the 
photograph appears “unified with” (co-conscious with) whatever thoughts and 
experiences are generating her stream of speech. But she appears to lack a “unified 
consciousness” in another respect: again, she must have seen and recognized her son, 
but that visual experience and recognition does not seem co-conscious with whatever 
thoughts and experiences are generating her stream of speech.  
Now let me describe this scene more carefully, and in a way that depicts it as 
a case of partial co-consciousness. Clearly both of N.G.’s hemispheres had access to 
some information about the stimulus, and clearly the two hemispheres did not have 
access to all of the same information about the stimulus. N.G.’s right hemisphere, 
presumably, recognized the photograph as being of her son, a recognition that 
generated in her a positive affective state. N.G.’s left hemisphere also xperienced a 
positive affective state—she expresses, via her verbal left hemisphere, positive 
feelings towards the person pictured—but lacked access to purely e ceptual 
information about the stimulus; again, she apparently could not tell if the pictured 
person was male or female, for instance. And while her left hemisphere had some 
category information about the depicted subject—she knew she was seeing a member 
of her immediate family—it lacked stimulus identity information: she (LH) didn’t 
know she was seeing her son, specifically.  
Moreover, it seems as if both hemispheres may have been subject to some f 




seemed to experience the same happy, fond emotional response. And that emotion 
was no doubt co-conscious with the visual experience that produced it, N.G.’s RH 
visual experience of the photograph. But N.G. was presumably also having a non-
overlapping set of visual experiences in her left hemisphere at the same time (she 
didn’t cry out (LH) that everything had gone black), and this set of visual experienc s 
was presumably co-conscious with the affective state evoked by the photograph of 
N.G.’s son as well, since with her left hemisphere N.G. verbally expressed her 
positive feelings towards the photographed subject. And yet N.G.’s right and left 
hemisphere visual experiences were not co-conscious with each other; N.G. could not 
with her left hemisphere identify the subject of the photograph. In other words, N.G. 
had a positive emotion evoked by the photograph, and this positive emotion was co-
conscious with her right hemisphere visual experiences, and with her left hemisp re 
visual experiences, and yet her right and her left hemisphere experiences were not co-
conscious with each other.  
So appears to be some mental state—an affective state say—co-conscious 
with the conscious visual experiences of both N.G.’s right and her left hemisphere. 
And yet there is still at the same time clearly a failure of interaction between some 
right and left hemisphere experiences. So co-consciousness both appears to hold and 
not to hold across the hemispheres. In the face of this (from his perspective) 
contradiction, Nagel (1979) suggested that the entire concept of conscious unity (co-
consciousness) might be unscientific—might even be an illusion. But Lockwood 




away if we drop the assumption that conscious “unity” is always perfect, i.e. that co-
consciousness is necessarily transitive. 
2.2 Transitivity and the Partial Co-consciousness Model 
Nagel (1979) worried that if streams or centers of consciousness aren’t discre e, then 
perhaps the whole notion of conscious unity had best be dropped altogether. For 
Nagel, that is, transitivity was an essential property of the co-consciousness relation, 
and therefore essential to the very concept of a unified consciousness or a stream of 
consciousness: such concepts are essentially of something w olly unified, something 
necessarily not partial. Is this correct? Or might streams of consciousness still exist—
even if they are not (or not always) structured in quite as neat a way Nagel believes?  
Largely dropping the language of streams of consciousness, Lockwood 
creates the term phenomenal perspective to refer to a set of experiences that are all 
perfectly co-conscious with each other. He then drops the transitivity principle. When 
we do this, he says, “a remarkable possibility immediately opens up; that of 
simultaneous, overlapping phenomenal perspectives. And it is in these terms, I 
believe, that we should seek to understand the split-brain cases” (1989: 89; original 
emphasis).63 Within the partial co-consciousness framework, we can, if we wish, still 
speak of a split-brain subject’s consciousness using the language of streams of 
                                                
63 The language of overlapping phenomenal perspectives l aves somewhat ambiguous whether the 
overlap involves mental types or tokens. The most natural connotation of an overlap in perspective is 
that of an overlap in what is seen. Thus, my sister’s perspective on the 2008 presidential primaries 
overlap with mine (we both agree that Thomson would make a bad president, but we disagree over 
whether or not Huckabee would be worse). But Lockwood does not mean that two phenomenal 
perspectives overlap when they both include one or more of the same experience types, as this would 
just be a version of the duality model. (At least, ccording to him, as well as to me, of course.) Rather, 
two phenomenal perspectives overlap when they each n ompass or include one or more of the same 
token experiences. To avoid this potentially confusing terminology, then, I will not speak of 
overlapping phenomenal perspectives; instead I will continue to speak of co-consciousness and 





consciousness. We could just say that a split-brain subject has neither two perfectly 
discrete streams of consciousness nor one stream of consciousness within which co-
consciousness is perfectly transitive. Whereas one who accepts the transitivity 
principle will say that what makes an experience part of a stream of co-c nsciousness 
is that it is co-conscious with every other experience in that stream, Lockwood can 
just say that what makes an experience part of a stream of consciousness is that it is 
co-conscious with some other experiences in that stream.  
Lockwood says that if we instead insist upon the transitivity of co-
consciousness, then we will have to accept that split-brain subjects have two streams 
of consciousness, since at any given moment a split-brain subject’s inter-hemisp ric 
experiences won’t be perfectly transitively co-conscious. Unlike Nagel (1979), Marks 
(1981), and Tye (2003), that is, Lockwood doesn’t seem to find the conscious duality 
claim (or even the two minds claim) particularly difficult to reconcile with the 
behavior of split-brain subjects. For he says:  
 
ostensibly, it is the two-minds theory that has the most going 
for it. Indeed, Nagel’s arguments for rejecting this alternative 
are hardly decisive. Nagel places great stress on the apparent 
normality of split-brain patients when they are not in the 
experimental situation. But it is possible to explain this 
normality, consistently with there being two streams of 
consciousness. . . . the two hemispheres of a split-brain patient 
will, under normal circumstances, be receiving broadly the 
same information, and certainly consistent information. 





Moreover, “Quite apart from that, there is, contrary to what Nagel suggests, a 
certain amount of evidence for dissociated behavior in split-brain patients, even 
outside the experimental situations” (1989: 86).  
Unlike Marks’ or Tye’s singularity models of split-brain subjects’ 
consciousness, then, Lockwood’s partial co-consciousness model is not driven by the 
perceived implausibility of the conscious duality model of “split brain” 
consciousness. Instead he is drawn to the partial co-consciousness model for two, 
more principled reasons. One reason concerns the relationship between neural and 
psychological tokens, as we will see in a moment. The second concerns the relation
between a more empirically/theoretically based individuation of psychological 
entities and what he sees as pre-theoretical, pre-empirical commitments about the 
nature and relations of those entities. There is, he says:  
 
something deeply unsatisfactory about a philosophical position 
that obliges one to impose this rigid dichotomy upon the 
experimental and clinical facts, either we have just one centre, 
or stream, of consciousness, or else we have two or more, 
entirely distinct from each other. (1989: 86) 
 
 Everyone will agree, he seems to suggest, with Nagel’s original observation 
that in split-brain subjects the two hemispheres seem co-conscious with each other in
some ways but not in others. Why insist that nonetheless they either are ntirely or 
are not at all co-conscious with each other?  
There is an intuition here, a general intuition about philosophy, folk science 
and psychology, and the natural world, that is appealing: we may tend to think in 




dichotomies, sharp boundaries, clear categories and binary distinctions; but the 
concepts that draw such bold lines may not neatly map onto a complex and messy 
world, much of the time. Of course, this may always be the case. (At least in 
situations involving concepts of ostensibly sharply delineable things—concepts like 
‘planet’ and ‘mouse’; there are many other concepts—‘justice’, ‘cloud’—we would 
expect to have looser application criteria.) Surely this does not show that all those 
concepts require modification or outright elimination. Sharp conceptual distinctions 
can sometimes help us get a grip even on messy or complex phenomena that those 
concepts don’t always capture neatly. But in some cases, the application of such sharp 
distinctions may not be even epistemically helpful; it may instead only make the 
shape or structure of a phenomenon of interest moredifficult to grasp than it should 
be. In such cases, rather than simply shrugging that while the ways we have of 
thinking about the world are not always in lock-step with that world, they’re still the 
only ways of thinking about the world that we’ve got, why not try to reject and revise 
and create new concepts, that make better sense of our world? This is the first 
motivation for Lockwood’s partial co-consciousness model.  
A second and related motivation for Lockwood’s partial co-consciousness 
model of split-brain consciousness concerns what I have called the isomorphism 
thesis, following Hurley (1998)—the thesis that there is necessarily some sort of
isomorphism between the structure of the mind (and of consciousness) and neural 
structure. (Hurley, recall, rejects this thesis.) If the co-consciousness relation 
supervenes on some physical pathway or pathways, then co-consciousness must come 




disconnectedness. (Descartes reasoned similarly: if the mental (the conscious) is 
physical, then consciousness isn’t essentially unified, since matter isn’t es entially 
unified. Since Descartes believed that the mental was necessarily unified, he 
concluded that the mental wasn’t physical. Lockwood believes that the mental is 
physical, and therefore rejects the claim that the mental is necessarily unified, i.e. in 
this instance that co-consciousness is necessarily perfectly transitive.) Lockwood asks 
us to imagine cutting the corpus callosum one tiny section at a time (1989, 1994). The 
first cut leads to a very small bit of conscious dissociation; the last cut results in the 
greatest degree of conscious dissociation associated with the split-brain phenomena. 
Would conscious duality advocates, Lockwood asks, maintain that the very first cut 
creates two streams of consciousness? Or only the last cut? Or some small cut in 
between? All of these look like unattractively arbitrary positions to try to defend.  
One might be tempted to object that Lockwood commits a version of the 
“heap” fallacy here. There of course isn’t a single neural fiber that, once cut, suddenly 
makes a single stream of consciousness dual. But differences in degree can still be 
significant, and the difference between conscious singularity and conscious duality 
may sometimes be a matter of degree, even if between the two far ends of the 
spectrum there is a middle space that we recognize as containing borderline and 
indeterminate cases. (Compare with two actual streams, whose banks merge for 
several feet before a boulder divides them, ultimately sending them down different 
faces of a mountain.) Again, still setting aside, for the moment, how and even 
whether this is possible, it would seem that if there were occasional or some small 




there would still be two streams of consciousness, co-conscious with each other to 
some very small degree. For Lockwood to disagree, I think, would be to commit the 
same error of abstemiousness that he believes those who insist upon the transitivity of 
co-consciousness commit. Of course, this objection is compatible with the 
fundamental ideas behind the partial co-consciousness model, and I pursue different 
objections to the model here. 
The partial co-consciousness model ostensibly enjoys the strengths of both the 
singularity and the duality model, while not suffering from their weaknesses. Where 
the advocate of conscious singularity referred to conscious singularity to explain 
behavioral integration, Lockwood can refer to co-consciousness across the 
hemispheres. Where the advocate of conscious duality referred to conscious duality to 
explain dissociated behavior, Lockwood can refer to the lack of co-consciousness 
across the hemispheres. And the partial co-consciousness model is again ostensibly a 
better fit with the neuroanatomical data (or, at least, with some possible 
neuroanatomies, even if one thinks that the duality model for instance is a better fit 
with the neuroanatomy of a split-brain subject in particular). The two hemisphere of 
a split-brain subject are physically connected to each other and causally interact via 
subcortical and non-cortical structures. To the extent that the singularity modelis 
supported by neuroanatomical facts, then, the partial co-consciousness model appears 
better supported; to the extent that the duality model is supported by neuroanatomical 
facts, the partial co-consciousness model may again appear better supported.  
In fact before examining the crucial question of how and even whether 




three further things in defense of the partial co-consciousness model. First, the 
isomorphism thesis that I take Lockwood to be defending—a thesis I described in 
Chapter Three—makes perfectly good sense. Of course, this is in part because that 
thesis is basically (though not, I don’t think, viciously) circular; as Revonsuo says 
about phenomenal consciousness for instance, “there must be isomorphism between 
one specific level of organization in the brain and phenomenal consciousness, simply 
because these boil down to one and the same thing” (Revonsuo, 2000: 67; original 
emphasis). Lockwood would not believe that the neuroanatomy of a split-brain 
subject provided support for his partial co-consciousness model over a conscious 
duality model, for instance, if he did not already believe that some non-cortical 
(including subcortical) structures could bear conscious experiences.  
Second, the kind of attitude Lockwood brings to bear on the split-brain cases 
is a good one. Certainly there is a good deal of evidence, an increasing amount, that 
introspection can lead us astray in theorizing about consciousness. This is not to say 
that introspection is without value or always incorrect, for it obviously isn’t. But it is 
to say that we need more reason for insisting upon the perfect transitivity of co-
consciousness other than just the fe ling that our experience is perfectly transitively 
co-conscious. This is especially the case because introspection seems particularly 
incapable of telling us anything about the structure of consciousness. Subjects of 
experience are what have phenomenal perspectives, and there is one subject of 
experience for each stream of (transitively co-conscious) experiences; even 
Lockwood would seem to acknowledge this; recall his definition of a “phenomenal 




experience!) will feel as if they have one stream of consciousness (at a time), in other 
words—regardless of how many streams of consciousness are actually associated 
with their brains.64 Lockwood’s openness to amending our understanding of 
conscious unity (co-consciousness), to allow for failures of transitivity for example, is 
wise. For our pre-theoretic ideas about co-consciousness no doubt are wrong in many 
respects and will require (at a minimum) substantial revision as neuropsychology 
develops.  
Finally, it is, at first glance, easy to imagine how a consciousness could come 
to be “partially unified” on the account of co-consciousness that I have offered. A 
single creature could have two distinct sets of (token) consumer systems, and two sets 
of globally broadcast states. For the most part, each set of global consumers might 
work with a unique set of experiences. But some experiences, some mental tokens, 
might be broadcast to both sets of global consumers simultaneously. And those 
experiences would presumably be co-conscious with all the other experiences being 
broadcast at that time to either or to both sets of global consumers. Again, this all 
seems right, at a glance—though I will argue in short order that this first glance may 
be misleading.  
 
                                                
64 It follows that, where phenomenology is concerned, the partial co-consciousness and the conscious 
duality model for split-brain subjects tell the same story. There will be two subjects of experience, it 
would seem, either way. Lockwood apparently denies this, however, saying, “Like Nagel, I am still 
unable to project myself into the position of a subject with a partially unified and partially disunified 
consciousness” (1994: 95). My point is that a subject of experience is the subject of all experiences that 
are transitively co-conscious with each other—even if that subject of experience belongs to a subject 
(i.e. a creature) whose conscious experiences are not all transitively co-conscious with each other. So, 
what it is like to be a subject with a “partially unified consciousness” (of the sort under discussion 




2.3 Objections to the Partial Co-consciousness Model 
Lockwood would surely (and, I think, rightly) reject a Nagelian objection to the 
partial co-consciousness model that stated that co-consciousness just has to be 
transitive, simply because this is part of our concept of consciousness, or part of our 
concept of conscious unity, or something. If the partial co-consciousness model does 
offer the best characterization of split-brain subjects’ consciousness, on 
phenomenological, functional, and/or neuroanatomical grounds, then our concept of 
co-consciousness can be revised to not assume transitivity. Given the state ofour 
understanding not just of the structure of consciousness in split-brain subjects, but 
also of the nature and mechanisms of co-consciousness, and for that matter 
consciousness, in general, it is impossible to say with any confidence much less 
certainty which model of conscious structure best characterizes the split-brain 
phenomenon. Our empirical knowledge concerning interhemispheric transfer in split-
brain subjects is too contradictory and incomplete, our theoretical understanding of 
interhemispheric transfer similarly so, and our understanding of consciousness in 
general is minimal. I nonetheless uspect hat neither phenomenological, functional, 
behavioral, nor neuroanatomical considerations provide strong support for the partial 
co-consciousness model, and that the conscious duality is more strongly supported.  
Let us look at the phenomenological considerations first. Here I argue that 
while phenomenology can offer some kind of support for an ascription of conscious 
duality, it cannot do so for an ascription of partial co-consciousness. In making this 
argument I will refer first to a number of creatures, C1, C2, C3…. These creatures 




of experiences, and primes distinguish tokens of content-identical experiences, 
though only within a creature. (I.e. if I say that C1 possesses E2 and C2 possesses E2, 
this means that C1 and C2 possess distinct token experiences with the same content; 
if I say that C2 possesses E2′ and E2′′, this means that C2 possesses two token 
experiences with the same content.) See Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Some Kinds of Conscious Structure 
C1 has a single stream of consciousness containing or composed of three 
experiences that are all mutually co-conscious with each other, E1, E2, and E3. Of 
course there is nothing peculiar it is like to be C1 (at least as so minimally described). 
In the second creature, C2, consciousness is dual: C2 possesses experiences E1, E2′, 
E2′′, and E3. E1 and E2′ are co-conscious, and E2′′ and E3 are co-conscious, and 
neither E1 nor E2′ are co-conscious with E2′′ or with E3. As we have already noted, 
there is nothing very odd it is like for C2 to possess this dual consciousness. With 
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regards to just the structure of their consciousness, in fact, there is no subjective 
difference between being C1 and being C2. There are just two different things it is 
like to be C2; in fact, it is better to identify C2 with two subjects of experience, S1 
and S2, one of whom experiences E1 and E2′ together, and one of whom experiences 
E2′′ and E3 together.  
(Put differently, if creature C4 is like creature C2 but with a fifth experience, 
E3′, where E3′ is co-conscious with E1 and E2′ but with none of C4’s other 
experiences, C4’s consciousness is transitively co-conscious, and dual, and what it is 
like for C4 to possess E1, E2′ and E3′ is exactly what it is like to be C1. Of course, 
what it is like to be C1 still does not capture everything it is like to be C4, since there 
is also something different it is like for C4 to possess E2′′ and E3. This is why, as I 
just said about C2, it would be better to identify C4 with two subjects of experience.)  
Now imagine a third creature, C3, to whom one would be tempted to attribute 
an only partially transitive co-consciousness. C3 possesses the non-co-conscious 
experiences E1 and E3; imagine that there is also some reason or other to belive that 
C3 has a third, final, and single experience E2, that is co-conscious with both E1 and 
E3. Now, what would it be like to be C3? As Hurley (2003, 1998) notes, being C3 
would be no different, from C3’s subjective perspectives (plural), from being C2. 
There is one thing it is like for C2 to possess E1 and E2 simultaneously, and another 
thing it is like for C2 to possess E2 and E3 simultaneously, and nothing it is like to 
possess E1 and E3 simultaneously (either with or without E2).  
In other words, there is no phenomenological support for attributing to C2 an 




nothing against ascribing a partially transitive co-consciousness to C3. After all, I 
have already noted on multiple occasions, including just above, that having two 
streams of consciousness feels no different from having one stream of consciousness, 
for the simple reason that there is no such thing as a feeling of having two 
(synchronic) streams of consciousness, properly speaking. All (conscious) feelings 
are located within one stream of consciousness or another. (And if a conscious feeling 
occurred outside of a stream of consciousness, it could hardly be a feeling of having 
that stream of consciousness.) Another way to put this would be to say that things feel 
one way or another only to subjects of experience. And transitive co-consciousness 
really does seem essential to a subject of experience. This is why even Lockwood 
adopts the language of phenomenal perspectives, acknowledging that a split-brain 
subject would have two of these. So a subject of experience will always feel as if he 
or she or it has a single stream of consciousness (or else a single experience).  
Yet I have also argued that there are nonetheless reasons, non-
phenomenological in nature, not to attribute a single stream of consciousness to a 
split-brain subject. Phenomenology simply can’t tell us much about the s ructure of 
consciousness.65 Thus it would seem that by my own arguments the lack of 
phenomenological support for attributing only partial co-consciousness (i.e. only a 
partially transitive co-consciousness) to C3 does not provide any good argument 
against such an attribution, either.  
                                                
65 I put the point this way: phenomenology most directly yields information about the contents of 
consciousness, and not about the structure of consciousness. (Though as I will explain in a moment 
some facts about conscious structure can be i ferred from phenomenology.) Hurley (1994, 1998) puts 
this same point in different terms: phenomenology can reveal to you the types of experiences you’re 
having, but not their token identities. We are agreed that objective and not just subjective facts or 




While the lack of phenomenological support for attributing to C3 partial co-
consciousness is by no means decisive, the comparison between the position of the 
duality claim relative to the singularity claim, where phenomenology is concerned, 
and the position of the partial co-consciousness claim relative to the duality claim,
where phenomenology is concerned, may mislead. The duality claim an be 
supported by phenomenological evidence over the singularity claim—indirectly. For 
what phenomenology does reveal is the content of a subject’s experience. Therefore 
phenomenology does support a conscious duality claim over a singularity claim, for 
creature C2 above, for example. It does this not because there is a phenomenology 
associated with C2’s having two streams of consciousness instead of one; there is no 
phenomenology associated with having multiple streams of consciousness per se. It 
does this simply because there is nothing it is like for C2 to have experiences E1 and
E3 simultaneously. And because there is nothing it is like for C2 to have experiences 
E1 and E3 simultaneously, and yet C2 does have experiences E1 and E3 
simultaneously, we know that C2’s experiences, unlike C1’s experiences, cannot be 
transitively co-conscious. Unlike C1’s phenomenology, C2’s phenomenology reveals 
the absence of co-consciousness of E1 and E3. Their phenomenology is different. In 
this sense, then, phenomenology supports a conscious duality claim over a conscious 
singularity claim for C2. 
In contrast phenomenology cannot support a partial co-consciousness claim 
over a conscious duality claim for C3. There is by necessity a phenomenological 
difference between having three mutually co-conscious experiences and three only 




words. But there is no necessary phenomenological difference between having a 
consciousness structured like C3’s and having one structured like C2’s. Why not just 
identify C3’s E2 with two content-identical experiences, then—why not attribute to 
C3 in other words, E2′ and E2′′? Then we would attribute to C3 four experiences, just 
as we did with C2, where E1 and E2′ are co-conscious and E2′′ and E3 are co-
conscious (but neither E1 nor E2′ is co-conscious with either E2 or E3′′).  
It is important to be clear on what this first objection to the partial co-
consciousness model is saying. It is not saying that there is any positive 
phenomenological evidence against the partial co-consciousness claim in favor of the 
conscious duality claim. (That is, if we assume that the two hemispheres of a split-
brain subject are sometimes associated with qualitatively identical mental e.g. 
emotional contents. Obviously if they aren’t, this provides positive phenomenological 
evidence against the partial co-consciousness model in favor of the conscious duality 
model. But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the two hemispheres of a 
split-brain subject are sometimes subject to the same conscious contents.) 
Phenomenology cannot provide this sort of evidence. It is just saying that there isn’t 
any positive phenomenological evidence in favor of the partial co-consciousness 
claim over the conscious duality claim.  
Note, for that matter, that phenomenology doesn’t even provide any positive 
evidence in support a conscious singularity claim over a conscious duality claim for 
C1. For there is no difference that phenomenology can reveal between C1 and C5, the 
latter of whom possesses two sets of mutually co-conscious experiences [E1′, E2′, 




interesting fact: phenomenology cannot support the partial co-consciousness model 
because phenomenology can never provide evidence for one mental token rather than 
for two mental tokens with one content. Phenomenology reveals contents, and thus 
can provide evidence for multiple conscious tokens by providing evidence of multiple 
conscious contents, but cannot provide evidence of single conscious tokens, only 
single conscious contents. Thus something besides phenomenology is needed to 
motivate attributing to C3 the single mental token E2, as opposed to two mental 
tokens, E2′ and E2′′. 
Some might object, however, that phenomenology can provide at least prima 
facie evidence of conscious singularity, for instance, in a creature whose 
phenomenology reveals no c ntents that aren’t experienced together. I am not sure, 
though, that a phenomenology that doesn’t reveal two sets of not co-conscious 
contents really does provide evidence of conscious singularity, given the general 
limits in what phenomenology can reveal about the structure of consciousness. But let 
us assume that this is right, for the sake of argument: let us assume that the absenc of 
positive evidence for conscious duality (or for the lack of co-consciousness) 
constitutes prima facie evidence in favor of conscious unity (or for the presence of co-
consciousness). Phenomenology still can’t provide strong support for the partial co-
consciousness model—especially since a consideration of another kind of 
phenomenological entity, the subject of experience, seems to count in favor of the 
conscious duality model instead. So something besides phenomenology is needed to 
motivate attributing to C3 the single mental token E2, as opposed to two mental 




Behavioral integration on C3’s part cannot motivate attributing to C3 only a 
single experience E2, rather than two experiences with the same content as E2. For
both the duality model and the partial co-consciousness model would explain C3’s 
integrated behavior with respect to whatever E2 represents in termsof what E2 
represents (in terms of its content, in other words). Now, a singularity model, applied 
to C3, might try to explain C3’s integrated behavior with respect to whatever E2 
represents not just in terms of E2’s content but also, for instance, the content’s 
availability to a single center of agency and reasoning. But if the account of co-
consciousness that I have adopted is correct, then the partial co-consciousness model 
does not have this line of explanation available to it. For any failure of transitivity in 
co-consciousness can only be explained by the presence of at least two f-sets f 
global consumers.  
Lockwood of course looks to “split brain” neuroanatomy to support his model 
of split-brain subjects’ consciousness, which is sound, I think—but the neuroanatomy 
that matters is functional neuroanatomy. I think Lockwood (1994) is perfectly right, 
in other words, to respond to Hurley, “it seems to me that the physical basis of the 
unity of consciousness should be sought in whatever we have reason to identify as the 
physical substratum of consciousness itself” (94; emphasis added). But if the account 
of co-consciousness that I have offered is correct, then “split brain” neuroanatomy, 
and in particular the intact subcortical structures that Lockwood believes support 
interhemispheric co-consciousness in split-brain subjects, explains why some of the 
same (or similar) contents become conscious in the two hemispheres.66 But it does not 
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suffice to make a single set of conscious representations available to the two 
hemispheres. Let me explain why, using a familiar example of what could reasonably 
be seen as a plausible case of partial co-consciousness.  
Gazzaniga has just presented to the right hemisphere of the split-brain subject
V.P. a “filmstrip from the Cornell Office of Health and Safety, which counsels its 
employees not to throw fellow employees into fires should they come across one” 
(Gazzaniga 1885: 76). (He assures us that, “This bit of drama brought. . . by some 
federal regulation is indeed terrifying.”) The following conversation ensues between 
V.P. and Gazzaniga:  
 
M.G.: What did you see? 
V.P.:  I don’t really know what I saw. I think just a white 
 flash. 
M.G.:  Were there people in it? 
V.P.:  I don’t think so. Maybe just some trees, red trees like in 
the fall. 
M.G.:  Did it make you feel any emotion? 
V.P.:  I don’t really know why but I’m kind of scared. I feel 
jumpy. I think maybe I don’t like this room, or maybe 
it’s you. You’re getting me nervous. 
     (Gazzaniga 1985: 76-77) 
 
V.P. then apparently “turned to an assistant and said, ‘I know I like Dr. 
Gazzaniga, but right now I’m scared of him for some reason.’” (ibid) 
This scene is a prima facie plausible instance of partial co-consciousness: 
V.P. has some emotional state of fear or anxiety that is co-conscious with both her 
left and her right hemisphere experiences, for instance, though some of these rig t 




So V.P. is watching an alarming film—a film showing people throwing their 
coworkers into fires—with her right hemisphere. Her right hemisphere sees people
being thrown into fires, on the basis of which a somatic state is entered into. A 
representation of this somatic state—an affective state—is also formed, in some 
subcortical structure or structures, say. Perhaps after some cortical elaboration within 
the right hemisphere, this affective state (or a causal descendant of it) isbroadcast, by 
the thalamus, say, to both the subject’s right and to her left hemisphere global 
consumers. The subject’s right hemisphere consumer systems, meanwhile, are also
still being broadcast the contents of the film itself. Of course it is difficult to say 
precisely what right hemisphere emotional experience/s V.P. is having. Is she 
distraught thinking about the likely injuries and scars, perhaps even deaths, of the 
people thrown into the fire? Is she angry at the throwers? Is she simply upset by the 
contents of the film, even though she knows it’s a dramatization and is neither 
concerned for the thrown nor angry at the throwers? But let us just imagine that in or 
through her right hemisphere V.P. is experiencing the emotional state of distressed 
concern for the film’s victims. 
Now V.P.’s left hemisphere consumer systems are not receiving a 
representation of the film. They are receiving a stream of auditory representations, 
however; V.P. has been asking herself what sorts of questions Gazzaniga will ask her 
next. Let us say that in or through her left hemisphere V.P. begins feeling n rvous 
about these questions, and soon enough afraid of the person who will be asking them 
of her. Thus the same affective state of negatively-valenced arousal is an aspect of 




experiences—auditory experience of inner speech, and visual experiences of the 
film—that are not co-conscious with each other.  
(In my view the example is not significantly changed if V.P.’s right and left 
hemisphere are both experiencing the same emotion—e.g., anxiety—because, as I 
explain in a moment, what is really shared by the hemispheres in either case is a 
common cause of an emotional state and not the emotional state itself. This is true 
whether or not the emotion in the two cases is of the same type.)  
I have just said that there is a single affective state here, but of course how to 
individuate affective states is also not given. In fact I think there is some evid nce to 
suggest that the major subcortical components of emotional experience are 
themselves lateralized, at least to a large extent. (See Doty 1989, for exampl .) For 
the sake of argument, though, let us simply stipulate that there is a single neural event 
in the V.P.’s amygdala, say, receiving some kind of information about the film from 
high level visual and association cortices, and that this event initiates interaction with 
V.P.’s hypothalamus, which in turn produces an increase in V.P.’s heart rate and 
other sympathetic nervous system responses. Call this amygdala event the r sponse-
signaling event, because it is this event that is responsible for generating an 
autonomic response to the film. Let’s us also simply stipulate that there is some single 
amygdala event representing the occurring autonomic response (the arousal 
response), and call the latter a esponse-representing event. Finally, assume that it is 
in part via access either to the response-signaling event, or to the response-
representing event, or to both, that V.P. comes to feel afraid in her left hemisphere.67  
                                                
67 Needless to say, while there are things like this “re ponse-signaling” and this “response-




Now: is this response-signaling event a token of the type experience—a 
representation that is a component of a stream of consciousness? And if so, is it a 
single experience? Or is it (associated with) two experiences? Is this response-
representing event a token of the type experience? And if so, is it a single experience, 
or two experiences? Do the response-signaling and response-representing evets 
together constitute a single token of the type experience? 
I don’t adopt a particular theory of emotion or emotional experience in this 
work, although my overall approach is cognitivist insofar as I wouldn’t regard either 
the response-signaling event or the response-representing event described above as 
constituting a whole experience. Nonetheless, even if the response-signaling event 
described above is of the type “experience” or “affective state” (where an affective 
state is a representational component of an experience), and even if the response-
representing event described above is of the type “experience” or “affective state,” 
neither the response-signaling event nor the response-representing event should be 
identified with a single conscious representation. 
I have adopted in this work an account of phenomenal (and access) co-
consciousness in terms of access consciousness, and I have accepted that some 
version of the global workspace theory offers an account of access consciousness. 
According to this theory, a representation is conscious if it is globally broadcast to 
                                                                                                                                          
of the response-representing event, but so too have t e mid-insula (especially in the right hemisphere) 
and the orbitofrontal cortex independently of the insula. (E.g. Critchley, 2005.) The amygdala is more 
securely recognized as at least one site of response-signaling events, at least for the emotion of fear. 
(See LeDoux 1990, 1993a, 1993b; LeDoux et al. 1990.) But cortical areas (in particular the 
orbitofrontal cortex) have also been implicated as the or a site of response-signaling events. (See 
Bennett, Hacker, 2005; Buttern, Snyder, 1972.) Obviously to the extent that V.P.’s response-signaling 
and response-representing events are cortically located there is less reason to think that V.P. has only a 
single emotional or affective experience; I just assume here for the sake of argument, though, that the 




global consumers. It is the broadcasting that constitutes the broadcasted state, that 
constitutes the experience. That is to say, the broadcasting event itself is the 
conscious representation.  
And there are two broadcasting events responsible for V.P.’s emotional 
responses in the scenario described above. We can see this in two ways. First, just in 
general, it is apparently possible to broadcast a representation to one hemisphere’s set 
of global consumers and not to the other’s; the results of the split-brain experiment 
show this. Second, and somewhat more subtly, what makes an event a broadcasting 
event is the presence of the global consumers to which the representation is broadcast. 
But if one hemisphere lacked global consumers, the content carried by the response-
representing event in this example would still be broadcast, since it could be 
broadcast to the other hemisphere’s consumer systems. So there are two broadcasting 
events. It is the broadcasting events, however, and not the response-representing or 
the response-signaling events in and of themselves, that suffice for experience. And 
just as there are two broadcasting events, there are two broadcast states or 
experiences.  
But what are these two conscious, broadcasted experiences? One might think 
that they are the two emotions, distressed concern and fright, that V.P. experiences 
via her right and her left hemisphere, respectively. It is relatively obvious that 
because there are two broadcasting events, there are two emotions, two emotional 
experiences. By virtue of the contents of the response-signaling and the response-
representing events being broadcast to left hemisphere global consumers, along with 




experience of ear is generated. By virtue of the contents of the response-signaling 
and the response-representing events being broadcast to the right hemisphere, along 
with the broadcast of other representations (e.g. visual representations of the film) to 
those consumers, the experience of distressed concern is generated. But these 
emotional states or experiences aren’t the equivalents of the broadcasting events. 
Rather, they are the outcome of those broadcasting events, the product of 
representations being broadcast and then processed by global consumers. The 
broadcasted representations are the affective components of these emotions. And, 
again, there are two of them. To repeat, there are not just two different emotional 
experiences (whether of the same or of different types) g nerated by the two 
broadcasting events. There are two affective experiences, also, equivalent to the two 
broadcasting events.  
I have obviously just been assuming some sort of cognitivist theory of 
emotion that distinguishes between an affective representation of some sort, on the 
one hand, and on the other hand a representation of the cause or meaning of that 
affective state. But of course the main point I am making here still holds even if w  
identify the two broadcasting events not with two affective components of two 
emotions but simply with two emotions, period. Given what I suspect is the 
complexity of those affective representations, I lean towards identifying them with 
conscious emotions. But that does not alter my fundamental argument. What is 
important to the argument is that neither the response-signaling event nor the 
response-representing event are themselves conscious or components of conscious 




If all this is right, then it has more widespread applicability than just the split-
brain case. For it would appear that for any consciousness structured like that of the 
split-brain subjects, where there are two global workspaces possessing largely 
different conscious contents, and then a third set of contents making it into both 
workspaces, the conscious representations carrying those contents are to be identified 
with the making it into the workspaces. I.e., an experience is not an experience 
because it is going to be broadcast. It is not something that exists prior to the 
broadcast, and which would exist, albeit not as a conscious experience, even if 
broadcast were not possible. Again, experiences are broadcasting events.  
Now by stipulation, there is still a single response-signaling event in the 
amygdala, and still a single response-representing event in the amygdala. These 
(jointly or separately) are common causes of the broadcast affective states and 
emotions. But, again, they are not themselves conscious affective states or emoti ns. 
In fact, setting aside for the moment any concerns about consciousness (much less 
consciousness in split-brain subjects) in particular, and while acknowledging the lack 
of a broadly accepted account of emotions and of their neural basis, it looks unlikely, 
at this point, that any subcortical activity alone will be identifiable with an affective 
or emotional state. Emotional networks look highly complex, and while they do seem 
to crucially involve subcortical structures, the activation of subcortical networks 
involved in emotional experience itself appears inextricably linked (in its inputs and 
its outputs) with cortical processes.  
Finally, recall that in the last major section of Chapter Three I noted that it




interhemispheric interaction per se, and to what extent they mediate “horizontal” 
patterns of brain activity, rather than simply being crucial elements in vertical loops 
of activity. It is possible, that is, that the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject 
appear relatively “unified” with regard to emotional experience in large part because 
of the physiological aspects of emotional experience. Non-cortical structures of 
course play an essential role in producing and sensing these physiological responses. 
But they could do this, again, while not directly interacting across the midline. Their 
interacting would be indirect, via patterns of bodily responses.  
My arguments against the partial co-consciousness model are tentative and 
inconclusive. What I have just suggested about the role of non-cortical structures in 
providing the two “disconnected” hemispheres with “unified” emotional experience 
may be incorrect, and moreover, the general account of co-consciousness that I have 
adopted may be wrong also. It is not possible to say anything definitive against the 
partial co-consciousness model, and indeed there is no reason to do so. Contra what 
some critics have suggested (Hurley 1998, 1994; Bayne and Chalmers 2003), the 
model has some theoretical appeal and may ultimately be easier to work with and 
provide a more parsimonious model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness.  
Still, even if Lockwood’s partial co-consciousness model is the best model of 
split-brain subjects’ consciousness, split-brain subjects would still have two minds. 
Imagine that Lockwood is right, and that V.P., for instance, has a single set of 
affective states and even emotional experiences that are shared by her two
hemispheres, which otherwise possess distinct experiences and so forth. If this is 




of “direct” first defined in chapter two. But direct interaction and integration at the 
level of affect and emotion does not alone suffice to make a single mind out of what 
are otherwise two distinct sets of systems. V.P. still possesses both a right and a left 
hemisphere mental architecture, each one of which meets the criteria for mindhood; 
between most of the systems in each architecture, meanwhile, there is not direct 
interaction. Some number of shared mental tokens, token experiences, that is, may 
suffice for a partially unified consciousness. But they will not suffice for a single 
mind. Rather, they will simply afford an unusually intimate degree of connectedness 
between two whole and distinct mental systems.  
That said, the fact that the two hemispheres are associated with two different 
mental systems—indeed, two minds—provides one additional reason to adopt the 
conscious duality model. Even if we assume that some subcortical structures make 
the very same conscious affective or emotional contents available to both 
hemispheres, and via a process that does not supervene on any physiological 
response, still, the contents are then utilized by two functionally (and of course 
physically) distinct sets of mental activities. The very fact that a puttive mental token 
is available to two different minds—two minds that aren’t functionally identical at 
that—provides a reason to question our having individuated only a single mental 
token in the first place.  
 
3 The Dynamic Singularity Model 
In Consciousness and Action (1998) and other works (2003, 1994), Hurley develops 




subpersonal, or conscious and unconscious, level. She does this while criticizing what 
she calls the traditional or “input-output” model of mind, which she thinks has several 
objectionable features. First, the traditional model depicts personal-level cognition as 
sandwiched between perception and action (or intentions to act), and subpersonal-
level cognitive processing as sandwiched between sensory input and motor output. 
But according to Hurley, rather than being “vertically modular” (such that, for 
instance, perception or sensation could be damaged, leaving cognition and action still 
more or less intact), the mind is “horizontally modular”: if one particular aspect of 
perception is impaired, there will be a corresponding impairment in closely linked 
aspects of cognition and action. (Consider neglect, as an example; neglect patients
may not only fail to draw the left sides of objects but fail to engage in leftward 
movements or actions involving the left side of space.) Furthermore, in Hurley’s 
work, cognition—as something distinct from perception and action—is largely 
absent. Like proponents of the “Extended Mind” view (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; 
Clark, 1997), which will be discussed in Chapter Six, Hurley sees the mind not as 
something entirely internal to organisms, not as an “interface” between the world-
involving processes of perception and action: perception and action re the basis of 
cognition, essentially the entire basis of (at least the personal-level) mind.  
There is something else wrong with the input-output picture of mind, too. This 
concerns the way in which it relates the personal to the subpersonal level. For Hurley,
subpersonal-level processes are the vehicle of personal-level mental processes, and I 
think she thinks this is true of the input-output model of mind, too. But the input-




perception, and views motor outputs as the vehicles of action (or intentions). In 
actuality, Hurley argues, perception and action do not map neatly onto sensory inputs 
and motor outputs, respectively. This is in part because subpersonal-level mental 
processes are best understood as “involving complex relations between sensory inputs 
and motor outputs and a circular or looping structure of causes, effects, and feedback 
effects on further causes, with both internal and external feedback loops” (1998: 206-
207). Hurley calls this a “dynamic singularity in the field of causal flows, centered on 
but not bounded by a biological organism” (1998: 2007; original emphasis). 
Subpersonal-level processes meanwhile are the vehicles of the personal-level 
processes of perception and action. But perception and action can’t just be mapped, 
one-to-one, onto causal (sensory) input and causal (motor) output, respectively, 
because there’s no systematic division of input and output at the subpersonal level. 
Perception, therefore, maps onto both sensory input and motor output, and action or 
intention does, too.  
Hurley believes that the rejection of the input-output picture of the mind has 
significant implications concerning the structure of consciousness, among other 
things. Conscious perception, again, is constructed not just out of sensory input but 
out of motor output as well. Hurley takes what Bayne (2001) calls an “objectivist” 
position on the unity of consciousness, or on co-consciousness: she does not think 
that phenomenal unity can be characterized in wholly phenomenal or indeed any 
person-level terms. There are person-level constraints on co-consciousness (including 
of coherence), but there are additionally subpersonal-level, structural constraints on 




internal to the organism, can (or at least can necessarily) provide these latt r sort of 
constraints. Rather we must look for a particular sort of functional unity to provide 
them. And it is possible, she says, that this functional unity may include processes 
that extend outside the brain (and indeed perhaps the body).  
The split-brain phenomenon enters Hurley’s works at multiple points. As we 
have already seen in Chapter Three, she uses a comparison between split-brain and 
acallosal subjects to reject Lockwood’s “isomorphism thesis,” and, relatedly, o 
support what she calls “vehicle externalism” about consciousness—the view that the 
structure of consciousness can supervene in part upon actions or behavior. The debate 
about vehicle externalism is one that I will discuss in the next chapter. But Hurley 
also uses the results of some split-brain experiments (Trevarthen 1974b, Sergent
1990) to motivate rejecting the input-output model of mind and accepting what I shall 
call the “intentions-content thesis. This is the thesis that the contents of consciousness 
can vary, “directly,” with motor intentions. She offers a new interpretation of 
Trevarthen’s and Sergent’s results, and of the structure of consciousness in split-brain 
subjects. I call this the “dynamic singularity” model of consciousness. Hurley a gues 
that some of the debate between advocates of partial co-consciousness and of 
conscious duality can be best resolved by adopting this dynamic singularity model of 
consciousness. If that is correct, then perhaps, at least at many times, a split-br in 
subject has only a single, intra-hemispheric stream of consciousness.  
 
3.1 Conscious Experience: the Input-Output Picture versus the Intentions-
Content thesis 
Hurley believes that our intuitive picture of conscious perception is one according to 




Hurley provides numerous examples (some quite convincing, and others much less 
so) meant to test this intuition. If the input-output picture is wrong, she says, then we 
should accept what I am calling the “intentions-content” thesis. This thesis says that 
intentions can alter the contents of consciousness “directly” (or “non-
instrumentally”)—i.e. even without altering sensory inputs. (That motor intentons 
can “indirectly” alter perceptual contents is obvious; motor intentions to clap can lead 
to clapping, which can lead to an auditory experience of hearing oneself clap.)  
Hurley concedes that “the idea that the contents of consciousness can change 
noninstrumentally with our intentions is already familiar and not at odds with 
widespread assumptions. Consider aspect shifts: we can often if not always 
intentionally control whether we see a figure as a duck or a rabbit” (1998: 198). She 
believes, however, that her intentions-content claim is more radical and unintuitive, 
because we know that aspect shifts involve intentions about how to (consciously) 
perceive something. Hurley’s claim is that all sorts of motor intentions, even those
that don’t concern how to consciously perceive something, can in fact directly alter 
what is conscious perceived. A large part of her work is devoted to defending this 
thesis.  
But Hurley’s work actually contains a multitude of strands and positions that 
hang together thematically, and that may help support each other, to some extent, but 
that may also be separately accepted or rejected. For instance, Hurley takes the 
intentions-content thesis to challenge vehicle internalism. But of course one could 
accept the intentions-content thesis while remaining an internalist: motor intentio s 




intentions-content thesis is at least as compatible with internalism as it is with 
externalism; the intentions-content thesis, again, says that intentions can alter the 
contents of consciousness even without altering sensory input—even, that is, without 
resulting in any kind of non-neural activity. 
The intentions-content thesis and the input-output model of consciousness 
may also stand or fall independently of each other, at least on to certain 
interpretations. Hurley describes the input-output picture of consciousness as stating 
that consciousness is the product of sensory input, and produces motor output, i.e. 
action. (That is, in the input-output model of consciousness, says Hurley, there can be 
no change in conscious experience without change in sensory input. Or, at least, 
motor intentions can’t make the difference, though perhaps something else (e.g. shifts 
of attention, or the application of concepts) can.) The intentions-content thesis, if true
challenges this input-output model of consciousness.  
And indeed I am certain that the input-output model of consciousness just 
described is not true; I am certain, that is, that conscious perception is not just a 
product of sensory input. There is every reason to believe (and Hurley herself mak s 
a strong case that) conscious experience is the product of highly complex processing 
that is itself sensitive not only to sensory input but also to motor (or motor 
intentional) factors—and, for that matter, to executive and attentional and conceptual 
factors as well. In that sense, then, the intentions-content thesis does challenge the 
input-output picture of mind.  
But I am not sure who accepts a characterization of consciousness according 




consciousness looks something of a caricature. Viable models of consciousness—
including some that Hurley herself would reject—should indeed acknowledge that 
many things, including motor intentions, can alter the contents of consciousness even 
without altering sensory input.  
A more sensible version of the input-output picture of consciousness might 
just say that conscious contents are perceptual contents. This more sensible ver ion of 
the input-output thesis could acknowledge that these conscious perceptual contents 
may themselves be the result of calculations that factor in motor intentions. This 
version of the input-output picture could for that matter acknowledge that motor 
intentions play a causal role in determining which perceptual contents become 
conscious. Thus a sensible version of the input-output model of consciousness is 
perfectly compatible with the intentions-content thesis—or at least with one version 
of that thesis. 
But there is admittedly more to Hurley’s intentions-content thesis than what 
has been described so far. So far I have described what we could call the usal 
version of the intentions-content thesis, which again just says that conscious contents 
can vary, directly, with changes in motor intentions. Hurley herself offers a 
constitutive version of the intentions-content thesis, which says that motor intentions 
are part of the vehicles of conscious experience. On this understanding, motor 
intentions don’t just causally influence perceptual contents. Motor intentions are a
much a part of conscious experience as perceptual contents themselves. 
The constitutive intentions-content thesis may then challenge even the 




input-output model of consciousness, reasonably interpreted, the perceptual 
processing that results in conscious experience may well be sensitive to motor 
intentions, and use information about motor intentions to make adjustments to its 
contents and calculations. But this is different from claiming that those motor 
intentions are part of its contents.  
Hurley never makes a good case for accepting the constitutive version of the 
intentions-content thesis over the causal. It is one thing to say that processes at the 
subpersonal-level are characterized by a multitude of feedback loops between input 
and output. And it is one thing to say that conscious experience is in part a function of 
the interaction between causal input and causal output. But it is another thing to say 
that conscious experience is, i.e. is constituted by, both causal input and causal 
output. Why should we say this, rather than simply saying that subpersonal-level 
processes—whatever the role that motor intentions and even motor behavior play in 
them—causally contribute to the generation of conscious perceptual contents? Hurley 
shows close relationships between causal output (or in some cases just motor 
intentions, which is arguably not the same thing) and perception. But I’m never 
convinced that any of these relationships are that of jointly constituting conscious 
experience. I suppose Hurley would just accuse me of being in the grip of the input-
output picture of mind, which sees conscious experience as located at the interface of 
causal input and causal output—but she doesn’t ultimately do enough to challenge 
that picture.68  
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This is mostly all just prefacatory, to note, again, that various strands in 
Hurley that might seem to stand or fall together in fact require separate examination 
and acceptance or rejection. Two strands that are like this, I argue in what follows, are 
the dynamic singularity model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness and the 
intentions-content thesis (either the causal or the constitutive version, though I will 
just speak about the causal version). Intentions may well alter the contents of 
consciousness directly or non-instrumentally, i.e. without altering sensory inputs. 
They might even in part constitute the contents of consciousness, although again, 
Hurley provides insufficient reason to think that they do. But this is distinct from the 
claim that motor intentions in split-brain subjects play so significant a role in altering 
conscious experience that they result in conscious experience, entire, shifting to one 
hemisphere, leaving the other wholly non-conscious. This is highly unlikely to 
happen as a general rule. In fact I don’t even think it’s the best analysis of what’s
happening in the particular split-brain experiments Hurley discusses.  
 
3.2 The Intentions-Content Thesis and the Dynamic Singularity Model 
If motor processes and motor intentions can alter the contents of consciousness, then 
some of the behavior split-brain subjects exhibit during the split-brain experiment can 
be reinterpreted as resulting not from conscious duality, nor from partial co-
consciousness, but rather from conscious singularity, albeit perhaps a conscious 
singularity in which only one hemisphere at a time is the site of conscious perceptual 
contents. I call this the “dynamic singularity” model of split-brain subjects’ 




intra-hemispheric stream of consciousness, but one that shifts from hemisphere to 
hemisphere, from moment to moment.  
Now Hurley herself applies the intentions-content thesis to the split-brain 
phenomenon largely to question the need to appeal to a parti l co-consciousness 
model in particular. Nonetheless, particularly in discussing a commissurotomy s udy 
by Trevarthen (1974b), she does suggest that neither the partial co-consciousness nor 
the conscious duality model need be appealed to in order to explain a split-brain 
subject’s behavioral dissociation under experimental conditions. Rather, she says, we 
can understand the subject’s conscious experience as moving from one hemisphere to 
the other with a change in which hemisphere is motorically active.  
Here is how the structure of the rest of this section will go. First, I will discuss 
“Trevarthen’s case”, which intuitively makes the best case for the dynamic singularity 
model of split-brain subjects’ consciousness. I suggest, though, that there are other 
equally plausible interpretations of this case that don’t refer to this model. Next, I turn 
to “Sergent’s cases” (Sergent 1990). Sergent’s cases actually intuitively make a better 
case for Lockwood’s partial co-consciousness model than they do for the dynamic 
singularity model, as Hurley herself seems to acknowledge. But a fuller look at the 
data suggests that Sergent’s cases make a stronger case yet for the conscious duality 
model.  
Ultimately I think that the intentions-contents thesis, if not the dynamic 
singularity model, is plausible, though I suggest that motor intentions may influence 
the contents of consciousness at least largely through the intervening action of 




intentions-content thesis more generally, I will then say why it is unreasonable to 
suppose that split-brain subjects always have a single stream of consciousness, or 
even that they have a single stream of consciousness outside of experimental 
situations. For, first of all, it is unlikely that consciousness in one hemisphere ceases 
altogether even in the absence of any motor intentions in that hemisphere, and, 
second of all, the two hemispheres seem capable of sustaining (and even acting upon) 
distinct sets of motor intentions simultaneously. Indeed it is likely that they oft n do 
act upon token-distinct motor intentions simultaneously.  
 
3.3 Motor Intentions and the Dynamic Singularity Model: Trevarthen’s Case 
In this subsection I discuss Hurley’s application of the intentions-content thesisand 
the dynamic singularity model to split-brain subjects in two different studies (one by 
Trevarthen (1974b), and one by Sergent (1990)). The intentions-content thesis may 
well be supported in the first instance, but it is not clearly supported by Sergent’s 
results. And the dynamic singularity offers the best model of split-brain subjects’ 
consciousness in neither case; the conscious duality model does, instead.  
A split-brain subject, N.G., is staring at a central fixation point while holding 
a pen in her left hand (RH).69 An image of an object is projected in her right visual 
field (RVF/LH). The subject says (LH) she can see the object, unsurprisingly. N.G. is 
then asked to use the pen, still held in her left hand (RH), to point to the center of the 
shape. When she attempts to comply, however, she is unable to; “It’s disappeared!” 
                                                
69 Actually both hemispheres have a fair degree of motor control even over the ipsilateral hand. The 
results of this experiment suggest, however, that N.G.’s right hemisphere controlled her hand in this 
experiment. This may be because of the spatial nature of the task she was asked to perform with that 




she exclaims (LH). In fact, even as the shape is slid, slowly, towards her LVF (RH), 
she remains motionless. As soon as the shape slides to or past center, however, her 
left hand (RH) jumps into action, pointing to the center of the object as requested 
(Trevarthen, 1974b).  
Hurley says that Trevarthen’s own interpretation of the case is one involving 
partial co-consciousness. (I am not sure I agree with Hurley’s interpretation of 
Trevarthen’s interpretation, but that isn’t really relevant.) Here is how Hurley 
describes the case according to the partial co-consciousness model (or as she c lls it, 
following Lockwood, the “partial unity” model):  
 
suppose that right- and left-visual-field contents are both 
conscious. And that while right- and left-field contents were 
not co-conscious with each other, both are co-conscious with 
one set of background intentions that are continuous across the 
discontinuity in perceptual awareness, such as linguistic 
intentions, intentions to cooperate with the experimenter, and 
so on.     (Hurley 1998: 196) 
 
Different motor intentions (to speak, to point) arise over the course of the 
experiment, and these are co-conscious with different visual experiences. But visual 
experiences, motor intentions, and background intentions are all conscious: they are 
simply not all co-conscious with each other.  
Unfortunately this study, involving N.G., arguably provides a poor, and 
somewhat confusing, case for the application of the partial co-consciousness model. I 
suppose the “background intentions” could be co-conscious with both right and left 
hemisphere visual experiences. But, first of all, why think this is any more likely than 




cooperate? (This is what the “conscious duality (with partially redundant contents) 
model” would say.) Second of all, intentions to cooperate might not be components 
of streams of consciousness at all. Certainly the major advocates of the partial co-
consciousness model—including Lockwood, of course, but also perhaps including 
Trevarthen himself, —see as paradigm cases of partial co-consciousness those in 
which the hemispheres appear to share access to at least the same types (including 
contents) of perceptual information. (In the same article, for instance, Trevarthen 
suggests that certain visual information—concerning the “ambient visual field”—is 
inter-hemispherically co-conscious. And Sperry (1986), recall, seemed to suggest that 
emotional or affective information might be co-conscious with both right and left 
hemisphere experiences.) 
Hurley provides her own model of N.G.’s consciousness during this 
experiment, however—one according to which (she says) both the partial co-
consciousness interpretation and the conscious duality (with some duplication of 
contents) interpretation “are preempted” (1998: 197). According to this interpretation, 
which I am calling the “dynamic singularity” model:  
 
before the patient forms the immediate intention to move, 
background intentions are co-conscious with left-hemisphere 
perceptual content, not with right-hemisphere motor and 
perceptual content. Once the patient forms the immediate 
intention to move, background intentions are co-conscious with 
right-hemisphere motor and perceptual content.  
     (1998: 197) 
 
There are five sets of mental events that can be or fail to be co-conscious with 




motor intentions to speak (LH motor intentions), motor intentions to point with the 
left hand (RH motor intentions), LH visual representation (initially of the object), and 
RH visual representation (initially of a blank screen). There are also three tim  
periods or stages at which the content and structure of N.G.’s consciousness can be 
analyzed. At stage one, N.G. is asked to describe what she sees; she hasn’t yet been 
asked to do anything with her hand. The shape is in her RVF (LH), and so she says 
(LH) she can see it. At stage two, the shape is still in her RVF (LH), but now the 
subject has been asked to point to the center of the shape (RH); she now says 
(presumably LH) she can’t see the shape. At stage three the shape is moved into h r 
LVF (RH). I will only discuss the first two stages, because these are sufficient to 
illustrate the dynamic singularity model of what’s happening.  
Figure 5.2 diagrams the first two stages, according to Hurley’s dynamic 
singularity model. At stage one, a set of verbal motor intentions (LH) are activ , and 
at stage two a set of motor intentions concerning the left hand (RH) are active. Notic  
that in this diagram, co-consciousness is transitive (as it wouldn’t be according to the 
partial co-consciousness model).  
At first, background intentions to cooperate are co-conscious with one set of 
motor intentions—motor intentions to speak. Since these are left hemisphere 
intentions, those intentions, and the background intentions to cooperate and so forth, 
are co-conscious with left hemisphere visual experience, and not with right 
hemisphere visual experience. N.G. therefore reports left hemisphere visual 
experience. Now a new set of motor intentions is created, however: motor intentions 




intentions are located in the right hemisphere. Now the background intentions to 
cooperate are co-conscious with this new set of motor intentions—motor intentions to 
draw (using the left hand). Since these are right hemisphere intentions, they, and the 
background intentions to cooperate and so forth, become co-conscious with right 
hemisphere visual representation, and cease to be co-conscious with left hemisphere 
visual representation. Therefore the subject intends to cooperate by pointing (RH) to 


















Figure 5.2: The Dynamic Singularity Model: Trevarthen’s Case 
 
Of course, the subject doesn’t just fail to point to the object at this state two; 
she also claims that the shape has vanished. So she has a set of verbal motor 



























































hemisphere motor intentions. (Some split-brain subjects do develop some spoken 
language in their right hemisphere.) This is possible but probably unlikely (I return to 
this below), and Hurley does not believe this. Rather, she says that this case involving 
N.G. suggests that left hemisphere verbal intentions can be co-conscious with either 
LH or RH visual experience. 
(This might seem create a problem for Hurley’s own, “dynamic singularity” 
model of the case, however. Hurley is going to say that the contents of consciousness 
shift depending on which motor intentions are active. But then why don’t left 
hemisphere verbal motor intentions make left hemisphere visual contents conscious? 
But perhaps this isn’t a problem; different sorts of motor intentions might plausibly 
play a greater or lesser role in altering conscious contents.) 
Since the shape is still in the RVF (LH) prior to stage three, one would expect 
N.G. to claim (LH) that she can still see the object, even if she can’t point (RH) to its 
center. But N.G. claims (LH, by assumption) that she can’t see the object. Why? 
Because, Hurley says, her background intentions to cooperate (to point, but also to 
speak, to respond, to describe her visual experience when asked) are no longer co-
conscious with her RVF (LH) visual representation: these background intentions have 
become co-conscious with her LVF (RH) visual experiences, because of new RH 
motor intentions (to point). 
But of course, I have so far left out of this application of the dynamic 
singularity model what Hurley considers its most interesting claim. And that there is 
only one set of conscious visual experiences at each stage. At stage one, left 




experiences are conscious. But there are no other, contralateral conscious visual 
experiences at either of these stages.  
Hurley essentially just questions whether the right hemisphere’s visual 
experience is really conscious at stage one, and whether the left hemisphere’s visual 
experience is really conscious at stage two. Perhaps motor intentions and/or 
background intentions to cooperate create changes in conscious contents. (Possibly by 
partially constituting conscious experiences.) Hurley believes that it is tempting to 
view Trevarthen’s cases in terms of partial co-consciousness just because “it is 
natural to pass over the temporal distinction marked by motor intentions, given that 
relevant sensory inputs are held constant” (1998: 198) In other words we assume that 
whatever perceptual states of the subject N.G. and of her hemispheres are conscious 
at stage one, these same perceptual states are conscious at stage two, and the only 
question becomes one concerning the co-consciousness relations between these 
various conscious experiences. We assume this, Hurley says, because at stage one and 
stage two, the subject is receiving the same sensory input; the shape is present and in 
the RVF (LH) at both stages, and N.G. is still staring at the same fixation point.  
But what if the shift in motor intentions that occurs between stage one and 
stage two marks a shift in conscious contents? In that case, there need not be two sets 
of visual experiences—a visual experience of the shape, and a visual experience of a 
blank screen—that are conscious at both stages but just not co-conscious with each 
other. Perhaps at each stage there is one conscious visual experience: of the shape, 
and associated with the LH, at stage one, and of the blank screen, and associated with 




I have just described Trevarthen’s case according to the dynamic singularity 
model. (The case, as Hurley interprets it, also illustrates the “intentions-content” 
thesis, though note that there is nothing in the description to favor the constitutive 
over the causal version of that thesis.) And the dynamic singularity model makes 
some sense of the case, although it also requires accepting that when N.G. says (LH) 
the object has disappeared, she is describing her RH’s visual experience. (Hurley
apparently just accepts that this is the case, stating that, “Information from the 
motorically active hemisphere, whether left or right, can be reported by the subject 
verbally, that is, using the left, linguistic hemisphere” (1998: 195). But then why are 
there so many split-brain experiments—including other experiments using this 
particular subject—in which subjects can’t verbally describe their RH experiences? 
And why does Sperry (1990) mention that it is not uncommon for the left hemisphere 
to keep up a stream of chatter only on the aspects of an RH task that the left 
hemisphere has perceptual access to—even when the RH is engaged in a motor task?)  
I am not convinced that the dynamic singularity model of split-brain subjects’ 
consciousness offers the clearest interpretation of the results of this study. 
Admittedly, the data is difficult to explain for any model of consciousness. Among 
other things, given the spatial nature of the task, it’s a little surprising that the subject 
couldn’t perform the pointing task at all, even under dominant control of her right 
hemisphere, and even if her right hemisphere could not consciously perceive the 
shape. For this seems like the sort of thing the right hemisphere (although perhaps not 
the left) would be able to do, in part due to midbrain representations of the visual 




discussion.) It’s surprising, that is, that N.G. had to wait for the shape to enter the 
LVF (RH) in order to perform the pointing task. Given this fact, I’m somewhat 
reluctant to speculate about this one, potentially non-representative case. But I do still 
think that it can be interpreted under the conscious duality model. 
While I don’t at this point have an explanation as to why N.G. could not 
perform the pointing task until the shape was consciously perceived by her RH, I 
don’t see that Hurley has one either. (I am not familiar with the details of N.G.’s case 
history, but perhaps there is something in that history which would explain this?) But 
for whatever reason, N.G. couldn’t target the center of the shape, at least with her left 
hand, until the shape was in her LVF (RH). Now, why did N.G. claim that the object 
had disappeared as soon as she attempted to point to its center—and even though the 
object was still within the visual field of her speaking hemisphere?  
I suppose one possibility is that N.G.’s exclamation that she could no longer 
see the object was actually a RH vocalization. I am not sure how likely a possibility 
this is. Trevarthen (1974b) describes N.G. as having said, “It’s disappeared!” and as
“continu[ing] to report that the stimulus in the right field was not visible, even while 
it was moved slowly about by the experimenter” (Trevarthen 1974b: 196), and this 
sounds too sophisticated for an RH vocalization. (See Levy, Nebes, and Sperry, 1971, 
however.) Note that Sperry, Zaidel, and Zaidel (1979) at one point at least considered 
the possibility of spoken language—in particular, short verbal exclamations—in this 
particular subject; I don’t know if they later reached some sort of more decisive view 




A second, more likely possibility is that N.G. was simply embarrassed to find 
herself unable to point to an object she had just stated that she could see—a task any 
child could perform. She may then have simply stated that the shape had vanished, 
either through deliberate dishonesty or in mere confusion. Alternatively, there is 
Trevarthen’s own interpretation of the experimental result, offered “in terms of 
interlateral, probably interhemispheric, communication of an inhibitory nature, 
leading first to erasure or occlusion of the right field percept from consciousness, and 
then report of loss emanating from the left hemisphere” (1974b: 196). One version of 
this third alternative explanation is that, in preparation to perform as requested, the 
right hemisphere diverted significant attentional resources from the left hemisphere, 
or at least from the left hemisphere’s visual areas, making the left hemisphere’s 
percept of the object non-conscious.  
According to either of these latter two interpretations, the left hemisphere’s 
percept of the object may have indeed become non-conscious, at stage two—but the 
left hemisphere was still reporting the contents its own stream of consciousness, and 
not that of the right hemisphere. Note that if this interpretation is correct, the 
intentions-content thesis is affirmed—motor intentions really have made a difference 
to conscious contents, directly—but the dynamic singularity model is not, for there 
are still two streams of consciousness, and the left hemisphere is merely reporting the 
contents of its own stream. This is the more conservative interpretation of the case.  
There is another result of Trevarthen’s (Levy, Trevarthen, and Sperry, 1972) 
that I don’t believe Hurley discusses but that seems to make an equally strong case 




study bilateral chimeric stimuli were presented tachistoscopically for brief periods to 
split-brain subjects, with a different half-object, or a different word or pattern, just on 
either side of the vertical meridian. When asked to say what they’d seen, split-brain 
subjects described the RVF (LH) stimulus. When asked to point, with either hand, “to 
a picture matching the stimulus in form or appearance, the left half of the chimera, 
seen by the right brain, was chosen” (Trevarthen, 1984: 333). This pattern of results is 
easily explained by the intentions-contents thesis. When the motor intentions in 
question are associated with the left hemisphere (i.e. intentions to speak), left 
hemisphere visual percepts are conscious. But the right hemisphere is dominant for 
many visuo-spatial, including drawing, tasks; perhaps, then, when asked to draw an 
object, right hemisphere motor intentions are generated (or dominant), leading right 
hemisphere visual percepts to become conscious. This pattern of results, again, lends 
itself to an interpretation in terms of the dynamic singularity model.  
Of course it equally well lends itself to an interpretation in terms of consciu  
duality: whichever hemisphere is dominant for the response type indicates its 
conscious contents. As data points for the dynamic singularity model of 
consciousness, then, both of Trevarthen’s cases suffer from the same problem: the 
dynamic singularity model offers a workable interpretation of the results; there are 
just other equally good interpretations possible. In fact some of these other 
interpretations are arguably better, if only because they are supported by a great deal 





3.4 Motor Intentions and the Dynamic Singularity Model: Sergent’s Case 
Sergent hypothesized that the experimental paradigm that first found evidence of 
conscious dissociation in split-brain subjects may have overestimated the extent of 
conscious dissociation in such subjects by requiring them to name right-hemisphere 
lateralized stimuli. Her studies on split-brain subjects exploited different types of 
paradigms, in order to test whether the degree of conscious dissociation found 
depended upon the type of question subjects were asked.  
Sergent (1990) asked subjects to cross-compare two bilaterally presented 
stimuli in two different ways and in two different trial types. In both sets of rials, two 
numbers were flashed simultaneously to a subject, one in each visual field. When 
asked to push a button indicating whether the numbers were same or different, split-
brain subjects were at chance. This is a standard result for split-brain subject : th y 
can’t cross-identify objects. Sergent wondered, however, whether they might be able 
to cross-compare objects in some other way. In a second trial type, subjects wer  
asked to make a motor response indicating not whether the identity of the two 
numbers was the same, but rather which of the two numbers was greater in v lue. The 
object of this study was to see if the hemispheres were capable of passing some 
abstract information associated with a stimulus, even if the stimulus identity (either in 
the form of a name or in the form of perceptual representation of the stimulus) could 
not be passed. And, as it turned out, subjects performed well above chance (though 
not perfectly) at this task. 
An impressive, even startling, amount of transfer thus seemed to obtain in this 




to transfer between hemispheres: not information about the identity of the numeric 
stimuli, but at least information about their quantitative value. Sergent hypothesized 
that while perceptual information about stimuli could not transfer, other, more 
“abstract” information about stimuli could. Take a trial in which a “3” is presented i  
the RVF (LH) and a “6” in the LVF (RH). The identity of the RH stimulus did not 
transfer to the LH, nor vice versa; so presumably the shape of the RH stimulus did 
not transfer to the LH, nor vice versa; yet somehow the value associated with one 
hemisphere’s stimulus had transferred to the other hemisphere, apparently.  
As Hurley notes, Sergent herself did not suggest that the information about the 
“6” that reached the left hemisphere, say, via some subcortical structures, was 
conscious. (Sergent did not specify which subcortical structures she thought might be 
playing this role.) It was still possible that it was not conscious. But an interpretation 
of Sergent’s results in terms of partial co-consciousness is, as Hurley notes, qui  
tempting. At any one moment, a split-brain subject perceiving “6” in her LVF (RH)
and “3” in her RVF (LH) would have a conscious percept of the numeral on the left 
as a 6, which was co-conscious with a “perception” (as Hurley puts it) of that number 
as higher (than the other number), which is also co-conscious with a perception of the 
number on the right as a 3—but the perception of the number on the left as a 6 and 
the perception of the number on the right as a 3 are not themselves co-conscious. 
Another way of explaining these results using the partial co-consciousness model 
would be to say that (conscious) “abstract” or semantic information is inter-




Prima facie, then, Sergent’s results seems to make a nice case for the partial 
co-consciousness model. They do not seem to make a good case for the intentions-
contents thesis or the dynamic singularity model. In fact, how, exactly, Hurley views 
Sergent’s pattern of results as supporting the intentions-content thesis is unclear. (Se  
Hurley, 1994.) For it is difficult to see what the different motor intentions are in this 
case. Hurley believes that there is a “change in intention between the same/different 
and higher/lower tasks in a Sergent-like case [that] is sufficient for a change in 
perceptual consciousness despite constant sensory input” (1994: 77). But how have 
the motor intentions changed between the two sorts of tasks? As Hurley herself 
describes the two trial and task types, “Sergent’s series of experiments projected pairs 
of numerals simultaneously, one numeral to each half-brain, and asked patients to 
compare them. Either hand was allowed to reply by pushing a lever to indicate the 
correct response in a given task” (Hurley 1994: 52). The motor intentions in the two 
types of task are the same, then: using whatever hand you wish—and, by the way, it 
apparently makes no difference which hand you use; subjects can’t do the 
same/different task with either hand, and they can do the greater/lesser task with 
either hand—push the appropriate lever. Something has changed in between the two 
trial types, of course, and admittedly it isn’t the stimuli themselves. But I wouldn’t 
call what differs motor intentions. What changes is just the type of information about 
the stimulus that the subject is asked to consider and compare. It is some sort of 
representation of the stimulus, and not of a motor act, that changes. So Sergent’s 
results make a better case for the partial co-consciousness model than they do for the 




Hurley acknowledges that Sergent’s results are readily interpreted in trms of 
partial co-consciousness. But the problem with accepting such a model of split-brain 
subjects’ consciousness, Hurley says, is that any putative instance of partial co-
consciousness could also be characterized as a case of conscious duality (or 
multiplicity) with some redundancy of contents. Hurley offers the intentions-content 
thesis in part as a way out of this “indeterminacy” problem. 
I wouldn’t call it “indeterminacy,” however, and I don’t see it as a problem 
(certainly not for the conscious duality view). Even if there is no behavioral evidence 
that could ever ule out conscious duality with some redundancy of contents 
anywhere partial co-consciousness appeared a plausible interpretation also, or vice 
versa, other factors could come into play in our choice of a model of consciousness. 
For instance, as Lockwood notes, we could turn to neuroanatomy. (Though 
concededly Hurley believes that we can’t turn to neuroanatomy, as already 
mentioned; I have said something already about why I think that we can turn to 
neuroanatomy, and in the next chapter I give a defense of vehicle internalism or 
mind-brain supervenience that will support this move even more.) For that matter, we 
could turn to considerations of simplicity, as I also believe Lockwood also implies 
(see Lockwood 1989, but also Lockwood 1994, responding to Hurley 1994). If a 
subject has a hundred experiential contents, for instance, and it appears that two of 
these contents are not co-conscious with each other, and the rest are, partial co-
consciousness looks much more appealing than does conscious duality with almost 





In any event, though, once we get beyond first glances, Sergent’s results 
actually don’t make a compelling case for the partial co-consciousness model, either; 
they make a compelling case for conscious duality. Sergent herself noted a 
methodological flaw with the trials involving the higher/lower task: only the numbers 
one through nine were presented, and the subjects knew this, and so either 
hemisphere could employ a simple guessing strategy and be successful a statistically 
significant 78% of the time—which was about the level of accuracy split-brain 
subjects in fact achieved. (I.e. 78% correct could be obtained by either hemisphere, or 
by both hemispheres separately, employing the following rule: if you see a number 
greater than 5, guess that that number is “greater”; if you see a number less than 5, 
guess that that number is “lesser”; if you see a 5, guess at random.) In fact when 
Seymour, Reuter-Lorenz, and Gazzaniga (1994) redid the study but using digits that 
were never more than one digit apart (so that subjects were always asked to compare 
a 2 and a 3, or a 5 and a 6, a 7 and a 7, etc.), subjects did well on the within-field 
condition (i.e. where both digits were presented within the same visual field) but were 
at chance on the between-field condition—presumably because the within-
hemisphere guessing strategy just described could not be employed. (In a different set 
of trials in which the two digits presented could be more than one number apart, 
subject J.W. was between 72.7% and 77.8% correct (depending on response hand) for 
the between-field conditions, and again, perfect use of the guessing strategy would 
predict 78% correct on between-field conditions. And in fact, J.W. described himself 




My conclusion therefore is that these two split-brain experiments with which 
Hurley tries to motivate the dynamic singularity model do no such thing. While at 
first glance one of the experiments in question might seem best accounted for by the 
partial co-consciousness model, upon closer examination, the partial duality model 
provides the best explanation of both sets of results.  
 
3.5 A Qualified Defense of the Intentions-Content Thesis 
Although Hurley’s attempts to apply the dynamic singularity model to split-bra n 
subjects are not highly successful, the intentions-content thesis motivating it does not 
seem implausible, or even (pace Hurley) particularly counterintuitive. (And indeed, at 
other points in Consciousness in Action she provides some persuasive empirical 
evidence for the thesis.) Perception itself, certainly conscious perception, inv lves 
extraordinarily rich feedback, much of whose nature and significance we probably do 
not know. Among other things, to become conscious, a perceptual state must, it 
seems, win more than one competitive processes. Some of the competition is local, 
i.e. some of it involves a competition within the visual system between multiple 
visual interpretations, for example, and some of it is global: some of it involves a 
competition for general processing and attentional resources. To respond, 
deliberately, to a perceptual stimulus, no doubt involves a complex pathway that does 
leave room for feedback at multiple points, and perhaps some of this feedback might 
alter the strength of the perception, or even make the difference between its b coming 
conscious or not.  
So there is some compelling evidence that at least the causal version of the 




intentions might alter the contents of consciousness via the intervention of, or because 
of their relation to, processes of (especially spatial) attention. Brain imaging studies, 
for instance, have suggested substantial overlap between structures involved in spatial 
attention and structures responsible for at least some behavioral responses—including 
those involving hand and eye movements. (I have not read anything linking the 
structures of spatial attention with structures for verbal responses.) Some have 
hypothesized that the “extrastriate body area” integrates “visual, spatial attention, and 
motor signals for the dynamic updating of the observer’s body representation. 
Astafiev et al. (2004) considered this process related to the updating of visual space 
for eye and hand movements that takes place in the posterior parietal cortex” 
(Praamstra, Boutsen, and Humphreys, 2005: 771). And many people believe that 
shifts of attention can directly alter the contents of consciousness. Perhaps, then, the 
generation of motor intentions can have some influence on the contents of attention 
which can in turn influence the contents of consciousness. (Note that this means of 
influencing conscious contents would still be “direct” in Hurley’s sense, i.e., not 
dependent on actual motor behavior resulting in changed sensory input.) This is mere 
speculation though, and of course the direction of influence could go the other way 
around only, with attention priming or inhibiting motor intentions.  
Still, let me quickly say why, even if the intentions-content thesis is true (in 
either its causal or its constitutive version), split-brain subjects would still have two 





3.6 The Conscious Duality Model, Defended 
In order for motor intentions to unify a split-brain subject’s consciousness, or, as I 
have been putting it, in order for motor intentions to create a single stream of 
consciousness in split-brain subjects, one of two conditions must hold:  
 
Condition 1: Motor intentions are only present or dominant in 
one hemisphere at a time, in such a fashion as to produce a 
single intra-hemispheric stream of consciousness at any one 
moment.  
 
Condition 2: Motor intentions are integrated inter-
hemispherically in such a fashion as to produce a single inter-
hemispheric stream of consciousness.  
 
Note that only the truth of condition 1 would vindicate Hurley’s 
dynamic singularity model, as I understand it, but if condition two held 
instead, I imagine that she would be nearly equally pleased, as the model of 
consciousness so resulting would be quite consistent with a number of the 
themes and arguments in her work.  
There is excellent evidence that neither condition 1 nor condition 2 can 
hold at all times; indeed, I won’t even bother to review some of this evidence. 
For we have already seen, in the context of other discussions, numerous 
instances in which each hemisphere has evidenced a unique set of motor 
intentions that are not integrated with those of the other—and in which each 




Given that neither of these conditions hold at all imes, the question 
becomes whether one of these conditions might still hold at mos times. Now I 
will discuss the two cases separately, starting with condition 2.  
It might be said that there is some compelling evidence for condition 
2, since split-brain subjects generally behave in so integrated a fashion, as if 
their hemispheres’ motor intentions were coordinated inter-hemispherically. 
But the first thing to note about condition 2 is that it assumes a thesis that goes 
beyond anything that’s been presented thus far: the thesis that integration of 
motor intentions suffices for conscious unity (co-consciousness). Granted, 
Hurley does argue that unity of agency (which includes but need not be 
exhausted by the integration of motor intentions) is necessary for the unity of 
consciousness, relying in particular upon a discussion of “Marcel’s case” 
(Marcel, 1993). (See especially the discussion of “Marcel’s case” in Hurley 
1998.) While I am skeptical that Hurley draws the correct conclusion from 
this case, we should note that even if hers wa the correct interpretation, this 
would only show that disunity of motor intentions can disunify 
consciousness—not that integration of motor intentions can unify 
consciousness.70  
                                                
70 This was a complicated study with a large number of trial types and conditions, but essentially 
Marcel found that the way in which (“normal”) subjects were asked to indicate perception of a stimulus 
influenced how likely they were to indicate that the stimulus had been perceived. In particular, winking 
was more accurate than pressing a button, and both were more accurate than verbal response. When 
subjects were just asked to guess whether a stimulus had been presented or not, all response types were 
more accurate. I question Hurley’s and Marcel’s interpretation of the study insofar as I question 
whether the performance difference between report and guess conditions really reduces to a difference 
between conscious and non-conscious perception. For a number of reasons, however, it seems more 
likely to me that responses on verbal affirmation trials were most likely to be reports of conscious 
experience, and that superior performance on winking and button-pressing trials is explained by these 




The split-brain cases seem to show that integrated behavior can result 
from two streams of consciousness—and they also show that behavior and 
motor intentions can appear integrated even when they arguably are not. It is 
surely true that the motor outputs of the two hemispheres are coordinated non-
cortically somehow—in the basal ganglia, the reticular formation, the 
cerebellum, etc.—to some, possibly great, degree. But that sort of 
coordination is of motor intentions that probably don’t shift the contents of 
consciousness. For as I mentioned in Chapter Four, it appears that a good deal 
of the representations that guide our actions aren’t conscious to begin with. It 
is the selection of actions to perform, motor intentions framed as the fulfilling 
of goals, and so forth, that seem most closely linked to conscious perception. 
But these are cortical motor processes.  
Keep in mind, again, that it is not always obvious when behaviors 
aren’t the result of intimate, inter-hemispheric coordination of motor 
intentions. Split-brain subjects may even perform “remarkably free of 
noticeable clumsiness or incoordination” and may display “fine motor 
precision” on many “unimanual and bimanual tasks” (Zaidel and Sperry, 
1977: 196). . . even if their performance is quite slow. Severe impairments 
may be most obvious only for a particular sort of bimanual task: that requiring 
“interdependent bimanual movements”, i.e. in which “the movements of one 
hand depended upon the sequencing of movements in the opposite hand” 




is when the two hands cannot each just “do their own thing” separately, that 
is, to contribute to a movement, that performance breaks down.  
Motor coordination in split-brain subjects, then, may frequently be a 
result of cooperation between two streams of consciousness. In other 
instances, meanwhile, the kind of inter-hemispheric coordination of motor 
output that’s really at play may be a simple inhibition of one hemisphere’s 
outputs. Motor control may switch from one hemisphere to the other. (It might 
be slightly misleading to even call this “coordination”: it results in 
coordinated behavior—but still behavior originating from only one 
hemisphere. The coordination of motor outputs in this case is at most the 
inhibition of one hemisphere’s output by the other’s.) Meanwhile, as Sperry 
points out:  
 
[Various] kinds of evidence further confirm that, while one 
hemisphere is performing, the nondominant less-active 
hemisphere, though overtly passive in not exerting control over 
the motor system, may nevertheless be alert and consciously 
cognizant of what is going on externally. This is indicated, for 
example, in disgusted shaking of the head or irked facial 
expressions triggered from the minor hemisphere after it has 
heard its speaking partner making what it knows to be an 
incorrect answer. Also, it is not uncommon, while the informed 
right hemisphere is performing, for the vocal hemisphere to 
make remarks like, ‘Now, why did I do that?’ ‘What’s the 
matter with me anyway?’  (Sperry 1990: 375)  
 
Indeed, Sperry notes in this same article that it is in fact not uncommon for the 




situation not restricted to the mute hemisphere” (ibid 374) when the right hemisphere 
is engaging in some kind of perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral task.  
This is not to say that the drawing of attentional resources to one hemisphere 
can’t to some extent depress the conscious activities of the other. This may well 
happen, to some degree, at some times (as Sperry suggests in the same article, 1990). 
Of course, just because the left hemisphere shuts down behaviorally doesn’t 
necessarily mean that it literally loses all consciousness of what’s going on. (I’ve 
never heard, for instance, of a split-brain subject suddenly blinking, after being 
deeply absorbed in a RH task, and asking (LH), “What just happened? Was I 
asleep?”, or saying (LH) that for the past few moments, everything was dark.) But in 
part because of a shift of attention to one hemisphere, the other hemisphere’s 
consciousness may be reduced or at least made into a more passive sort.  
But now we have shifted to talking about condition 1: whether it is likely that, 
at most times, only one hemisphere of a split-brain subject will be associated w th a 
stream of consciousness at all. The split-brain experiment is often set up in such a 
fashion so as to require the simultaneous behavior of both hemispheres. Outside of 
experimental conditions, though, perhaps only one hemisphere at a time has active 
motor intentions—perhaps just switching consciousness from one hemisphere to the 
other, but not sharing it between hemispheres at a time.  
This seems implausible on its face. Hurley herself does not seem to believe 
this, and she willingly acknowledges that the input-output picture “is about right for 
many cases” (1998: 289) and that perceptual experience does not always depend upon 




resources would routinely drain one hemisphere of all conscious experience, but also, 
split-brain subjects’ performance on many motor tasks in fact seems to require active 
motor intentions in both hemispheres simultaneously. They’re impaired on those 
tasks requiring that the intentions be integrated in a particular way: when the precise 
intention the LH should form depends on which one the RH has formed or will form. 
Since the hemispheres can’t integrate their intentions in this way, they have to rely on 
sensory feedback: one hemisphere has to look at the actual motor consequences of the 
other hemisphere’s intentions before it acts, resulting in slow, halting, and somewhat 
ragged-looking performance.  
In an experiment by Preilowski (1990), for instance, “normal” and split-brain 
subjects were each given an Etch-a-Sketch-like device and told to draw a line that 
stayed between two given parallel lines. Obviously the task is quite simple when the 
two given lines are either vertical or horizontal; all you need to do is spin a single
knob as quickly as you can. When the two given lines are diagonal, the two knobs 
must be turned in a coordinated way, and the rates of turn for each knob will not 
necessarily be equal; this will vary based on the slope of the two given lines. But 
apparently “normal” subjects begin to draw smooth, straight lines, and very quickly, 
with a little practice. Split-brain subjects draw staircases, painstakigly struggling just 
to stay within the two given lines.  
At the same time, they appear to perform many other kinds of motor tasks 
successfully (if unusually slowly) using both hemispheres at once. Indeed recall that 
while they have trouble with motor tasks that require inter-hemispheric integration of 




can draw two pictures with two hands at once, or engage in two different sorting tasks 
with two hands at once, with no obvious interference, as discussed in Chapter Four. 
Their hands, that is, seem to work perfectly well at the same time, independently. So 
at least at those moments, they have two streams of consciousness. Even though, as I 
mentioned in Chapter Four, their behavior might actually look, in a sense, perfectly 
coordinated. So there is no need to refer to “dynamic singularity” to explain the 
unified-seeming behavior of split-brain subjects, as I have previously argued.  
Motor intentions may have a direct influence on conscious contents, even 
without effecting any change in sensory input. In some cases intentions may have this 
effect via the intervention of attentional mechanisms. Because the hemispheres s ar  
and compete for at least some attentional mechanisms, active motor intentions may 
depress the conscious contents of the other hemisphere at some moments. It is 
unlikely, however, that one hemisphere would be rendered completely non-conscious 
during such moments; at many other moments, meanwhile, motor intentions are 
either not particularly active in either hemisphere or quite active in both. The kind of 
integration of motor intentions that does occur between the hemispheres, meanwhile, 
does not seem to suffice to integrate their conscious contents—to make the 
hemispheres co-conscious, that is.   
 
4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I’ve defended the conscious duality model from two interesting and 
alternative models of split-brain subjects’ consciousness: the partial co-consciousness 




empirically. But the former provides a good fit with the empirical data, and indeed it, 
and the conscious duality model, should make basically equivalent predictions with 
respect to the behavioral data. I suggested that there may still be reasons to prefer the 
conscious duality model, for functional considerations of several sorts seem to weigh 
in favor of characterizing interhemispheric transfer of conscious affect, for example, 
as involving the generation of the same conscious content but different conscious 
experiences in the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject. But these arguments are 
admittedly tentative, and perhaps split-brain subjects have a single stream of 
consciousness, spanning two hemispheres and shared by two minds, within which co-





Chapter 6: Functionalism and the Boundaries of the Mental 
 
1 Introduction 
At several points throughout this dissertation the issue of the sup rvenience base of
mental phenomena has been raised either explicitly or implicitly.71 For instance, the 
claim that something about the split-brain experiment itself changes the structure of 
split-brain subjects’ consciousness is ultimately plausible only if the ve icles of 
consciousness—conscious representations, and not just conscious contents—may be 
located outside the brain. And Hurley’s rejection of the isomorphism thesis—the 
thesis that there is some kind of isomorphism between the structure of cognition and 
consciousness and the structure of the nervous system—seems to rest most 
fundamentally upon her rejection of mind-brain supervenience.  
Up until this point, however, I have merely assumed the truth of some kind of 
mind-brain supervenience claim. In this chapter I finally defend vehicle internalism: 
the view that mental states and minds themselves are internal to the organism, from 
the criticisms of proponents of vehicle externalism (or the “extended mind” 
hypothesis). This defense supports many of the arguments made and conclusions 
                                                
71 A supervenes on B—or B is the supervenience base of A—if there can be a change in B without a 
change in A, yet there can be no change in A without a change in B. Constitution is one way that 
supervenience can come about—if B constitutes A, then A supervenes on B—though constitution is 
arguably a stronger relationship. (So one might believ  that the aesthetic properties of, say, a dress—it  
flamboyance—supervene on the dress’s basic perceptual properties—its shapes, colors, textures—
without being constituted by those basic perceptual properties. Thanks to Jerrold Levinson for this 
example.) In this chapter I argue that minds supervene on brains. Consider my total state of mind right 
now—call this M. This state could not change without some change in the actual state of my brain right 
now—call this B. But in fact B could change without M changing; slight changes in glucose 
metabolism or in neurotransmitter levels or in oxygen levels, the death of a single glial cell, etc. . . . 




reached in earlier chapters. Insofar as it unifies several of these arguments, it also 
serves in part to conclude the dissertation.  
Let me define some relevant concepts and distinctions and make a few 
clarificatory remarks before continuing. First, instead of contrasting the claim of 
mind-brain supervenience with the extended mind hypothesis, I refer instead to the 
debate between vehicle externalism and vehicle internalism. This is properly s aking 
a debate about the supervenience base of the vehicles of cognition and consciousness. 
By vehicles of cognition and consciousness I simply mean token mental (sometimes 
conscious), representational states, i.e. states carrying content. So, let us say that, if I 
consciously examine a bottle of ketchup, I have a single representation of a bottle of 
ketchup. (I may instead have numerous representations of the bottle of ketchup, but 
make it one representation for simplicity’s sake.) The content of that representational 
state represents the bottle as a bottle of red stuff that is ketchup, and the 
representation itself is the vehicle of that content. But I don’t just mean to defend 
internalism about the vehicles of consciousness and cognition; I mean also to defend 
internalism about whole minds, the systems that mental representations are states of.  
Vehicle externalism and vehicle internalism are normally defined as follows. 
Vehicle internalists, it is said, are those who believe that minds supervene on brains,
and that mental states (percepts, emotions, etc.) and mental events (perceiving X, 
feeling Y, etc.) supervene on neural states and events. Vehicle externaliss, in 
contrast, may accept that minds center on brains in some sense, but don’t accept that 
the supervenience basis of a mind necessarily ends at the borders of a brain. Minds 




vehicle externalist, not every mental state or event is a neural state or event. For 
reasons that will emerge shortly, however, I think it is more helpful to describe 
vehicle internalists as believing that mental states supervene on states of nervous
systems, and to describe vehicle externalists as believing that mental states can 
supervene on things outside of nervous systems as well.  
I want to distinguish the debate about the supervenience base of the vehicl s 
of consciousness and cognition from debates about the supervenience base of the 
contents of consciousness and cognition. Content externalists (Putnam (1975), Burge 
(1986, 1979), Dretske (1988), Tye (2000, 1995)) believe that the cont nts of mental 
states aren’t or aren’t always or entirely determined by what is inside the brain. So, 
the content of a subject’s mental state, M, could change even if nothing inside that 
subject’s brain changed, simply by changing something about the subject’s world. 
Content internalists (Segal (2000), Botterill and Carruthers (1999)) instead believe 
that the contents of a subject’s mental states are determined entirely by internal states 
of the subject. The debate about content externalism is not unrelated to the debate 
about vehicle externalism; some of the considerations that weigh in favor of vehicle 
internalism also weigh in favor of content internalism, for instance. But it is 
nonetheless fully possible to be a content externalist and a vehicle internalist. (Indeed, 
content externalism is probably a significantly more popular position among 
philosophers than is vehicle externalism.) And it is only the debate about vehicle 
externalism that is really relevant to my purposes, since I am interested in 
individuating the vehicles of contents (as well as whole minds), and not in 




simply to internalism and externalism, I mean to refer to vehicle internalism nd 
vehicle externalism. 
The specific critics of internalism that I address myself to in this chapter re 
Hurley (1998), who advocates externalism in part in the context of discussing the 
split-brain phenomenon, and Clark and Chalmers (1998), who defend externalism (or 
as they call it the “extended mind” hypothesis) in a different context. Again, the 
defense mounted against these particular critics ties together a number of strands that 
have emerged over the course of this work.  
In the next section I briefly explore Hurley’s implicit and explicit claims about 
the vehicles of consciousness in split-brain subjects and in acallosal subjects in 
particular. When we think carefully about what it would mean for behavior to serve 
as a mechanism of co-consciousness, however, it seems unlikely that behavior could 
play such a role. This suggests a more general diagnosis of one major difficulty with 
vehicle externalism, which is just that (at least most) non-neural events don’ seem 
capable of serving the same fine-grained functional role that some neural events play. 
This point is illustrated in Section Three in which I discuss Clark and Chalmers. The 
major distinction between vehicle externalists and vehicle internalists—when vehicle 
internalism is properly defined—isn’t that the latter draw an arbitrary, unprinci led 
distinction between what’s inside the skull and what’s outside of it. The major 
difference lies in the way they conceive of functional roles. For the externalists, 
apparently, these roles are not very fine-grained, whereas for the internalists, they are. 




with psychofunctionalism—or at least so an examination of scientific psychology at 
this point would suggest.  
 
2 What are the Vehicles of Consciousness? 
In Chapter Three I argued that neural facts constrain the individuation of 
psychological entities. I have agreed with Lockwood that mental structure is 
isomorphic to neural structure in at least one, albeit minimal and sort of obvious way. 
And in fact I have suggested more and less explicitly throughout this dissertation that 
neuroanatomical facts provide support for the mental and conscious duality models 
for split-brain subjects. 
Yet all of these positions might seem to require, or to amount to, or to at least 
be importantly motivated by, some sort of mind-brain supervenience claim, or by a 
commitment to internalism about the vehicles of consciousness and cognition. Else, 
why think neuroanatomy in particular offers important constraints about something as 
functionally complex as co-consciousness? Why allow that apparent mental unity can 
be shown to be merely apparent in part on the basis of neural facts? Why even think 
that there is any distinction between intra-mind and inter-mind interactions that can 
be given in psychological terms—why think, that is, that there is some sort of hard 
line we can draw between events occurring within a mind and events occurring 
outside of it? The vehicle externalist raises all of these challenges.  
Hurley’s (1998) views on vehicle externalism in split-brain and in acallosal 
subjects were already described once in Chapter Three, in the context of a discussion 




not think that split-brain subjects and acallosal subjects differ significantly t the level 
of neuroanatomy. As I noted at the time, this is actually not clear; split-brain subjects 
and acallosal subjects may differ significantly at the rel vant neuroanatomical level, 
for “the same” neuroanatomical structures—structures that are the same in terms of 
their (gross) morphology, epigenetic origin, etc.—may subserve different functions in 
the two groups of subject. Their functional neuroanatomies may differ, in other 
words. (Though these functional differences may come with morphological 
differences as well, for example, a larger anterior commissure in acallosal subjects.) 
Hurley’s more interesting point, though, is that even if we assume that 
acallosal subjects and split-brain subjects really don’t differ at the neuroanatomical 
level, this does not show that they don’t differ at the level of conscious structure. 
Even if acallosal and split-brain subjects behave similarly outside of the split-brain 
experiment, and even if their behavioral integration is achieved through the same 
means, acallosal subjects might still have a single stream of consciousness whil  
split-brain subjects had two streams of consciousness.72  
Hurley’s reasons for thinking that the lack of a corpus callosum says more 
about the structure of a split-brain subject’s than an acallosal subject’s conscious ess 
were given in Chapter Three and I won’t discuss them again here. I wish instead to 
consider the more general claim that cross-cuing and access movements could by 
themselves create a single stream of consciousness across two hemispheres that 
would otherwise each possess a unique stream consciousness. Hurley states that (at 
                                                
72 Clearly, then, Hurley is not guilty of the sort of verificationism that may lurk in some of Marks’ 
(1980) and Tye’s (2003) arguments for mental and cons i us singularity in split-brain subjects; Hurley 
does not confuse behavioral evidence concerning the structure of split-brain subjects’ consciousnes 




least in acallosal subjects) “to the extent either external or internal mechanisms of 
integration function reliably, there is no reason not to regard them as part of the 
vehicles of co-conscious contents and of a unified consciousness” (1998: 191). 
Access movements and cross cuing transmit information from one hemisphere to the 
other, thereby carrying contents (information), thereby constituting mental vehicles 
of content—mental representations. 
In Chapter Four I argued that the global workspace theory of consciousness 
(Baars, 1997, 1988; Baars and Franklin, 2003; DeHaene and Naccache, 2001) can 
account for (access and phenomenal) co-consciousness. In this account, for two 
experiences to be co-conscious is just for them to be available to the same set of 
(token) global consumer systems. If we accept this account of co-consciousness, 
determining the structure of a split-brain or an acallosal or a “normal” subject’s 
consciousness is a matter of determining how many sets of global consumers the 
subject has, and which perceptual states they have access to.  
From this perspective, Hurley’s willingness to go externalist about the 
vehicles of consciousness or at least co-consciousness, amounts to accepting that 
cross-cuing and access movements can provide the global consumer systems of one 
hemisphere access to experiences in the other hemisphere. In defense of this kind of 
claim, Hurley writes that: 
in principal, an external mechanism of integration could be part 
of a causal system that supports the very unity of consciousness 
itself. There is nothing magical about this possibility: it appeals 
to a system of causes and effects in a perfectly naturalistic way, 
even though some causal paths go external. Indeed, the point 
depends on recognizing that there is no magic causal boundary 
around the brain that makes it impossible in principle for the 




can think of the subpersonal basis of a unified consciousness as 
a kind of dynamic singularity in the field of causal flows. . . 
Such a dynamic singularity is centered on the organism and 
moves around with it, but it does not have sharp boundaries. 
    (2003: 81; original emphasis.)  
 
Hurley twice asserts in this passage that vehicle externalism isn’t committed 
to the existence of magic, which is correct—but of course I don’t think vehicle 
internalism is committed to anything magic, either. The internalist could agree that 
“There is no reason i  principle. . . why the unity of consciousness could not be 
supported by causal mechanisms that pass outside of the central nervous system, so 
long as they do so in a way that meets the relevant functional criteria” (1994, fn 14: 
71; emphasis added). The vehicle internalist simply suspects that the vehicles of 
consciousness and of co-consciousness and of cognition generally in f ct do not 
spread beyond the central nervous system (at least as we know it, in the creatures we 
know of it, so far).  
That said, Hurley is also right to note that the relevant functional criteria—for 
co-consciousness, or for being a desire, or a memory, or anything else—“remain to be 
specified!” (ibid) So it is not possible to definitively rule out that cross-cuing could 
serve as a mechanism of co-consciousness. But my suspicion is that the relevant
functional criteria for the mechanisms of co-consciousness will not be ones that cross-
cuing and access movements will meet.  
Certainly they will not if the account of co-consciousness that I have adopted 
is correct. According to the theory of co-consciousness I first described in Chapter 
Four, the mechanism of co-consciousness, that which makes E1 and E2 co-conscious, 




consumer systems. For cross-cuing and access movements to serve as the mechanis  
of co-consciousness, then, they would have to make the same token experiences 
available to the same set of global consumers. But access movements—moving the 
eyes to bring a previously LVF (RH) percept into the RVF (LH), for example—seem 
capable, at best, of making experiences with the same contents available to RH and 
LH global consumers. (And even here, recall that in Chapter Four I argued that the 
functional non-identity of the two hemispheres with regard to perceptual processing 
make likely inter-hemispheric differences in conscious contents.) And cross-cuing 
doesn’t seem capable of doing even that. Cross-cuing is a means of exchanging 
information, by creating new experiences—but the new experiences are unlikely to 
have the same rich contents as the original experiences. For instance, S has two 
conscious representations of the lighter, one in his RH and one in his LH, and both 
representations may even be multimodal. (His right hemisphere has a tactile and a 
visual representation of the lighter; his left hemisphere has an auditory and a visual 
representation of the lighter, because he’s constructed a mental image of a lighter.) 
But what are the chances the contents of these representations will be identical?  
Of course, this account of co-consciousness may very well be wholly 
incorrect. Even if it is, however, I still suspect that, whatever the correct account of 
co-consciousness, cross-cuing and access movements will not be able to serve as 
mechanisms of it—even if they contribute to the contents of consciousness in split-
brain subjects, as they clearly do. 
An analogy to a non-mental instance of drawing such boundaries may be 




doesn’t the carbonation process at the ginger ale plant count as part of this person’s 
digestive process? After all, the carbonated beverage really is providing some 
important contribution to his digestive process as a whole. So why aren’t the steps 
involved in preparing the carbonated beverage a genuine part of this process? Of 
course, no one would think that they were, and there is good reason not to think so, 
which is that none of the explanatory generalizations and distinctions and so forth that 
make sense of digestion apply to whatever goes on at the ginger ale manufacturing 
plant.  
It is, again, possible that the generalizations and distinctions and so forth that 
apply to the generation of co-consciousness within a brain, and that help us make 
sense of the generation of co-consciousness within a brain, will also apply to cross-
cuing and access movements in split-brain subjects; that is, it is not possible to rule 
out this possibility. It simply seems unlikely that the developed laws of an adequate 
psychological theory that account for things such as perceptual binding in the brain, 
will somehow apply also to smiles and frowns and turns of the head. The internalist 
needn’t be committed to some sort of “magic” boundary at the boundary of the brain. 
The internalist simply believes that there is an explanatorily interesting boundary to 
be drawn at the brain. 
It may be worth noting in passing that while brains aren’t magic, they are 
somewhat impressive. (The brain is impressive in part because it isn’t magic; how 
does something whose basic constituents and activities are so simple nonetheless do 
such complex things?) Neural stuff allows for interactions and entities whose richness 




understand, and can’t yet explain. This again isn’t to say that things besides the brain 
couldn’t realize equally rich phenomenal experiences, or couldn’t realize equally 
subtle forms of integrating cognitive and perceptual information. It’s just to ay that 
the bar is set pretty high—higher, I submit, than vehicle externalists tend to set it.  
 
3 Functional Roles and Fineness of Grain 
The most important point of contention between internalists and externalists may be 
how fine-grained our functional characterizations of mental states should or will
ultimately be. Hurley is right and correct to remind us not just that what matters in 
psychological individuation is functional role, but also that the functional roles of 
conscious states and of co-consciousness have not yet been specified. I think that the 
internalist and the externalist have different beliefs about how those and other 
functional roles should and ultimately will be specified, however.  
Let me explain this by talking about vehicle externalism more generally, 
especially since I have already explained why I think that split-brain subjects have 
two sets of global consumers and two streams of consciousness. I don’t deny the 
possibility of non-neural mental states and events. Indeed I can imagine hypothetical 
scenarios in which such things are actually plausible—cases involving digital 
memory storage devices, for instance, that have not yet been invented. Admittedly in 
these scenarios, however, the “external” device I am imagining could itself be called 
an electronic or robotic or digital part of the nervous system. For, whatever it was
made out of, the “external” device would be so deeply integrated with the rest of the 




of it. So I think that the disagreement between internalists and externalists is better 
captured by talk of nervous systems, where these are defined largely functionally, 
than by talk of brains, where these are defined largely physically/anatomic lly.  
I have just suggested that the conditions for being a nervous system are at 
least largely functional. They won’t be entirely functional of course, but at leas  partly 
physical, at the very least in the minimal sense that something must have some 
physical properties in order to be a nervous system, both for standard physicalist 
reasons, and for reasons laid out in the arguments in Chapter Three that the 
constitutive conditions for mental tokens are partly neural. (I won’t work out the 
conditions for being a nervous system here, but note that one plausible condition is 
the very rapid transfer of information within a nervous system—probably much more 
rapid than communication between other parts of the organism’s body, and certainly 
faster, of course, than the organism’s behavior.) Now perhaps it is a further condition 
for something’s being a nervous system that it is made (at least in part) out of 
biological stuff. (See Rey, 1997, pp. 191-194, for a brief discussion of “anchored 
functionalism” and “physiofunctionalism.” Rey, however, is discussing the 
constitutive conditions for being a mind, and the possibility that some properties of 
biological matter are essential for consciousness and even cognition.) And even if 
some nervous systems can be non-biological, it could turn out that biological matter is 
essential for consciousness and even cognition. I simply don’t mean to rule ut now, 
a priori as it were, the possibility of non-biological nervous systems and indeed non-




But now, surely, we must revisit the claim that the constitutive conditions for 
mental tokens are partly neural. This claim, defended in Chapter Three, has played a 
significant role in my arguments for mental and conscious duality in split-brain 
subjects. Yet I have just allowed that minds and indeed nervous systems may be 
constituted by something other than (biological) neurons! But there is no 
contradiction here; to resolve the apparent contradiction one need merely understand 
neurons as, at a first pass, the physical constituents of nervous systems. In split-brain 
subjects, these constituents are neurons; in some possible creatures these constitu nts 
might be electronic switches, or something. All the arguments for the constitutive 
criteria for minds and other mental tokens being partly neural—arguments concerning 
realism and physicalism and the causal nature of the mental—still go through even if
we understand “neural” in this broader way.  
Whatever the physical basis of a creature’s nervous system, some non-
functional, physical properties of it are part of the constitutive conditions for that 
creature’s mental tokens. Or so I claim. This claim is what is at issue between the 
internalists and the externalists. Vehicle internalists believe that states of minds 
supervene on states of nervous systems; vehicle externalists believe that states of 
minds can supervene on things beyond the nervous system as well. 
Now internalists may believe that, at this point in time, nervous systems are 
constituted entirely of neurons, and many may believe that mental states supervene on 
certain parts of existing biological nervous systems in particular, i.e., on brains (or on 
cerebral cortices, or whatever). But the internalist could allow that this is just a 




vehicle internalism isn’t committed to it being metaphysically impossible for minds 
to supervene on anything but brains. This isn’t the source of disagreement between 
internalists and externalists. Rather what is at issue seems to be some sort of 
nomological possibility: internalists believe that the laws (or models or whatever) of 
psychology fail to apply to the sorts of non-neural states and events that externalists 
must claim at least some of them doapply to. Internalists deny that the particular 
cases externalists believe show that minds don’t entirely supervene on brains (or 
nervous systems) really do show this.  
Internalists deny, for instance, that the case of Otto and his notebook (Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998) constitutes an exception to mind-brain supervenience. Otto is a 
person with Alzheimer’s who functions adaptively in his daily life due to steadfast 
reliance upon a particular notebook that he carries with him at all times. In this 
notebook Otto writes down every new bit of information he learns that he thinks he 
might need in the future. When he wants to recall where the MoMA is located, or 
indeed where his own apartment is located, or perhaps even what his own name is, he 
looks it up in the notebook. Clark and Chalmers, defenders of vehicle externalism, 
believe that Otto’s notebook entries qualify as mental entities: they constitute (a  least 
some of) Otto’s dispositional, non-occurrent beliefs.  
In a moment I will explain why Otto’s notebook entries look as if they will 
not fall under the laws of a developed psychological theory. Before offering this 
objection to the Otto case in particular, however, it is worth emphasizing the crucial 
role that the Otto case plays in Clark and Chalmers’ arguments for vehicle 




introduced until halfway into their article, after several other mundane and less 
mundane scenarios meant to test the intuition that the mind does not extend beyond 
the brain. One such mundane scenario is the use of pencil and paper to calculate a 
long division problem; another is the use of the rotate function on a controller to 
determine whether a particular shape in the game Tetris will fit in a particul  slot. 
Clark and Chalmers argue that pressing the rotate button or writing numerals ar n’t 
external to some cognitive process but are rather components of cognitive processes. 
So stated, however, the argument isn’t necessarily counter-intuitive; depending on 
how broadly or how loosely we understand “cognitive process,” or what it is to 
participate in a cognitive process, all sorts of non-mental entities may participate in 
such processes. (It isn’t as if, for example, psychological accounts of people’s 
behavior and of the underlying mental causes of that behavior can never refer to non-
mental things to do explanatory work. Explanations of addiction might refer to drugs 
or to money without implying that drugs and money are mental entities.)  
Clark and Chalmers seem to understand this; they acknowledge that readers 
looking at scenarios depicting cognitive processes that involve entities located outside 
the brain, might shrug: “Perhaps some processing takes place in the environment, but 
what of mind?” (1998: 12; original emphasis) After all, “Everything. . . said so far is 
compatible with the view that truly mental states—experiences, beliefs, desires, 
emotions, and so on—are all determined by states of the brain. Perhaps what is truly 
mental is internal, after all?” (ibid) 
Otto is their attempt to “take things a step further”, by showing that mental 




when those features play the right sort of role in driving cognitive processes. If o, the 
mind extends into the world” (ibid; original emphasis). Otto is arguably the crucial 
case for Clark and Chalmers’ defense of vehicle externalism, in other words.  
And they use Otto’s case to argue that vehicle internalists draw an 
unprincipled distinction between entities and events inside the brain and those outside 
it, a distinction that the best functionalist psychological theories will prove irel vant. 
Otto’s notebook entries play the same functional role for Otto as ordinary long-term 
(semantic) memories or beliefs play for ordinary human subjects. So Clark and 
Chalmers begin by describing a comparison case, a “normal case” involving a “belief
embedded in memory” (1998: 12): Inga decides to see an exhibit at the MoMA today, 
“thinks for a moment and recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 
53rd Street and goes into the museum.” Clark and Chalmers note that surely Inga 
believed the museum was on 53rd Street before she began thinking about visiting it 
today, “before she consulted her memory. It was not previously an occurrent belief, 
but then neither are most of our beliefs. The belief was somewhere in memory, 
waiting to be accessed” (ibid; original emphasis).  
They next contrast Inga with Otto:  
When he [Otto] learns new information, he writes it down. 
When he needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, 
his notebook plays the role usually played by biological 
memory. Today, Otto hears about the exhibition at the Museum 
of Modern Art, and decides to go see it. He consults his 
notebook, which says that the museum is on 53rd Street, so he 
walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum.  





Just as Inga surely believed that the museum was on 53rd Street even before 
she consulted her memory, surely Otto believed that the museum was on 53rd Street 
even before he consulted his notebook, Clark and Chalmers reason: 
For in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the 
notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for 
Inga. The information in the notebook functions just like the 
information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it 
just happens that this information lies beyond the skin. 
    (1998: 13; emphasis added)  
 
Both Otto and Inga must “consult” their “memory”; Inga’s is just located in 
her skull, and Otto’s (in part) in his notebook. Otto’s notebook entry interacts (albeit 
not directly) with Otto’s desire to see the new MoMA exhibit, just as Inga’s memory 
interacts with Inga’s desire to see the new MoMA exhibit; Otto’s notebook entry 
allows him to find the MoMA, just as Inga’s memory allows her to find the MoMA. 
So, for Clark and Chalmers, the functional role is the same: both Otto’s notebook 
entries and Inga’s memories meet the constitutive criteria for memories. All that 
differs is the supervenience base.  
Now perhaps Otto’s notebook entries play the same role for Otto, in some 
sense, that Inga’s memories do for Inga. This seems unlikely, but I will assume that 
this is the case for the sake of argument. Nonetheless, even if Otto’s notebook plays 
the same role for him that Inga’s memories do f r her, the relevant question for the 
realist is what role long-term (semantic) memory, or dispositional belief, will play in 
a psychological theory. Will an adequate psychological theory leave unanalyzed the 
phrase, “consult one’s memory”, for instance? If so, then perhaps that theory would 




contexts in which Inga consults hers. For even our current (developing and still 
inadequate) psychological theories don’t leave “memory consultation” unanalyzed. 
There are many kinds of memory, and many (still poorly understood) means of 
accessing one’s memory, and cognitive psychologists are interested in developing 
separate accounts of all of them.  
And quite obviously Inga accesses her memory of the MoMA’s address 
wholly differently from how Otto accesses his “memory” of its address. If this isn’t 
quite obvious in the passages above, it’s because in their description of Otto and his 
notebook Clark and Chalmers (deliberately, it would seem) skate over issues any 
memory researcher would ask immediately about any putative memory system—
questions like, “How is information organized in this memory system? In what 
format is that information is encoded? How does one l cate a particular entry within 
the system?” For once we do ask those questions, it is perfectly plain that the 
theoretical characterization of Inga’s memory and Otto’s notebook will be wildly 
different. Are Otto’s notebook entries organized alphabetically by the name of the 
person or place or object he’s looking for information on? (“Andy Abrams”; “Betsy 
Johnson Boutique, San Diego”; “Car Wash, Local”.) Alphabetically by category? 
(“Markets”; “Mosques”; “Museums”.) Alphabetically by information type? 
(“Addresses”; “Fashion Tips”; “Recipes”.) Will entries be organized by the frequency 
with which he will need to consult them? (Not a bad system, but it will require some 
careful thought to get it up and running, since he won’t always know in advance just 
how often he’ll need to consult an entry, and since he won’t be able to rely on his 




be organized by the date on which the information was acquired? (Hopefully not—he 
might have to read through the entire notebook to search for any piece of information, 
assuming he can’t remember when he acquired it; parts of Inga’s memory, however, 
may be organized by date.) Do Otto’s notebook consultations reveal “state-
dependency”; does he have a tendency to find happy listings (birthdays, lists of books 
he’s enjoyed) when he’s in a good mood, and sad entries (reminders of upcoming 
dental appointments, lists of terrible movies he definitely does not want to rent and 
watch a second time by accident) when he’s feeling down?  
There is of course an alternative to accepting that Otto’s notebook entries 
themselves constitute non-occurrent beliefs; as Clarke and Chalmers acknowledge:  
The alternative is to explain Otto’s action in terms of his 
occurrent desire to go to the museum, his standing belief that 
the Museum is on the location written in the notebook, and the 
accessible fact that the notebook says the Museum is on 53rd 
Street.  
       (1998: 13) 
 
But, they insist, “this complicates the explanation unnecessarily” (ibid): 
If we must resort to explaining Otto’s action this way, then we 
must also do so for the countless other actions in which his 
notebook is involved; in each of the explanations, there will be 
an extra term involving the notebook. We submit that to 
explain things this way is to take one step too many. It is 
pointlessly complex, in the same way that it would be 
pointlessly complex to explain Inga’s actions in terms of 
beliefs about her memory. (1998: 13; original emphasis) 
 
This is question-begging, and I think somewhat confused. It is question-
begging because we shouldn’t say anything about Otto that it would be “pointlessly 




Inga’s memories. It is somewhat confused because it wouldn’t be pointlessly complex 
to explain Inga’s successful navigation to the museum in terms of her occurrent desire 
to go to the museum, her standing belief that the museum is at the location specified 
in her memory, and the accessibility of her memory that the museum is on 53rd Street 
(or, the accessible fact that her memory says the museum is on 53rd Street (!)). It 
would be outright misleading to say this. For Inga might not have any beliefs about 
her memory whatsoever; maybe she’s skeptical, on her walk down to 53rd, that her 
memory can be trusted; maybe Inga somehow doesn’t even know what memory is. 
For memories are no doubt often accessed without first forming or accessing any 
beliefs about memories. (Animals appear to access long-term memories, presumably 
without possessing beliefs about their memory systems.) Inga, in other words, need 
have no beliefs at all about her memory system in order to retrieve from memory the 
MoMA’s address. But Otto’s beliefs about his notebook are plainly essential to his 
ability to access and utilize its entries; we could easily manipulate his ability to access 
and utilize those entries by altering his beliefs about, e.g., his notebook’s current 
location.  
It is significant, I think, that, when attempting to find a plausible example of 
an external mental state, the type of mental state Clark and Chalmers come up with is 
the dispositional belief. It is interesting that it is his role that Otto’s notebook entries 
are claimed to meet, for non-occurrent beliefs are not in and of themselves causally 
efficacious. While I can’t offer much in the way of an analysis of this problem, much 
less a solution to it, I think that what the Otto case illustrates is a certain puzzle (or 




beliefs in psychology, rather than illustrating the inadequacy of vehicle internalism.73 
While Inga’s dispositional belief that the MoMA is located on 53rd Street is just as 
easily described as a semantic memory that the MoMA is so located, there is 
something puzzling about describing Otto’s notebook entries as Otto’s semantic 
memories. Otto doesn’t have semantic memories. (Though apparently his procedural 
memory is intact, since he uses his notebook so well.) That’s why he, but not Inga, 
needs the notebook. Of course, Clark and Chalmers would presumably accuse me of 
begging the question by supposing that Otto’s memories aren’t just differently 
realized than Inga’s, by supposing that Otto is cognitively impaired in the first place! 
But this seems an odd response on at least Clark’s part, for he has previously and 
persuasively argued (1997) that we citizens of the modern technological (and even th  
not-so-modern, pre-technological) age “off-load” so much information into our 
environments (books, street signs, personal digital assistants), and up-load 
information we deliberately store in our environments (road maps, telephone books, 
customer service representatives), precisely b cause there are so many limits to our 
memory, precisely to lighten our own mneumonic burdens.  
Meanwhile, to actually cause something, a belief (or any stored memory) 
would seem to have to be occurrent. How does an entry in Otto’s notebook—say, 
“The MoMA is located on West on 53rd Street between Fifth and Sixth Avenue—
become an occurrent belief? Well, to begin with, very differently from the way in 
which Inga’s non-occurrent belief becomes an occurrent belief. Among other things, 
                                                
73 While the motivation for and usefulness of referring to non-occurrent, dispositional or standing 
beliefs is clear, there are also certain problems with such explanations. I suspect that our understanding 





Otto has to read his non-occurrent belief—literally, physically read it. (Let’s hope 
that, on top of Alzheimer’s, he doesn’t also have glaucoma, or arthritis in his hands 
that makes flipping pages difficult.)  
And, of course, the representational format carrying the fact the entry 
represents (i.e., the address of the MoMA), has to undergo a radical transformation. 
His entries are linguistic entities, sentences in natural language. His semantic 
memories are stored perhaps in a language of thought. (The very handwriting his 
entries are written in may determine their causal role; if Otto were the paranoid sort, 
he might distrust any notebook entry written in boxy print as opposed to his own 
loopy cursive.) Finally, his notebook entries, though they are representations, need 
themselves to be re-represented in order to become causally efficacious, whereas t is 
is presumably not true of Inga’s dispositional belief or semantic memory representing 
the MoMA’s being located on 53rd Street. To explain why Otto crosses Central Park 
on his way downtown, Otto needs to generate a g nuine mental representation, one 
instantiated in his brain, of the MoMA’s being located on 53rd Street. In other words, 
we end up needing to go back to good old internal physical states after all.74  
4 Conclusion 
Cognitive psychology looks for stable patterns of functional interactions in 
constructing models of cognition; it seeks out causes of behavior that are relatively 
stable, in order to have as much predictive and explanatory power as possible. Clark 
                                                
74 My point in this paragraph is that identifying entries in a notebook with non-occurrent mental states 
constitutes a kind of hedge, a significant qualification of the externalist position. Bartlett (2008) points 
out that Clark and Chalmers in fact hedge in two further ways as well: they don’t say that Otto’s 
notebook contains some of his beliefs, only that his notebook entries partly constitute some of his 
beliefs. This hedges against the claim that any of Otto’s beliefs exist entirely outside his body, and also 




and Chalmers argue that if Otto’s reliance on his notebook becomes sufficiently 
steadfast—if he and his notebook form a sufficiently tightly “coupled” system—then 
he and his notebook become a mental system. So they believe that it would be 
pointlessly complex to refer to Otto’s notebook each and every time we want to 
explain his successful navigation in the world because “Otto’s book is a constant for 
Otto, in the same way that memory is a constant for Inga; to point to it in every 
belief/desire explanation would be redundant. I  an explanation, simplicity is power” 
(1998: 13-14; emphasis added). Similarly, Hurley believes that the stable causal 
system that causes and explains a subject’s unified behavior may include access 
movements and cross-cuing, even if such external mechanisms are not part of the 
stable causal system that causes and explain all subjects’ unified behavior.  
Part of my point in response to this is that cognitive psychology doesn’t just 
look for patterns of functional interaction that are stable within an individual, or a 
small group of subjects. It looks for patterns that are stable across individuals as well. 
We aren’t just looking for a theory of Otto psychology, for instance: we are looking 
for a theory of human psychology. And the counterfactuals and generalizations that 
apply to human memory will not apply to Otto’s notebook.  
Defenders of vehicle externalism might object that they alsobelieve that 
cognitive psychology looks for patterns of functional interaction that exist across 
individuals. After all, Clark and Chalmers argue that Inga and Otto both fall under the 
same patterns of functional interaction, and this is why Otto’s notebook entries are 
dispositional beliefs just as Inga’s own semantic memories are. Indeed, I take it that 




psychologists (and psychofunctionalists) should do; they even claim that “differences 
between Otto’s and Inga’s cases are all shallow differences” (1998: 16; original 
emphasis). They seem to say, that is, “Of course, on the surface, Otto’s notebook 
entries and Inga’s long-term memories are differently realized, which means there 
will be some small differences in how they are accessed so forth. But look deeply and 
you will see that central functional roles of these two different physical entities are 
the same.”  
But this is only plausible if our functional roles are very coarse-grained. For 
the psychofunctionalist, who believes that the best account of mental states will come 
from an analysis by ramsification of a developed, adequate scientific psychological 
theory, functional roles are unlikely to be so coarse-grained. For the history of 
theoretical work even in cognitive psychology so far is one of drawing ever finer 
functional distinctions: between procedural and semantic and episodic and working 
and iconic and echoic memory systems, between identification-oriented and action-
oriented visual processing streams, between acoustic and phonetic and syntactic and 
semantic and pragmatic components of language comprehension, between various 
kinds of somatosensory information—pain versus temperature versus proprioception 
versus deep touch versus light touch. The patterns of functional interaction that 
characterize the activities referred to in psychological theories are subtle, and the 
categories of entity that these give rise to may be very fine-grained—or at least more 
fine-grained than vehicle externalists appear disposed to recognize.  
Carruthers (in conversation) has pointed out that there is nothing 




in performing an act of long multiplication. Of course, the marks made could reveal
to us some psychologically interesting things, like that this four-year old iscapable of 
long multiplication, or that this accountant is suffering from some kind of cognitive 
impairment; but the pencil marks are not psychologically interesting in and of 
themselves. It is of course psychologically interesting that most calculus students can 
do long multiplication in their heads only painfully (and unreliably), while they can 
do the same problems quite easily provided that pen and paper are allowed; this tells 
us something about working memory capacity, for instance. But nonetheless all the 
entities and activities that are psychologically interesting in and of themselves are 
internal to the agent: in the percepts of the four and the seven, in the accessing of the 
memory that four times seven is twenty-eight, in the procedural memory used to 
nearly automatically write the “8” at the bottom of the rightmost column and write the 
(“carried”) “2” at the top of the second column from the right. But the actual marking 
of the shape 2 on the paper? That’s just physics.75  
There are some functional similarities, of course, between Otto’s notebook 
entries and Inga’s dispositional beliefs or stored semantic memories. And no doubt 
there are some functional similarities between inter-hemispheric information 
exchange via cross-cuing, and standard cases of intra-hemispheric information 
                                                
75 Similarly, not all of the internal events that partly constitute the entire process of solving the 
problem are psychologically interesting. It is itself an interesting question of scientific psychology and 
of philosophy of psychology at what point, internal to the agent, the in-and-of-themselves 
psychologically interesting things start happening. But it is unlikely that all of the entities and events 
necessary to moving the hand to calculate the long multiplication problem are psychologically 
interesting, even if they are interesting from some neuroscientific perspectives, e.g. from that of 
electrophysiology. A single skeletal muscle fiber, fo  instance, is usually innervated by just a single 
motor neuron; when an action potential travels down a motor neuron axon, a very large postsynaptic 
potential results, and this one synaptic potential is generally by itself sufficiently large to trigger an 
action potential in the muscle fiber. There is no need, to explain this final necessary cause of motor 





exchange. But there are also enough genuine functional differences between the 
entities and activities realized by neural stuff and the entities and activities no  so 
realized, at least at this point in time, to make the vehicle internalist’s way of drawing 
the border around the mental genuinely principled. External things can carry 
information, of course; telephone directories and road maps and Stars of David all 
represent, and calculators and PDAs process representations, and all of these things 
may play roles in cognitive processes. But these external vehicles of information 
cannot yet do the things that internal vehicles can do. This is why the borders of the 
mind can still be located within the borders of the brain. And this is why neural facts 
offer special constraints on the individuation of mental entities—constraints that facts 
about notebooks and even body parts like fingers and mouths do not offer.  
The externalists do not need to make the case that we should look deeply in 
order to construct the best accounts of the nature of beliefs and memories, 
experiences and streams of consciousness. They need to make the case that they are 
looking deeply enough. “In an explanation, simplicity is power,” Clark and Chalmers 
say—but their explanation ultimately complicates. Consider their response to the 
objection that Otto’s notebook entries, unlike Inga’s long-term memories, need to be 
perceived in order to play a role in Otto’s adaptive daily behavior: they suggest that 
“to put things this way is to beg the question,” for if their arguments are correct: 
Otto’s internal processes and his notebook constitute a single 
cognitive system. From the standpoint of this system, the flow 
of information between notebook and brain is not perceptual at 
all; it does not involve the impact of something outside the 





But again, what about the standpoint of psychological theory? Must a 
developed psychological theory now have to say that people can sometimes access 
the representational content of sentences written in natural language without engaging 
in any sort of reading (or listening)? Or will it have to say that reading is sometimes 
not at all a perceptual process? Either way we now need additional psychological 
accounts of how this is possible. This adds a burden onto our psychological theories. 
Explaining each and every one of Otto’s notebook-guided behavior by referencing his 
beliefs about his notebook does not complicate our psychological theorizing or 
theories. Denying that Otto’s notebook entries are memories may make giving 
explanation after explanation of Otto’s individual behaviors slightly more tedious. 
But the account of memory thus permitted is both simpler and deeper. In fact to the 
extent that it is simpler, the power of its simplicity arguably comes in part from its 






The split-brain studies are fascinating from numerous perspectives: they rais  
questions about our own self-knowledge, about the epistemic limits of 
phenomenology and introspection, about the sources of our agency and our sense of 
free will, about the unity of our mental lives, about personhood, and about the very 
nature of the human self. Yet this dissertation has been focused much more narrowly 
on another, humbler, question: what is the proper way to individuate mental tokens in 
split-brain subjects?  
I have argued that split-brain subjects have two minds—and, most likely, two 
streams of consciousness—albeit minds bearing an unusually intimate relationship 
with each other, because they belong to one subject. On the assumption that each 
hemisphere of a split-brain subject (perhaps in conjunction with non-cortical 
structures) constitutes a competent mind, and given the fact that that the two 
hemispheres are hooked up to the same body, the integrated-seeming and adaptive 
nature of split-brain subjects’ behavior is not surprising. Two systems can produce 
integrated behavior without their own mental processes being integrated with each 
other.  
Although the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject interact with each other 
in various ways, these interactions occur at least in most cases in part via the 
mediation of behavioral and other non-mental events, rather than via the kinds of 
interactions that seem to characterize the inner workings of a mind. The results of the 




subject are clearly not co-conscious with each other, at least with respect to most of 
their conscious states. Certain conscious information does appear to transfer from one 
hemisphere to the other—affective information for instance—but that it does transfer 
still does not show that the hemispheres share any mental tokens, or even, again, that 
the transfer occurs via a wholly mental process. 
As I have acknowledged throughout, however, these conclusions, regarding 
the structure of consciousness and cognition in split-brain subjects, are necessarily 
tentative. There is far too much we still do not understand about minds, brains, and 
consciousness, to have real confidence in our conclusions about this hard case.  
Perhaps more important than these specific conclusions, however, is the 
approach I have tried to take in reaching them. While the split-brain phenomenon is 
probably a source of insight for many non-scientific inquiries and in many important 
domains, I have tried to show that how many minds plit-brain subjects have—and 
how many streams of consciousness they have, and so forth—are questions that may 
well ultimately be answerable from a theoretical (i.e. theoretical-empirical) 
perspective. For even the concept of a mind appears to do some important, albeit 
perhaps implicit, work in functional, psychological explanation. 
As a psychofunctionalist I believe that the constitutive conditions for mental 
phenomena will come from the ramsification of a developed psychological theory. 
Functionalism in its various forms is most fundamentally a theory of mental ki dsor 
types. It offers a general strategy for discovering the constitutive conditions for 
various types of mental states—a strategy for determining what it is to be a lief 




properties at all. But in this work I assume that the constitutive conditions for being a 
mental token—one belief rather than another, one mind rather than two minds—will 
also come from a developed psychological theory. And although such a theory is 
something that we again do not yet possess, this work at least begins to explore some 
of the constraints that a developed psychological theory is likely to impose on the 
individuation of mental entities.  
In particular I have argued throughout that neural facts constrain the 
individuation of mental entities. As I first acknowledged in Chapter Two, it is 
admittedly difficult to say at this point at what level of abstraction away from the 
physical a developed psychological theory, and thus a psychofunctionalist approach 
to mental phenomena, will be pitched. But psychology is clearly interested in giving a 
causal story of the mind. And psychofunctionalists who are realists, who believe that 
there really are things occupying the functional roles implicitly defined by a 
psychological theory, are similarly committed to the existence of causally efficacious 
mental tokens, and similarly committed to the causal reality of these tokens. 
Therefore their functional roles are genuine causal roles. But causal role isn’t just 
necessary to type-identifying mental phenomena: it’s necessary to token-identifying 
such phenomena, to individuating them, as well. The causal properties of a neural 
token constrain the mental tokens with which we can identify it.  
Not all of a neural token’s causal or physical properties need matter to its 
token identity, just as they needn’t all matter to its type identity. But some of th m do. 
One thing that is relevant to the type identity of a mental token is the kind of causal 




the token identity of a mental token is the kind of causal relations it bears to other 
particular instantiations of mental types. Thus the causal distance between multiple 
neural events has implications for their individuation as mental tokens. Indeed I have 
tried to provide some reason to think that that there is a psychologically important 
difference between the causal processes that occur within each hemisphere of a split-
brain subject and the ways in which the hemispheres interact with each other. If these 
conclusions are correct, then the hemispheres may communicate, and even cooperate, 
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